A Critical Analysis of the RAF Air Superiority Campaign in India, Burma and Malaya in 1941-45 (1 Viewer)

[Kevin J]

The Spitfire needs about 80IG to fly 452 miles at Max weak mixture, so add a 20IG reserve and there's 100IG for the return flight. It will burn about 100IG to the target zone, leaving 85IG for combat, if we have 200IG of internal fuel and a 90IG DT. Of course there's no reason to fly at MWM over water or over the UK, so about 1/3 of the mission can be flown at ME speed:
View attachment 549370
with greatly reduced fuel consumption, so an allowance of 200IG for transit and 85IG for combat is more than sufficient.

There in no reason that Spitfire losses from fuel exhaustion would be excessive. The main difference, compared to a Mustang is that the Spitfire will have to spend less time at it's assigned leg of the escort mission, before breaking off to return to base. Spitfires and P47s were flying escort for the Schweinfurt raids, and did not suffer excessive losses from fuel exhaustion because they RTB when their fuel state required it but, of course, that meant that they couldn't cover the entire bombing mission. LR Spitfires would have to provide escort in stages by overtaking the bombers along their route, rather than flying continuous close escort.

You don't want to be carrying the 90 IG slipper tank because even an Me 110 will make mincemeat out of you if it bounces you while you fly in a straight line only making gentle manoeuvres, that's why I suggested the P-40 tank. Longest Spitfire raids are to La Palice, 370 miles, Mk VII with slipper tanks mostly over water, East Timor 445 miles, with Mk VIII, totally over water. I do agree though that the idea is marginally plausible but you don't want to be lumbered with that big slipper tank over hostile territory.

Even the post war Mk XVIII with its strengthened wing only carried 176 internal.

 

[PAT303]

The biggest problem I see trying to perform LR escort missions in 41/42 early 43 is dealing with JG 2 and JG 26 who were at their height in fighting power and confidence. Trying to fly LR missions with a premium fighter group sitting just across the channel in a heavily fuel loaded fighter is going to be folly regardless if it's a Spit or P51. If the opposing fighter group used tactics such as Parks peeling off the escorts of BoB fame range is pointless because you'll never use it, the last thing you will see will be a ground directed FW190 if you are below 20,000ft, a Me109F if above.

 

[RCAFson]

Spitfire IX handling with 160IG internal fuel:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/Spitfire_IX_ML-186_Handling.pdf

You don't want to be carrying the 90 IG slipper tank because even an Me 110 will make mincemeat out of you if it bounces you while you fly in a straight line only making gentle manoeuvres, that's why I suggested the P-40 tank. Longest Spitfire raids are to La Palice, 370 miles, Mk VII with slipper tanks mostly over water, East Timor 445 miles, with Mk VIII, totally over water. I do agree though that the idea is marginally plausible but you don't want to be lumbered with that big slipper tank over hostile territory.

Even the post war Mk XVIII with its strengthened wing only carried 176 internal.

Of course if they get intercepted they'll have to release their DTs (Ditto for the Mustang), but the Luftwaffe didn't have fighters everywhere, and if were expending fighter sorties to engage Spitfires, then they weren't attacking bombers. Of course there was alternatives to the 90IG slipper, such as the twin 45IG Hurricane tanks used by Malta Spitfires in mid 1942 or the P-40 tanks.

We know that Mk IXs were being fitted with ~200IG of internal fuel by 1945 (96+75+27).

 

[RCAFson]

The biggest problem I see trying to perform LR escort missions in 41/42 early 43 is dealing with JG 2 and JG 26 who were at their height in fighting power and confidence. Trying to fly LR missions with a premium fighter group sitting just across the channel in a heavily fuel loaded fighter is going to be folly regardless if it's a Spit or P51. If the opposing fighter group used tactics such as Parks peeling off the escorts of BoB fame range is pointless because you'll never use it, the last thing you will see will be a ground directed FW190 if you are below 20,000ft, a Me109F if above.

The need for a LR escort doesn't really exist until the 8th AF gets into high gear in 1943. However, its better to lose single seat fighters than 4 engine bombers.

 

[Kevin J]

The need for a LR escort doesn't really exist until the 8th AF gets into high gear in 1943. However, its better to lose single seat fighters than 4 engine bombers.

Can an average of 60 Spitfires at a time defend 240 - 300 bombers. It sounds doubtful. All you need is Me 110's to bounce the Spitfires with their 90 IG tanks still on them over the North Sea and they're mincemeat.

 

[Shortround6]

Stating that a Spitfire with increased internal and external fuel will have an increased combat radius, is simply stating a fact and in no way implies that it would equal a Mustang as a LR escort fighter.

Not in dispute.

Where to begin... It almost sounds as though you're arguing that the Spitfire was incapable of engaging in any combat because it didn't have enough fuel...yet we all know that this isn't true.

Not what I am arguing at all. what we are arguing about is how far from bases the Spitfire could engage in combat.

A Spitfire VIII with a 75IG fuselage tank, 124IG main tanks and 45IG slipper tank carried 245IG of (effectively) internal fuel

in my mind internal fuel only counts if you have it for the return trip, this may be in stark contrast to some other people.

Maybe I am simple minded but what is the difference between stuffing 71 gallons of fuel in the rear fuselage that has to burned/used to make the plane safe to fly before you reach the area where enemy fighters may be encountered (let alone the bombers target) and simply using drop tank/s that hold 71 gallons more than the drop tanks used with the rear fuselage tanks? You can't fly home on fuel you used to take-off and climb to operational hight with no matter what tank it was in.

Question on the 45 gallon slipper tank. Was it self-sealing or not?

Given enough time (projected started early) I don't see the plumbing of the wings for wing drop tanks as an insurmountable problem. The bigger problem is using wing leading edge tanks and drop tanks on wings not designed to hold the weight. WHich is part solved by limiting maneuvers with the drop tanks, which just about everybody did.
Likewise I don't worry too much about how difficult it was to jettison the slipper tanks as I assume that given enough interest either the problem would have been sorted out or alternative tank/s designed. Using twin 44 gallon Hurricane tanks sounds like too much of a bodge to get very far, you want the simplest fuel system possible to cut down on accidents caused by either pilot error (wrong tank selected) or leaky fittings, sucking air into the system is as bad as leaking fuel.

I don't know how difficult it was to put wing tanks in the MK IX. If any rib noses had to be taken out? or how hard it was to run fuel lines in an existing wing. the rear fuselage tank set up may have been seen as an easy way to modify existing aircraft.

The Main problems as I see it for the escort Spit is properly engineering the wing for the increased loads (and that includes loads imposed by taking off on less than perfect airfields) and getting the plane to fly properly (solve a lot of the problems by just sticking 33-37 of fuel behind the pilot and forgetting the remainder of the 71 gallons).
If doesn't give the impressive number on paper though

 

[Shortround6]

Can an average of 60 Spitfires at a time defend 240 - 300 bombers. It sounds doubtful. All you need is Me 110's to bounce the Spitfires with their 90 IG tanks still on them over the North Sea and they're mincemeat.

If the Spits spot the 110s at several miles it might be the 110s that are mincemeat.

 

[Kevin J]

If the Spits spot the 110s at several miles it might be the 110s that are mincemeat.

I believe there was an incident off the coast of The Hague in 1941/42 where a Spitfire squadron with those tanks attached got annihilated by Me 110's.

 

[michael rauls]

Not in dispute.



Not what I am arguing at all. what we are arguing about is how far from bases the Spitfire could engage in combat.



in my mind internal fuel only counts if you have it for the return trip, this may be in stark contrast to some other people.

Maybe I am simple minded but what is the difference between stuffing 71 gallons of fuel in the rear fuselage that has to burned/used to make the plane safe to fly before you reach the area where enemy fighters may be encountered (let alone the bombers target) and simply using drop tank/s that hold 71 gallons more than the drop tanks used with the rear fuselage tanks? You can't fly home on fuel you used to take-off and climb to operational hight with no matter what tank it was in.

Question on the 45 gallon slipper tank. Was it self-sealing or not?

Given enough time (projected started early) I don't see the plumbing of the wings for wing drop tanks as an insurmountable problem. The bigger problem is using wing leading edge tanks and drop tanks on wings not designed to hold the weight. WHich is part solved by limiting maneuvers with the drop tanks, which just about everybody did.
Likewise I don't worry too much about how difficult it was to jettison the slipper tanks as I assume that given enough interest either the problem would have been sorted out or alternative tank/s designed. Using twin 44 gallon Hurricane tanks sounds like too much of a bodge to get very far, you want the simplest fuel system possible to cut down on accidents caused by either pilot error (wrong tank selected) or leaky fittings, sucking air into the system is as bad as leaking fuel.

I don't know how difficult it was to put wing tanks in the MK IX. If any rib noses had to be taken out? or how hard it was to run fuel lines in an existing wing. the rear fuselage tank set up may have been seen as an easy way to modify existing aircraft.

The Main problems as I see it for the escort Spit is properly engineering the wing for the increased loads (and that includes loads imposed by taking off on less than perfect airfields) and getting the plane to fly properly (solve a lot of the problems by just sticking 33-37 of fuel behind the pilot and forgetting the remainder of the 71 gallons).
If doesn't give the impressive number on paper though

Lets see if ive got this right( and it seems logical, to me anyway) the range of an escort fighter would be limited to the miles it could fly on internal fuel only from the point at which it was likely to encounter enemy fighter oposition to the target and then home again. Because you've got to drop your tanks at that point.
Could this, and perhaps it was, be mitigated by aditional waves of fighters scootin along at a pretty high cruise speed ( difficult to intercept therefore not likely to have to be forced to drop there tanks)to rondevue with the bombers farther out.

 

[Schweik]

I have noted before that American sources don't always agree on number of victories, in the posted link the P-38 also has 1928 victories combined in the ETO/ MTO. You are of cause right on the sortie/ loss rate being higher for the P-38; but the P-38 also has a higher ratio of victories to sorties: 67 sorties per victory vs. 113 for the P-40, using the highest numbers.

I agree, this is interesting - perhaps it is because the P-38s didn't really have an escape maneuver against Axis fighters (until their dive flaps got added on and even then I'm not sure) so until then they basically had to fight to the death whenever they got attacked.

P-40 units also flew a lot of fighter-bomber missions, probably about 2/3 to 3/4 of their missions overall, so didn't always engage in air to air on every sortie. This happened to the P-38s toward the end of the war (I think after Mustangs arrived in early to mid 1944 most of the ETO units were shifted over to a ground attack role) but their MTO use was mostly as long range escort fighters.

Success though is going to hinge on the combination of victories per sortie and losses per sortie. I know if I was a pilot which one of those two factors would matter more to me! I think this is part of why so many P-40 pilots liked their plane even when commanders did not.

 

[Schweik]

I guess you didn't read the linked article:

I had read it long before you posted it sir. I just didn't reach the same conclusions you did. To me the article was saying 'maybe' with a lot of strong caveats. It's the same thing we are doing here, exploring an idea, it's not some scientific proof that it actually was plausible. I remember a lot about bent wings and drop tanks bouncing off the plane and all kinds of other problems.

A 30 or 45IG combat slipper tank is retained during combat for a effective 180/195 IG of internal fuel after the wing torpedo tanks are released prior to combat. This was completely achievable with existing mods to Spitfires except for the wing mounted DTs and that could have been done with little effort.

This is where my eyebrows raise the highest. As Shortround6 asked you, are those slipper tanks self-sealing? Because if not, you are essentially taking an A6M2 into combat with Bf 109G and Fw 190s..

Similarly, what is the drag penalty for carrying that tank? How much does it affect top speed? Cruise speed? acceleration? Climbg? High G turns? Power dives (escape!)

It wasn't done because there wasn't any specific customer for such a mod, and there wasn't sufficient production capacity to provide the USAAF with sufficient Spitfires for them to mod them. However, if the Spitfire was license built in North America, then the USAAF would probably have gone ahead with it, especially if the Mustang was never ordered by the BPC.

I don't agree, it wasn't done because it wasn't feasible. The problem with the Spit was a big part of what made it great- that thin, high efficiency, low drag wing. Couldn't fit both gas and guns in it. Those 'bag' tanks in the leading edges of the wings... were those self-sealing?

You are talking about a scenario that sounds like getting into a knife fight while carrying a stack of dishes in one hand and a bucket of water in the other.

 

[Schweik]

The need for a LR escort doesn't really exist until the 8th AF gets into high gear in 1943. However, its better to lose single seat fighters than 4 engine bombers.

The need for a long range escort existed from the time of the first long range RAF bombing missions in 1940. They didn't bomb at night because they loved looking at the stars, bombing at night made already abyssmally low bombing accuracy drop to sub-marginal levels. They were lucky if they even hit the right city and quite often they didn't.

If the RAF had a daytime escort fighter available in 1941 or 1942, and one that could take on Fw 190s and Bf 109F and G, I am pretty sure they would have used it.

 

[Schweik]

I believe there was an incident off the coast of The Hague in 1941/42 where a Spitfire squadron with those tanks attached got annihilated by Me 110's.

Would not surprise me

 

[Kevin J]

I had read it long before you posted it sir. I just didn't reach the same conclusions you did. To me the article was saying 'maybe' with a lot of strong caveats. It's the same thing we are doing here, exploring an idea, it's not some scientific proof that it actually was plausible. I remember a lot about bent wings and drop tanks bouncing off the plane and all kinds of other problems.



This is where my eyebrows raise the highest. As Shortround6 asked you, are those slipper tanks self-sealing? Because if not, you are essentially taking an A6M2 into combat with Bf 109G and Fw 190s..

Similarly, what is the drag penalty for carrying that tank? How much does it affect top speed? Cruise speed? acceleration? Climbg? High G turns? Power dives (escape!)



I don't agree, it wasn't done because it wasn't feasible. The problem with the Spit was a big part of what made it great- that thin, high efficiency, low drag wing. Couldn't fit both gas and guns in it. Those 'bag' tanks in the leading edges of the wings... were those self-sealing?

You are talking about a scenario that sounds like getting into a knife fight while carrying a stack of dishes in one hand and a bucket of water in the other.

Yes, and that 452.90 miles from Debden to Schweinfurt which is marginally feasible is also the direct air distance taking you over Antwerp, Aachen, Dusseldorf, Bonn and Koblenz, so over concentrated AAA and the fighters defending these cities. You're gonna have to detour big time to avoid all this. I've changed my mind it's definitely not feasible.

 

[Schweik]

The Spit was turned from a short range interceptor to a medium range fighter with the Spit VIII and subsequent marks. It just wasn't possible to really make it into a truly long range fighter. Same thing basically happened to the P-40 in the Pacific, that is what Robert DeHaven said anyway, it was just left behind in 1944 due to range limitations and gave way to the P-38.

I was reading up on the P-47N, that was quite a long ranged beast but it came too late to matter. The P-51 was really quite useful despite it's limitations, there is no denying that.

I'm a little confused about some of the statements on the CBI to the effect that the Brits were isolated there. The USAAF (including 23rd, 51st and 80th FG) was operating there at the same time, weren't they working together closely? I have never quite understood that.

Wikipedia says:

"After consultation among the Allied governments, Air Command South-East Asia was formed in November 1943 to control all Allied air forces in the theater, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse as Commander-in-Chief.[11] Under Peirse's deputy, USAAF Major General George E. Stratemeyer, Eastern Air Command (EAC) was organized in 1943 to control Allied air operations in Burma, with headquarters in Calcutta.[12] Unlike the strained relations and confusion encountered in coordinating Allied ground force commands, air force operations in the CBI proceeded relatively smoothly.

Relations improved even further after new U.S. military aid began arriving, together with capable USAAF officers such as Brigadier General William D. Old of CGI Troop Carrier Command, and Colonels Philip Cochran and John R. Alison of the 1st Air Commando Group.[13] Within Eastern Air Command, Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin commanded the Third Tactical Air Force, originally formed to provide close air support to the Fourteenth Army. Baldwin was later succeeded by Air Marshal Sir Alec Coryton. U.S. Brigadier-General Howard C. Davidson and later Air Commodore F. J. W. Mellersh commanded the Strategic Air Force. In the new command, various units of the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Tenth Air Force worked side-by-side. In the autumn of 1943 SEAAC had 48 RAF and 17 USAAF squadrons; by the following May, the figures had risen to 64 and 28, respectively.[12] "

It sounds from all that as if RAF and US 10th & 14th Air Force etc. should have been working together fairly efficiently. I'm surprised RAF couldn't get some replacements for their Hurricanes. I think even Martlets would have been more useful for that Theater. Again from the Wiki, it sounds like by summer of 1944 (which is pretty late) Anglo-American forces had come to dominate the air battle:

"After a period of reshuffling, Eastern Air Command's air operations began to show results. In August 1944, Admiral Mountbatten noted in a press conference that EAC fighter missions had practically swept the Japanese air force from Burmese skies. Between the formation of SEAAC in November 1943, and the middle of August 1944, American and British forces operating in Burma destroyed or damaged more than 700 Japanese aircraft with a further 100 aircraft probably destroyed.[15] This achievement considerably reduced dangers to Air Transport Command cargo planes flying in support of the Hump airlift operation. By May 1944, EAC resupply missions in support of the Allied ground offensive had carried 70,000 tons of supplies and transported a total of 93,000 men, including 25,500 casualties evacuated from the battle areas. These figures did not include tonnage flown in the Hump airlift missions to China.[15] "

That sounds like an extremely high number of ground-troop casualties ... feel sorry for anyone stationed in that Theater it must have been really tough.

 

[Schweik]

70,000 tons really doesn't sound like much though, how much does a C-47 or C-46 carry, 3 or 4 tons? So what is that 15,000 sorties? Presumably most of the supplies went down the Burma road...?

 

[Kevin J]

The Spit was turned from a short range interceptor to a medium range fighter with the Spit VIII and subsequent marks. It just wasn't possible to really make it into a truly long range fighter. Same thing basically happened to the P-40 in the Pacific, that is what Robert DeHaven said anyway, it was just left behind in 1944 due to range limitations and gave way to the P-38.

I was reading up on the P-47N, that was quite a long ranged beast but it came too late to matter. The P-51 was really quite useful despite it's limitations, there is no denying that.

I'm a little confused about some of the statements on the CBI to the effect that the Brits were isolated there. The USAAF (including 23rd, 51st and 80th FG) was operating there at the same time, weren't they working together closely? I have never quite understood that.

Wikipedia says:

"After consultation among the Allied governments, Air Command South-East Asia was formed in November 1943 to control all Allied air forces in the theater, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse as Commander-in-Chief.[11] Under Peirse's deputy, USAAF Major General George E. Stratemeyer, Eastern Air Command (EAC) was organized in 1943 to control Allied air operations in Burma, with headquarters in Calcutta.[12] Unlike the strained relations and confusion encountered in coordinating Allied ground force commands, air force operations in the CBI proceeded relatively smoothly.

Relations improved even further after new U.S. military aid began arriving, together with capable USAAF officers such as Brigadier General William D. Old of CGI Troop Carrier Command, and Colonels Philip Cochran and John R. Alison of the 1st Air Commando Group.[13] Within Eastern Air Command, Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin commanded the Third Tactical Air Force, originally formed to provide close air support to the Fourteenth Army. Baldwin was later succeeded by Air Marshal Sir Alec Coryton. U.S. Brigadier-General Howard C. Davidson and later Air Commodore F. J. W. Mellersh commanded the Strategic Air Force. In the new command, various units of the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Tenth Air Force worked side-by-side. In the autumn of 1943 SEAAC had 48 RAF and 17 USAAF squadrons; by the following May, the figures had risen to 64 and 28, respectively.[12] "

It sounds from all that as if RAF and US 10th & 14th Air Force etc. should have been working together fairly efficiently. I'm surprised RAF couldn't get some replacements for their Hurricanes. I think even Martlets would have been more useful for that Theater. Again from the Wiki, it sounds like by summer of 1944 (which is pretty late) Anglo-American forces had come to dominate the air battle:

"After a period of reshuffling, Eastern Air Command's air operations began to show results. In August 1944, Admiral Mountbatten noted in a press conference that EAC fighter missions had practically swept the Japanese air force from Burmese skies. Between the formation of SEAAC in November 1943, and the middle of August 1944, American and British forces operating in Burma destroyed or damaged more than 700 Japanese aircraft with a further 100 aircraft probably destroyed.[15] This achievement considerably reduced dangers to Air Transport Command cargo planes flying in support of the Hump airlift operation. By May 1944, EAC resupply missions in support of the Allied ground offensive had carried 70,000 tons of supplies and transported a total of 93,000 men, including 25,500 casualties evacuated from the battle areas. These figures did not include tonnage flown in the Hump airlift missions to China.[15] "

That sounds like an extremely high number of ground-troop casualties ... feel sorry for anyone stationed in that Theater it must have been really tough.

In the case of Vietnam and Indonesia, the Brits used Japanese troops for a while to maintain order before French and Dutch troops arrived. The liberation of Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong was a purely British affair, likewise Borneo and Timor liberated by the Australians and New Zealanders. So no Americans.

N.B. The Martlet was a low altitude fighter, unlike the American Wildcat and British Hurricane.

 

[Schweik]

In the case of Vietnam and Indonesia, the Brits used Japanese troops for a while to maintain order before French and Dutch troops arrived.

Wow that's dark! No wonder all the revolutions so soon after the war.... I know Malaya went into a revolt very soon after right?

N.B. The Martlet was a low altitude fighter, unlike the American Wildcat and British Hurricane.

Didn't know that! Different engine variant I guess? RN / Fleet Air Arm seemed to have a preference for low altitude engines for so many of their planes which I never did grasp. They must have had the strangest procurement policies of the war and that is saying something.

Well, FM-2s then the US had plenty of those I think.

 

[Schweik]

Apparently Royal Navy had FM-2s as Wildcat Mk VI

 

[Kevin J]

Apparently Royal Navy had FM-2s as Wildcat Mk VI

We had both FM-1's and -2's, but by then the Spitfire had arrived in India. The F4F-4 with its two stage supercharger was a purely American affair.