A 'different' strategy for the early SE Asian campaign?

renrich said:

When you are talking about post December 7 action by the US you have to take into account that FDR had promised and agreed with Churchill that the war against Germany would take precedence over the Japan war. Stalin played a role in these priorities also. Of necessity any offensive actions against Japan would drain strength needed for the defeat of Germany. In retrospect the allies accomplishments in 1942 against Japan, at Coral Sea, Midway, Buna-Port Moresby, Guadalcanal, not to mention Torch were, IMO, amazing.

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Amazing indeed, when one considers the almost standing start commencement of efforts to establish a defensible position while looking for an early opportunity to take the offensive. I think it was Toland (I believe in Rising sun or Not in shame) who corectly I think characterized the literally overnight change in the war from the fall of Corrigidor on May 6th, 1942 and the Coral Sea Battle (on May 7-8, 1942) as one of the most incredible turn abouts in history. I have to agree.

The turn around however was as much about Japanese over confidence (and over hasty and rash responses to the Doolittle raids), and sheer dumb luck for the allies as it was about allied capabilities. despite the game being given away by the breaking of the japanese codes at Coral Sea and Midway Midway, the japanese could easily have still won these battles. If they had not been so overconfident, they would not have have tried to take Port Moresby with just two fleet carriers, and would not have diluted their carrier strength yo take largely irrelevant targets in the far north.

Ive played this critical period out in several simulations, both professional training and for entertainment. By far the best strategy for the Japanese is to not launch Operation Mo in early May. A better strategy would be to wait about three weeks, replenishing the Japanese CAGs with 44 additional pilots in that time. Then mount an overwhelming series of attacks, firstly against Midway. As soon as that island is taken, the LR flying boats are moved in, and a second reaction TF built around Junyo Hiyo, Ryujo Zuiho and Shoho are concentrated in the Marshalls as a counter to any USN outflanking moves across central Pacific. At the same time the six big carriers almost immediately descend onto Moresby with Horris divisional sized marine amphibious force.

With forces concentrated, the allied players usually dont commit their fleet at all to these operations, they hold back awaiting the arrival of Wasp and the Marine Division. However, for the second operational phase of this Japanese offensive, they have to move. The Japanese, after securing their flanks and forming a reserve TG will usually make a move againt either Fiji or Noumea...either way the USN cannot allow these bases to fall, they are critical to their position. There is a complication....sometime after July the Japanese change their naval ciphers (they were due to do so in late June) which effectively robs the USN of its SIGINT advcantage from July August. Penultimate battle, with sixe Japanese veteran carriers versus 5 larger allied carriers would be likely to occur August/September. if the japanese are smart they will attack where those USN carriers are not concentrated....a penultimate battle is actually something they dont want against a concentrated US carrier group. Dodging the USN, taking bases where they are not, strangles them (the US) and mighht force them to spplit their forces. Forcing them to split, causes them to be vulnerable....

It all could have gone so horribly wrong for the US. This is what makes Coral Sea and Midway all the more amazing

Was hoping your war gaming experience would include such scenarios. You've painted a fairly heart-stopping set of possibilities.

The only strategy I can see that might preserve the USN combatant and island-based air assets is for the USN to operate its carriers under the unbrella of land-based air. Of course that assumes that land based air can protect the naval assets. Based upon the Midway Battle that would appear to be a vain expectation. However, on reading about the early PI campaign it looks to me that the best antishipping aircraft the US Possessd and would have done well to reinforce its island bases with was the P-40E. It may not have done well intercepting japanese bombers or parrying their escorts, but with 6 x .50's, a 500 pound bomb load and jury rig swing, it was apparently a helluvan "antishipping bomber." If the US persisted in using B-17s in an antishipping role, I'd expect that particular strategy to fail.

The IJN planned the Midway operation well before the ill advised and IMO and others more professional than me, Doolittle Raid, and were going to execute it without the Japanese Army if necessary. The Army decided to cooperate after the Raid but obviously the Army had no impact on outcome of the battle.

The Allies did have some lucky breaks in 1942 in the PTO but the bravery, dedication to duty, self sacrifise and pure guts of the flyers and sailors of the USN at Coral Sea, Midway and The Solomons, the Australian soldiers and sailors at Buna and the Solomons and the US Marine pilots at Midway and in the Solomons as well as the Marine infantry in the Solomons all played a major role in the victories in that year. Those people often fought aginst long odds with inferior equipment against a well trained and fanatically brave foe. They persevered and finally prevailed. The breaking of the Japanese code played a major role ,obviously, and the Japanese were over confident but we all owe those young men a great debt. No one has ever showed more bravery than those crew men of the three VT squadrons at Midway. By then they knew how deadly the Zeke could be. They knew they had little or no fighter protection and they knew their torpedos were less than effective and yet they made their runs anyway.

The only strategy I can see that might preserve the USN combatant and island-based air assets is for the USN to operate its carriers under the unbrella of land-based air. Of course that assumes that land based air can protect the naval assets.

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There are a few simulations that deal with this subject. my favourite is a monster called "War In the Pacific" by the old SPI company. Its a monster, 4500 playing pieces, nine A2 map sections, individual ships down to destroyer size. The Japanese side does indeed offer some interesting possibilities, but even under the most optimistic circumstances ground will need to be yielded and there is simply no way to defeat the US outright. even under the most favourable of circumstances. Even if the japanese manage to attain all those territotial objectives, and pull of a massive one sided defeat of the USN in 1942, about all they gain is a 1 year respite from the inevitable allied counterattack.

For this reason the full campaign (ie to the end of 1945) is simply a game against time for the allies. They must achieve the necessary circumstances needed to force the unconditional surender of Japan. Japan, must of course avoid that situation. this very simple assumption for the game creates a very real set of circumstances that tends to create a historical or at least historically plausible series of battles in 1942-3. these are the times that the game is lost or won.....the US simply cannot allow the Japanese to dig in on an extended frontier, and must avoid one sided naval defeats. The Japanese for their part cannot afford to lose too many of their precious carriers early, but must maintain the pressure on the US regadless.

I found the best option as the Japanese was to hit the allies where their carriers werent. I would look for opportunities to corner isloated part of the USN and defeat it in detail. But the limiting factor for the japanese was thjeir limited shpping capacities. Overly ambitios plans, like invading Australia or the HI are simply not feasible. even the capture of Fiji is an operation that tends to stretch the japanese to the very limit. This limited amount of shipping is, incidentally the safest means of allied counterattack...destroy enough Japanese shipping and their front will implode by its own. Cautious transfer fom strict ddefence to limited offence is a good odea. When that happens, the allied player needs to choose a situation that forces the Japanese into an attritional battle, a Guadacanal if you like. There are ample opportunities to do that anywhere in the South Pacific. The battlefield that the allies select needs to be able to be supported from another friendly base and needs to be able to support an airfield. Usually, if the japanese have isolated Australi by taking Noumea and Fiji, the best counterattack point is from either new Zealand in the far south, or from Johnston or the Ellice islands in the Central Pacific. the central Pacific option is good because it is closer to Pearl, and decreases the strain on US shipping.

To me a discussion of strategy in the PTO in 1942 or later by us today differs hugely by what actually happened in the war. Have a new book entitled "The Admirals" which details the careers of Halsey, Nimitz, King and Leahy. The strategy of the Allies in the PTO was heavily influenced by these individuals, especially King and Nimitz, not to mention MacArthur, FDR and Churchill. The Japanese, of course had a similar slate of players with Yamamoto being the 1000 pound gorilla. Every decision made concerning the strategy had a politiclal component as well as the military one. The political component became more prevelant as the war wore on. In other words what would seem logical to a single commander in a hypothetical situation probably would not seem logical to a number of other commanders and the final decision would usually reflect a shaky consensus unless FDR or Yamamoto put their foot down. Almost every POV held by MacArthur had a political component and the actual choice of commanders in the field was often made based on political considerations. Examples were MacArthur and Halsey.

An interesting point about a momentous strategy decision was the dropping of the A bombs. The record seems to indicate that none of the four admirals featured in the book were in favor of the use of the bomb!

Now I've got to put another book on my list... I wonder what would happen to the nation's publishers and paper industry if you stopped buying? Or have you become an agent of the digital universe now?

To me a discussion of strategy in the PTO in 1942 or later by us today differs hugely by what actually happened in the war.

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Of course, I do not disagree with this statement in any way. however, the system used in the simulations I have reported are based on the german "Kriegspiel" systems....literally translates to "war game". Before WWI the Germans developed this system into a highly accurate tool on which to assess their war plans. The system continued through to the destruction of the German General Staff in 1945. It was used to simulate most of the famous German attacks and battles, including the Schlieffen plan Case White, Case Yellow and Case Blue. They incidentally accurately predicted what would happen in those battles, though for Case blue Hitlers political decision to go after Stalingrad was not anticipated.

The USN revived the system in the '60s to develop its SeaTag gaming system to test tactical warfare theories. A hint of just how much effort was put into these simulation systems can be found in the following link. SEATAG Extension.

The RAN adapted the SeaTag system to a computer simulation. This is no arcade style sim....the computer that runs the algorithms behind the sim only just fits into a nine storey building (or at least that was the situation back in 1982). Every conceivable variable, including the political variables you mention are incorporated into these sims and allowed for. They represent the most comprehensive and accurate way of depicting confict short of actually shooting at someone.

The simulations that I was referring to are not quite these professional training tools. I dont have a spare super computer in my backyard, and dont have 100+ people to run the sim. However the commercial version I use was designed by a guy who now works for the Pentagon as a consultant in, you guessed it, developing simulations as training aids for officers at your various officer traiing establishments. I would not heesitate to hold these sims up against any single volume book dealing with the strategic possibilities in 1942.

Have a new book entitled "The Admirals" which details the careers of Halsey, Nimitz, King and Leahy. The strategy of the Allies in the PTO was heavily influenced by these individuals, especially King and Nimitz, not to mention MacArthur, FDR and Churchill. The Japanese, of course had a similar slate of players with Yamamoto being the 1000 pound gorilla. Every decision made concerning the strategy had a politiclal component as well as the military one.

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With respect but this is not a major revgelation. Its taught in just about every strategic studies module for every 1st year cadet. Clausewitz first coined the term "war is an extension of policy"...meaning it should be viewed as a rather blunt instrument of achieving political objectives. War that does not serve or achieve a policy objective is rather pointless.

The political component became more prevelant as the war wore on. In other words what would seem logical to a single commander in a hypothetical situation probably would not seem logical to a number of other commanders and the final decision would usually reflect a shaky consensus unless FDR or Yamamoto put their foot down. Almost every POV held by MacArthur had a political component and the actual choice of commanders in the field was often made based on political considerations. Examples were MacArthur and Halsey.

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This doesnt mean they were bad military commanders. it means they understood whay they were there, and could slip effortl;essly (relatively) from a political stance to a military one, and transform a military concept to suit the political agenda of the time.

I would say, thank goodness the Allied military commanders were politically inclined. The problem arises when policy objectives become detached from the military reality. A prime example of that occurring was Adolf Hitlers political wishes in the later years of the war, compared to the shrinking capbilitiy of his military to deliver those outcomes.

Pars,

Seatag is evidently different in both size snd function to the war gaming system at the Naval War college in Newport, Rhode Island? That would be the Enhanced Naval War Gaming System or ENWGS (called EN-WAGS). IIRC, ENWGS with its command cells and computer geear fills a 3 story building is staffed by a small tech-maintenance crew and has about a dozen or so workstations where ship movements and air assets can be controlled on commands issued from the command cells, isolated visually but not electronically from the game floor. It's a pretty good tactical similation but campaigns are dealt with in an entirely different format there and are focued pprimarily on logistics. These can involve hundreds of people and many rooms (cells) situated across the campus as well as a complete multimedia set up to mimic faux new reports and political analysis as the typical multi-day game progresses.

Reading Racing the Sun, and found that the JCS and War Dept. wanted to tread softly when economic sanctions were first weighed by FDR as a response to the IJ SE Asia bases aggreement with Vichy in July, 1941. Of course their concern was an educated premonition of the preemptive attack that actually occurred. Apparently a case of military considerations driving the political response; at least from the JCS perspective. I would guess the IJ attack would have occurred in any event, because the PI build up was just too much of a threat to IJ interests at the time.

The book was given to me as a present for my 77th birthday. Never really contemplated being that old.

No question that political issues have almost always played a role in warfare. Many instances in the war of Northern Aggression. However, according to this book, the military commanders in the book paid much less attention to politics than either FDR, or Churchill. Several times proposals or decisions made by the top military commanders were overuled by the politicians. MacArthur was retained and catered to because he was such a symbol to the American public. Like wise Halsey. Halsey subsequently became a five star admiral while Spruance who was probably a better commander did not.

renrich said:

The book was given to me as a present for my 77th birthday. Never really contemplated being that old.

No question that political issues have almost always played a role in warfare. Many instances in the war of Northern Aggression. However, according to this book, the military commanders in the book paid much less attention to politics than either FDR, or Churchill. Several times proposals or decisions made by the top military commanders were overuled by the politicians. MacArthur was retained and catered to because he was such a symbol to the American public. Like wise Halsey. Halsey subsequently became a five star admiral while Spruance who was probably a better commander did not.

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I would only object to the word "probably" but only because of my academic bias. Although I have to grudgingly admit, Halsey was probably the more charismatic leader of men. He know what to say and how to posture for greatest motivational effect, while I get the impression Spruance was "above" that. As much as I hate to admit it, when spirit counted most, I'd opt for Halsey. If better tactics were required, I would go with Spruance. The old saw that Halsey was a sailor's admiral while Spruance was an admiral's admiral I think hits the nail on the head. Speaking of politics and war, Have you read Keegan's American Civil War book? I really enjoyed it.

You aren't getting older! Your body is lying to you. You are simply becoming more seasoned.

Halsey was known as the "sailor's admiral" alright but that sobriquet seemed to be false when it came to dealing with typhoons. "Slew" McCain took the rap for him in an injustice according to the book. I am beginning to learn that there are at least two types of history books. One, like "Shattered Sword" or "The First Team" gets deeply into the events by way of research into details of, for instance, the enclosed hangars of the IJN CVs or the Thach Weave or the comparison of IJN pilot training versus USN pilot training. The other type tends to put a lot more weight on the record of what people said or wrote or were reported to have done. To me the latter type is more problematical. Knowing that because of training and doctrine the IJN CVs in 1942 could launch a strike in 30 minutes that the US CVs took an hour to do seems more important in the outcome of a battle than what some admiral wrote in a report after the event.

Have not read Keegan on the CW. What is the title? My budget is strained but can always make room for Keegan.

"war of northern aggression"...I like that

They invaded us not the other way around. I call that aggression. I have an online source which gives a complete report of a given USN ship during WW2. Looked up CA25, Salt Lake City ,since my uncle served on her during much of the war. My goodness, she was really busy after December 7. The report really gives one some insight about how stretched thin the USN was in 41-42-43.

Another interesting anecdote in "The Admirals" The USN commanders did not want the RN to come over and help in the PTO near the end of the war, partly because of logistics. The RN would have different equipment which required different replacement or replenishment supplies. The RN was not as experienced or adept at underway replenishment. A British admiral told a USN admiral that his ships could maintain at sea for as much as 8 days. The USN guy almost collapsed from laughter. They finally compromised on 20 days. Part of the reason was that the USN did not want to share in the glory and they had more than adequate equipment to finish the job. It was said that Churchill wanted the RN to be in on the kill so that Britain could retain Singapore. Politics won out and the RN arrived. The RN more than did their duty in the Atlantic.

renrich said:

Halsey was known as the "sailor's admiral" alright but that sobriquet seemed to be false when it came to dealing with typhoons. "Slew" McCain took the rap for him in an injustice according to the book. I am beginning to learn that there are at least two types of history books. One, like "Shattered Sword" or "The First Team" gets deeply into the events by way of research into details of, for instance, the enclosed hangars of the IJN CVs or the Thach Weave or the comparison of IJN pilot training versus USN pilot training. The other type tends to put a lot more weight on the record of what people said or wrote or were reported to have done. To me the latter type is more problematical. Knowing that because of training and doctrine the IJN CVs in 1942 could launch a strike in 30 minutes that the US CVs took an hour to do seems more important in the outcome of a battle than what some admiral wrote in a report after the event.

Have not read Keegan on the CW. What is the title? My budget is strained but can always make room for Keegan.

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Agree with you about the history and Shattered Sword, First Team and I think Richard Frank (Guadacanal) are good examples. Detail, give me detail!

Keegan's very unexpected title : "The American Civil War: a Military history"

Amazon.com: The American Civil War: A Military History (9780307263438): John Keegan: Books