I've seen very little to "document" my theory, but by 1942 the Eastern Front was a concern for every man living and working in Germany. A real personal threat!
Meanwhile, opposing the Nazi regime was exceptionally dangerous.
What better personal strategy could there be than to support the "war effort" by offering up Wonder Weapons, and projects claiming to better the "enemy" and could be deemed essential to the German war effort. All the while recognizing that any effort put into these "advanced" programs was energy unlikely to actually contribute to the Nazis winning the war.
Even low level technicians, engineers and workers could be deemed "essential" to a project, and hence exempt from conscription.
There were several top engineers that have said exactly that. Heisenberg in fact said he was keeping men working on nuclear projects that had no hope of being ready in time to keep them off the frontlines.
See here:
Me 262 was ready, however the engines were not available.
I got your logic, just think it is based on semantics.
Here we disagree - I still claim that not going with an 1-engined fighter already by 1943 was a mistake for the Luftwaffe.
With what ready and available jet engine? And what sort of performance would it have had with the power that they could even produce in 1944?
All good, the Bf 109 was very good in the East, and in general it was a good/excellent fighter.
They did not what?
Having more of the night fighters would've been a bigger hurdle to the Allies. German problem was that they were already unable to provide enough of skilled pilots for the fighters they had, and that by 1942, let alone in 1943 the fighter force they had were still unable to achieve air superiority against the West. Fuel situation was also not very conductive for the significantly increased fighters' numbers.
They needed an over-performer, and even an improved Bf 109 could not do it. A jet-powered fighter just might do it, provided they can be had in many hundreds, and in many thousands by 1944.
You claimed they did as I suggested more or less. I'm saying no they did not do that and explained why.
I have a very detailed book by a participant about the night fighter war and he states that the problem in 1941-42 was lack of equipment, not pilots. When I get home later today I'll post the title and link to it. It's from the 1970s.
Air superiority against the west wasn't necessary for the attritional strategic air war at night, they needed to inflict unsustainable losses on BC and the lack of equipment prevented them from doing so, both by obviously lacking weapons in the air and by having enough equipment in the quieter period of the war when pilots could have gained the experience they needed to become more skilled night fighter pilots; the point was made that the best night fighter pilots later in the war all honed their skills in 1941-42, while the later additions were never able to catch up in skills, mainly because they were constantly unable to get the necessary equipment to learn how to do their jobs effectively. This led to desperation moves like the 'Wilde Sau' tactics and using Me109s as night fighters. That incidentally killed more German pilots than Allied ones.
The fuel situation in 1941-42 was not the problem and in fact really only became a major limiting factor in 1944 with the bombing of Luftwaffe fuel production facilities.
In terms of daylight fighters I agree with you, but the single jet engine fighter was not the way to go and wouldn't have been viable anyway due to lack of engines until 1944, not that the single engines had enough performance to make a single engine fighter what you claim they needed.