A more effective Dec 1941 preemptive attack on the USA

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This automatically meant that the American body count would be much higher and the war much longer. Fortunately for the US the nukes were developed and cut the war shorter than it could have been but if Halsey was correct the war would have been over months before Hiroshima. Maybe he was right and maybe not. We can never know.

The USAAF, it its postwar examination documented in the USSBS, came to the conclusion that:

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated .
 
What's hard to understand?

The document delivered to the state department was in a language used for state to state dialog.

The Imperial decree delivered was worded for the public.

Both meant war.

The main problem with the state department message was that it was too complex in it's wording and the timely delivery of the document. That fault lies with the Japanese Foreign Ministry, not the Japanese delegate.

The document was to be delivered one half hour prior to the start of military operations and it was intended to read in such a manner that "since the U.S. won't negotiate, then war is the result".

Let's review.

In post #86, you state the declaration was to have been delivered prior to the attack, and repeat this in post #90. GreenKnight121 replies in post #141 that the delayed message contains no formal declaration of war. You respond to that in post #143 formally declared war on the U.S. two hours after the attack, and provide a citation to that formal declaration. GreenKnight121 replies in post #145 that that declaration was after the attack, and reiterates the 14-part message contains no such formal declaration. You respond in post #146 that it took two hours for the Japanese diplomats to decode and prepare the 14-part message.

But as has been shown, that 14-part message contains NO formal declaration of war. Certainly nothing like the clear declaration which came after the attack and to which you cited.

Now you are arguing that the 14-part message is an equivalent to that formal declarative statement. In which case, why cite the formal declaration at all? Especially as it came after the attack.

If Japan can offer formal language after the attack, then surely it could have contained an equally clear statement of situation in the conclusion of the 14-part message — especially as it was to have been delivered prior to the raid. "We, the Emperor of Japan, hereby proclaim we have now declared war upon the United States of America and Great Britain"
instead of "The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."
 
This automatically meant that the American body count would be much higher and the war much longer.

Let's note the Japanese body count would also have been much higher had the war dragged on longer. The USAAF was preparing to formally attack the Japanese rail network in the fall of 1945, and that would have turned the country into a series of isolated areas between which next to nothing, including food, could have been moved.

A third atomic bomb had been prepared for use on or about August 19th, but President Truman ordered a stay on further atomic attacks a week prior.
 
All sorts of people, military and political, were estimating casualty figures. Many of these estimates found their way to Truman's desk or those of his most senior advisers. No one was saying we shouldn't invade.

To put it in context from D-Day to VE Day, a period of 11 months, Allied casualties had been in Europe had been about 766k. At the Quadrant conference in Quebec in the Allies concluded that the defeat of Japan would occur in late 1946, and that was before the "bomb" was even known to work. The arrival of that weapon gave Truman a choice to see if that could work at bringing about an end to the war. But if Japanese resistance had continued? The invasions would have gone ahead as planned until they did surrender.

Some did advocate a blockade to starve Japan into submission. But that would have meant the war going on for longer (into 1947?), delaying demobilisation and risking the loss of the support of the American public for the war. The political view was that the war needed to be ended with a clear Allied victory. I suppose the worry was the WW1 experience where there was not a clear defeat of Germany and it had to be done all over again 20 years later.
Dan Carling in The Destroyer of World gave hints that there were people started to get tired of the war and a bloodbath invading Japan surely would had raised the pressure to the end the war with a pact. How much? Don't know, but the bigger the USA (and allied) body count, more pressure.

Many japanese would had continued with a guerrilla warfare till they got captured or, more probable, killed. Don't forget those soldiers (zan-ryū Nippon hei the were calles I think) that carry the war on for decades in far islands in the P.I. or elsewhere. Once the Home Islands became invaded, that would increase manyfold and the bags would trickle back to the USA although Japan would had been flooded with G.I. & Marines. Some exasperated soldiers could commit atrocities against what could be innocent civilians or guerrilla warriors or both (much to the pleasure of the URSS and Mao media) and then the pressure for an end of the war would go up.

Not an unfamiliar song, nowadays and many times before in History.
 
Dan Carling in The Destroyer of World gave hints that there were people started to get tired of the war and a bloodbath invading Japan surely would had raised the pressure to the end the war with a pact. How much? Don't know, but the bigger the USA (and allied) body count, more pressure.

Many japanese would had continued with a guerrilla warfare till they got captured or, more probable, killed. Don't forget those soldiers (zan-ryū Nippon hei the were calles I think) that carry the war on for decades in far islands in the P.I. or elsewhere. Once the Home Islands became invaded, that would increase manyfold and the bags would trickle back to the USA although Japan would had been flooded with G.I. & Marines. Some exasperated soldiers could commit atrocities against what could be innocent civilians or guerrilla warriors or both (much to the pleasure of the URSS and Mao media) and then the pressure for an end of the war would go up.

Not an unfamiliar song, nowadays and many times before in History.

I think if America were willing to inflict famine, the war against Japan could have been won without an invasion or an atomic bombing. I also think the atomic bombing was as much a warning to the USSR as it was an attempt to end the war with Japan.
 
80% of Japanese oil came from USA.
80% of Japanese oil came from USA?

Wow.

That's incredibly stupid to know your oil supply comes from your Numero uno enemy.

So how does that work? Answer; it Doesn't.

It clearly shows don't go to war with your main supply.

Does that make any sense to anyone? It clearly shows that USA had the whip hand from day dot.
Err…
By that logic (and correct one at that) Germany shouldn't have attacked the Soviet Union - but it did.
 
I think if America were willing to inflict famine, the war against Japan could have been won without an invasion or an atomic bombing. I also think the atomic bombing was as much a warning to the USSR as it was an attempt to end the war with Japan.
The U.S. had over half a million Purple Heart medals commissioned in 1945, in anticipation of the invasion of Japan.

The Atom Bombs most certainly were an object of rapid conclusion to the war.

Several estimates had the final defeat of Japan by late 1946, with some indicating early 1947. Without the Atom Bombs, the defeat of Japan was going to be protracted, bloody and ugly - the likes of which had never before seen in the history of war.
 
The U.S. had over half a million Purple Heart medals commissioned in 1945, in anticipation of the invasion of Japan.

The Atom Bombs most certainly were an object of rapid conclusion to the war.

Several estimates had the final defeat of Japan by late 1946, with some indicating early 1947. Without the Atom Bombs, the defeat of Japan was going to be protracted, bloody and ugly - the likes of which had never before seen in the history of war.
Just the starting of my point. A long battle with a long time ago defeated enemy with a trickle of casualities. How long would it take for voices to rise for a negociated peace or a total withdrawal?
 
How long would it take for voices to rise for a negociated peace or a total withdrawal?
It would be up to the Japanese leaders - the Allies were in for the long haul and were only going to accept unconditional surrender.

I don't have my books available, but going by memory, the Allied planners had several phases laid out under Operation "Downfall" for taking strategic locations starting with the southern island in November 1945, the next phase being in March 1946 *if* the Allies were successful in taking Kyushu.

The total estimated Allied manpower committed would be about 6,000,000 versus an estimated Japanese force of about 35,000,000 (consisting of 4-5 mil. regulars and 30 mil. conscripts).

Japan knew an invasion was imminent and had a counter-invasion plan (operation Ketsugo) that was not to stop the Allied invasion, but to make it so costly that the Allies would be forced to negotiate - again, holding onto that idea that it was possible.
The problem with the Japanese, is their theory of inflicting great losses in order to force terms failed many times over and by the time of the Okinawa invasion, should have concluded it simply wasn't an option.
 
Operation Olympic planned for 1Nov 1945 wasn't intended to take the whole island of Kyushu. Only the southern part. The plan was to use that ground to build airfields to put USAAF fighters and light/medium bombers, then resident on Okinawa, within range of the proposed Operation Coronet landing areas on Honshu. Distance involved is just under 600 miles. That would ease the pressure on the air power wielded by carrier forces.

That step 2 to Honshu was intended to utilise, at least in part, troops redeployed through the USA from Europe including 2 Armoured divisions. In many ways it takes on the appearance of a Normandy rather than a typical Pacific invasion, complete with its own artificial harbour.
 
There is some question as to whether Olympic would have been carried out as planned.

Intelligence received by mid-July indicated that Kyushu had been reinforced considerably. The Japanese had reinforced the island after correctly deducing it was likely to the first target of any U.S invasion. That meant the invasion of Kyushu would have been below the usual 3:1 strength ratio advantage required for an assault.
 
Err…
By that logic (and correct one at that) Germany shouldn't have attacked the Soviet Union - but it did.
The Germans maybe shouldn't have attacked the USSR.

The weakness of the Japanese is that they played Rolls Royce games with Ford Pinto money.

They pretenses they was is a Super powers but didn't haves the muscles to backs it up.

So Japanese had no control over its own oil or steel. So it had no control of it's destiny. That weak sauce bro.
 
That was Bismark's rule too. The problem Napoleon and Hitler faced is that you have extended supply lines. Logistics are a huge problem, and the French and the Germans did not take it seriously.

Writers Nicolai Tolstoy and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have claimed that the Germans could have invaded the Soviet Union successfully by taking advantage of how much everyone hated Stalin. But again, the whole point of attacking the Soviet Union was to enslave and exterminate them.

The Japanese blew the same opportunity in the Philippines, and in Malaysia and Burma. Could they have recruited people in eastern Russia? Maybe. Would they have?
 
Quoth Mr Osman, my 7th-grade science teacher: "You're living a champagne life on a Coca-Cola income."
Coca Cola is one of the most rich companies in the world.

Take that stupid science teacher.

I would take coca cola income all the day long.

I would teach the world to sing in perfect harmony. Or stop the Japanese leaving the League of Nations. Both are good.
 
That was Bismark's rule too. The problem Napoleon and Hitler faced is that you have extended supply lines. Logistics are a huge problem, and the French and the Germans did not take it seriously.

Clearly. Wehrmacht went into the USSR without winter gear and got caught flat-footed for it. The Russians/Sovietshave the advantage of being able to trade space for time and etting winter kick your ass.

Writers Nicolai Tolstoy and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have claimed that the Germans could have invaded the Soviet Union successfully by taking advantage of how much everyone hated Stalin. But again, the whole point of attacking the Soviet Union was to enslave and exterminate them.

Right, I remember reading Solzhenitsyn writing that, and to a point I think it's fair. Harnessing Ukrainian resentment against Stalin, especially after the Holomodor, could have stood the Germns in good stead, but the Germans saw all Slavs as untermenschen and so thankfully they couldn't make their initial advances stick.

The Japanese blew the same opportunity in the Philippines, and in Malaysia and Burma. Could they have recruited people in eastern Russia? Maybe. Would they have?

I don't know about Eastern Russia, because once past the coastal cities there just ain't many people the anyway -- nor are there logistics routes to make any such invasion lucrative.

The Japanese did have some success with the Thais and to a lesser extent the separatist Indians in luring second-rate units to their cause. They at least tried. But I don't think even that would've helped the Japanese because the theater was so large and their resources, equipment, and manpower weren't able to do anything useful even against the scanty forces the Allies mustered.
 
Coca Cola is one of the most rich companies in the world.

Take that stupid science teacher.

I would take coca cola income all the day long.

I would teach the world to sing in perfect harmony. Or stop the Japanese leaving the League of Nations. Both are good.

I think he was talking on the personal and not corporate level. Mr Osman was a lot of things, but stupid wasn't one of them.
 

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