A more effective Dec 1941 preemptive attack on the USA

[GreenKnight121]

As far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, the public wasn't outraged by the attack so much as they were outraged that there was no declaration of war. So it was seen as a "dastardly", "unwarranted", "un-provoked" "sneak attack".

Yes, the Japanese intended to deliver the declaration just before the attack, but it was delayed.
This was a huge mistake on their behalf and a golden opportunity for the press.

It would be interesting to see how the press and public would have reacted, had the declaration been delivered as intended.

No, if you read the actual text of the "14th part" of the communique, the part which was delivered after the attack, you will see NO "declaration of war"...
Part 14 accused the American government of having used Nomura's negotiations with Hull "to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia." As a consequence, the Japanese government had come to the conclusion that an agreement could not be reached with the United States "through further negotiations."

This was all that Part 14 said. It did not declare war. It did not sever diplomatic relations or reserve freedom of action. On the surface, it amounted to nothing more than a suspension of the Hull-Nomura conversations.

So there never was an intent to "declare war before the attack".

 

[SaparotRob]

I should write a book about everything I don't know.

 

[GrauGeist]

No, if you read the actual text of the "14th part" of the communique, the part which was delivered after the attack, you will see NO "declaration of war"...
Part 14 accused the American government of having used Nomura's negotiations with Hull "to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia." As a consequence, the Japanese government had come to the conclusion that an agreement could not be reached with the United States "through further negotiations."

This was all that Part 14 said. It did not declare war. It did not sever diplomatic relations or reserve freedom of action. On the surface, it amounted to nothing more than a suspension of the Hull-Nomura conversations.

So there never was an intent to "declare war before the attack".

I beg to differ.

The Empire of Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain two hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A part of the transcript:
"We, the Emperor of Japan, having acceded to the throne of the unbroken line of emperors which is for ages eternal, with the divine providence of the heavenly god, hereby proclaim unto our loyal and valorous subjects:

That we, the emperor, have now declared war upon the United States of America and Great Britain. The officers and men of our army and navy will concentrate their strength in engaging in battles, the members of our government will endeavor to carry out their assigned duties, our subjects throughout the empire will employ full strength to perform their respective tasks. Thus uniting one hundred million hearts and discharging the fullest strength of the nation, we expect all our subjects to strive to attain the ultimate objective of this expedition."

If you wish to learn more, this is a good start:

Japan declares war, 1941 | Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History

Japan declares war, 1941 | | On December 7, 1941, two hours after the Japanese attack on American military installations at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain, marking America’s entry into World War II. The Japanese government had originally intended...

www.gilderlehrman.org

 

[33k in the air]

It is my understanding that high ranking US officials were actively trying to provoke an attack by Japan. They had chosen to fight Japan, but wanted the Japanese to attack first, to galvanize the American people. Moving the fleet to Hawaii, militarizing Wake Island, sending US flagged fishing vessels into waters claimed by Japan, sending B-17s to the Philippines, these things were designed to put pressure on Japan,and hopefully provoke an attack.

It was clear the differences between Japan and the United States over Japan's actions in China were intractable. Both sides knew war at some point was going to happen — as even a majority of Gallup poll respondents in the U.S. recognized.

The only question was where the first blow would fall. It was expected to be in the Philippines, but the IJN had the audacity to sail 3,800 miles across the Pacific to hit the USN in its home port.

 

[GreenKnight121]

I beg to differ.

The Empire of Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain two hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A part of the transcript:
"We, the Emperor of Japan, having acceded to the throne of the unbroken line of emperors which is for ages eternal, with the divine providence of the heavenly god, hereby proclaim unto our loyal and valorous subjects:

That we, the emperor, have now declared war upon the United States of America and Great Britain. The officers and men of our army and navy will concentrate their strength in engaging in battles, the members of our government will endeavor to carry out their assigned duties, our subjects throughout the empire will employ full strength to perform their respective tasks. Thus uniting one hundred million hearts and discharging the fullest strength of the nation, we expect all our subjects to strive to attain the ultimate objective of this expedition."

If you wish to learn more, this is a good start:

Japan declares war, 1941 | Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History

Japan declares war, 1941 | | On December 7, 1941, two hours after the Japanese attack on American military installations at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain, marking America’s entry into World War II. The Japanese government had originally intended...

www.gilderlehrman.org

Which does not contradict what I wrote in any way.

That was a SEPARATE declaration made two hours AFTER the attack, NOT the "delayed part of the 14-part message"!
The text you copy/pasted clearly states this!

The 14-part message, which was the only one planned for delivery BEFORE the attack, still made no mention of a commencement of hostilities.

There was NO intention on the part of the Japanese government to declare war BEFORE the attack!

 

[GrauGeist]

Which does not contradict what I wrote in any way.

That was a SEPARATE declaration made two hours AFTER the attack, NOT the "delayed part of the 14-part message"!
The text you copy/pasted clearly states this!

The 14-part message, which was the only one planned for delivery BEFORE the attack, still made no mention of a commencement of hostilities.

There was NO intention on the part of the Japanese government to declare war BEFORE the attack!

Bullshit - it took the diplomatic mission two hours to decipher the transmission, which was supposed to be delivered 30 minutes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Read:
30 minutes prior to 7:00 a.m. Oahu time.

 

[33k in the air]

Bullshit - it took the diplomatic mission two hours to decipher the transmission, which was supposed to be delivered 30 minutes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Read:
30 minutes prior to 7:00 a.m. Oahu time.

The declaration you cited does NOT appear anywhere within the 14-part message the Japanese diplomats delivered on December 7th.

You can read the entire translated contents of that 14-part message here.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Actually the US did start the Pacific war by blockading Japan and cutting off vital supplies Japan needed for its war in Manchuria.

Are sanctions an act of war? If so, you're right. If not, you're wrong.

By this logic, any nation should be able to attack another nation which didn't want to do business, because the sanctioning nation "started" the war.

 

[MiTasol]

America did not cease trading with Japan.

It prevented other countries trading with Japan instead.

If your country was cut off from fuel, rubber (which in those day had far more uses than now), other raw materials and other essentials including some food supplies which came from nearby countries would you consider that an act of peace or an act of war.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

America did not cease trading with Japan.

It prevented other countries trading with Japan instead.

If your country was cut off from fuel, rubber (which in those day had far more uses than now), other raw materials and other essentials including some food supplies which came from nearby countries would you consider that an act of peace or an act of war.

No. We embargoed fuel and metals in 1941. How did we force any other nation to cease trading with Japan? Be specific and cite credible sources, please.

We had no power to enjoin any other nation to cease trading with Japan, and even if we had, that is still not an act of war. Imposing a blockade would be an act of war relating to trade. This wasn't a blockade.

As for your last question, we're discussing facts here and not appeals to emotion. Acts of war are defined in international law. Refusing to trade with a country is not in that definition, nor is organizing a boycott. Angering? Certainly. Bellicose? Not de jure.

 

[MiTasol]

You may be correct on fuel and metals only and I will have to look for how it was done but my memory is that rubber, oil and metals from other countries were prevented from reaching Japan because of a naval blockade. It was something learned in history lessons in the late 50s that I have never questioned since. Rubber was definitely in what I was taught as we were studying rubber plantations, production and uses at the time. Naturally if a ship contained any of those items as well as other goods such as food then the other items are also prevented from reaching the intended destination. Then and now a ship does not only carry one item of cargo.

And I would definitely call a naval blockade of commerce far more angering to any nation which has pride.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

Sorry, but there is no way that Spain could be considered a major power in 1898.

After some 400 years of world discovery and empire building, all what was left was Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and some little islands in the Pacific Islands (Marianas, Carolines) and some little possessions in North and Equatorial Africa, with open rebellions in Cuba and the P.I., reeling from various civil wars and regime changes (from the borbonic destiny to the Savoy to the republic to the borbonic once more). Hardly a tough contender for the title of major power.

Sidenote: Interesting what if if in lieu of selling the Carolines and the Marianas to Imperial Germany (and them going to Japan after WW1) they were given to the USA after the 1898 war. Not quite the same WW2 we know.

Another thing is that Japan didn´t thought (from the start at least) to defeat the USA, just push them hard enough to became unwilling to fought all the way back due to the cost of doing it. I think that was not as an unreasonable plan as it might sound, except for the nuclear bomb and the soviet attack. Japan hierarchy was willing to let the whole country die in a (perceived) glorious way. Were FDR or Harry Trumman as willing to have some 400.000, 600.000 or 1.000.000 million casualties to invade and defeat Japan?

I don´t think so. Neither Korea, Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan tend to support that view.

 

[EwenS]

There was no "naval blockade" of Japan prior to Pearl Harbor. Economic sanctions and embargoes by the US, Britain and the Govt of the Dutch East Indies were imposed.

For one thing Britain was busy fighting a live war elsewhere and the RN could not afford to base many ships in Singapore and Hong Kong after 1939. The Dutch Fleet was small with its largest ships being 3 cruisers. The US Asiatic Fleet based in the Philippines was also small being led by 2 cruisers. The US Pacific Fleet with its Battleships and aircraft carriers was based on the US west coast until April 1940 when it moved to Hawaii.

 

[The Basket]

80% of Japanese oil came from USA.
80% of Japanese oil came from USA?

Wow.

That's incredibly stupid to know your oil supply comes from your Numero uno enemy.

So how does that work? Answer; it Doesn't.

It clearly shows don't go to war with your main supply.

Does that make any sense to anyone? It clearly shows that USA had the whip hand from day dot.

 

[EwenS]

Sorry, but there is no way that Spain could be considered a major power in 1898.

After some 400 years of world discovery and empire building, all what was left was Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and some little islands in the Pacific Islands (Marianas, Carolines) and some little possessions in North and Equatorial Africa, with open rebellions in Cuba and the P.I., reeling from various civil wars and regime changes (from the borbonic destiny to the Savoy to the republic to the borbonic once more). Hardly a tough contender for the title of major power.

Sidenote: Interesting what if if in lieu of selling the Carolines and the Marianas to Imperial Germany (and them going to Japan after WW1) they were given to the USA after the 1898 war. Not quite the same WW2 we know.

Another thing is that Japan didn´t thought (from the start at least) to defeat the USA, just push them hard enough to became unwilling to fought all the way back due to the cost of doing it. I think that was not as an unreasonable plan as it might sound, except for the nuclear bomb and the soviet attack. Japan hierarchy was willing to let the whole country die in a (perceived) glorious way. Were FDR or Harry Trumman as willing to have some 400.000, 600.000 or 1.000.000 million casualties to invade and defeat Japan?

I don´t think so. Neither Korea, Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan tend to support that view.

I think you will find that the US leadership was very much prepared to suffer that level of casualties in invading Japan.

Plans were already well advanced for the invasion of Japan as part of Operation Downfall. This was to be in two parts - southern Kyushu on 1 Nov 1945 (Operation Olympic) and Honshu on 1 March 1946 (Operation Coronet). All sorts of casualty figures were suggested, but MacArthur's own planners were looking at a potential 500,000 from all causes, with 50% being battle casualties, just for the Kyushu invasion alone. That wasn't putting anyone off the invasions. 500,000 Purple Hearts were manufactured in anticipation of those casualties and that stock has still not been fully utilised in all the wars the US has participated in since WW2.

The US leadership was prepared to do what was necessary to get the job done. To minimise Allied casualties (there was to be British and Commonwealth participation in these operations) they were prepared to use chemical weapons on the battlefield if necessary along with atomic weapons in a tactical role.

 

[EwenS]

80% of Japanese oil came from USA.
80% of Japanese oil came from USA?

Wow.

That's incredibly stupid to know your oil supply comes from your Numero uno enemy.

So how does that work? Answer; it Doesn't.

It clearly shows don't go to war with your main supply.

Does that make any sense to anyone? It clearly shows that USA had the whip hand from day dot.

But that misses the point that the Japanese plan was to knock the US out of the war AND to secure the DEI oilfields (Sumatra, Java, Borneo and lesser places). That would have allowed them to replace the US oil supplies they had lost.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Actually the US did start the Pacific war by blockading Japan and cutting off vital supplies Japan needed for its war in Manchuria.

That's a stretch. The US pushed Japan into a corner, but they didn't take the first shot, AVG aside. Japan's exit was obvious, claim victory and in Jan 1938 after the fall of Nanking withdraw to Manchuria and Korea… and stay out of FIC (US' last straw). Yes, making this happen requires a near cataclysmic leadership change in Japan, but it's that or suicidal annihilation by taking on the US.

Had Japan exited China and returned to its established territory in Manchuria and Korea the US would have reopened trade with Japan, and most importantly, by Feb 1942 Japan would see that the Germans (and Italians) have lost their momentum in Russia and North Africa, suggesting that their potential allies were of no use to Japan.

Japan didn't need to be invading anywhere to find national prosperity, as we clearly see in the postwar era. And if we enter the 1950s with Japan holding Manchuria and Korea the west may be well pleased with this potential counter to a new and resurgent PRC.

 

[Admiral Beez]

But that misses the point that the Japanese plan was to knock the US out of the war AND to secure the DEI oilfields (Sumatra, Java, Borneo and lesser places). That would have allowed them to replace the US oil supplies they had lost.

Japan's generals and admirals may have dreamt up the idea seizing the DEI. But no, Japan never had any plan to utilize the DEI oil fields. Japan had no means of getting the oil from the DEI to Japan, had very few petrochemical engineers who knew what to do with the oil fields and oil, and depended on the Dutch to first not sabotage and then operate the pumps and refineries.

It's akin to the Africans attacking and seizing the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean farms from their European descendan owners. Sure, the prize looked inviting, the breadbasket of Africa with super productive farms. But once the locals seized the land, and chased off those with the expertise, the farms collapsed, and the nation went into famine. That's what Japan did in the DEI, rampaging through and hardly getting any oil back to Japan. The IJN benefited somewhat as they could refuel their ships at the well heads, though once the refineries were destroyed the IJN had to use engine-destroying pure crude.

The DEI was stupidly planned for. It's as if Japan's leadership forgot to ask their nascent petrochemical industry what was needed and most importantly what was possible. It's noteworthy that late war air strikes aside, once the USN's submarines sank the few oil tankers Japan had, the allies mostly ignored Sumatra and the oil fields, so much for a strategic asset.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

I think you will find that the US leadership was very much prepared to suffer that level of casualties in invading Japan.

Plans were already well advanced for the invasion of Japan as part of Operation Downfall. This was to be in two parts - southern Kyushu on 1 Nov 1945 (Operation Olympic) and Honshu on 1 March 1946 (Operation Coronet). All sorts of casualty figures were suggested, but MacArthur's own planners were looking at a potential 500,000 from all causes, with 50% being battle casualties, just for the Kyushu invasion alone. That wasn't putting anyone off the invasions. 500,000 Purple Hearts were manufactured in anticipation of those casualties and that stock has still not been fully utilised in all the wars the US has participated in since WW2.

The US leadership was prepared to do what was necessary to get the job done. To minimise Allied casualties (there was to be British and Commonwealth participation in these operations) they were prepared to use chemical weapons on the battlefield if necessary along with atomic weapons in a tactical role.

That the military were willing to accept high casualty figures didn't mean that the politics were willing to do so. Neither that it could go forever if the bags keep coming and the public opinion chance the mood.

Is my understanding that to avoid a high casualty count one of the leading reasons to drop the Nules, at least officially.

 

[EwenS]

That the military were willing to accept high casualty figures didn't mean that the politics were willing to do so. Neither that it could go forever if the bags keep coming and the public opinion chance the mood.

Is my understanding that to avoid a high casualty count one of the leading reasons to drop the Nules, at least officially.

All sorts of people, military and political, were estimating casualty figures. Many of these estimates found their way to Truman's desk or those of his most senior advisers. No one was saying we shouldn't invade.

To put it in context from D-Day to VE Day, a period of 11 months, Allied casualties had been in Europe had been about 766k. At the Quadrant conference in Quebec in the Allies concluded that the defeat of Japan would occur in late 1946, and that was before the "bomb" was even known to work. The arrival of that weapon gave Truman a choice to see if that could work at bringing about an end to the war. But if Japanese resistance had continued? The invasions would have gone ahead as planned until they did surrender.

Some did advocate a blockade to starve Japan into submission. But that would have meant the war going on for longer (into 1947?), delaying demobilisation and risking the loss of the support of the American public for the war. The political view was that the war needed to be ended with a clear Allied victory. I suppose the worry was the WW1 experience where there was not a clear defeat of Germany and it had to be done all over again 20 years later.