A Victorious Luftstreitkräfte-Imperial German Aviation Development After WW1

[parsifal]

Michael, this
4. The Fourteen Points were accepted by France and Italy on November 1, 1918. Britain later signed off on all of the points except the freedom of the seas. The United Kingdom also wanted Germany to make reparation payments for the war, and thought that that should be added to the Fourteen Points.
and this
The Allies agreed to accept the Fourteen Points as the basis for the coming peace negotiations if Wilson would agree to two reservations:
1. The delegates would not be committed to accepting a provision guaranteeing freedom of the seas
(Point 2) — a measure demanded by Britain.
2. The French insisted that the provision having to do with German evacuation from French territory
(Point 8) be interpreted to allow for the collection of compensation (reparations) for civilian damages
incurred in the war.
are from: Grigg, John (2002). Lloyd George: War Leader. London: Allen Lane. ISBN-7139-9343-X

The main difference is in the way the allied position evolved and its final form as it appeared in the final communique from the entente as it is presented in their note of 5 November 1918. Ive previously given a verbatim account of the final resting position of the French and British governments. They were first formally informed of German peace feelers in early October which was followed by a series of frantic and furious diplomatic exchanges between the Wilson administration and the French and British Governments. The final form in which the 14 points were accepted was nothing like it existed in January. Moreover, the most important difference in our respective positions on this is that the notes passed to the americans In early November make it abundantly clear that insfar as the fourteen points applied to western Europe, the allies were in fact not accepting the full application of the Wilson doctrine. The important differences were, in essence, that Germany be made to pay reparations, that she accept full responsibility for causing the war, and of course the freedom of navigation issues on the high seas. This final position was made very clear by British and the French to the Americans. Whether it made it to the Germans I don't know.


How accurate or bad your source is, I don't know. But the sources im relying on are all primary sources, that is the actual transcripts of the actual diplomatic notes at the time. In other words, your relying on a secondary interpretative source, im relying on the actual words as they were recorded at the time.



The rest of your #95 and #96 posts are essentially the same as what I have already posted so I fail to see any substantial differences between our stances.


What point are you trying to make?


Im mindful of the starting position for this debate. The starting point, as I read it was that it would be possible for Germany to obtain a better result from Versailles, by outfighting the allies and through incredible amounts of exceptional luck and downright bias. From there im led to understand that it was surmised that hitler could be easily dispensed with and from there a more moderate, and hence successful post war, or interwar Germany would emerge.


I see numerous issues with this. The first is that the suppositions leading to a german victory were wildly optimistic. Based mostly on the surmise that the US does not enter the war, but then also that the germans could react or initiate new emphasise with no substantive counter reaction. Secondly, the supposition is based on the erroneous belief that German militarism was based solely, or mostly on the so-called unequal treaty of Versaille. That then relates to an even more outlandish claim that german guiltfor WWII can be traced soley and completely to one man, hitler.


None of these suppositions hold any weight. Which is what is motivating my responses. Anti-semitism for example is a symptom of the overall malaise afflicting Germany. This was not a product of the Nazis, or even the defeat suffered in 1918. Rabid anti-0semitism in Germany existed all the way back to middle ages. German militarism and innate conservatism existed well before the treaty had its effect. All of the suppositions relating to the hypothetical are based on a false premise. Versaille did not cause WWII. It was a factor, but far greater was the inherent nature of German society and values that existed well before the treaty and remained with the added incentive of pain after the treaty

 

[mikewint]

29 September 1918 the German Supreme Army Command informed Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Imperial Chancellor, Count Georg von Hertling at Imperial Army Headquarters in Spa of occupied Belgium, that the military situation facing Germany was hopeless.

On 3 October, the liberal Prince Maximilian of Baden was appointed Chancellor of Germany, replacing Georg von Hertling in order to negotiate an armistice.

5 October 1918, the German government sent a message to President Wilson to negotiate terms on the basis of a recent speech of his and the earlier declared "Fourteen Points".

23 October 1918 Wilson's second note arrives in Berlin in which he sets a precondition for negotiations, the retreat of Germany from all occupied territories, the cessation of submarine activities and the Kaiser's abdication

Night of 29 to 30 October 1918 in the naval port of Wilhelmshaven, the sailors revolt begins and spreads across Germany

In late October, Ludendorff, in a sudden change of mind, declared the conditions of the Allies unacceptable.

5 November 1918, the Allies agreed to take up negotiations for a truce

6 November 1918 the latest note from Wilson was received in Berlin requiring the Kaiser's abdication

7 November 1918 The German delegation headed by Matthias Erzberger crossed the front line in five cars

8 November 1918 after being escorted for ten hours across the devastated war zone of Northern France the German delegation arrives at a secret destination in the forest of Compiegne

9 November 1918 the Germans were handed the list of Allied demands and given 72 hours to agree.

9 November, Max von Baden handed over the office of Chancellor to Friedrich Ebert

9 November 1918 Friedrich Ebert issues a proclamation declaring Germany a republic

9 November 1918 Wilhelm's abdication was announced by Chancellor Prince Max von Baden

On Sunday 10 November, they were shown newspapers from Paris to inform them that the Kaiser had abdicated. That same day, Erzberger was instructed to sign by Ebert.

At 5:00 a.m. on 11 November, the Armistice was agreed upon, signatures were made between 5:12 am and 5:20 am, Paris time. The Armistice was scheduled come into effect at 11:00 a.m. Paris time, i.e.:"the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month

 

[parsifal]

5 November 1918, the Allies agreed to take up negotiations for a truce

This is the main point of contention, and no matter how many times it is repackaged it will always get the same answer out of me. it was on the 5th November that Britain and France, in a formal diplomatic note to the United States, made their position with respect to the 14 points and how they might apply to the entente. They were "accepted" subject to major qualification, centred around war guilt and reparations, that in turn required complete re-think of the armistice terms. The germans and americans should have been alive to the meaning of the Anglo-French diplomatic note, but they don't appear to have been on top of this at all. For the British, the concept of freedom of the seas was rejected entirely it ought to be noted, though we aren't disagreeing about that. .

In effect, and in the clearest of terms, the main powers of Britain and France made their positions very clear. they were not bound by the 14 points, for the situation on the western front, though they would accept them for other principals like the formation of the league and the rights to self determination. On the critical issues of reparations, war guilt and navigation there was no agreement.

The germans could have rejected this and fought on. they knew they could not. They placed false hope that britain and france would follow the 14 points in all respects, which was a promise never given. Therein lies the true courses of WWII. The germans lost WWI on the field of battle and were forced to accept terms that gave them no security. they didn't like it. What they really needed to avoid the unequal treaty was outright victory, something that was completely out of their grasp after Summer 1918, probably earlier.

 

[swampyankee]

5 November 1918, the Allies agreed to take up negotiations for a truce

This is the main point of contention, and no matter how many times it is repackaged it will always get the same answer out of me. it was on the 5th November that Britain and France, in a formal diplomatic note to the United States, made their position with respect to the 14 points and how they might apply to the entente. They were "accepted" subject to major qualification, centred around war guilt and reparations, that in turn required complete re-think of the armistice terms. The germans and americans should have been alive to the meaning of the Anglo-French diplomatic note, but they don't appear to have been on top of this at all. For the British, the concept of freedom of the seas was rejected entirely it ought to be noted, though we aren't disagreeing about that. .

In effect, and in the clearest of terms, the main powers of Britain and France made their positions very clear. they were not bound by the 14 points, for the situation on the western front, though they would accept them for other principals like the formation of the league and the rights to self determination. On the critical issues of reparations, war guilt and navigation there was no agreement.

The germans could have rejected this and fought on. they knew they could not. They placed false hope that britain and france would follow the 14 points in all respects, which was a promise never given. Therein lies the true courses of WWII. The germans lost WWI on the field of battle and were forced to accept terms that gave them no security. they didn't like it. What they really needed to avoid the unequal treaty was outright victory, something that was completely out of their grasp after Summer 1918, probably earlier.

I suspect that Wilson got played, pretty effectively, by both the French and British: they had been playing diplomatic tango for centuries, in one of the more interesting international analogies to a co-dependent relationship. "Too proud to fight" Wilson was also, I suspect, too proud to realize that his closest advisors were amateurs. Lord Grey, for example, had started his inadvertent preparation for foreign secretary as a secretary to the consul general of Egypt in 1884, and became under secretary to the foreign minister in 1892; after that he was in and out of the foreign ministry and the shadow cabinet.

 

[parsifal]

I should also clarify that I obtained my diplomatic note material that accurately details the final allied response from a now defunct website called the WWi Document Archive

This reproduced primary source material from Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, D.C., 1918, Supplement, I, 468-69.
A statement of the Allied Governments after the German Government had indicated its willingness to consider signing an Armistice based on President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'. You can only now access this information either third hand or by travelling to a major library in the US (i think the library of congress)

 

[cherry blossom]

A fascinating discussion which cannot be easily summarised in a single paragraph.

The nature of the Central Powers victory clearly will have effects on the subsequent development of German aviation. However, I disagree with Ascent's proposal that having a neutral Britain will lead to a victory for Germany in WW1. It seems to me that Russia would not have mobilized had Britain not given Russia assurances of support (Nicholson via the French Ambassador to Britain, Cambon) and that Serbia would have either accepted the Austrian Ultimatum or suffered defeat in a soon to be forgotten Austro-Serbian War of 1914.

If we want something like WW1 but with a Central Powers victory, we might try having Austria perform better in 1914 and early 1915. Their best hope would be having someone less idiotic than Conrad in charge of their Army but, unfortunately, Conrad was one of the prime Austrian advocates of war, so we need to step carefully.

If Russia is retreating from Galicia by the middle of March 1915, we probably won't see an Italian entry into the war. If Italy remains neutral, there are bigger holes in the blockade against Germany and Germany cares more about American opinion to try to lever the holes open further. We also may see Austria able to hold any 1916 Russian offensive without a serious collapse, which will probably keep Romania neutral.

With better prospects late in 1916, it is just possible that Germany might be cautious about raising another enemy by using submarines. Of course, there are many other possibilities. For example, perhaps Germany had invented the tank and was both doing better in the war and needed the steel used for submarines to build more tanks. What is crucial is that American intervention is avoided.

As several posters have noted, the German Army was heavily defeated over the Hundred Days Campaign with the British Army, including Canadians, Australians, Indians, New Zealanders and South Africans, playing the most important role and taking 188,700 prisoners as against 196,070 by the French, American and Belgian armies put together.

However, that will not happen if America has not joined the war because there is nothing to stop Germany standing on the defensive in 1918 if Russia has collapsed. The collapse of Russia breaks the blockade, which in any case will not be so strict whilst America is neutral, and Germany can expect to be stronger in 1919 than 1918. Without a German Offensive in 1918, the German Army will have the reserves to hold their lines.

Unfortunately, we now come to a fork in the road. Will Russia collapse into Revolution or will Britain, France and Russia jointly make peace over 1916-7?

If Russia collapses, one force on German aviation after a victory will be the need to support operations in what was the Russian Empire. Pushed to its extreme, this predicts that the ideal aircraft is something like the Hs 123.

The other force after a war with a neutral America might be to develop aircraft that could fly from German territory to America. Long range aircraft might also be attractive if the British Empire is the most likely opponent.

Finally, will the High Seas Fleet be building its carriers during the Twenties and what aircraft will they carry? Will the Army and Navy maintain separate air forces?

 

[swampyankee]

A fascinating discussion which cannot be easily summarised in a single paragraph.

The nature of the Central Powers victory clearly will have effects on the subsequent development of German aviation. However, I disagree with Ascent's proposal that having a neutral Britain will lead to a victory for Germany in WW1. It seems to me that Russia would not have mobilized had Britain not given Russia assurances of support (Nicholson via the French Ambassador to Britain, Cambon) and that Serbia would have either accepted the Austrian Ultimatum or suffered defeat in a soon to be forgotten Austro-Serbian War of 1914.

If we want something like WW1 but with a Central Powers victory, we might try having Austria perform better in 1914 and early 1915. Their best hope would be having someone less idiotic than Conrad in charge of their Army but, unfortunately, Conrad was one of the prime Austrian advocates of war, so we need to step carefully.

If Russia is retreating from Galicia by the middle of March 1915, we probably won't see an Italian entry into the war. If Italy remains neutral, there are bigger holes in the blockade against Germany and Germany cares more about American opinion to try to lever the holes open further. We also may see Austria able to hold any 1916 Russian offensive without a serious collapse, which will probably keep Romania neutral.

With better prospects late in 1916, it is just possible that Germany might be cautious about raising another enemy by using submarines. Of course, there are many other possibilities. For example, perhaps Germany had invented the tank and was both doing better in the war and needed the steel used for submarines to build more tanks. What is crucial is that American intervention is avoided.

As several posters have noted, the German Army was heavily defeated over the Hundred Days Campaign with the British Army, including Canadians, Australians, Indians, New Zealanders and South Africans, playing the most important role and taking 188,700 prisoners as against 196,070 by the French, American and Belgian armies put together.

However, that will not happen if America has not joined the war because there is nothing to stop Germany standing on the defensive in 1918 if Russia has collapsed. The collapse of Russia breaks the blockade, which in any case will not be so strict whilst America is neutral, and Germany can expect to be stronger in 1919 than 1918. Without a German Offensive in 1918, the German Army will have the reserves to hold their lines.

Unfortunately, we now come to a fork in the road. Will Russia collapse into Revolution or will Britain, France and Russia jointly make peace over 1916-7?

If Russia collapses, one force on German aviation after a victory will be the need to support operations in what was the Russian Empire. Pushed to its extreme, this predicts that the ideal aircraft is something like the Hs 123.

The other force after a war with a neutral America might be to develop aircraft that could fly from German territory to America. Long range aircraft might also be attractive if the British Empire is the most likely opponent.

Finally, will the High Seas Fleet be building its carriers during the Twenties and what aircraft will they carry? Will the Army and Navy maintain separate air forces?

It seems that you're almost proposing a WW1 that leaves the Central Powers unimpeded by any enemies, as Russia only entered the war because of Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia. Since Russia would not be involved, there would be no justification for Germany to attack France, and even less to invade Belgium (the act that most immediately brought Britain into the war), although a pretext could always be found.


What would German aviation development been like had there not been WW1? Tony Fokker probably wouldn't have relocated, for one thing

 

[parsifal]

I suspect that Wilson got played, pretty effectively, by both the French and British: they had been playing diplomatic tango for centuries, in one of the more interesting international analogies to a co-dependent relationship. "Too proud to fight" Wilson was also, I suspect, too proud to realize that his closest advisors were amateurs. Lord Grey, for example, had started his inadvertent preparation for foreign secretary as a secretary to the consul general of Egypt in 1884, and became under secretary to the foreign minister in 1892; after that he was in and out of the foreign ministry and the shadow cabinet.

I don't the answer to that for certain, but my opinion is that the 14 points were a very real attempt at achieving real change in the European political scene so as to improve the world security situation. The pre-war situation was punctuated with secret alliances, mistrust, oppression of minorities little or no respect for the rule of law and a disregard for human rights. Wilson had witnessed that and was rightly appalled.

Wilson was against the germans and saw their actions as the most bellicose of the European powers, He was particularly concerned about the loss of freedom on the high seas, and rightly or wrongly, blamed Germany the most for that loss of innocence.

Certainly the US administration was less experienced than the british, or even the French in the intrigues of diplomacy.

Its a matter of opinion, I cant say ther is any strong supporting evidence, but my notion of german diplomacy is that it was less well developed to that practiced by Britain and France. happy to be corrected on this one

 

[swampyankee]

I don't the answer to that for certain, but my opinion is that the 14 points were a very real attempt at achieving real change in the European political scene so as to improve the world security situation. The pre-war situation was punctuated with secret alliances, mistrust, oppression of minorities little or no respect for the rule of law and a disregard for human rights. Wilson had witnessed that and was rightly appalled.

Wilson was against the germans and saw their actions as the most bellicose of the European powers, He was particularly concerned about the loss of freedom on the high seas, and rightly or wrongly, blamed Germany the most for that loss of innocence.

Certainly the US administration was less experienced than the british, or even the French in the intrigues of diplomacy.

Its a matter of opinion, I cant say ther is any strong supporting evidence, but my notion of german diplomacy is that it was less well developed to that practiced by Britain and France. happy to be corrected on this one

Reading history, it sometimes seemed surprising that the Germans would, during the Great War, assume that other countries would react in ways beneficial to Germany: Britain would stand aside over Belgium, the US would acquiesce to Germany's U-boat campaign, or embargo Britain and France, or Mexico would positively leap for a military alliance against the US.

 

[mikewint]

Michael, Once again I find that you and I are in agreement 95%. Going back to your post #101. You quote my previous post and then say essentially the exact same thing. My post was not as complete and I did leave out the contentious articles 231 and 232 a can of worms if there ever was one.
I would also disagree with you about the German ability to win the war. IMHO the Germans had the potential to win and almost did so. The Schlieffin Plan was workable but for the time period had too many assumptions. In my initial post in this thread #15 I set out four changes in German policy that, again, IMHO would have lead to the Germans winning the war. Nothing is of course certain and the first casualty in any battle is your ORPLAN.
Antisemitism - I hope that you are not suggesting that this originated with the Germans either WWI or WWII. Starting in the three centuries (300–600 C.E.) pattern of institutionalized discrimination against Jews occurred: Jews were forbidden to marry Christians (399 C.E.), were prohibited from holding positions in government (439 C.E.) and were prevented from appearing as witnesses against Christians in court (531 C.E.). In addition certain bizarre fantasies about Jews arose in Northern Europe It was alleged that Jews had horns and tails and engaged in ritual murder of Christians. The latter allegation, referred to as "blood libel," was devised by Thomas of Monmouth in 1150. In 1095, Pope Urban II made a general appeal to the Christians of Europe to take up the cross and sword and liberate the Holy Land from the Muslims. The Crusader army, which more closely resembled a mob, swept through Jewish communities looting, raping and massacring Jews as they went. During the middle of the 14th century, the Bubonic Plague spread throughout Europe. Fear, superstition and ignorance prompted the need to find someone to blame, and the Jews were a convenient scapegoat. In Germany and Austria it is estimated that 100,000 Jews were burned alive for this and other false accusations including using the blood of Christian boys to make Passover Matzoth and for desecrating sacramental wafers. Martin Luther, the founder of the 16th century Reformation and Protestantism, wrote a pamphlet in 1545 entitled The Jews and Their Lies, claiming that Jews thirsted for Christian blood and urging the slaying of the Jews. The Nazis reprinted it in 1935. Beginning in the 13th century, Jews were required to wear a distinctive symbol (a badge and/or a pointed hat) so that they could be immediately recognized and were required to live in ghettos, an action that was revisited by the Nazis in the 20th century. Since Jews were not allowed to own land and the Church did not allow Christians to loan money for profit, Jews had few alternatives but to become moneylenders. Once they became associated with the forbidden trade of usury a new set of stereotypes evolved around the Jews as money-hungry and greedy. As moneylenders, Jews were frequently useful to rulers who used their capital to build cathedrals and outfit armies. As long as the Jews benefited the ruler, either through finance or by serving as convenient scapegoats, they were tolerated. When it suited the ruler, they were expelled—from England in 1290, France in 1394, and Spain in 1492.
Pogrom is a Russian word meaning "to wreak havoc, to demolish violently." Historically, the term refers to violent attacks by local non-Jewish populations on Jews in the Russian Empire and in other countries. The first such incident to be labeled a pogrom is believed to be anti-Jewish rioting in Odessa in 1821.
The perpetrators of pogroms organized locally, sometimes with government and police encouragement. They raped and murdered their Jewish victims and looted their property. During the civil war that followed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Ukrainian nationalists, Polish officials, and Red Army soldiers all engaged in pogrom-like violence in western Belorussia (Belarus) and Poland's Galicia province (now West Ukraine), killing tens of thousands of Jews between 1918 and 1920.

 

[soulezoo]

I don't the answer to that for certain, but my opinion is that the 14 points were a very real attempt at achieving real change in the European political scene so as to improve the world security situation. The pre-war situation was punctuated with secret alliances, mistrust, oppression of minorities little or no respect for the rule of law and a disregard for human rights. Wilson had witnessed that and was rightly appalled.

Wilson was against the germans and saw their actions as the most bellicose of the European powers, He was particularly concerned about the loss of freedom on the high seas, and rightly or wrongly, blamed Germany the most for that loss of innocence.

Certainly the US administration was less experienced than the british, or even the French in the intrigues of diplomacy.

Its a matter of opinion, I cant say ther is any strong supporting evidence, but my notion of german diplomacy is that it was less well developed to that practiced by Britain and France. happy to be corrected on this one

With regard to diplomacy, experience doesn't necessarily translate to effectiveness. Hitler vs Chamberlain exhibit A.
That said, world diplomacy in Wilson's cabinet was certainly not up to the European standards of the day. Because the US was still relatively young, that didn't mean it couldn't have great diplomats. One Ben Franklin also comes to mind. Also, ideology plays a part as well.

Great discussion by the way... thanks to all for it!

 

[mikewint]

Articles 231 and 232
On 18 January 1919, the Paris Peace Conference began. The Treaty of Versailles formed only one part of the conference, and dealt solely with Germany. While 70 delegates from 26 nations participated in the negotiations representatives from Germany were barred from attending.

As Michael has already posted, the Americans, British, and French all differed on the issue of reparations. The Western Front had of course been fought in France and it had been heavily damaged in the fighting. In addition France's most industrialized region had been laid to waste during the German retreat. As a result Georges Clemenceau thought it appropriate that any just peace should require Germany to pay reparations for the damage they had caused and additionally those reparations would serve as a means to ensure that Germany could not again threaten France.

British Prime Minister David Lloyd George opposed harsh reparations in favor of a less crippling reparations settlement so that the German economy could remain a viable economic power and British trading partner. Initially Woodrow Wilson opposed these positions, and was adamant that there be no indemnity imposed upon Germany. However as the war progressed Wilson had hardened his position. Prior to the American entry into the war, Woodrow Wilson called for a "peace of reconciliation with Germany", what he dubbed a "peace without victory". Following the war, on 4 September 1919, Wilson commented that the treaty "seeks to punish one of the greatest wrongs ever done in history, the wrong which Germany sought to do to the world and to civilization, and there ought to be no weak purpose with regard to the application of the punishment. She attempted an intolerable thing, and she must be made to pay for the attempt."

In an attempt to reconcile these views American diplomats Norman Davis and John Foster Dulles began work on the wording of Article 231. Davis and Dulles managed to produce a compromise between the Anglo-French and American positions, wording Article 231 and 232 to reflect that Germany "should, morally, pay for all war costs, but, because it could not possibly afford this, would be asked only to pay for civilian damages."

The 180 man German delegation had departed Berlin on 18 April 1919. Headed by Foreign Minister Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau the delegation was anticipating that the peace talks would soon start and that they and the Allied Powers would negotiate a settlement. Before leaving Brockdorff-Rantzau had informed the Weimar National Assembly that Germany would have to pay reparations for the devastation caused by the war, but would not pay for actual war costs. On 5 May, Brockdorff-Rantzau was informed that there would be no negotiations. Once the German delegation received the conditions of peace they would have fifteen days to reply. Following the drafting of the treaty, on 7 May the German and Allied delegations met and the Treaty of Versailles was handed off to be translated and for a response to be issued. Following the meeting, the German delegation retired to translate the 80,000 word document. As soon as the delegation realized the terms of peace, they agreed that they could not accept it without revision. They then proceeded to send their Allied counterparts, message after message attacking each part of the treaty. On 18 June, Brockdorff-Rantzau declared that Article 231 would have Germany accept full responsibility for the war by force and that he preferred to reject the treaty than submit to what he called a "rotten peace".

On 16 June, the Allied Powers demanded that Germany unconditionally sign the treaty within seven days or face the resumption of hostilities. On 19 June, Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann resigned rather than sign the treaty and was followed by Brockdorff-Rantzau and other members of the government, leaving Germany without a cabinet or peace delegation. After being advised by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg that Germany was in no condition to resume the war, President Friedrich Ebert and the new Chancellor, Gustav Bauer, recommended that the Weimar National Assembly ratify the treaty. The Assembly did so by a large majority, and Clemenceau was informed nineteen minutes before the deadline expired. Germany unconditionally signed the peace treaty on 22 June.

A major contributor to Germanys rejection to Article 231 was that initially it had not been correctly translated. Rather than stating "... Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all the loss and damage ...", the German Government's edition read "Germany admits it, that Germany and her allies, as authors of the war, are responsible for all losses and damages ...". Germans felt that they had signed away Germany's honor, and there was a prevailing belief of humiliation as the article was seen, overall, as an injustice.

The Allied delegation initially thought Article 231 to be a mundane addition to the treaty intended to limit German liability with regard to reparations, and were surprised at the vehemence of the German protests. Georges Clemenceau rebuffed Brockdorff-Rantzau's allegations.
Lloyd George commented that "the English public, like the French public, thinks the Germans must above all acknowledge their obligation to compensate us for all the consequences of their aggression.
Both United States diplomats believed that they had "devised a brilliant solution to the reparation dilemma"; appeasing both the British and French, as well as Allied public opinion.

In 1940, Dulles stated that he was surprised that the article "could plausibly be, and in fact was, considered to be a historical judgment of war guilt". For the rest of his life Dulles took it personally that the Treaty of Versailles failed in its intentions of creating a lasting peace and believed that the treaty was one of the causes of the Second World War. By 1954, as United States Secretary of State he commented that "Efforts to bankrupt and humiliate a nation merely incite a people of vigor and of courage to break the bonds imposed upon them. ... Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited."

 

[Peter Gunn]

*SNIP*

All these aspects have weight, but really are not the root course for the rise of Nazism. They are peripheral factors at best. Nazism, or fascist tendencies are in my opinion innate to german society until german society was smashed and rebuilt from the ground up in 1945. in order for it to work in 1918, the allies had to be as ruthless and unforgiving as they were to be in 1945. Surrender, no terms, just surrender. Unconditionally.

^^^THIS.

I have often pondered what the political landscape of Germany in particular would have looked like if, in 1918-1919 the allies had continued on into Germany and gave the total knockout blow and demanded unconditional surrender.

 

[GrauGeist]

^^^THIS.

I have often pondered what the political landscape of Germany in particular would have looked like if, in 1918-1919 the allies had continued on into Germany and gave the total knockout blow and demanded unconditional surrender.

*IF* the Allies had pushed into German proper and forced a surrender and *IF* the Allies had been more of a benevolent factor in post-war Germany, helping to stabilize the German economy, then there is a strong chance that the socialist movements among the population wouldn't have had a fertile landscape to take root.

I do honestly think that there would have been armed confrontations on down the road, as the Soviet Union would not have been affected by Germany one way or another, post-war and there was still going to be trouble in Italy, Spain and other areas that historically ran their course in the decades following the Great War.

However, I do feel that those hotspots wouldn't have had gasoline poured on them by Germany as did happen historically.

 

[mikewint]

By November 1918, the German Army was beaten but by no means routed. The withdrawal through Belgium and out of France was still fairly orderly.
History tells us that newly revolutionary societies can be both militarily aggressive and successful - look at France from 1792 onward and Bolshevik Russia in 1919. Both were able to withstand powerful internal and external counter-revolutionary forces and I suspect that had the allies entered Germany, the newly republican Germans would have resisted fiercely.
Indeed, would not the Germans have in any case have seen a foreign army as an invader rather than a liberator? We know in 1944-45 there was fanatical resistance in both east and west by the Germans (much more so into 1945 in the east but look at the fight the allies had to secure Aachen and the Hurtigen Forest in late 1944).
So, let's imagine a lesser uprising with a more combative Imperial effort to put down the mutinies and disorder while at the same time continuing the war in the west.
November-December 1918 sees a patchwork of confused fighting within Germany as British, French and American forces advance slowly but steadily from the west encountering strong resistance in some areas but almost none in others.
Bavaria declares independence but soon fragments into internal conflict as does Austria and most of the regions of the former Hapsburg dominion.
The onset of winter further slows the allied advance but on December 11th 1918 the French reached the Rhine at Bonn, south of Cologne. Hastily-assembled German artillery barred the way to the east but the German Army was collapsing under internal tensions, food shortages and mass desertions.
By mid-January, reconnaissance showed German forces dissipating east of the Rhine. On January 15th, under an artillery barrage, French and British forces advanced across the Rhine bridges while American troops improvised a waterborne crossing near Oppenheim .
The French and British soon advanced east as the Germans collapsed in front of them. They found towns full of starving people desperate for food and fuel. On its knees Germany surrenders
The peace will be harsher in some accounts - more territorial losses, Germany likely will be partitioned into several smaller entities, maybe the leadership is put to court, the whole fleet will go, military restrictions will be much harder. Considering reparations, I can imagine that it will be somewhat lighter: everybody by then knows that Germany cannot afford much, and the US influence will have grown massively during the later months of the war.

 

[delcyros]

While suggested otherwise, I hold the opinion that the Kaiserreich would continue, and even encourage to search for technological answers to their social problems. It´s too much to cover now but just from the maritime perspective:

-they would probably have continued the WÜRTTEMBERG, MACKENSEN´s, ERSATZ YORKs while decomissioning all PDN´s, followed soon by the NASSAU´s and HELGOLAND´s, at least.
-PRINZREGENT LUITPLOD would finally receive a four months refit to install the MAN 12,000 ihp marine DIESEL plant for the central shaft, which was standing idle waiting since 1917 for installation after passing the service acceptance trials. This would be a trial ship afterwards for Diesel propulsion.
-Another 12000hp Diesel for SACHSEN made by Germania was not fit for installation (it was junk)
-The next battleship design scheduled for laying down was L20eta alpha -ERSATZ KAISER FRIEDRICH III. Had it come to a Washington Naval agreement, it appears highly likely that the vessel buildt after this design would meet the same fate like TOSA, and BB49 class as well as the formidable G3 design.
- Firecontroll improvements across the board have to be reckoned with (including R.G. for directing AAA)
- during 1918, the IGN introduced a new underwater explosive: Schiesswolle 18. This would be still used during ww2 as S1 explosive. It´s an aluminized underwater explosive, considerably more powerful in underwater hammer effect (jet) than TNT and almost as strong as Torpex in this regard but less powerful in blast.