A Victorious Luftstreitkräfte-Imperial German Aviation Development After WW1

[mikewint]

Once again the Germans did not loose or surrender. The signed an ARMISTICE and eventually a PEACE treaty, but I digress-
Ah Yes, that wonderful feeling of beating your enemy into the earth and making him eat a crapola sandwich without bread. Consider all the peace and tranquility it breeds.
Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place unto the wrath of God : for it is written, Vengeance belongeth unto me; I will recompense, saith the Lord.
Otto von Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor was certainly not a softie, but he did know how to really WIN a war.

At the Battle of Königgrätz, the Austrian army of 240,000 faced the Prussian Army of the Elbe (39,000) and First Army (85,000). One would assume a 2-1 advantage would make a difference, but nonetheless Prussia won handily.
King William and his generals were excited. They wanted to push onward, conquer Bohemia and march straight into Vienna.
However, Bismarck aware that the winds of luck are fickle and that planting the seeds of resentment yields a crop of vengeance, enlisted the help of the Crown Prince (who had opposed the war but had commanded one of the Prussian armies at Königgrätz) to dissuade his father at a very angry meeting. Bismarck had insisted on a "soft peace" with no annexations and no victory parades, so as to be able to quickly restore 'friendly' relations with Austria. Fortunately he got his way and a pattern was established. Each time Bismarck won a battle, he found a way to allow the vanquished side to safe face. His caution served him well.
The "soft" approach allowed Prussia to get everything they wanted at the Peace of Prague (1866). First the German Confederation was dissolved. Then Prussia annexed former Austrian territories Schleswig, Holstein, Frankfurt, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, and Nassau.
Thanks to Bismarck's "soft" policies Prussia now controlled practically all of Northern Germany with Austria as an ally.

 

[parsifal]

The First World War was a war of attrition. After the United States of America joined the war on the side of the Entente, Germany simply lacked the ability to place enough men and military resources on the western front to provide an adequate challenge, especially in light of the abandonment of Germany by its allies Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, all of whom began negotiating their own independent armistices in September 1918.


US intervention was not decisive to the outcomes achieved in 1918. It would have begun to have a massive effect had the fighting continued into 1919 and beyond


Yet, despite losing the war of attrition and facing total defeat, Germany did not lose the war militarily as it was not defeated by a crushing Entente invasion.


Germany was facing invasion after the results of amiens and the 100 days offensive. August 8 was described as the german army's "black day" by Ludendorf, who within a fortnight was admitting privately that Germany was doomed. A really good account of what the germans were facing and the effects of the last allied offensive was having on them is to be found in The German Army on the Western Front 1917-1918

by David Biltone


As such, some historians have maintained that Germany did not lose the First World War, as an armistice is "a cessation of hostilities by common agreement of the opposing sides; a truce," to be concluded by a peace treaty, not a surrender by either side.


Germany was driven to the "armistice" because her armies , indeed her entire society, were facing abject and total defeat if they did not agree to the terms of 'armistice" presented to them. They thought they could rely on the 14 points, but this was never agreed to by the main entente nations. The supreme german commandeer of the western front armies, Crown Prince Rupprecht gave a detailed assessment of the plight of the German army, summarized in the following

What the germans were facing were Wilsons so called "14 points" which in effect amounted to a German capitulation, an abandonment of all their war aims. The western allies and significant element of the US establishment rejected the 14 points as too lenient on Germany. Pershing, the head of the US army in France was prophetic in his appraisal, knowing that a negotiated settlement was not sufficient and in fact the allies could, and should, demand unconditional surrender. The germans until the very end were unable to accept even the dove like proposals submitted by Wilson,


In July 1918, the Germans' Spring Offensive that had been launched in March was successfully "withstood" by the Allies who then began a counter offensive that steadily pushed the Germans back. Following this turn of events, the notion that Germany was losing the war and would have to commence peace negotiations with the Entente powers was brought to Kaiser Wilhelm II's attention for the first time in August 1918. Despite the military setback, General Ludendorff ascertained that "although the military situation was grim, it was not hopeless," but over the following month the German High Command came to recognize the immense strength and power of the American military. Thus, approaching the Kaiser just over a month later, on September 29, 1918, Ludendorff was certain that Germany's loss of the war was inevitable and impending. Along with General Hindenburg, he called for the immediate undertaking of armistice negotiations for a peace treaty based on President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff sought an "honourable peace" for the German military and relied on the American President's call for "a just peace and 'impartial' justice."


This an overly optimistic appraisal of where Ludendorf stood at this point. Using Billton again;

Therefore, though Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff had not read the Fourteen Points, they requested that the ensuing peace treaty be based on them in order to allow Germany and the German army to escape a "shameful peace".


The United States entered World War I on the side of the Allies on April 6, 1917. However, the U.S. entered the war reluctantly. Unlike many European nations, the U.S. wasn't fighting over territory or in revenge for past wars. Wilson wanted the end of the war to bring out lasting peace for the world. Through this speech and the Fourteen Points, Wilson became the only leader of the countries fighting in the war to publicly outline his war goals.


It is important to remember that the US was not the major allied power, and that the main power if the entente, France, never agreed to the 14 points. Britain was evasive and non-committal

Although the nature of the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles was that of a dictated peace, a weak government, such as the new-born Weimar Republic government, had even less authority to protest the conditions being imposed. As Wilhelm II wrote in his memoirs, "the Entente would never have dared offer such [harsh] terms to an intact German Empire."


This is typical of the unreality in which the Kaiser existed at the time. By 1918, the over weaning emotion driving the entente leadership was firstly to inflict revenge, and secondly to ensure that the germans be made to pay and accept responsibility for the conflagration. Increasingly Germany was losing its ability to control what happened to it. What was missing from the Allied surrender was occupation of the german capital and unconditional surrender, as Pershing had advocated.

Furthermore, until the imposition of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it was easy for Germans to imagine that they were…undefeated. In this way, the deposition of Germany's monarch meant its loss of a strong, established central actor that embodied the nation and, had he been supported, could have defended Germany in the peace negotiations.

Without the Kaiser, Germany was made vulnerable, allowing for its defeat in the Armistice and peace negotiations. Thus the nature of Germany's loss of the Great War, while intrinsically tied to its inability to continue the war of attrition, was diplomatic.

What made Germany vulnerable, and indeed ripe for revolution, was its defeat on the field. If Germany had succeeded in its expansionary war of conquest, it would not have suffered the breakdown that it did. Kaiser, or no Kaiser, it was in for a rough time once it was faced with defeat.

 

[GrauGeist]

And the German Royalty was not being "cowardly" in their leaving to exile - with the unrest in the streets, the lesson recently learned at the expense of the Romanov family was well heeded and certainly the right decision.

 

[swampyankee]

So, you're arguing that a) the German forces didn't surrender. Fine. The navy had collapsed, the government had collapsed, civil society was collapsing, the German people were starving because the German government gave higher priority to munitions than to keeping its people alive, and the German Army was being beaten in the field.

But they didn't lose.

OK. What would a "loss" look like? Carthage after the Third Punic War?

 

[GrauGeist]

So, you're arguing that a) the German forces didn't surrender. Fine. The navy had collapsed, the government had collapsed, civil society was collapsing, the German people were starving because the German government gave higher priority to munitions than to keeping its people alive, and the German Army was being beaten in the field.

But they didn't lose.

OK. What would a "loss" look like? Carthage after the Third Punic War?

So what's your point that you're attempting to make?

You've been working really hard at making sure everyone knows how evil and vile the Germans are.
Fine, point taken and so, now what?

And Germany may have been Carthage after the dust settled in 1918...the country lay in ruins, it's economy was destroyed - tell me, should we have just burned the damned place down and put all the Germans out of their misery?

 

[KiwiBiggles]

So what's your point that you're attempting to make?

You've been working really hard at making sure everyone knows how evil and vile the Germans are.
Fine, point taken and so, now what?

And Germany may have been Carthage after the dust settled in 1918...the country lay in ruins, it's economy was destroyed - tell me, should we have just burned the damned place down and put all the Germans out of their misery?

No, but something needed to be done to make the Germans realise that they lost, and stop the "stab in the back" myth before it started. As it was, the lack of ostentatious victory demonstrations allowed the Germans, and others it would appear, to convince themselves that they didn't really lose.

 

[parsifal]

The answer to that hypothetical is definitely not. The problem however has three main elements.

1) Germany was not a happy place to live in in the aftermath of her defeat.
2) Many germans emerged not understanding that they had lost, the beginnings of the "stabbed in the back myth"
3) Linked to this, there was no tangible allied presence, except for the occupation of the Rhineland, which did not have the effect that should have been a number one priority for the allies

It is inescapable to compare the relative failure of the Versaille peace to peace in 1945. The level of destruction endured by Germany was vastly greater in 1945 than it had been in 1918. In 1918, virtually none of the national infrastructure was affected, the casualties suffered by germany in WWI a fraction of those they had endured in WWII. The allies immediately embarked on a program of denazification, and more importantly were determined to make every German survivor keenly aware of what they had done. their collective guilt was enshrined in the peace treaty. this was attempted in 1918, but largely failed. The Nuremberg trials were a part of that de-nazification and war guilt process

Reparations is another red herring often touted as the reason for the rise of Nazism. Yet in 1945 the reparations bill for the Germans was far greater than it had ever been in 1918. moreover most of the reparations imposed under Versailles were never paid, still aren't.

All these aspects have weight, but really are not the root course for the rise of Nazism. They are peripheral factors at best. Nazism, or fascist tendencies are in my opinion innate to german society until german society was smashed and rebuilt from the ground up in 1945. in order for it to work in 1918, the allies had to be as ruthless and unforgiving as they were to be in 1945. Surrender, no terms, just surrender. Unconditionally.

 

[swampyankee]

So what's your point that you're attempting to make?

You've been working really hard at making sure everyone knows how evil and vile the Germans are.
Fine, point taken and so, now what?

And Germany may have been Carthage after the dust settled in 1918...the country lay in ruins, it's economy was destroyed - tell me, should we have just burned the damned place down and put all the Germans out of their misery?

No. Losing is neither evil nor vile; it's losing. The evil was committed by the nation's security services, who were publicly against the government the Kaiser handed power to and nationalist propagandists who blamed German Jews and socialists for the defeat: after all, the Kaiser didn't sign or order the military to surrender or stop fighting. That's my point; that's the historical datum you're ignoring.

Germany lost. It's armies may not have been defeated in detail or ground to powder, as was done in 1945, but they were defeated. It's nothing but the founding myth of nazism that they weren't.

 

[GrauGeist]

I am fully aware of the historical datum and I am fully aware of the impact that Germany had on the post-war landscape. I am also fully aware of the growing social sentiment of the time, particularly against governments.

With growing attention to Marxism by the working class, failing economies or economies that saw people struggling for their very existance created a hotbed of trouble. Russia was one such example, as their involvement in the war bankrupted the economy and gave the Bolsheviks a way to get their foot in the door.

So Germany was left to rot - staggering national debt, no economy and people starving to death. Add the current Marxist and Anarchist sentiments floating about in social circles - what could have possibly gone wrong?

 

[mikewint]

Michael, excellent points as always and we're in about 90% agreement.
1. Yes, the US had yet to make a "significant" contribution BUT the US had delivered a million men with another million on the way. The German civilian population was enduring severe shortages of everything. The Army fared better but even so shortages of men and materials were severe. Britain and France thanks to the US had literally unlimited material.
2. Actual Invasion of Germany. In late October Wilhelm had appointed Gen. Groener to fill Ludendorff's post. Transferred now to army high command headquarters at Spa, Belgium, Groener was demoralized with what he found.
In the book, "The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff conduct World War I," historian Robert B. Asprey wrote: "A tour of the front convinced (Groener) that total defeat was very close. Many divisions had battalion strengths of only two or three hundred men or less; numerous units had no officers. The enemy was advancing in almost all sectors and would probably break through before the army could withdraw ... Bulgaria had already laid down her arms, Vienna and Constantinople had requested armistices."
Additionally, when the admirals of Germany's High Seas Fleet ordered their ships to make one last glorious attack upon Britain's Royal Navy, sailors at Kiel mutinied and started to riot. Communists had already seized control of much of Munich and proclaimed a "worker's republic."
3. The 14 points acceptance. The speech was widely disseminated as an instrument of Allied propaganda and was translated into many languages for global dissemination. Copies were also dropped behind German lines, to encourage the Central Powers to surrender in the expectation of a just settlement. Indeed, in a note sent to Wilson by Prince Maximilian of Baden, the German imperial chancellor, in October 1918 requested an immediate armistice and peace negotiations on the basis of the Fourteen Points.
4. The Fourteen Points were accepted by France and Italy on November 1, 1918. Britain later signed off on all of the points except the freedom of the seas. The United Kingdom also wanted Germany to make reparation payments for the war, and thought that that should be added to the Fourteen Points.

 

[mikewint]

Swamp & Kiwi well true enough: "All of the inhabitants were enslaved and the city utterly destroyed (the myth that the land was then spread with salt to prevent resettlement is a later invention). A curse was then set on any person who attempted to resettle the area. North Africa was then made a Roman province." So nope didn't happen but hyper inflation did.
I also suggest that you re-read my post #73. The effect of hyperinflation on German citizens cannot be over stated. In 1914, the exchange rate of the German mark to the American dollar was about 4.2 to one. Nine years later, it was 4.2 trillion to one.
The out-of-control inflation began somewhat mildly during World War I, as the German government printed unbacked currency and borrowed money to finance military expenditures. After the war inflation crept up slowly at first, before accelerating rapidly in late 1922. The exchange rate ballooned from 2,000 marks per dollar to 20,000 to a million and beyond in just a few months, riding on a growing wave of economic panic and mistrust.
As the government commissioned 130 printing companies to churn out piles of increasingly worthless currency, Germans struggled to survive in increasingly absurd conditions.
Waiters had to climb on top of tables to announce new menu prices every half hour.
Workers brought wheelbarrows, sacks and suitcases to work to collect their wages. According to one story, a distracted worker found that his suitcase was stolen, with his wages dumped out and left behind. Families burnt money to stay warm because it was cheaper than buying fuel.
The price of a loaf of bread went from 250 marks in January 1923 to 200 trillion in November — when Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party attempted the Beer Hall Putsch.

 

[mikewint]

Michael, your post #87:
In early 1918, German forces on the western front were still holding conquered territory but faced a problem. Their forces were finite and being pushed to exhaustion, while their enemies were benefitting from millions of fresh US troops being on their way. A French breakdown in morale a few months before had been saved by the thought other people were coming to help. While Germany might have won in the east, many troops were tied down holding their gains. The German commander Ludendorff, therefore decided to make one final great attack to try and break the western front open before the US arrived in strength. The attack made large gains at first but petered out and was pushed back; the allies followed this up by inflicting 'The Black Day of the German Army' (Battle of Amiens) when they started to push the Germans back beyond their defenses.

Ludendorff was forced to admit finally that Germany could no longer win and would need to seek an armistice. But he also knew the military would be blamed, and decided to move this blame elsewhere. Power was transferred to a civilian government, who now had to seek an armistice and negotiate a peace. This effectively allowed the military to stand back and claim they could have carried on: after all, Germans forces were still on enemy territory. As Germany went through a transition from imperial military command through socialist upheaval and then a democratic government, the old soldiers blamed these 'November Criminals' (those who had helped to form the new Weimar government and broker the peace which Germans had so desperately wanted, but which had ended so disastrously in the Versailles Treaty) for abandoning the war effort. Hindenburg, Ludendorff's notional superior, said the Germans had been 'stabbed in the back' ( Dolchstosslegende was initiated and fanned by these retired German wartime military leaders, who, well aware in 1918 that Germany could no longer effectively wage war and had advised the Kaiser to sue for peace) by these civilians. The Treaty of Versailles' harsh terms did nothing to prevent the 'criminals' idea festering. The military escaped the blame and was seen to stand apart. Socialists were 'at fault'.
The men of the new civilian government had a hard time negotiating with their enemies, who felt they had completely won. Not only did the November Criminals sign the armistice to end the war, but they went on to be involved in the settlement negotiations that produced the Treaty of Versailles. These weren't negotiations with the Germans, but amongst the allies and then dictated to their enemies. It was a disaster for Germany, and the new, democratic Weimar government was tarred with it.
Vernunftsrepublikaner ("republicans by reason"), individuals like the historian Friedrich Meinecke and Nobel prize-winning author Thomas Mann, had at first resisted democratic reform. They now felt compelled to support the Weimar Republic as the least worst alternative. They tried to steer their compatriots away from polarization to the radical Left and Right. The promises of the German nationalist Right to revise the Versailles Treaty through force if necessary increasingly gained inroads in respectable circles. Meanwhile the specter of an imminent Communist threat, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and of short-lived Communist revolutions or coups in Hungary (Bela Kun) and in Germany itself (Sparticist Uprising), shifted German political sentiment decidedly toward right-wing causes.
Agitators from the political left served heavy prison sentences for inspiring political unrest. On the other hand, radical rightwing activists like Adolf Hitler, whose Nazi Party had attempted to depose the government of Bavaria and commence a "national revolution" in the November 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, served only nine months of a five year prison sentence for treason—which was a capital offense.
Hitler, recruited disaffected ex-soldiers and military elites, who wielded the stab in the back myth and the November Criminals to enhance his own power and plans. The lie of the November Criminals played a key and direct role in Hitler's rise to power.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Lot's of good stuff in this thread.

Mike, thanks for the reply, not to sound like a jerk, but yes, I pretty much know all that, I was curious on your stance, it seemed you were angling for the "stabbed in the back" theory. I'm convinced I'm wrong about that, I can tell from your posts you obviously realize Germany WAS beaten, more of a question of semantics as far as armistice v. surrender. But technically yes, you're correct, they signed an armistice not a surrender document.

In all my studies it's nagged me what would have happened if there had at least been a reasonable negotiated peace in say late 1916 early 1917. Imperial Germany had it's flaws as any government does, but I'm of the opinion that the Nazi's were far worse. I've pondered what would have happened even in late 1918, if the Kaiser had been allowed to abdicate in favor of his eldest son and kept the monarchy more on the English model. Would we have had another go 'round or would there have been cooler heads prevailing. I tend to think with the Soviets around, peace in Europe was not in the cards anyway.

I also tend to think that the red army wasn't going to just waltz all the way to the Bay of Biscay in '45, I think they would have been in for a rude awakening.

Just my two pennies worth.

Cheers.

 

[mikewint]

Peter, as to Dolchstoss in den Rucken, no I don't buy it but I do feel that the Germans were mislead as to what the Peace treaty would entail. When the Treaty was forced on them it bred a great deal of resentment and the first domino fell planting the seeds of WWII.

Now, beyond a shadow of a doubt, after the last German offensive on the western front failed in 1918, the German war effort was doomed and raw production figures confirm that Germany could not possibly have won a war of attrition against Britain, France, and the United States combined. The Germans would have to sue for peace. So yes, in all but name the Germans were defeated BUT like the boxer who is knocked down but not out the war had not touched German soil and as such they had a tremendous potential. Whether that would be for good or evil would depend on their perception on the Peace that ensued.

Enter the 14 points, as I posted, Wilsons speech was widely disseminated as an instrument of Allied propaganda and was translated into many languages for global dissemination. Copies were also dropped behind German lines, to encourage the Central Powers to surrender in the expectation of a just settlement. Indeed, in a note sent to Wilson by Prince Maximilian of Baden, the German imperial chancellor, in October 1918 requested an immediate armistice and peace negotiations on the basis of the Fourteen Points.

Allied governments paid lip service to the Fourteen Points while the fighting continued. Those nations needed American financial might to assist in their rebuilding after the war and did not want to risk offending Wilson. There was some fear in Europe the United States might seek a separate peace with Germany, freeing that nation to continue the fight without the presence of American forces.
The French and British were particularly unhappy with Wilson's plan. Both had felt the impact of German militarism much more deeply than the United States and were committed to taking steps that they felt would preclude further German aggression.
The Allies agreed to accept the Fourteen Points as the basis for the coming peace negotiations if Wilson would agree to two reservations:
1. The delegates would not be committed to accepting a provision guaranteeing freedom of the seas
(Point 2) — a measure demanded by Britain.
2. The French insisted that the provision having to do with German evacuation from French territory
(Point 8) be interpreted to allow for the collection of compensation (reparations) for civilian damages
incurred in the war.

Wilson accepted these reservations and forwarded the peace plan to the German government on November 5.

Instead the German delegation was handed the fait accompli that was the Treaty of Versailles
The treaty, was written by the Big Three with no participation by the Germans. The negotiations revealed a split between the French, who wanted to dismember Germany to make it impossible for it to renew war with France, and the British and Americans, who did not want to create pretexts for a new war. The eventual treaty included fifteen parts and 440 articles.
Part I created the Covenant of the New League of Nations, which Germany was not allowed to join until 1926.
Part II specified Germany's new boundaries, giving Eupen-Malmeacutedy to Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine back to France, substantial eastern districts to Poland, Memel to Lithuania, and large portions of Schleswig to Denmark.
Part III stipulated a demilitarized zone and separated the Saar from Germany for fifteen years.
Part IV stripped Germany of all its colonies.
Part V reduced Germany's armed forces to very low levels and prohibited Germany from possessing certain classes of weapons, while committing the Allies to eventual disarmament as well.
Part VIII established Germany's liability for reparations without stating a specific figure and began with Article 231, in which Germany accepted the responsibility of itself and its allies for the losses and damages of the Allies "as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."
Part IX imposed numerous other financial obligations upon Germany.

The German government signed the treaty under protest. Right-wing German parties attacked it as a betrayal, and terrorists assassinated several politicians whom they considered responsible. The U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty, and the U.S. government took no responsibility for most of its provisions.

From "Ludendorff: The Soldier and the Politician" by John W. Wheeler-Bennett the following story:
In the autumn of 1919, when Ludendorff was dining with the head of the British Military Mission in Berlin, British general Sir Neill Malcolm. Malcolm asked Ludendorff why it was that he thought Germany lost the war. Ludendorff replied with his list of excuses, including that the home front failed the army.
Malcolm asked him: "Do you mean, General, that you were stabbed in the back?" Ludendorff's eyes lit up and he leapt upon the phrase like a dog on a bone. "Stabbed in the back?" he repeated. "Yes, that's it, exactly, we were stabbed in the back". And thus was born a legend which has never entirely perished.
The phrase was to Ludendorff's liking, and he let it be known among the general staff that this was the "official" version, and so it was disseminated throughout German society. This was picked up by right-wing political factions and used as a form of attack against the SPD-led early Weimar government.
In a hearing before the Committee on Inquiry of the National Assembly on November 18, 1919, a year after the war's end, Hindenburg declared, "As an English general has very truly said, the German Army was 'stabbed in the back'."
Malcolm could not have known at the time but he had used a phrase that had special meaning to the Germans. Hitler of course realized that to Germans: in the medieval legend of the Nibelungenlied, the hero, Siegfried, exhausted from being pursued, stopped to drink at a spring and was murdered by a villain thrusting a spear into his back.
This spawned the Dolchstosslegende and made Germans culturally sensitive to the duplicity of a stab in the back.

So as I already posted in #81: Ah Yes, that wonderful feeling of beating your enemy into the earth and making him eat a crapola sandwich without bread. Consider all the peace and tranquility it breeds

 

[parsifal]

4. The Fourteen Points were accepted by France and Italy on November 1, 1918. Britain later signed off on all of the points except the freedom of the seas. The United Kingdom also wanted Germany to make reparation payments for the war, and thought that that should be added to the Fourteen Points.

no, that is not correct, not even close. in fact the formal response from Britain and france was a combined response in the form of a formal diplomatic note and reads;

"A statement of the Allied Governments after the German Government had indicated its willingness to consider signing an Armistice based on President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'.

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference. Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the Allies feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air".

Sure the allies were moving to outmanouver the germans yet again, but at no point did Britain or France ever accede to the 14 points in their entirety (in fact the qualifications they placed on them were such that they would not apply at all to the resolution of the conflicts insofar as it affected these major western nations. It should have been clear to any clear thinking german government at the time that the western allies were not going to be bound by them. That the US was too naïve and the germans too desperate to pay attention is hardly reason to criticise Britain or France to the hard nosed reality check they were applying).

The 14 points were used as the basis for the creation of yugoslavia,, the rights of self determination and the like, but for the way the war had affected the core allied nations of Britain and france they were not, and never were accepted and the Allies made that VERY clear from the beginning. Germany had no choice other than to accept these terms because they knew they faced total defeat and occupation if they did not.

 

[parsifal]

The stab in the back myth (German: Dolchstoßlegende) was the notion, widely believed in right-wing circles in Germany after 1918, that the German Army did not lose WWI on the battlefield but was instead betrayed by the civilians on the home front, especially the republicans who overthrew the monarchy in the German Revolution of 1918-19. Advocates denounced the German government leaders who signed the Armistice on November 11, 1918, as the "November Criminals". There are various latter day permutations of that basic positioning as is being witnessed here.


When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they made the legend an integral part of their official history of the 1920s, portraying the new weimar republic as the work of the "November criminals" who used the stab in the back to seize power while betraying the nation. The Nazi propaganda depicted Weimar as "a morass of corruption, degeneracy, national humiliation, ruthless persecution of the honest 'national opposition'—fourteen years of rule by Jews, Marxists, and 'cultural Bolsheviks', who had at last been swept away by the National Socialist movement under inspired leadership of adolf hitler.

Scholars inside and outside Germany unanimously reject the notion, pointing out the German army was out of reserves and was being overwhelmed in late 1918. (see Kolb, Eberhard (2005). The Weimar Republic. New York: Routledge. p. 140)

In the later part of the war, Germany was essentially a military dicatatorship, with the Supreme High Command (OHL) and General Field Marshal Hindenburg as commander-in-chief advising the figurehead Kaiser. After the failure of the spring and summer offensives of 1918 failed in 1918, the war effort was doomed. In response, by autumn, OHL arranged for a rapid change to a civilian government. General Ludendorf, Germany's Chief of Staff, said:

I have asked His Excellency to now bring those circles to power which we have to thank for coming so far. We will therefore now bring those gentlemen into the ministries. They can now make the peace which has to be made. They can eat the broth which they have prepared for us!"

As the military situation for the Germans on the Western Front became ever more precarious, Prince Maximilian of Baden reached out to the American President Woodrow Wilson, indicating that Germany was willing to accept his fourteen point plan. On November 11, 1918, the representatives of the newly formed weimar republic signed an armistice agreement with the allies which would end World War I. The subsequent Treaty of Versailles led to further territorial and financial losses. As the Kaiser had been forced to abdicate and the military relinquished executive power, it was the temporary "civilian government" that sued for peace—the signature on the armistice document was of Matthias Erzberger, a civilian, who was later murdered for his alleged treason; this led to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

Wilson's plan, however, was not widely supported in France or Britain, where attitudes towards Germany were much less conciliatory. The prevailing attitude in Paris and London was that Germany had been chiefly, if not entirely responsible for the outbreak of the war. For that, many argued, Germany should be held accountable and punished. They also called for measures to reduce Germany's ability to make war in the future, by dismantling or reducing her military and industrial sectors. The push to castrate Germany's military capacity came chiefly from the French, who had the most to fear from its eastern neighbour. At the Paris negotiations, French prime minister Georges Clemenceau argued forcefully for punitive and restrictive measures against Germany. Clemenceau wanted to send Germany's economy backwards, from a first-world industrial nation into a weak cluster of provinces concerned with agricultural production and small-scale manufacturing.

The Treaty of Versailles came to reflect much more of Clemenceau's punitive approach than Wilson's conciliatory one. Among its main terms and conditions:

• Germany lost substantial amounts of territory. She was stripped of all overseas colonies and forced to surrender large amounts of European territory, including some of significant strategic or industrial value. Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France, while other areas were surrendered to Belgium, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
  
  
• The Rhineland, an area of German territory bordering France, was ordered to be demilitarised, as a means of protecting the French border. Another German border region, the Saarland, was occupied and administered by France.
  
  
• Germany was banned from entering into any political union or confederation with Austria.
  
  
• The German Reichswehr (army) was restricted in size. It could contain no more than 100,000 men and was forbidden from using conscription to fill its ranks. There were also restrictions on the size and composition of its officer class.
  
  
• The German military was subject to other restrictions and prohibitions. Naval vessels were restricted in tonnage while bans were imposed on the production or acquisition of tanks, heavy artillery, chemical weapons, aircraft, airships and submarines.
  
  
• The treaty's Article 231 (the 'war guilt clause') determined that Germany was single-handedly responsible for initiating the war, thus providing a legal basis for the payment of war reparations to the Allies.
  
  These terms were formulated by the Allies without the input of Germany, which was not permitted to attend the Paris peace summit. In May 1919 German delegates were finally invited to Paris. After being kept waiting for several days, they were presented with the draft treaty. The German foreign minister, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, spoke at Versailles, suggesting that while his country was prepared to make amends for its wartime excesses, the suggestion that Germany was alone in starting the war or exceeding the rules of war was baseless:
  
  When news of the treaty reached Germany it generated a firestorm of public anger. Germans had expected a fair and even handed agreement based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. Instead, they were handed what they called the "Versailles diktat" – a treaty that was not negotiated between equals but was forced on a war-ravaged and starving people at the point of a gun. There were few moments of national unity in Weimar Germany – but the response to Versailles was one of them. Erich Ludendorff considered the treaty the work of Jews, bankers and plotting socialists. Gustav Stresemann described it as a "moral, political and economic death sentence". "We will be destroyed," said Walter Rathenau. In the Weimar Reichstag, delegates from all political parties except the USPD rose to condemn the Versailles treaty and the conduct of the Allies. Almost every newspaper in Germany slammed the treaty and screamed for the government to reject it.
  
  For two tense months the Weimar government debated the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. The issue brought about the demise of Weimar's first chancellor, Philipp Scheidemann, who resigned rather than ratify the treaty, which he deemed a "murderous plan". President Friedrich Ebert was also opposed to the Versailles treaty. In June he contacted military commanders and asked whether the army could defend the nation, if the government refused to sign the treaty and the Allies resumed the war. Both Paul von Hindenburg and Wilhelm Groener advised the Reichstag that the army lacked materiel and munitions and could not withstand an Allied offensive or invasion of Germany. Any refusal to comply with Versailles would also prolong the Allied food blockade, which was still ongoing in June 1919 and contributing to thousands of civilian deaths from starvation and Spanish flu epidemic. Confronted with this advice, the Reichstag had no alternative but to submit to the Allies. Germany's delegates signed the treaty on June 28th 1919. It was ratified by the Weimar assembly almost a fortnight later (July 9th), passed 209 votes to 116.
  
  For the SPD and other moderates, the acceptance of Versailles was a necessary measure, given reluctantly to prevent more war and bloodshed, an Allied invasion of Germany and the possible dissolution of the German stateitself. There can be little doubt that the civilian leadership was duped by the snior German army leadership. . Some accepted Versailles in the hope that it could be renegotiated and relaxed later.
  
  Those in the military and the far right, however, saw it as yet another betrayal. "Today German honour is dragged to the grave. Never forget it!" screamed one nationalist newspaper. "The German people will advance again to regain their pride. We will have our revenge for the shame of 1919!" Conspiracists on the far right claimed the ratification was more evidence of destructive forces at work in Germany's civilian government. The Treaty of Versailles – or rather the question of how Germany should have responded to it – would contribute to political divisions for the life of the Weimar Republic.
  
  The question arising from all this is whether the treaty caused this self delusion, or whether it was innate in the german psyche before the treaty. The treaty was harsh, but not as harsh as those that followed the surrender in 1945. Most scholars agree that the peace treaty as the main cause of the swing to the right is in fact to believe the myths generated by the Nazis and other far right organisations that ate this stuff up and manufactured it for public consumption to a willing and demoralised public. Its up to everyone top make their own minds up, but for me it is clear. Versailles was not the main reason for the right wing reaction in Germany. The seeds for that reaction were already there, any treaty would have caused a swing to the right. What the germans really wanted they could not have. They wanted victory when none was to be had. Without victory they were never going to play ball. Therein lies your long term reasons for the rise of Nazism. It was inevitable, inescapable until the national psyche had been rewritten as it was in 1945.
  
  
  
  
  

 

[swampyankee]

Parsifal,

Thank you for a great summary.

 

[mikewint]

Michael, this
4. The Fourteen Points were accepted by France and Italy on November 1, 1918. Britain later signed off on all of the points except the freedom of the seas. The United Kingdom also wanted Germany to make reparation payments for the war, and thought that that should be added to the Fourteen Points.
and this
The Allies agreed to accept the Fourteen Points as the basis for the coming peace negotiations if Wilson would agree to two reservations:
1. The delegates would not be committed to accepting a provision guaranteeing freedom of the seas
(Point 2) — a measure demanded by Britain.
2. The French insisted that the provision having to do with German evacuation from French territory
(Point 8) be interpreted to allow for the collection of compensation (reparations) for civilian damages
incurred in the war.
are from: Grigg, John (2002). Lloyd George: War Leader. London: Allen Lane. ISBN-7139-9343-X
The rest of your #95 and #96 posts are essentially the same as what I have already posted so I fail to see any substantial differences between our stances.
What point are you trying to make?

 

[swampyankee]

Hopefully, this will be neutral question with a definable answer: when was the final armistice on the Western Front requested and by whom? I've got one source (Germany telegraphs President Wilson seeking armistice - Oct 04, 1918 - HISTORY.com) that says Chancellor von Baden on Oct 4, 1918, in a telegram to US President Wilson.

 

[Peter Gunn]

God I love this place. You all are awesome.