"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (2 Viewers)

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Russian insider sources claimed that the Kremlin's inner circle is again actively disagreeing about the necessity of and preparations for a second wave of reserve mobilization ahead of the semi-annual fall conscription cycle, which starts on October 1. A Russian Telegram channel with alleged connections to Russian security sources claimed that select Russian officials are "seriously" preparing for a second wave of reserve mobilization and are hoping to conduct another reserve mobilization wave in the fall.[1] It is important to distinguish between Russia's normal semi-annual conscription callup, a large-scale reserve mobilization like the one that brought more than 300,000 reservists into the Russian armed forces in Fall 2022, crypto-mobilizations that bring reservists into the force at lower numbers over a long period of time, and various efforts to encourage or coerce Russians to sign ostensibly voluntary contracts with the Russian military. The channel claimed that Russian officials want to mobilize between 170,000 to 175,000 reservists and move the fall conscription date from October 1 to November 1 to accommodate a reserve mobilization processes, while simultaneously conducting "contract mobilization" to recruit an additional 130,000 personnel for contract service using coercive measures.[2] The channel claimed that a powerful group of "siloviki hawks" is also proposing stricter reserve mobilization measures such as restricting certain individuals from obtaining mobilization deferrals, which has sparked major disagreements with officials in the Russian Presidential Administration. The channel claimed that the Presidential Administration fears a response to such measures from other Russian officials and broader Russian society.

These plans, proposals, and disagreements are not new and do not indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has ultimately decided to conduct a second reserve mobilization wave in the near term. ISW previously observed an increase in discussions about reserve mobilization preparations and speculations in the lead-up to the spring conscription cycle earlier in 2023.[3] Select Russian officials have also proposed more dramatic mobilization measures that have not materialized.[4] Putin also emphasized Russian contract service recruitment rates when responding to the question about the potential second reserve mobilization wave at the Eastern Economic Forum on September 12.[5] Putin's response does not necessarily set information conditions to prepare Russian society for involuntary mobilization and instead may suggest his commitment to ongoing crypto mobilization practices. Any new reserve mobilization wave depends on Putin.[6]

[...]

A car killed a Russian milblogger in occupied Donetsk City on September 11. Russian milblogger Gennady Dubovoy died after a car struck him as he crossed the road, and some other Russian milbloggers mourned Dubovoy's death.[18] Dubovoy's death comes amid an ongoing Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) campaign to censor Russian ultranationalist milbloggers whose narratives and complaints deviate too far from accepted official narratives.[19] Dubovoy has recently levied criticisms against the Russian government for its treatment of Russian combat veterans and former Wagner Group fighters, and recently stated that he took a step back from the ultranationalist information space due to demands to report on the "confirmation of your [referring to Russian officials] delusions."[20] Dubovoy recently indicated that he is not a supporter of imprisoned ultranationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin, whose supporters have recently been the targets of official and public censorship.[21]

Institute for the Study of War

This page collects ISW and CTP's updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
www.understandingwar.org www.understandingwar.org
 
gumbyk said:
Most turbine engines will run on any flammable liquid, BUT...
The life of the engine will be severely shortened. e.g. The Rolls-Royce 250 series allows avgas as an emergency fuel, but has a limitation of 6 hours per engine overhaul period.

So, you might only want to use that stash of vodka to get home in an emergency.
Click to expand...
The shortened life with avgas is due to lead deposits. Unleaded is much less problematic. The problem with vodka would be its much lower LHV, both by mass and by volume than kerosene
 
MiTasol said:
They had some in Ukraine and then withdrew them so one must assume that they had a serious defect. Can that be fixed in the next 15 months? Who knows but if they send one or two back then they have met their promise.
Click to expand...
Yeah, the serious defect is called engine and is known since 2015 give or take. Of course they can redeploy the ones they have, no working engine is required if you use them as static artillery pillboxes.

I re-post what I posted in another thread regarding the T-14

--------

On the future of T-14 Armata

Wanted to write this since the start of the war, but never found the time to do so. In the end it has become quite a long text despite being a short version (initially the history of V-2 was much more detailed).

TLDR: It has no future.

51b2e218-74d1-4a62-9365-18d0d7ada4b6_1080x619.jpg

When the T-14 Armata tank was unveiled at the 9 May Victory Day parade, in 2015, it embarrassingly broke down in front of thousands of spectators. Eight years later it can be stated the T-14 is over. To understand why T-14 has been a failure and there is no way to save it, we need a bit of history on soviet tank engines.

The V-2 engine is a diesel V12 designed by the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and is most famous for powering, yes you guessed it, the T-34s fielded during WWII. However, work on this engine continued on, being used in the T-54/55, T-62, T-72 and T-90. You read that right, many of Russia's current main battle tanks use a modified version of the T-34's engine.
Richard-Allen-CC-BY-2.0.jpg


The development of the V-2 started in 1931 as a potential new engine for future Soviet tanks and aircraft. It was originally developed in the Kharkiv Locomotive Factory (in today's Ukraine). The V-2 was an impressively modern design for the 1930s, with double overhead cams and four valves per cylinder. It displaced a huge 38.8 liters (2,367.7 cu in) and, in its initial variants, had an output of 500 hp. Despite being around 70 years old, the V-2, albeit in modernized form, found itself powering Russia's third generation MBT, the T-90. Latest T-90 variants T-90AM and T-90MS feature the upgraded 1,130 hp V-92S2F a direct descendant of the original V-2. This piece of engineering is now around 90 years old. There are few pieces of technology, let alone engines, that have remained in service for as long as the V-2.

A notable exception to the V-2 saga is the T-64, which carried a 5TDF engine. Some claim it's a failed attempt to copy the German wartime bomber engine Junkers Jumo 205. It certainly was inspired by it. Like the Jumo its a 2-stroke diesel engine with opposed pistons sharing a single cylinder per pair. The engine although small, compact and powerful was not very reliable, plus the T-64 was expensive to manufacture. The engine its produced in Ukraine, that is why Russia is returning to service older stored tanks like T-54/55 and T-62 but not the T-64 while Ukraine is fielding a few hundred T-64. The other exception is the T-80 that was powered by the SG-1000 gas turbine. A special case is the T-80UD variant, a diesel version with 1,000 hp 6TD (an evolution of the 5TDF engine) that was produced in Ukraine.

The T-14 Armata also started with a new engine, the X-shaped A-85-3. Again, there are claims that it's a (failed) Russian copy of the German X-shaped Simmering SLA 16 tank engine being developed at the end of WWII. The Sla 16 engine never entered production because of the German surrender in May 1945. The majority of Sla 16 parts, tooling, and equipment were captured by the Soviet Union. The A-85-3 however was not designed for a tank but rather as a unit for compressor oil and gas pumping stations. It proved a flop and failed to make any sales. Uralvagonzavod decided to use the engine as the basis of a novel tank: The T-14 Armata. The tank was designed around the engine and not the other way around. The A-85-3 was smaller and more powerful than the V-92S2F fitted to the modern T-90s.

52859468239_7977817929_o.jpg


On November 2014, Russian Defense Ministry television announced that the new tank will surpass all world analogues. These vehicles will replace the three main tanks of the Russian army at once: T-72, T-80 and T-90. The Russian Army initially planned to acquire 2,300 T-14s between 2015 and 2020. By 2018, production issues and fiscal shortfalls delayed this to 2025. Still in 2023 Russia only has a handful of test tanks.

On the top of the list of the production issues stands its engine. The A-85-3 did not sell because it was complex, manifested too many problems, and was difficult to maintain. It was assumed the problems would be corrected over time. They have not been and the A-85-3 remains a problem engine. A quick solution might have been to abandon the A-85-3 and refit T-14 Armata with the proven V-92S2F. It will be a bit underpowered, but at least will work, unfortunately the latter is too big and does not fit in the T-14. Second issue is all the sophisticated electronic equipment. Unfortunately for T-14, advanced microelectronics are no longer available due to sanctions.

The final reason why T-14 Armata will not become a production tank is because there is no assembly line. All models to date have been assembled by hand. The plant and workshops were built but are empty. Contracts were signed, but Western machine tools and other technology were never supplied due to sanctions.

Russia's announcement of the deployment of the T-14 Armata in Ukraine can only be interpreted as an act of propaganda. That tank is far from having a decisive role in this war. More recently it's been reported that T-14 has completed combat trials and has been withdrawn from the frontline. Yet, no footage of T-14 in combat has emerged.
 
MiTasol said:
Hey mate

Got a summary of what was there? Seeing Gobble removed the whole account about two hours after your post it should be interesting

View attachment 737382
Click to expand...
It was a Ukrainian soldier talking about using the Challenger 2 in battle - something referenced in the video posted immediately thereafter.
 
fubar57 said:
www.cbc.ca

North Korea's Kim Jong-un promises Putin full support for Russia's 'sacred fight' | CBC News

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed support for Russia's "sacred fight" during a summit with President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday that the U.S. warned could lead to a deal to supply ammunition for Moscow's war in Ukraine.
www.cbc.ca www.cbc.ca

This would be a fine time to stage a coup in NK. Just sayin'
Click to expand...
Unless his sister (who appears even more ruthless) did it I wouldn't count on anything.
 
RogerdeLluria said:
Yeah, the serious defect is called engine and is known since 2015 give or take. Of course they can redeploy the ones they have, no working engine is required if you use them as static artillery pillboxes.

I re-post what I posted in another thread regarding the T-14

--------

On the future of T-14 Armata

Wanted to write this since the start of the war, but never found the time to do so. In the end it has become quite a long text despite being a short version (initially the history of V-2 was much more detailed).

TLDR: It has no future.

View attachment 737439
When the T-14 Armata tank was unveiled at the 9 May Victory Day parade, in 2015, it embarrassingly broke down in front of thousands of spectators. Eight years later it can be stated the T-14 is over. To understand why T-14 has been a failure and there is no way to save it, we need a bit of history on soviet tank engines.

The V-2 engine is a diesel V12 designed by the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and is most famous for powering, yes you guessed it, the T-34s fielded during WWII. However, work on this engine continued on, being used in the T-54/55, T-62, T-72 and T-90. You read that right, many of Russia's current main battle tanks use a modified version of the T-34's engine.
View attachment 737440

The development of the V-2 started in 1931 as a potential new engine for future Soviet tanks and aircraft. It was originally developed in the Kharkiv Locomotive Factory (in today's Ukraine). The V-2 was an impressively modern design for the 1930s, with double overhead cams and four valves per cylinder. It displaced a huge 38.8 liters (2,367.7 cu in) and, in its initial variants, had an output of 500 hp. Despite being around 70 years old, the V-2, albeit in modernized form, found itself powering Russia's third generation MBT, the T-90. Latest T-90 variants T-90AM and T-90MS feature the upgraded 1,130 hp V-92S2F a direct descendant of the original V-2. This piece of engineering is now around 90 years old. There are few pieces of technology, let alone engines, that have remained in service for as long as the V-2.

A notable exception to the V-2 saga is the T-64, which carried a 5TDF engine. Some claim it's a failed attempt to copy the German wartime bomber engine Junkers Jumo 205. It certainly was inspired by it. Like the Jumo its a 2-stroke diesel engine with opposed pistons sharing a single cylinder per pair. The engine although small, compact and powerful was not very reliable, plus the T-64 was expensive to manufacture. The engine its produced in Ukraine, that is why Russia is returning to service older stored tanks like T-54/55 and T-62 but not the T-64 while Ukraine is fielding a few hundred T-64. The other exception is the T-80 that was powered by the SG-1000 gas turbine. A special case is the T-80UD variant, a diesel version with 1,000 hp 6TD (an evolution of the 5TDF engine) that was produced in Ukraine.

The T-14 Armata also started with a new engine, the X-shaped A-85-3. Again, there are claims that it's a (failed) Russian copy of the German X-shaped Simmering SLA 16 tank engine being developed at the end of WWII. The Sla 16 engine never entered production because of the German surrender in May 1945. The majority of Sla 16 parts, tooling, and equipment were captured by the Soviet Union. The A-85-3 however was not designed for a tank but rather as a unit for compressor oil and gas pumping stations. It proved a flop and failed to make any sales. Uralvagonzavod decided to use the engine as the basis of a novel tank: The T-14 Armata. The tank was designed around the engine and not the other way around. The A-85-3 was smaller and more powerful than the V-92S2F fitted to the modern T-90s.

View attachment 737441

On November 2014, Russian Defense Ministry television announced that the new tank will surpass all world analogues. These vehicles will replace the three main tanks of the Russian army at once: T-72, T-80 and T-90. The Russian Army initially planned to acquire 2,300 T-14s between 2015 and 2020. By 2018, production issues and fiscal shortfalls delayed this to 2025. Still in 2023 Russia only has a handful of test tanks.

On the top of the list of the production issues stands its engine. The A-85-3 did not sell because it was complex, manifested too many problems, and was difficult to maintain. It was assumed the problems would be corrected over time. They have not been and the A-85-3 remains a problem engine. A quick solution might have been to abandon the A-85-3 and refit T-14 Armata with the proven V-92S2F. It will be a bit underpowered, but at least will work, unfortunately the latter is too big and does not fit in the T-14. Second issue is all the sophisticated electronic equipment. Unfortunately for T-14, advanced microelectronics are no longer available due to sanctions.

The final reason why T-14 Armata will not become a production tank is because there is no assembly line. All models to date have been assembled by hand. The plant and workshops were built but are empty. Contracts were signed, but Western machine tools and other technology were never supplied due to sanctions.

Russia's announcement of the deployment of the T-14 Armata in Ukraine can only be interpreted as an act of propaganda. That tank is far from having a decisive role in this war. More recently it's been reported that T-14 has completed combat trials and has been withdrawn from the frontline. Yet, no footage of T-14 in combat has emerged.
Click to expand...

View: https://youtu.be/PUp-qGkQvNo?si=qkwXHPHHKO3uJ-B7
 
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