"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (7 Viewers)

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Sure, but that isn't the issue. Radiation leaking at near Chernobyl style from a EU based Nuke power-plant might be enough to render that particular or neighboring EU countries
of their will to keep supporting the Ukraine. So traceability of a cyber attack is essential towards such a scenario.
 
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clearly you have very limited clue about security of nuclear installations. All of its critical systems are designed to be be completly separated from internet and immune to the cyberattacks untill you will drive your tank to the control room and hook up to the powerplant's computers from there. Even so it will take you weeks to communicate with control nodes not mentioning breaching firewalls. I can assure you that dropping FAB1500 on the reactor cooling system building is much easier way to "organize" catastrphy.
 
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Yes I would certainly admit to this - that is why I am trying to find out about the 'feasibility" of cyber attacks, especially in regards to nuke plant operators in the former Eastern Block countries.
there is not much differwence between security level of nuclear installations in UK, France or for example Slovakia or Hungary - they have to conform to the exactly the same international regulations and standards.
 

The United Kingdom's defense ministry said on Wednesday that Russia is "highly likely" to try to capture the Ukrainian cities of Kramatorsk and Severodonetsk, effectively consolidating Moscow's control of the Donbas region.

Should that happen, Russia would have what the ministry called in its intelligence update a "staging point for their efforts to cut-off Ukrainian forces in the region."

At least 21 civilians were left dead after attacks in the eastern Donbas region, according to The Associated Press, which cited Ukrainian officials.

That death toll marks the highest known fatalities since at least 59 people were killed on April 8 after a missile struck a railway station in Kramatorsk, the news service noted.



...and even if the Russians can't encircle and destroy the Ukrainian forces there, securing the Donbas could perhaps give Russia the fig-leaf it desperately needs to get out of the fight.
 
...and even if the Russians can't encircle and destroy the Ukrainian forces there, securing the Donbas could perhaps give Russia the fig-leaf it desperately needs to get out of the fight.
My worry is that if Russia calls a unilateral ceasefire that Ukraine will forever lose the opportunity to recapture the Donbas region. Will the West continue to send weapons and money for Ukraine to keep fighting if the Russians have stood down? I fear there's a great betrayal of Ukraine in the works, akin to Yalta in 1945 and before.

 

Would you mind answering the question I asked? What do you mean when you called one of my points "creative"?
 
Yes I would certainly admit to this - that is why I am trying to find out about the 'feasibility" of cyber attacks, especially in regards to nuke plant operators in the former Eastern Block countries.

The key word is "access." In order to attack via cyber mechanisms, the hacker must be able to reach the targeted system via some external means. To use a stupid example, if I buy a computer but never connect it to the internet, and I never put any third-party software or files on there (i.e. the only software or data comes from me personally) then my computer can't be the target of a cyber attack because there's no way for a hacker to access my system. I could even have a local wired network with multiple computers but if none of them have external access, then they can't be targeted via cyber means.

If there's no external access, then the only way to deliver a cyber attack to that system is by physically getting a human being into my facility, breaking all my username and password protections, and successfully uploading a file that I didn't create. While that's often seen in movies, it's incredibly tough to do in reality.

The one caveat for external human access is insider threats. The larger the system/network, the greater the risk that an authorized system user could inject malicious code. A disaffected user, or a vulnerable user susceptible to bribes (financial or otherwise), could provide access to a foreign nation, which is why Governments put a lot of time in layered mechanisms to prevent it such as human security (background checks etc), leadership/management (ensuring staff aren't disaffected/vulnerable), access control (limiting users to specific functions so a general user can't upload malicious code), and monitoring (ensuring staff aren't alone when they access a system, and ensuring all actions are logged and alerted in real time).

Cyber isn't a silver bullet. It takes a lot of time and hard work to develop access...and after all that work, access can disappear in the blink of an eye if the vulnerability in the target system is identified and closed off (e.g. regular software updates to close security holes, firing (or otherwise removing) possible insider threats, etc).

Bottom line...if the nuclear computer control systems do not have external access, and the staff are patriotic, loyal and largely incorrupt, then the systems are pretty much unhackable.
 
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Off course access is the key-word, and this seems to be possible in many way's, e.g was done IIRC in 2017 at a German nuclear plant via virus infected/corrupted USB sticks.
Also the new trend regarding the use of interconnected smart phones and blue-tooth poses additional new threats.
According to paper regulations things are pretty tight - but reality seems to be at various different levels in many countries in contra to the theoretical security measures.

I for myself "unintentionally" and also intentionally have brought my Mobil into highly restricted areas into the MoD's of several countries.
As for actually observed safety protocols in many countries - I wouldn't be willing to place my hand into the fire.

I can't open the following link, so I wouldn't know about the articles relevant date.
 
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Re cyber attacks. Let's just hope nuclear power plants have taken the lessons of Stuxnet to heart and that all vital software is airtight from the internet. The problem with cyber, however, is that software, network architecture, and cyber security all rely on one thing - human input. We all know humans make mistakes, are lazy or their skills simply aren't up to the task. This is the weakness cyber-criminals probe for.
 

Going back to my earlier post, while cyber is generally not seen as escalatory, I think attacking nuclear facilities would definitely cross a line and would lead to a response. I think any attack against a western nuclear facility would result in NATO Article 5, regardless of whether the attack could be directly attributed to the Kremlin.
 

Here's the article for you, unedited:


Belgium's network of nuclear power plants and other major infrastructure face the threat of a cyber-attack over the next five years, the European Union's counter-terror chief said in an interview published Saturday.

"I would not be surprised if there was an attempt in the next five years to use the Internet to commit an attack," Gilles de Kerchove told daily La Libre Belgique.

"It would take the form of entering the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), which is the nerve centre of a nuclear power plant, a dam, air traffic control centre or railroad switching station," he added.

His concerns come as Belgium is on high alert following Tuesday's suicide bombings at Brussels airport and aboard a metro train that killed 31 people and injured some 300.

Belgium's neighbors have raised concerns over the country's creaking nuclear plants for some time, after a series of problems ranging from leaks to cracks and an unsolved sabotage incident.

Doel 1, the country's oldest reactor, was originally shuttered in February 2015 under a law calling for the country's gradual phasing out of nuclear power, but the government then restarted it under an extension deal.

According to reports, a security guard at a Belgian nuclear power plant was murdered Thursday and his access badge stolen. Officials were not immediately available to comment.

These reports follow the discovery by investigators last year of surveillance footage of a Belgian nuclear plant official in the flat of a suspect linked to the Brussels and Paris attacks.
 
Hey thanks a lot, so it seems this article is from 2016, which still might make the issue relevant.
 
Some "talking head" brought this up a few weeks ago. You just can't say a war is over, especially if you started it. The guy you attacked might have something to say about it.
 

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