"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (2 Viewers)

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I believe it could be decisive; if the Ukrainians manage to split the Russian front, things get much harder, quickly, for the latter. As I mentioned above, I think that's the operational aim of this offensive. Shoulder the one flank while you roll up the isolated southern coast.
 
It looks that way, "The offensive to try to retake Kherson is picking up steam"—Ukraine's recapture bid

It's more likely only available well after the battle, but I'd like to see a comparison of the order of battle. What forces have the Ukrainians and Russians brought to bear? I imagine the US has its recon satellites and sigint intercepts sitting directly over Kherson, reporting every move to Kyiv. In the information and intelligence war, the Russians are outplayed.
 
As time goes by, more information about Mariupol's defence goes public.
4 Ukrainian marines, 15 days, 101 km (I tried to measure their track) through the enemy-controlled territory.
Original article (Ukrainian):
Google translated:
Their track from Mariupol to Ukrainian lines:
Only 7 men made it from their battalion and only 76 of 3 battalions of the 36th Brigade.
 
I can only think it's a matter of time before the Belarussians refuse to allow their country to be used as a launch point against Ukraine.


 

The news I've read reports the use of MLRS/HIMARS systems to strike the supply and ammo dumps in the area, and yes, they're likely identified and targeted with US satellite assistance. i don't doubt that the small arms and shoulder-missiles of various sorts are also in use.

Like you, I have no idea of the numbers of troops each side is committing to the battle. I do reckon that with interior lines, the Ukrainians are better able to shift units from one sector to another, using less fuel and likely exposed to less danger in the maneuver. That ability is in itself a force-multiplier, not big in the scale of things, but certainly something that the Ukrainians are -- or ought to be -- using.
 
Really good artical that sheda some light on why Ukraine's military is so successful against Russian forces - and also shines some light on why Russian forces are under performing.

 
Further to my point upthread about the south being seen as the decisive arena:


KYIV, Aug 4 (Reuters) - Ukraine said on Thursday it had been forced to cede some territory in the east of the country in the face of a Russian offensive, and the head of the NATO military alliance said Moscow must not be allowed to win the war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy this week described the pressure his armed forces were under in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine as "hell". He spoke of fierce fighting around the town of Avdiivka and the fortified village of Pisky, where Kyiv has acknowledged its Russian foe's "partial success" in recent days.


The Ukrainian military said on Thursday Russian forces had mounted at least two assaults on Pisky but that its troops had managed to repel them.

[...]

The Russian defence ministry confirmed its offensive.

[...]

Ukraine said the Russian offensive in the east looked like an attempt to force it to divert troops from the south where Kyiv's forces are trying to retake territory and destroy Russian supply lines as a prelude to a wider counter-offensive.

"The idea is to put military pressure on us in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk over the next few weeks ... What is happening in the east is not what will determine the outcome of the war," Ukrainian Presidential Adviser Oleksiy Arestovych said in an interview on YouTube.



I have emboldened the most relevant passage. It seems plain to me that the Ukrainians are seeing an opportunity to split the Russian forces, and the Russians are responding, trying to relieve pressure on the threatened sector.
 
I like this line…

" My assessment—that it was the United States that was unprepared for war with Russia, not Ukraine—was shared internally at this time by junior and mid-level leaders within the U.S. military itself, as evidenced by a paper circulated within the 173rd and other units and reported on by Wesley Morgan for Politico."
 
I can sympathize with that statement. I have noticed a strong risk aversion among the political class for many years. This includes high ranking military leaders. It's easy to launch cruise missiles at a collection of tents thousands of miles from home, but fighting to win takes a whole different mindset than punitive strikes to "shock and awe".
 
During the Gulf war and the subsequent Iraq war, battlefield tactics were solid.
But the U.S. got drug down into the dirt fighting a long, drawn out fight with insurgents and that perhaps dulled the American battle fitness to a certain degree.
Mostly because the combat experience was no longer fighting an actual military on equal terms, it was chasing ghosts that were hiding in doorways, behind rocks, in caves and so on.
 
Even during the early days in Iraq, there was plenty of crazy political crap going on. A collegue of mine was imbedded with a Ukrainian unit and they were caught in an ambush near the river. The Ukrainians wanted to call in artillery, but were told it was unavailable due to the proximity to the river. Shelling was considered to have too great an environmental impact on the fragile wetland.
 
 
Western media critical of the UAF is somewhat rare vs. that of media reports of the Russians, where we're led to believe they're Orc-like buffoons.


"It's not totally clear exactly how many tank brigades the army has. Maybe six. Maybe five. Maybe fewer. The Ukrainian army has a habit of keeping undermanned—practically non-existent—units on paper and occasionally touting them in the media."
 
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