Possibly of interest.
Some of my fellow war gamers and I just finished a scenario designed to figure out what aircraft would be the best in terms of smallest numbers, quickest in service times, and greatest impact on the air & ground situation in Ukraine. IMO what we came up with is kind of interesting.
Basically, at a minimum in terms of numbers (and hence the least training time) and earliest in use date along with ease of maintaining numbers, our conclusion is that Ukraine would best be served by 1x F-35 (oversize at 16-20 airframes) squadron and 3x A-10 squadrons in concert with moderate to high capability drones.
The numbers were kind of astonishing re the F-35. Even downplaying some of the F-35 capabilities we found that 8-9x operational airframes at any point in time would be enough to deal with the local air superiority mission (most of the time), and the anti-bomber launched air-to-ground missile threat (again most of the time), as well as acting as mini-airborne AWACS/INTEL/Targeting platforms in support of the A-10s and ground-based guided weapon systems.
The drone(s) INTEL and Targeting capabilities would be used to locate targets for both the F-35 and A-10 mission planning, and to indicate targets for the A-10s using laser designators and/or GPS coordinates.
The A-10s acted as guided weapon missile/bomb trucks in the stand-off mode about 2/3 of the time, in concert with the F-35s and drones, and as true CAS when needed to remove troublesome Russian hard points and disrupt force concentrations, as well as disrupting Russian operations all on their ownsome. BRRRRRRT-BRRRRRRT
The F-35B and A-10C are both capable of safely operating from relatively simple airstrips and hard surface roads of less than 1 mile length, so finding locations to operate from would be relatively easy. And they have compatible data-links.
The deployment of forward maintenance capability for the A-10C is already fully developed. But there would be the problem of maintaining the F-35. Our answer was to deploy "civilian contractors" to perform much of the local maintenance needs and send the airframes to a nearby country for higher level maintenance. (While the Russians might object to this, they really have no basis since they have done the same thing in nearly every war where they have actively supported one side that used any of their more sophisticated equipment.)
The only time we found the F-35s ran into problems in the air-to-air role was when the Russians managed to 'swamp' the F-35s in terms of numbers. This happened once when the F-35s did not shoot-and-scoot as soon as they saw a significant number (~20x MiG-29 & Su-27 vs the 8x F-35) and allowed the Russian aircraft get to within ~20 miles. The scenario F-35 losses were light overall, with more lost to accident (4) than to combat (2).
The A-10s took fairly heavy losses over the time of the scenario (1.5 months of operations) to the point that out of the original number (51) there were only 18 still operational. Given the total number of sorties flown (just over 1500) the losses by the A-10s were high at ~1 airframe loss per 7 sorties where they encountered significant AA activity in the CAS role (~300 sorties). But when taking the effect of the A-10 into account (ie near total loss of the Russian ground forces to operate due to inability to resupply, destruction of equipment, and loss of morale) it was worth it operationally. The last 10 days of the scenario the A-10s operated with near total impunity.
Obviously the above success of the F-35/A-10/drone methodology did not occur in a vacuum. The Ukraine artillery and HIMARS/MLRS continued to perform their missions, as did the infantry and armour units. By the end of the scenario, 80% of the surviving Russian and separatist combat units in the east and south (other than Crimea) were out of supply and cut off from retreat (if desired).
In the above scenario, we assumed several things:
That there are at least a small number (~20) of Ukraine's pilots able to learn to fly and successfully adapt relatively quickly (~3 months) to the F-35 weapon system.
That there are enough Ukrainian pilots able to learn to fly and successfully adapt relatively quickly (~3 months) to the A-10 weapon system.
That the above scenario will only work if Ukraine can protect the bases and airframes while on the ground.
That the above scenario requires a FAAD system capable of providing air defense over the front lines, including protection for the A-10s against air superiority aircraft to beyond visual range (at least ~20 miles) while operating within the FAAD system envelope. NASAMS (currently in the pipeline for Ukraine) would provide this capability.
Of note:
We did not deal with the over land threats possible via future large deployments of Russian forces from Crimea. We assumed that if Ukraine could succeed against the RF in the rest of the south then any future ground threat from the Crimean area would be negated.
We found no practical way to provide safe and sustainable operational in-flight refueling, so mission times were somewhat limited.
We found no practical way to provide the ability to maintain any of the more sophisticated US/NATO airframes (ie F-35/F-18/F-16/F-15) in any reasonable timeframe, without the use of 'civilian contractors'.
Within the 3 month timeframe (even with the deployable 'packaged' squadron level maintenance system developed for A-10 operations) the A-10 was only on the edge of the Ukrainian ability to maintain. The defective systems were sent to another country or to a rear area for maintenance by 'civilian contractors'.
We did not have any comprehensive knowledge of the state of the Ukrainian logistic system relative to aviation fuel supply volume vs time, but between fuel supply and maintenance we assumed the ability to fly at an average of 0.5 sorties a day per operational airframe.
There was a lot more involved in framing the scenario, but it would take a booklet to cover it all.
Just sayin' buzz-buzz, BRRRRRT-BRRRRRT