"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (2 Viewers)

[ThomasP]

re

Exclusive: Russia moves missiles from St Petersburg to Ukraine

Satellite images obtained by Yle show that Russia has been transferring anti-aircraft missiles away from St Petersburg.

yle.fi

The first thought that came into my mind when I saw this headline was that maybe the missiles were removed as a symbolic gesture to the politicians & political dissidents. Sort of a "fine, if you do not like what we are doing then you can be undefended agains NATO air strikes".

St Petersburg seems to be a hotbed of anti-Putin/anti-war sentiments - including at least 18 district politicians who have openly spoken against Putin.

 

[ThomasP]

China's Belt and Road Initiative

I do not remember seeing this mentioned in the thread, so as I think it is relevant to how China views Russia's actions re Ukraine and the effects, here are a couple of informative links:

"Belt and Road Initiative - Wikipedia"

and/or

"How China's Belt and Road Initiative is faring"

 

[SaparotRob]

re

Exclusive: Russia moves missiles from St Petersburg to Ukraine

Satellite images obtained by Yle show that Russia has been transferring anti-aircraft missiles away from St Petersburg.

yle.fi

The first thought that came into my mind when I saw this headline was that maybe the missiles were removed as a symbolic gesture to the politicians & political dissidents. Sot of a "fine, if you do not like what we are doing then you can be undefended agains NATO air strikes".

St Petersburg seems to be a hotbed of anti-Putin/anti-war sentiments - including at least 18 district politicians who have openly spoken against Putin.

I saw this this report and it encourages my little daydream. A bunch of Ukrainian MiG-29s, armed exclusively with Soviet era missiles/bombs snake through Ruzzian air defenses and take out a power station somewhat close to Moscow and safely return. It does require a bit of incompetence on the Russians part.
Say what you will, it's more realistic than my "Martian War Machines rising out of the rasputitsa (in groups of three) and vaporizing the orcs" fantasy.

The 1953 Martian war machines.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's not an opportunity to flee I'm thinking of. No, it's that Russia's hardier troops will give ground less readily in Kherson and Donbas. But let's see, the collapse at Kharkiv surprised many.

I will confess skepticism about hardy Russian troops. In the Kherson area, they've seen supplies throttled by Ukrainian strikes on the bridges, but they also reinforced the area against an anticipated offensive that now seems to have been a feint.

Around Kharkiv and on the north flank of the Donbas, the grudging successes they've achieved in the last four months have largely been rolled back in about a week or so, and the Russian troops, abandoning artillery pieces, tanks, and other heavy equipment; those are the troops whom I've read have retreated across the Russian border in some cases.

In the Donbas, it's all nice when the Russians have arty support, but I think that is changing as the Ukrainians have been using MLRS etc to interdict supply-lines and attack depots.

It seems to me that without heavy support the Russian soldiers don't have much stand-and-fight in 'em. And that speaks directly to the will to win, and hardiness.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

re

Exclusive: Russia moves missiles from St Petersburg to Ukraine

Satellite images obtained by Yle show that Russia has been transferring anti-aircraft missiles away from St Petersburg.

yle.fi

The first thought that came into my mind when I saw this headline was that maybe the missiles were removed as a symbolic gesture to the politicians & political dissidents. Sot of a "fine, if you do not like what we are doing then you can be undefended agains NATO air strikes".

St Petersburg seems to be a hotbed of anti-Putin/anti-war sentiments - including at least 18 district politicians who have openly spoken against Putin.

And that's his hometown!

 

[vikingBerserker]

.....and I suspect they will be used against ground targets as well. There is a good reason if you manufacture your own military hardware why you want it and the components all made within your country

 

[SaparotRob]

As to Russian soldiers not having much stand and fight in them, we will have to ask the Chechen enforcers who will shoot them if they try to run.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

As to Russian soldiers not having much stand and fight in them, we will have to ask the Chechen enforcers who will shoot them if they try to run.

If you need enforcers that says a lot right there. Motivated troops don't need backstops, they need reinforcements.

 

[ThomasP]

Possibly of interest.

Some of my fellow war gamers and I just finished a scenario designed to figure out what aircraft would be the best in terms of smallest numbers, quickest in service times, and greatest impact on the air & ground situation in Ukraine. IMO what we came up with is kind of interesting.

Basically, at a minimum in terms of numbers (and hence the least training time) and earliest in use date along with ease of maintaining numbers, our conclusion is that Ukraine would best be served by 1x F-35 (oversize at 16-20 airframes) squadron and 3x A-10 squadrons in concert with moderate to high capability drones.

The numbers were kind of astonishing re the F-35. Even downplaying some of the F-35 capabilities we found that 8-9x operational airframes at any point in time would be enough to deal with the local air superiority mission (most of the time), and the anti-bomber launched air-to-ground missile threat (again most of the time), as well as acting as mini-airborne AWACS/INTEL/Targeting platforms in support of the A-10s and ground-based guided weapon systems.

The drone(s) INTEL and Targeting capabilities would be used to locate targets for both the F-35 and A-10 mission planning, and to indicate targets for the A-10s using laser designators and/or GPS coordinates.

The A-10s acted as guided weapon missile/bomb trucks in the stand-off mode about 2/3 of the time, in concert with the F-35s and drones, and as true CAS when needed to remove troublesome Russian hard points and disrupt force concentrations, as well as disrupting Russian operations all on their ownsome. BRRRRRRT-BRRRRRRT

The F-35B and A-10C are both capable of safely operating from relatively simple airstrips and hard surface roads of less than 1 mile length, so finding locations to operate from would be relatively easy. And they have compatible data-links.

The deployment of forward maintenance capability for the A-10C is already fully developed. But there would be the problem of maintaining the F-35. Our answer was to deploy "civilian contractors" to perform much of the local maintenance needs and send the airframes to a nearby country for higher level maintenance. (While the Russians might object to this, they really have no basis since they have done the same thing in nearly every war where they have actively supported one side that used any of their more sophisticated equipment.)

The only time we found the F-35s ran into problems in the air-to-air role was when the Russians managed to 'swamp' the F-35s in terms of numbers. This happened once when the F-35s did not shoot-and-scoot as soon as they saw a significant number (~20x MiG-29 & Su-27 vs the 8x F-35) and allowed the Russian aircraft get to within ~20 miles. The scenario F-35 losses were light overall, with more lost to accident (4) than to combat (2).

The A-10s took fairly heavy losses over the time of the scenario (1.5 months of operations) to the point that out of the original number (51) there were only 18 still operational. Given the total number of sorties flown (just over 1500) the losses by the A-10s were high at ~1 airframe loss per 7 sorties where they encountered significant AA activity in the CAS role (~300 sorties). But when taking the effect of the A-10 into account (ie near total loss of the Russian ground forces to operate due to inability to resupply, destruction of equipment, and loss of morale) it was worth it operationally. The last 10 days of the scenario the A-10s operated with near total impunity.

Obviously the above success of the F-35/A-10/drone methodology did not occur in a vacuum. The Ukraine artillery and HIMARS/MLRS continued to perform their missions, as did the infantry and armour units. By the end of the scenario, 80% of the surviving Russian and separatist combat units in the east and south (other than Crimea) were out of supply and cut off from retreat (if desired).

In the above scenario, we assumed several things:

That there are at least a small number (~20) of Ukraine's pilots able to learn to fly and successfully adapt relatively quickly (~3 months) to the F-35 weapon system.

That there are enough Ukrainian pilots able to learn to fly and successfully adapt relatively quickly (~3 months) to the A-10 weapon system.

That the above scenario will only work if Ukraine can protect the bases and airframes while on the ground.

That the above scenario requires a FAAD system capable of providing air defense over the front lines, including protection for the A-10s against air superiority aircraft to beyond visual range (at least ~20 miles) while operating within the FAAD system envelope. NASAMS (currently in the pipeline for Ukraine) would provide this capability.

Of note:

We did not deal with the over land threats possible via future large deployments of Russian forces from Crimea. We assumed that if Ukraine could succeed against the RF in the rest of the south then any future ground threat from the Crimean area would be negated.

We found no practical way to provide safe and sustainable operational in-flight refueling, so mission times were somewhat limited.

We found no practical way to provide the ability to maintain any of the more sophisticated US/NATO airframes (ie F-35/F-18/F-16/F-15) in any reasonable timeframe, without the use of 'civilian contractors'.

Within the 3 month timeframe (even with the deployable 'packaged' squadron level maintenance system developed for A-10 operations) the A-10 was only on the edge of the Ukrainian ability to maintain. The defective systems were sent to another country or to a rear area for maintenance by 'civilian contractors'.

We did not have any comprehensive knowledge of the state of the Ukrainian logistic system relative to aviation fuel supply volume vs time, but between fuel supply and maintenance we assumed the ability to fly at an average of 0.5 sorties a day per operational airframe.

There was a lot more involved in framing the scenario, but it would take a booklet to cover it all.

Just sayin' buzz-buzz, BRRRRRT-BRRRRRT

 

[Admiral Beez]

I will confess skepticism about hardy Russian troops.

It's the widespread and popular feeling right now. I hope the skeptics are right, but I'm not counting on a repeat of the Kharkiv collapse in Donbas. Maybe in Kherson, but only above the Dniper River.

But again, I hope I'm wrong and that by the end of October the UAF has liberated Kherson, Donetsk and Sievierodonetsk. This will then prepare them well for a Spring 2023 offensive to liberate much of the rest.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's the widespread and popular feeling right now. I hope the skeptics are right, but I'm not counting on a repeat of the Kharkiv collapse in Donbas. Maybe in Kherson, but only above the Dniper River.

No one counts upon the opponent being weak, at least not no one sensible. But just speaking from what we've all read the last six months, I think we can all see a difference in motivation between Ukrainian forces who have fought outgunned and outnumbered, and their opponents who are literally abandoning field-pieces and heavy tanks in order to get out alive.

But again, I hope I'm wrong and that by the end of October the UAF has liberated Kherson, Donetsk and Sievierodonetsk. This will then prepare them well for a Spring 2023 offensive to liberate much of the rest.

I don't think the Ukrainians will be able to do all that in the next few months. This battle has been decisive, but only in the sense that it has bought Ukraine time. It is not a war-winner. But the Russian morale, or lack thereof, has been put on display in the front window.

Hopefully next the Ukrainians can slice to the coast between Kherson and Mariupol and sever the Russian fronts in the east and the south. Even that will take, probably, a couple of months for regrouping, planning, and re-equipping. The Ukrainians have been hurt too.

 

[at6]

I still believe the the Ukrainians right when they say no negotiations until Russia has left ALL Ukrainian territory.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I still believe the the Ukrainians right when they say no negotiations until Russia has left ALL Ukrainian territory.

Negotiate, but do not accept anything less than that. Barbarism can not be rewarded. I'll happily pay my taxes if Ukraine can rise free.

 

[GrauGeist]

I keep seeing "spring offensive".

Historically, Ukrainian Red Army regiments were the most effective in winter offensives in past wars.

I would be willing to bet that if this war drags on into the winter months, they will not wait until spring.

As an aside, in the most brutal street fighting in Berlin, it was the Ukrainian regiment that managed to break through into the heart of Berlin all ahead of the others after savage door to door fighting.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Much depends on the weather .A freeze can work both ways. So can spring mud.

 

[WARSPITER]

Ukrainian planners have done a really good job to this stage. Logistics are what allows anyone to keep fighting and the
clever attacks on Russian supplies which happened in various areas seems at first to be random opportunity actions.

In reality they were well planned as they were carried out just before Ukrainian counter offensives / feints and left the Russian
defenders with no way of holding lines where there was no backup when it came to munitions and general supplies. This is
a classic and well thought system by Ukraine and one that even a semi competent Russian command should have been
ready for.

Well done so far.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Just got home from an international aerospace conference. Interesting to say the least. First one I've been to since the start of COVID.

On the defense side, most talk was focused around Russia-Ukraine and issues of sustainment for both sides. The rest was US supply chains/insourcing (too much reliance on Asia, particularly Taiwan) and European re-armament, plus the usual complaints that drones and the F-35 are sucking up all the oxygen in the room. There was also the occasional bit of speculation about Russia panicking and pressing the big red button.

One seasoned executive from a US defense contractor said he hadn't seen defense orders for "expendables" (bombs, missiles, fuses, rockets, cannon ammunition and other things that go boom) at such volumes since 2002, during the lead up to the Iraq invasion. Talk was that weapon systems procurement spending for this year (FY2023) will be $5.5 billion above what it was last year, and that there will be a request for a similar increase in next year's budget.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Possibly of interest.

Some of my fellow war gamers and I just finished a scenario designed to figure out what aircraft would be the best in terms of smallest numbers, quickest in service times, and greatest impact on the air & ground situation in Ukraine. IMO what we came up with is kind of interesting.

Basically, at a minimum in terms of numbers (and hence the least training time) and earliest in use date along with ease of maintaining numbers, our conclusion is that Ukraine would best be served by 1x F-35 (oversize at 16-20 airframes) squadron and 3x A-10 squadrons in concert with moderate to high capability drones.

The numbers were kind of astonishing re the F-35. Even downplaying some of the F-35 capabilities we found that 8-9x operational airframes at any point in time would be enough to deal with the local air superiority mission (most of the time), and the anti-bomber launched air-to-ground missile threat (again most of the time), as well as acting as mini-airborne AWACS/INTEL/Targeting platforms in support of the A-10s and ground-based guided weapon systems.

I feel like a single F-35 squadron, along with the sustainment that needs to be in place to support it, would probably end up as the world's greatest magnet for PGMs.

If Ukraine did get a squadron and then the Russians learnt what base of operations they were using, I could see every cruise missile and long range drone remaining in the Russian inventory heading that way in very short order.

 

[GrauGeist]

I feel like a single F-35 squadron, along with the sustainment that needs to be in place to support it, would probably end up as the world's greatest magnet for PGMs.

If Ukraine did get a squadron and then the Russians learnt what base of operations they were using, I could see every cruise missile and long range drone remaining in the Russian inventory heading that way in very short order.

But the Ukraine AF is constantly rotating their FOBs - so there is no one single fixed location.
This has been one of the UAF's saving graces since day one.

 

[buffnut453]

Successful Ukrainian river crossing operation on the northeastern front? If they can hold the eastern bank, this could be huge.

Deadly Donetsk blasts hit separatist-run city in Ukraine

The Russia-backed mayor of the eastern city of Donetsk blames Ukrainians for the blasts that killed 13.

www.bbc.com