"All of Vlad's forces and all of Vlad's men, are out to put Humpty together again." (190 Viewers)

[Admiral Beez]

Spanish and french SAMs on the way to Ukrainia:

By the end of November Ukraine may have seven or eight different SAM systems. So far I've seen reports of NASAMS (USA/UK), Crotale (France), IRIS-T (Germany), Hawk (Spain), SAMP-T (Italy/France), plus their own S-300 and SA-11 systems originally from Russia. Ukraine is asking India for the Barak-8 Indo-Israeli Missile System. Britain has now deployed its Sky Sabre air defence system to Poland, so giving a few to Ukraine isn't out of the question. The NATO designs will have some interoperability, but will there be any issues coordinating all these disparate systems?

 

[tomo pauk]

It is interesting to note that, while Russians are hurriedly trying to make use of now obsolete tanks and artillery, Ukraine is getting better and better kit as the war progresses.
Go Ukraine.

 

[Frog]

The russian diesel electric sub Novorossiysk was spotted and tracked by the french Normandie frigate (D651) in the bay of Biscay.
The relay was then taken by the Spanish and Royal Navies.
Could have been a good target for a shot with a MU90.

https://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=Awr.nu6lakljG.gIJmUk24lQ;_ylu=Y29sbwNpcjIEcG9zAzEEdnRpZAMEc2VjA3Nj/RV=2/RE=1665784614/RO=10/RU=https%3a%2f%2ffr.news.yahoo.com%2fmarin-russe-rep%25C3%25A9r%25C3%25A9-au-large-115845923.html/RK=2/RS=sdlN3TEJN_L5i3UX8wPYz1iEyak-

 

[buffnut453]

Did some research on Russian fossil fuel earnings, prompted by discussions over at Tanknet.org. Thought this might be informative here too:

In the first 30 days of the war, Russia's fossil fuel exports earned an average of $1130 million per day. This dropped to an average of $702 million a day over September (and $657 million over the first week of October). So, at current figures they're losing an average of about $450-475 million per day in lost exports (down a little more than 40%).

Russian fossil fuel exports to the EU dropped from an average of $713 million per day over the first 30 days of the war to $251 million per day over the past 30 days. For October, it's averaged $234 million. US imports have dropped from $34 million to $2 million and South Korean and UK imports have dropped to similar amounts. Gas imports are (baseline) forecast to be down 45% this year, -55% in 2023, up to -80% by 2025 and potentially totally finished by 2027.

Meanwhile, Chinese imports of Russian fossil fuels averaged $174 million over the past 30 days, compared to $169 million over the first 30 days. Turkish imports have grown from $71 million to $92 million. Indian imports are the biggest gain, going from $15 million to $55 million over the last 30 days.

Some of the overall earnings decline is the swing in prices in global oil & natural gas markets - which peaked in March and then again spiked in June. However, even with the ~20% crude price rally since late September, Russian foreign trade earnings from fossil fuels continued to decline in October.

Given that oil exports are 14% of Russia's GDP and gas exports are about 2%, that's going to sting economically.

Thank you for sharing this analysis. It puts paid to the idea that increased global fuel prices are compensating for loss of customers in Europe, and the idea that China and India can somehow make up for those European losses.

 

[buffnut453]

Interesting analysis of Russian missile stockpiles, and use of S-300s in surface-to-surface mode. There's also some interesting analysis of the Russian claims that it's Ukrainian defensive missiles causing damage in urban areas:

War in Ukraine: Is Russia’s stock of weapons running low?

Some security experts say Russia's supplies are stretched, especially of modern missiles.

www.bbc.com

 

[RogerdeLluria]

Interesting analysis of Russian missile stockpiles, and use of S-300s in surface-to-surface mode. There's also some interesting analysis of the Russian claims that it's Ukrainian defensive missiles causing damage in urban areas:

War in Ukraine: Is Russia’s stock of weapons running low?

Some security experts say Russia's supplies are stretched, especially of modern missiles.

www.bbc.com

Curiously I run today into this other bit of info.



That reminded me of the German tank problem German tank problem - Wikipedia

This other info analyses production capacity. Maybe they produce more than 3 Kh-101 per month but not many more.

Russian Challenges in Missile Resupply - Jamestown

After more than three months of its undeclared war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia fired over 2,100 cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles at targets inside the embattled country. Now it is facing a growing deficit of these types of stand-off weapons (Twitter.com/DefenceHQ...

jamestown.org

 

[vikingBerserker]

I wonder if they will take the nuclear tipped ballistic missles and put conventional warheads on them.

 

[RogerdeLluria]

And it seems they don't do much better regarding manpower.

 

[RogerdeLluria]

I wonder if they will take the nuclear tipped ballistic missles and put conventional warheads on them.

If they where Germans, you know they have reputation of being methodical to extreme levels, they will keep removing the nukes from older missiles and installing on the newest one on a systematic strict monthly basis. However, being Russians, i bet the nukes are still on expired missiles.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

ISW's update for the 13th:

Public reports of the first deaths of ill-prepared mobilized Russian troops in Ukraine have sparked renewed criticism of the Russian military command.

• Russian forces continued to launch strikes on critical Ukrainian infrastructure on October 13.
• Increasingly degraded morale, discipline, and combat capabilities among Russian troops in combat zones in Ukraine may be leading to temporary suspensions in offensive operations in limited areas.
• Ukrainian forces made gains northwest of Svatove.
• Russian forces are continuing defensive operations in anticipation of potential Ukrainian attacks towards Kreminna.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Russian troops are attempting to recapture positions in northern and northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge continues to impede the movement of Russian supplies and personnel to southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast and claimed to make marginal advances south of Bakhmut.
• Russian incompetence continues to take its toll on mobilized personnel before they ever reach the front lines, likely exacerbating already-low morale.
• Russian officials are likely increasingly limiting freedom of movement in Russia to preserve additional mobilizable populations and prevent them from fleeing the country.
• Russian occupation officials called for the evacuation of civilians from occupied Kherson Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

This page collects ISW and CTP's updates on the conflict in Ukraine. In late February 2022, ISW began publishing daily synthetic products covering key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

www.understandingwar.org

 

[Token]

Interesting analysis of Russian missile stockpiles, and use of S-300s in surface-to-surface mode. There's also some interesting analysis of the Russian claims that it's Ukrainian defensive missiles causing damage in urban areas:

War in Ukraine: Is Russia’s stock of weapons running low?

Some security experts say Russia's supplies are stretched, especially of modern missiles.

www.bbc.com

On social media there have been reports going back at least as far as July that the S300 has been used as a ground attack system or in a ground attack role. And that makes some sense, or at the very least it should not be a surprising capability. Assuming the S300 has either a helo mode or a manual forced launch mode, it should be possible to use those modes to launch on a fixed location.

It also has to be remembered that the S300 is a family of missiles and systems, not just one specific missile type. The S300P, S300PT, S300PS, S300PM, S300PMU, S300PMU1, and S300PMU2 (and how many others I may have missed) are all S300's, but of different ages and capabilities. And that does not even start to go into the S300V stuff (S300V is a different line, which also carries the "S300" designation).

Talking about Russian missiles can get confusing to the unfamiliar. The same missile or missile system can have multiple names or designations it is known by. The terms V500, S300Px, 5V55, and SA-10 may all be used to describe the same missile. And then you get into the variations of each missile, do we mean the 5V55K or the 5V55R? The S300PT or the S300PS?

The point I am trying to make (and thus far failing) is that there are a lot of different "S300" missile types. Some are essentially obsolete, if not in performance than in the fact it has been replaced by something else. The Russians might be using up the oldest first, getting rid of missiles they no longer consider to be first rate, to do a needed task. For example, the original 5V55K or 5V55KD was command guided ( Almaz S-300P/PT/PS/PMU/PMU1/PMU2 / Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf / SA-10/20/21 Grumble / Gargoyle ) and would have had a much more limited range against maneuvering targets. But, against a non-maneuvering target, or a fixed target, you could push the range out to closer to the kinematics of the missile and still have a high probability of success.

It would tell a lot more about Russian issues / intent if we could get more detail on what is being done, i.e. are they just shooting up old original missiles to get them out of the inventory (most missiles have a limited shelf life, missile grain issues and such, they might even be using expired missiles), or are they shooting 48N6's that might indicate they are dipping into newer inventory in desperation? But we, at this level, are not likely to get that kind of information.

T!

 

[Dimlee]

You pretend to pay,
We pretend to work.

Old Russian proverb

Right, but it's a Soviet one, known in many languages across the USSR.

 

[Dimlee]

Just another infographic about Russian missiles ("high precision" types).
I'd take it with the usual grain of salt... Predictions of a kind "they spent 60-70% of their new missiles" were heard during spring and summer.

 

[Glider]

Taking into account the lack of missiles that most people accept that now exist in Russia, the following piece I found interesting

MSN

What makes you think the rumours are right.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Taking into account the lack of missiles that most people accept that now exist in Russia, the following piece I found interesting

MSN

What makes you think the rumours are right.

We'll have to see. Putin is under pressure from hawks in his country to go full-bore. If they still have missiles left he may have his hand forced in order to quell dissent from the right-wing there.

 

[buffnut453]

We'll have to see. Putin is under pressure from hawks in his country to go full-bore. If they still have missiles left he may have his hand forced in order to quell dissent from the right-wing there.

Yes, but the only way he can win is by destroying Ukraine entirely by using the big red button. No amount of missiles at this stage will bring Ukraine to its knees, and certainly not if those missiles continue to be used against non-military targets.

Per Putin's speech, he claims they destroyed 22 of 29 identified military targets over the past few days. It would be interesting to compare the number of missiles launched/destroyed/impacted and their locations to see how that all correlates to Putin's "22 of 29" statistic.

I found it interesting that Putin, in his latest comments, says he doesn't want to destroy Ukraine. Maybe he's walking back his prior rhetoric of going nuclear? His hardest challenge is defining what success looks like. Other than vague references to bringing down the Zelensky regime (which isn't going to happen...and even if Russia gets lucky and does take out Zelensky, there are dozens of other Ukrainians ready to take up the reins and persist with Zelensky's agenda.

So, what does success look like for Russia and will Ukraine be willing to accept the terms of that "success"? I suspect the respective answers are "nobody knows" and "hell no!" If my supposition about success criteria is correct, then this truly is an unwinnable war for Moscow.

 

[buffnut453]

On social media there have been reports going back at least as far as July that the S300 has been used as a ground attack system or in a ground attack role. And that makes some sense, or at the very least it should not be a surprising capability. Assuming the S300 has either a helo mode or a manual forced launch mode, it should be possible to use those modes to launch on a fixed location.

It also has to be remembered that the S300 is a family of missiles and systems, not just one specific missile type. The S300P, S300PT, S300PS, S300PM, S300PMU, S300PMU1, and S300PMU2 (and how many others I may have missed) are all S300's, but of different ages and capabilities. And that does not even start to go into the S300V stuff (S300V is a different line, which also carries the "S300" designation).

Talking about Russian missiles can get confusing to the unfamiliar. The same missile or missile system can have multiple names or designations it is known by. The terms V500, S300Px, 5V55, and SA-10 may all be used to describe the same missile. And then you get into the variations of each missile, do we mean the 5V55K or the 5V55R? The S300PT or the S300PS?

The point I am trying to make (and thus far failing) is that there are a lot of different "S300" missile types. Some are essentially obsolete, if not in performance than in the fact it has been replaced by something else. The Russians might be using up the oldest first, getting rid of missiles they no longer consider to be first rate, to do a needed task. For example, the original 5V55K or 5V55KD was command guided ( Almaz S-300P/PT/PS/PMU/PMU1/PMU2 / Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf / SA-10/20/21 Grumble / Gargoyle ) and would have had a much more limited range against maneuvering targets. But, against a non-maneuvering target, or a fixed target, you could push the range out to closer to the kinematics of the missile and still have a high probability of success.

It would tell a lot more about Russian issues / intent if we could get more detail on what is being done, i.e. are they just shooting up old original missiles to get them out of the inventory (most missiles have a limited shelf life, missile grain issues and such, they might even be using expired missiles), or are they shooting 48N6's that might indicate they are dipping into newer inventory in desperation? But we, at this level, are not likely to get that kind of information.

T!

Yep, Russia has a lot of obsolete hardware that they can explode on Ukrainian territory. The key challenge is whether it will do any good? Yes, it will cause some casualties and create some holes in the ground. They may even get lucky and hit a few important military targets. However, none of that will impact the progress of the war on the front lines.

The West continues to arm Ukraine and the latter is showing considerable tactical acumen compared to the Russian military. Throwing more conscript bodies into the meat grinder won't result in victory for Moscow.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes, but the only way he can win is by destroying Ukraine entirely by using the big red button. No amount of missiles at this stage will bring Ukraine to its knees, and certainly not if those missiles continue to be used against non-military targets.

Agreed, but my point was that he perforce must needs to consider the continued support of the Russian right, as due to recent Ukrainian successes and the call-up, he's seeing his broader support starting to erode. Can he afford to lose the hawks and still retain power? I don't know, and I doubt anyone outside Russia can have a firm answer to that.

So, what does success look like for Russia and will Ukraine be willing to accept the terms of that "success"? I suspect the respective answers are "nobody knows" and "hell no!" If my supposition about success criteria is correct, then this truly is an unwinnable war for Moscow.

Exactly. As America learned in both Vietnam and Afghanistan (if "learned" can be used when the mistake was repeated!), the absence of clear victory objectives and conditions is a good recipe for indefinite involvement, mounting losses, and ultimately defeat. This presupposes possessing the military power to actually inflict that defeat, which, as your opening point rightly states, is a highly doubtful premise outside of going nuclear.

In short, I think we agree they're ferfuckled unless they turn to WMDs, particularly nukes.

 

[GTX]

Norway detains Russian man found with two drones and terabytes of encrypted images and files

Under Norwegian law, Russian companies and citizens are prohibited from landing, launching or flying aircraft over Norwegian territory, with security around key infrastructure also beefed up after the Nord Stream pipeline explosions.

www.abc.net.au

 

[GTX]

There 'aren't enough air defence systems in the world' for Ukraine to protect itself from Russia

Ukraine is in desperate need of an integrated air defence system capable of shooting down Russian weapons. But such systems are hard to come by, leaving the country with some difficult decisions, writes Andrew Greene.

www.abc.net.au