Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Jensich, July 19, 1940 (I believe) and Hitler's "Appeal to Reason" speech I would count as a peace proposal.
All-out aerial war between Germany and the Allies
- Thread starter Jenisch
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Jensich, July 19, 1940 (I believe) and Hitler's "Appeal to Reason" speech I would count as a peace proposal.
- Thread starter
- #22
In theory this is correct, but the problem is to convince your people that it would be a good idea to accept a humiliating peace treaty after what Japan did in Pearl Harbour. Perhaps if the Soviets collapsed earlier than Pearl Harbor and the US agree do peace, the Japanese would be willing to accept it. There were orders to call the planes in flight for the attack back in case an agreement was reached with Washington.
As for you mention about the occupation of the Soviet Union: the Germans planned to starve most of the population. With the Red Army defeated, any partisan activity would result in much severe reprisals than historically. However I think that it would still take to the Germans some time to start to benefit from the conquered territories. This of course, if the Russians did not do things like sabotate the oil fields in Baku, which could have generated consequences which I'm not able to talk about.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
If the SU system collapsed and became a part of the Axis, would there be a need for Japan to attack USA - I mean, there is a wealth of resources available now to Japan through SU.
GregP
Major
Jenisch, let's say we see things differently and let it go at that. At least I will. I already had my say and still think that way, but arguing about a "what if"that never happened just doesn't make sense to me ... so ... you could be right and you could be mistaken, with same to be said of me.
- Thread starter
- #25
So all those 'what if' war games that are done in military schools are a waste of time?
GregP
Major
No and I never said that. They teach tactics and strategy, and the outcomes changes with the competency of the officers in charge. A war game isn't exactly a "what if," because they're actually doing it real time most if the time, that is.
I never went to military school and so don't really know what their games are like. Sometimes it could be a video game, and I have my doubts whether or not those are useful or just entertainment. Video games don't train you for action, they simply develop keyboard reflexes. Now if the video is a simulator it can be very helpful ... as in an aircraft simulator. That isn't a "war game," however.
At Red Flag and Top Gun, they fly the missions and it's all real except for the live ammunition. Ditto for Army tank and helicopter games. Same for submarines and other naval assets, too.
I never went to military school and so don't really know what their games are like. Sometimes it could be a video game, and I have my doubts whether or not those are useful or just entertainment. Video games don't train you for action, they simply develop keyboard reflexes. Now if the video is a simulator it can be very helpful ... as in an aircraft simulator. That isn't a "war game," however.
At Red Flag and Top Gun, they fly the missions and it's all real except for the live ammunition. Ditto for Army tank and helicopter games. Same for submarines and other naval assets, too.
- Thread starter
- #28
I fly in gliders, and there's a PC sim called Condor that is excellent. It's good in terms of realism, but it's most useful in order to the student understand certain vital concepts, like get used to make an area check before make a turn. Simulators make the training process more easy.
- Thread starter
- #29
HyperWar: An Unknown Future and A Doubtful Present [Chapter 3]
The WPD strategic assessment written in the late summer of 1941 and published in the fall was a thoroughly gloomy document. The G-2 identified the potential enemies of the United States as Germany, Italy, Japan, and Vichy France. Of the four, Germany was the strongest and occupied most of Colonel Smith's attention. He expected Germany to conduct strategic-offensive operations in the Russian theater and concurrently strategic-defensive operations in all other theaters. In the long run, German operations could take one of two directions: attacks on the Middle East or on England. While Germany would help Italy in containing British forces in the Mediterranean, Smith thought that the ultimate objective of German operations in that theater was either to take Gibraltar or to execute a pincer against the Suez area. Germany wanted to create favorable conditions for attacks through Turkey into the Caucasus area, coordinated with an early 1942 drive into the Ukraine. The other possibility was that Mediterranean operations were a diversion for an invasion of England. In any case, Germany wanted to discourage or postpone the entrance of the United States into the war in Europe.25
Colonel Smith concluded that Germany would concentrate against Russia, hoping for a quick victory over the Soviets. After those operations, Germany would seek a negotiated peace with Great Britain. In default of such a peace, Germany would then invade the British Isles or else fight to eliminate British influence from the entire Mediterranean-North African region. Due to the heavy German losses in the fighting in Russia, Smith was optimistic
--65--
about Germany's inability to reconstitute her military forces for an invasion of England any time in the near future. For the same reasons, Germany could definitely not undertake any major offensive operations in the western hemisphere for at least a year, and then "only if she acquires large numbers of British ships, both commercial and war vessels."26
Italy had not the military capacity to expand her operations outside of the Mediterranean, and the G-2 predicted that the Italians would be an "increasingly uncomfortable and precarious" ally for Germany. The German war strategy, Smith wrote, "contemplates a rugged and aggressive role wholly beyond the capabilities of the mercurial, non-bellicose Italian people." But Hitler, according to the G-2 analysis, saw value in retaining an alliance with a Catholic nation and presumably hoped to use the Vatican to lend credence to the notion that Germany was engaged in a Christian, or at least anti-Communist, crusade in Russia. The G-2 believed, however, that Mussolini's regime was in imminent danger of collapse and would desert the German alliance at the first propitious opportunity.27
Japan, on the other hand, would become more bellicose in the western Pacific in proportion to Nazi successes in Europe.28 G-2 analysis suggested that Japan would pursue an opportunistic role and would try to facilitate her freedom of action by ending the war in China. Intelligence analysts expected Japan to conduct strategic-offensive operations in the southern theater, striking toward the Netherlands East Indies; strategic-defensive operations in the central theater of China; and strategic-defensive operations in the northern theater of Manchuria. Although it was possible that Japan would act against the Russians in Siberia, a much more likely course of action was that Japan would expand into Dutch and British possessions in the southern Pacific. Concurrently, the G-2 warned that the Japanese were likely to occupy the Philippines and Hong Kong and make raids or feints against Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, and the west coast of the United States. The warning was timely:
Japan will not take aggressive military steps until favorable conditions for success have been created, when swift blows, timed with Axis operations in the European theater, will be struck. . . .29
Vichy France, the report concluded, could be disregarded almost entirely. The French would continue to pursue a policy of passive collaboration with the Axis and cooperate with Germany in economic matters. The only real French goal was to resist any attempt, not only by Germany, but also by Great Britain, to seize or use any portion of French territory or French possessions, particularly in Africa. The French could be expected to place their fleet and shipyards at Germany's disposal and cooperate militarily with the Axis in Africa. Throughout, France would take advantage of any opportunity to recover lost territory and her former position in continental Europe. French collaboration with the Axis would vary directly with Axis success, and the United States could expect Vichy France to attempt to pursue its own course if Germany's fortunes flagged.30
The nations confronting the Axis powers had few options. Great Britain had to remain on the strategic defensive, concentrating on winning the Battle of the Atlantic and retaining a lodgment in the Middle East. The British faced enormous risk, however, and G-2 analyses could not confidently predict victory of the United Kingdom, even with full American collaboration. British reverses in the Middle East, or a Russian collapse on that front, would enable the Germans to concentrate an overwhelming military force against England. For the British, the situation hinged on three issues: the German ability to win quickly in Russia without suffering excessive losses; the German ability to reconstitute military forces quickly after that victory; and the German ability to control the conquered regions and exploit their resources with the use of minimal forces. Having outlined such grim prospects, Smith concluded that "from a long range viewpoint, the situation is not hopeless for Great Britain, assuming the continuation of Russian resistance and/or full U.S. participation in the war."31
The crucial factor was the state of the Soviet Union. If fortune smiles on Russian arms, Germany might yet be prevented from achieving the early and decisive victory essential to the realization of
--71--
her military and economic objectives. But if Germany decisively defeated Russia, then Germany would extend its control over the vast expanses of central Eurasia. Within that area existed adequate natural resources, foodstuffs, and industrial potential for the Germans to create a strong, centrally planned economy, the beginnings of German domination of Mackinder's "heartland."
Economically and militarily secure within a citadel that possessed immensely strong geographical barriers, Germany could release millions of men to industry and to the exploitation of her conquests. The Axis would be virtually unaffected by even the tightest sea blockade and beyond the range of most of the existing strategic air forces. Such a situation would present the United States with the most difficult military problem imaginable, particularly if it were compounded by the catastrophe of the fall of the British Isles. In that case the nation would have lost the only remaining area in Europe from which it could conduct effective operations against Germany.
The WPD strategic assessment written in the late summer of 1941 and published in the fall was a thoroughly gloomy document. The G-2 identified the potential enemies of the United States as Germany, Italy, Japan, and Vichy France. Of the four, Germany was the strongest and occupied most of Colonel Smith's attention. He expected Germany to conduct strategic-offensive operations in the Russian theater and concurrently strategic-defensive operations in all other theaters. In the long run, German operations could take one of two directions: attacks on the Middle East or on England. While Germany would help Italy in containing British forces in the Mediterranean, Smith thought that the ultimate objective of German operations in that theater was either to take Gibraltar or to execute a pincer against the Suez area. Germany wanted to create favorable conditions for attacks through Turkey into the Caucasus area, coordinated with an early 1942 drive into the Ukraine. The other possibility was that Mediterranean operations were a diversion for an invasion of England. In any case, Germany wanted to discourage or postpone the entrance of the United States into the war in Europe.25
Colonel Smith concluded that Germany would concentrate against Russia, hoping for a quick victory over the Soviets. After those operations, Germany would seek a negotiated peace with Great Britain. In default of such a peace, Germany would then invade the British Isles or else fight to eliminate British influence from the entire Mediterranean-North African region. Due to the heavy German losses in the fighting in Russia, Smith was optimistic
--65--
about Germany's inability to reconstitute her military forces for an invasion of England any time in the near future. For the same reasons, Germany could definitely not undertake any major offensive operations in the western hemisphere for at least a year, and then "only if she acquires large numbers of British ships, both commercial and war vessels."26
Italy had not the military capacity to expand her operations outside of the Mediterranean, and the G-2 predicted that the Italians would be an "increasingly uncomfortable and precarious" ally for Germany. The German war strategy, Smith wrote, "contemplates a rugged and aggressive role wholly beyond the capabilities of the mercurial, non-bellicose Italian people." But Hitler, according to the G-2 analysis, saw value in retaining an alliance with a Catholic nation and presumably hoped to use the Vatican to lend credence to the notion that Germany was engaged in a Christian, or at least anti-Communist, crusade in Russia. The G-2 believed, however, that Mussolini's regime was in imminent danger of collapse and would desert the German alliance at the first propitious opportunity.27
Japan, on the other hand, would become more bellicose in the western Pacific in proportion to Nazi successes in Europe.28 G-2 analysis suggested that Japan would pursue an opportunistic role and would try to facilitate her freedom of action by ending the war in China. Intelligence analysts expected Japan to conduct strategic-offensive operations in the southern theater, striking toward the Netherlands East Indies; strategic-defensive operations in the central theater of China; and strategic-defensive operations in the northern theater of Manchuria. Although it was possible that Japan would act against the Russians in Siberia, a much more likely course of action was that Japan would expand into Dutch and British possessions in the southern Pacific. Concurrently, the G-2 warned that the Japanese were likely to occupy the Philippines and Hong Kong and make raids or feints against Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, and the west coast of the United States. The warning was timely:
Japan will not take aggressive military steps until favorable conditions for success have been created, when swift blows, timed with Axis operations in the European theater, will be struck. . . .29
Vichy France, the report concluded, could be disregarded almost entirely. The French would continue to pursue a policy of passive collaboration with the Axis and cooperate with Germany in economic matters. The only real French goal was to resist any attempt, not only by Germany, but also by Great Britain, to seize or use any portion of French territory or French possessions, particularly in Africa. The French could be expected to place their fleet and shipyards at Germany's disposal and cooperate militarily with the Axis in Africa. Throughout, France would take advantage of any opportunity to recover lost territory and her former position in continental Europe. French collaboration with the Axis would vary directly with Axis success, and the United States could expect Vichy France to attempt to pursue its own course if Germany's fortunes flagged.30
The nations confronting the Axis powers had few options. Great Britain had to remain on the strategic defensive, concentrating on winning the Battle of the Atlantic and retaining a lodgment in the Middle East. The British faced enormous risk, however, and G-2 analyses could not confidently predict victory of the United Kingdom, even with full American collaboration. British reverses in the Middle East, or a Russian collapse on that front, would enable the Germans to concentrate an overwhelming military force against England. For the British, the situation hinged on three issues: the German ability to win quickly in Russia without suffering excessive losses; the German ability to reconstitute military forces quickly after that victory; and the German ability to control the conquered regions and exploit their resources with the use of minimal forces. Having outlined such grim prospects, Smith concluded that "from a long range viewpoint, the situation is not hopeless for Great Britain, assuming the continuation of Russian resistance and/or full U.S. participation in the war."31
The crucial factor was the state of the Soviet Union. If fortune smiles on Russian arms, Germany might yet be prevented from achieving the early and decisive victory essential to the realization of
--71--
her military and economic objectives. But if Germany decisively defeated Russia, then Germany would extend its control over the vast expanses of central Eurasia. Within that area existed adequate natural resources, foodstuffs, and industrial potential for the Germans to create a strong, centrally planned economy, the beginnings of German domination of Mackinder's "heartland."
Economically and militarily secure within a citadel that possessed immensely strong geographical barriers, Germany could release millions of men to industry and to the exploitation of her conquests. The Axis would be virtually unaffected by even the tightest sea blockade and beyond the range of most of the existing strategic air forces. Such a situation would present the United States with the most difficult military problem imaginable, particularly if it were compounded by the catastrophe of the fall of the British Isles. In that case the nation would have lost the only remaining area in Europe from which it could conduct effective operations against Germany.
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- Thread starter
- #30
The health of Russia was therefore of paramount concern, and the Soviet situation defined the time available for the United States to act against Germany. If Russia lost the war by the end of 1941, the Germans would probably require one full year to reorganize their armed forces to conduct an invasion of the British Isles. Germany would likely also need a full year to bring sufficient order out of the chaos of the conquered territories to be able to benefit militarily and economically from them. The earliest, therefore, that the Axis could mount an invasion of England would be the spring of 1942, with the spring of 1943 a much more likely date. In the meanwhile, the United States needed to provide for the security of the western hemisphere in the event that Russia collapsed and the British suffered invasion or agreed to negotiate a peace.32 Such an estimate coincided with general staff assumptions about the earliest date that the United States would be able to conduct offensive operations outside the western hemisphere. For a variety of reasons, War Plans Division believed that the Army could not implement the provisions of RAINBOW 5 before about July of 1943.33 The United States would not, for example, be able to assemble manpower, organize, and train sufficient forces to an
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adequate standard to fight the Axis before that date. On a basic level, the Army needed time to build training facilities and housing for expansion. Manpower mobilization had to proceed cautiously to avoid calling up the skilled hands necessary to build training facilities before they built those bases. The second major limitation was industrial because, even in the fall of 1941 and even after the expansion of defense industries to support the requirements of Lend Lease, not more than 15 percent of the industrial capacity of the United States was devoted to defense. America needed time to convert industries to defense production.34 Finally, shipping would present problems.
In the middle of 1941 virtually all of the American merchant fleet was in normal commercial service. Around 855,000 gross tons of shipping could be made available to transport an expeditionary force overseas and then sustain it in an overseas theater. The WPD estimated that amount of shipping could move not more than 50,000 men and their equipment and 90 day's supplies to a trans-oceanic theater. That situation would improve significantly throughout 1942. Before the United States could fight outside the hemisphere, more time would be required to assemble the necessary vessels and prepare them for military use; to build the additional shipping that war service would make necessary; and to establish adequate port facilities at points of embarkation and debarkation.35 Wedemeyer later learned that the shipping required to transport the Army and Air Corps overseas amounted to around seven million tons, or one thousand vessels. Maintaining that force in overseas theaters required about ten million tons of shipping, or 1,500 hips. The two years required to build those ships coincided with the time the general staff estimated the Army needed to raise and train the combat divisions.36 It also coincided with the period of maximum risk, the earliest date the general staff estimated that Germany would be able to invade Great Britain and deprive the United States of is European base.
As Wedemeyer began to plan to meet the crisis, he therefore understood that the earliest date that the United States could go to war in anything other than defense of the hemisphere was July 1943. The excellent prospects for Axis victory in Europe made it
--73--
urgent for American to prepare its defenses as soon as possible. The chance that England would make peace with Germany or, indeed, be defeated, raised the possibility that the United States would have to continue the war alone. Thus he had to plan for a very large, and very well equipped, American army. But before the Army could engage in any decisive combat operations on the continent of Europe, the United States needed to establish certain conditions.
Wedemeyer was acutely conscious that the United States waged any war outside the western hemisphere at a considerable disadvantage. Before the Army could engage the enemy, the Navy had to transport it to the theater of operations. Besides crossing thousands of miles of potentially dangerous ocean, the United States had to establish and maintain an adequate line of supply across the ocean. Thus his first condition was that the Axis navies had to be swept from the seas, particularly from the Atlantic Ocean and those waters contiguous to Europe itself.37 Without the ability to transport military formations in security and to maintain the lines of supply needed to keep them in action, all other propositions became meaningless.
A powerful navy and a substantial merchant fleet were prerequisites, despite the increased fighting potential of the air arm. Air forces did not deprive naval vessels of their vital roles on the seas, but did accelerate the pace of war at sea and necessitate changes in the employment of navies. Neither could air forces effect the economic blockade of the enemy that was the concomitant of keeping sea lanes of communication open for the United States and Allied nations. A powerful navy remained essential, and planning had to allocate industrial potential and manpower with sea power in mind.38
? Air power was equally crucial, a fact Wedemeyer came to understand early in his career. "I was always air minded," Wedemeyer remarked in 1987.39 He was sufficiently taken with aviation to go with Nathan Twining, later a general officer in the Air Force, to take the Air Corps tests early in his career. Although he failed the flight physical, he retained a grasp unusual in a ground officer of the period of the potential for warfare in the third dimension. Both
--74--
from his study of the art of war and from his education in Berlin, Wedemeyer knew that an air force multiplied the value of a smaller ground force by denying mobility to the more numerous enemy. Various memorandums from the Air Corps emphasized this theme, and the language of those documents found its way into the mobilization studies. "The important influence of the air arm in modern combat," Wedemeyer wrote, "has been irrefutably established." He continued to explain that
the degree of success attained by sea and ground forces will be determined by the effective and timely employment of air supporting units and the successful conduct of strategical missions. No major military operation in any theater will succeed without air superiority, or at least air superiority disputed.40
While air operations could not guarantee victory alone, without a powerful air arm defeat was likely. The second condition, as Wedemeyer saw it, was thus that "overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished."41
Air power was the principal weapon with which the United States could accomplish the third condition for successful military operations against the Axis. By strategic aerial bombardment, the Air Corps could attack the German industrial and economic structure and render that structure "ineffective through the continuous disruption and destruction of lines of communication, port and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials."42 Wedemeyer was familiar with the doctrine for strategic bombing as espoused by Giulio Douhet and had been in the Army throughout the debates over air power occasioned by the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell. While he did not agree that air power could single-handedly win the war, a fact recently demonstrated by the failure of the German Douhet-style aerial offensive against England, he nonetheless agreed it was the ideal instrument with which to destroy the German economy.
--72--
adequate standard to fight the Axis before that date. On a basic level, the Army needed time to build training facilities and housing for expansion. Manpower mobilization had to proceed cautiously to avoid calling up the skilled hands necessary to build training facilities before they built those bases. The second major limitation was industrial because, even in the fall of 1941 and even after the expansion of defense industries to support the requirements of Lend Lease, not more than 15 percent of the industrial capacity of the United States was devoted to defense. America needed time to convert industries to defense production.34 Finally, shipping would present problems.
In the middle of 1941 virtually all of the American merchant fleet was in normal commercial service. Around 855,000 gross tons of shipping could be made available to transport an expeditionary force overseas and then sustain it in an overseas theater. The WPD estimated that amount of shipping could move not more than 50,000 men and their equipment and 90 day's supplies to a trans-oceanic theater. That situation would improve significantly throughout 1942. Before the United States could fight outside the hemisphere, more time would be required to assemble the necessary vessels and prepare them for military use; to build the additional shipping that war service would make necessary; and to establish adequate port facilities at points of embarkation and debarkation.35 Wedemeyer later learned that the shipping required to transport the Army and Air Corps overseas amounted to around seven million tons, or one thousand vessels. Maintaining that force in overseas theaters required about ten million tons of shipping, or 1,500 hips. The two years required to build those ships coincided with the time the general staff estimated the Army needed to raise and train the combat divisions.36 It also coincided with the period of maximum risk, the earliest date the general staff estimated that Germany would be able to invade Great Britain and deprive the United States of is European base.
As Wedemeyer began to plan to meet the crisis, he therefore understood that the earliest date that the United States could go to war in anything other than defense of the hemisphere was July 1943. The excellent prospects for Axis victory in Europe made it
--73--
urgent for American to prepare its defenses as soon as possible. The chance that England would make peace with Germany or, indeed, be defeated, raised the possibility that the United States would have to continue the war alone. Thus he had to plan for a very large, and very well equipped, American army. But before the Army could engage in any decisive combat operations on the continent of Europe, the United States needed to establish certain conditions.
Wedemeyer was acutely conscious that the United States waged any war outside the western hemisphere at a considerable disadvantage. Before the Army could engage the enemy, the Navy had to transport it to the theater of operations. Besides crossing thousands of miles of potentially dangerous ocean, the United States had to establish and maintain an adequate line of supply across the ocean. Thus his first condition was that the Axis navies had to be swept from the seas, particularly from the Atlantic Ocean and those waters contiguous to Europe itself.37 Without the ability to transport military formations in security and to maintain the lines of supply needed to keep them in action, all other propositions became meaningless.
A powerful navy and a substantial merchant fleet were prerequisites, despite the increased fighting potential of the air arm. Air forces did not deprive naval vessels of their vital roles on the seas, but did accelerate the pace of war at sea and necessitate changes in the employment of navies. Neither could air forces effect the economic blockade of the enemy that was the concomitant of keeping sea lanes of communication open for the United States and Allied nations. A powerful navy remained essential, and planning had to allocate industrial potential and manpower with sea power in mind.38
? Air power was equally crucial, a fact Wedemeyer came to understand early in his career. "I was always air minded," Wedemeyer remarked in 1987.39 He was sufficiently taken with aviation to go with Nathan Twining, later a general officer in the Air Force, to take the Air Corps tests early in his career. Although he failed the flight physical, he retained a grasp unusual in a ground officer of the period of the potential for warfare in the third dimension. Both
--74--
from his study of the art of war and from his education in Berlin, Wedemeyer knew that an air force multiplied the value of a smaller ground force by denying mobility to the more numerous enemy. Various memorandums from the Air Corps emphasized this theme, and the language of those documents found its way into the mobilization studies. "The important influence of the air arm in modern combat," Wedemeyer wrote, "has been irrefutably established." He continued to explain that
the degree of success attained by sea and ground forces will be determined by the effective and timely employment of air supporting units and the successful conduct of strategical missions. No major military operation in any theater will succeed without air superiority, or at least air superiority disputed.40
While air operations could not guarantee victory alone, without a powerful air arm defeat was likely. The second condition, as Wedemeyer saw it, was thus that "overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished."41
Air power was the principal weapon with which the United States could accomplish the third condition for successful military operations against the Axis. By strategic aerial bombardment, the Air Corps could attack the German industrial and economic structure and render that structure "ineffective through the continuous disruption and destruction of lines of communication, port and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials."42 Wedemeyer was familiar with the doctrine for strategic bombing as espoused by Giulio Douhet and had been in the Army throughout the debates over air power occasioned by the court-martial of General Billy Mitchell. While he did not agree that air power could single-handedly win the war, a fact recently demonstrated by the failure of the German Douhet-style aerial offensive against England, he nonetheless agreed it was the ideal instrument with which to destroy the German economy.
- Thread starter
- #31
The next condition was physical proximity to the enemy. That meant the United States needed advanced bases from which to
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operate. Not only did the country require the existing Atlantic bases in order to assure the security of the western hemisphere, but it also needed a series of bases to encircle Germany. From these forward bases, air forces could operate against the German industry and economy. Likewise, such bases offered convenient points from which to launch combined arms operations against the German "citadel" in Europe. In creating the necessary overseas stations, however, the Army had to be very careful to build only those bases that it really needed because the country could not afford to disperse its force so greatly that they could not "make timely and effective contributions to the accomplishment of our main task, the defeat of Germany."43 In building such bases, Wedemeyer pointed out that the provisions of RAINBOW 5 would have to govern:
The commitment of our forces must conform to our accepted broad strategic concept of active (offensive) operations in one theater (European), and concurrently, passive (defensive) operations in the other (Pacific).44
Finally, Wedemeyer saw that the United States and the Allies had to weaken the enemy by overextending and dispersing his armies. Concentration of forces brought victory. If the Allies could so threaten the Axis that it had to send reinforcements in many directions, then the eventual decisive attack would inevitably succeed, because the enemy could meet it with only a portion of his total strength. Attacks on enemy supplies of fuel and matériel and, most particularly, his transportation net, contributed to this end. Deterioration of the enemy's national will on the home front might result from propaganda, subversion, deprivation of a reasonable standard of living, destruction of the fabric of the enemy's society, and the chaos and public disorder that accompany such domestic conditions. Strategic bombing, planners expected, would attack the German national will just as it attacked the German industry and economy. Civilian and economic chaos would, in turn, diminish the effectiveness of the German military forces.45
In sum, the United States had to adopt a military strategy that placed the bulk of American combat forces in contact with the enemy in the European theater. In order to accomplish this, the United States had to build and maintain armed forces capable of controlling
--76--
the sea lanes of communications in two oceans; to fight a major land, sea, and air war in one theater; and to be sufficiently strong to deter war in the other. No other nation faced the task of building up its army, navy, and air forces to such standards, to meet such global commitments. Likewise, no other power had to rely upon lines of supply tenuously stretched across oceans, the control of which was still disputed, to bases that had still, in many cases, to be won.
--75--
operate. Not only did the country require the existing Atlantic bases in order to assure the security of the western hemisphere, but it also needed a series of bases to encircle Germany. From these forward bases, air forces could operate against the German industry and economy. Likewise, such bases offered convenient points from which to launch combined arms operations against the German "citadel" in Europe. In creating the necessary overseas stations, however, the Army had to be very careful to build only those bases that it really needed because the country could not afford to disperse its force so greatly that they could not "make timely and effective contributions to the accomplishment of our main task, the defeat of Germany."43 In building such bases, Wedemeyer pointed out that the provisions of RAINBOW 5 would have to govern:
The commitment of our forces must conform to our accepted broad strategic concept of active (offensive) operations in one theater (European), and concurrently, passive (defensive) operations in the other (Pacific).44
Finally, Wedemeyer saw that the United States and the Allies had to weaken the enemy by overextending and dispersing his armies. Concentration of forces brought victory. If the Allies could so threaten the Axis that it had to send reinforcements in many directions, then the eventual decisive attack would inevitably succeed, because the enemy could meet it with only a portion of his total strength. Attacks on enemy supplies of fuel and matériel and, most particularly, his transportation net, contributed to this end. Deterioration of the enemy's national will on the home front might result from propaganda, subversion, deprivation of a reasonable standard of living, destruction of the fabric of the enemy's society, and the chaos and public disorder that accompany such domestic conditions. Strategic bombing, planners expected, would attack the German national will just as it attacked the German industry and economy. Civilian and economic chaos would, in turn, diminish the effectiveness of the German military forces.45
In sum, the United States had to adopt a military strategy that placed the bulk of American combat forces in contact with the enemy in the European theater. In order to accomplish this, the United States had to build and maintain armed forces capable of controlling
--76--
the sea lanes of communications in two oceans; to fight a major land, sea, and air war in one theater; and to be sufficiently strong to deter war in the other. No other nation faced the task of building up its army, navy, and air forces to such standards, to meet such global commitments. Likewise, no other power had to rely upon lines of supply tenuously stretched across oceans, the control of which was still disputed, to bases that had still, in many cases, to be won.
parsifal
Colonel
You have got to be kidding. Hitlers alleged "peace offers" were nothing short of a demand for surrender, and a total betrayal to people that Britain had made unconditional promises of security to.
This is the contents of Hitlers speech to the reichstag dated May 4 1941. Parts I of III
Deputies. Men of the German Reichstag:
At a time when only deeds count and words are of little importance, it is not my intention to appear before you, the elected representatives of the German people, more often than absolutely necessary. The first time I spoke to you was at the outbreak of the war when, thanks to the Anglo-French conspiracy against peace, every attempt at an understanding with Poland, which otherwise would have been possible, had been frustrated.
The most unscrupulous men of the present time had, as they admit today, decided as early as 1936 to involve the Reich, which in its peaceful work of reconstruction was becoming too powerful for them, in a new and bloody war and, if possible, to destroy it. They had finally succeeded in finding a State that was prepared for their interests and aims, and that State was Poland.
All my endeavors to come to an understanding with Britain were wrecked by the determination of a small clique which, whether from motives of hate or for the sake of material gain, rejected every German proposal for an understanding due to their resolve, which they never concealed, to resort to war, whatever happened.
The man behind this fanatical and diabolical plan to bring about war at whatever cost was Mr. Churchill. His associates were the men who now form the British Government.
These endeavors received most powerful support, both openly and secretly, from the so-called great democracies on both sides of the Atlantic. At a time when the people were more and more dissatisfied with their deficient statesmanship, the responsible men over there believed that a successful war would be the most likely means of solving problems that otherwise would be beyond their power to solve.
Behind these men there stood the great international Jewish financial interests that control the banks and the Stock Exchange as well as the armament industry. And now, just as before, they scented the opportunity of doing their unsavory business. And so, just as before, there was no scruple about sacrificing the blood of the peoples. That was the beginning of this war. A few weeks later the State that was the third country in Europe, Poland, but had been reckless enough to allow herself to be used for the financial interests of these warmongers, was annihilated and destroyed.
In these circumstances I considered that I owed it to our German people and countless men and women in the opposite camps, who as individuals were as decent as they were innocent of blame, to make yet another appeal to the common sense and the conscience of these statesmen. On October 6, 1939, I therefore once more publicly stated that Germany had neither demanded nor intended to demand anything either from Britain or from France, that it was madness to continue the war and, above all, that the scourge of modern weapons of warfare, once they were brought into action, would inevitably ravage vast territories.
But just as the appeal I made on September 1, 1939, proved to be in vain, this renewed appeal met with indignant rejection. The British and their Jewish capitalist backers could find no other explanation for this appeal, which I had made on humanitarian grounds, than the assumption of weakness on the part of Germany.
They assured the people of Britain and France that Germany dreaded the clash to be expected in the spring of 1940 and was eager to make peace for fear of the annihilation that would then inevitably result.
Already at that time the Norwegian Government, misled by the stubborn insistence of Mr. Churchill's false prophecies, began to toy with the idea of a British landing on their soil, thereby contributing to the destruction of Germany by permitting their harbors and Swedish iron ore fields to be seized.
So sure were Mr. Churchill and Paul Reynaud of the success of their new scheme that finally, whether from sheer recklessness or perhaps under the influence of drink, they deemed it no longer necessary to make a secret of their intentions.
It was thanks to these two gentlemen's tendency to gossip that the German Government at that time gained cognizance of the plans being made against the Reich. A few weeks later this danger to Germany was eliminated. One of the boldest deeds of arms in the whole history of warfare frustrated the attack of the British and French armies against the right flank of our line of defense.
Immediately after the failure of these plans, increased pressure was exerted by the British warmongers upon Belgium and Holland. Now that the attack upon our sources for the supply of iron ore had proved unsuccessful, they aimed to advance the front to the Rhine by involving the Belgian and Dutch States and thus to threaten and paralyze our production centers for iron and steel.
On May 10 of last year perhaps the most memorable struggle in all German history commenced. The enemy front was broken up in a few days and the stage was then set for the operation that culminated in the greatest battle of annihilation in the history of the world. Thus France collapsed, Belgium and Holland were already occupied, and the battered remnants of the British expeditionary force were driven from the European continent, leaving their arms behind.
On July 19, 1940, I then convened the German Reichstag for the third time in order to render that great account which you all still remember. The meeting provided me with the opportunity of expressing the thanks of the nation to its soldiers in a form suited to the uniqueness of the event. Once again I seized the opportunity of urging the world to make peace. And what I foresaw and prophesied at that time happened. My offer of peace was misconstrued as a symptom of fear and cowardice.
The European and American warmongers succeeded once again in befogging the sound common sense of the masses, who can never hope to profit from this war, by conjuring up false pictures of new hope. Thus, finally, under pressure of public opinion, as formed by their press, they once more managed to induce the nation to continue this struggle.
Even my warnings against night bombings of the civilian population, as advocated by Mr. Churchill, were interpreted as a sign of German impotence. He, the most bloodthirsty or amateurish strategist that history has ever known, actually saw fit to believe that the reserve displayed for months by the German Air Force could be looked upon only as proof of their incapacity to fly by night.
So this man for months ordered his paid scribblers to deceive the British people into believing that the Royal Air Force alone - and no others - was in a position to wage war in this way, and that thus ways and means had been found to force the Reich to its knees by the ruthless onslaught of the British Air Force on the German civilian population in conjunction with the starvation blockade.
Again and again I uttered these warnings against this specific type of aerial warfare, and I did so for over three and a half months. That these warnings failed to impress Mr. Churchill does not surprise me in the least. For what does this man care for the lives of others? What does he care for culture or for architecture? When war broke out he stated clearly that he wanted to have his war, even though the cities of England might be reduced to ruins. So now he has got his war.
My assurances that from a given moment every one of his bombs would be returned if necessary a hundredfold failed to induce this man to consider even for an instant the criminal nature of his action. He professes not to be in the least depressed and he even assures us that the British people, too, after such bombing raids, greeted him with a joyous serenity, causing him to return to London refreshed by his visits to the stricken areas.
parsifal
Colonel
Hitlers speech to the reichstag May 4 1941
Part II of III
It is possible that this sight strengthened Mr. Churchill in his firm determination to continue the war in this way, and we are no less determined to continue to retaliate, if necessary, a hundred bombs for every one of his and to go on doing so until the British nation at last gets rid of this criminal and his methods.
The appeal to forsake me, made to the German nation by this fool and his satellites on May Day, of all days, are only to be explained either as symptomatic of a paralytic disease or of a drunkard's ravings. His abnormal state of mind also gave birth to a decision to transform the Balkans into a theater of war.
For over five years this man has been chasing around Europe like a madman in search of something that he could set on fire. Unfortunately, he again and again finds hirelings who open the gates of their country to this international incendiary.
After he had succeeded in the course of the past winter in persuading the British people by a wave of false assertions and pretensions that the German Reich, exhausted by the campaign in the preceding months, was completely spent, he saw himself obliged, in order to prevent an awakening of the truth, to create a fresh conflagration in Europe.
In so doing he returned to the project that had been in his mind as early as the autumn of 1939 and the spring of 1940. It was thought possible at the time to mobilize about 100 divisions in Britain's interest.
The sudden collapse which we witnessed in May and June of the past year forced these plans to be abandoned for the moment. But by the autumn of last year Mr. Churchill began to tackle this problem once again.
In the meantime, however, certain difficulties had arisen. As a result, Rumania, owing to internal changes, dropped out of England's political scheme.
In dealing with these conditions, I shall begin by giving you a brief outline of the aims of Germany's policy in the Balkans. As in the past, the Reich never pursued any territorial or any other selfish political interest in the Balkans. In other words, the Reich has never taken the slightest interest in territorial problems and internal conditions in these States for any selfish reason whatsoever.
On the other hand, the Reich has always endeavored to build up and to strengthen close economic ties with these States in particular. This, however, not only served the interests of the Reich but equally the interests of these countries themselves.
If any two national economic systems ever effectively complemented one another, that is especially the case regarding the Balkan States and Germany. Germany is an industrial country and requires foodstuffs and raw materials. The Balkan States are agrarian countries and are short of these raw materials. At the same time, they require industrial products.
It was therefore hardly surprising when Germany thus became the main business partner of the Balkan States. Nor was this in Germany's interest alone, but also in that of the Balkan peoples themselves.
AND NONE BUT OUR JEW-RIDDEN DEMOCRACIES, WHICH CAN THINK ONLY IN TERMS OF CAPITALISM, CAN MAINTAIN THAT IF ONE STATE DELIVERS MACHINERY TO ANOTHER STATE IT THEREBY DOMINATES THAT OTHER STATE. IN ACTUAL FACT SUCH DOMINATION, IF IT OCCURS, CAN BE ONLY A RECIPROCAL DOMINATION.
It is presumably easier to be without machinery than without food and raw materials. Consequently, the partner in need of raw material and foodstuffs would appear to be more tied down than the recipient of industrial products. IN THIS TRANSACTION THERE WAS NEITHER CONQUEROR NOR CONQUERED. THERE WERE ONLY PARTNERS.
The German Reich of the National Socialist revolution has prided itself on being a fair and decent partner, offering in exchange high-quality products instead of worthless democratic paper money. For these reasons the Reich was interested in only one thing if, indeed, there was any question of political interest, namely, in seeing that internally the business partner was firmly established on a sound and healthy basis.
THE APPLICATION OF THIS IDEA LED IN FACT NOT ONLY TO INCREASING PROSPERITY IN THESE COUNTRIES BUT ALSO TO THE BEGINNING OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. All the greater, however, became the endeavor of that world incendiary, Churchill, to put an end to this peaceful development and by shamelessly imposing upon these States utterly worthless British guarantees and promises of assistance to introduce into this peaceable European territory elements of unrest, uncertainty, distrust and, finally, conflict.
Originally, Rumania was first won over by these guarantees and later, of course, Greece. It has, meanwhile, probably been sufficiently demonstrated that he had absolutely no power of any kind to provide real help and that these guarantees were merely intended to rope these States in to follow the dangerous trend of filthy British politics.
RUMANIA HAS HAD TO PAY BITTERLY FOR THE GUARANTEES, WHICH WERE CALCULATED TO ESTRANGE HER FROM THE AXIS POWERS.
Greece, which least of all required such a guarantee, was offered her share to link her destiny to that of the country that provided her King with cash and orders.
EVEN TODAY I FEEL THAT I MUST, AS I BELIEVE IN THE INTEREST OF HISTORICAL ACCURACY, DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE GREEK PEOPLE AND THAT THIN TOP LAYER OF CORRUPT LEADERS WHO, INSPIRED BY A KING WHO HAD NO EYES FOR THE DUTY OF TRUE LEADERSHIP, PREFERRED INSTEAD TO FURTHER THE AIMS OF BRITISH WAR POLITICS. To me this is a subject of profound regret.
Germany, with the faint hope of still being able to contribute in some way to a solution of the problem, had not severed relations with Greece. But even then I was bound in duty to point out before the whole world that we would not tacitly allow a revival of the old Salonika scheme of the Great War.
Unfortunately, my warning was not taken seriously enough. That we were determined, if the British tried to gain another foothold in Europe, to drive them back into the sea was not taken seriously enough.
The result was that the British began in an increasing degree to establish bases for the formation of a new Salonika army. They began by laying out airdromes and by establishing the necessary ground organization in the firm conviction that the occupation of the airdromes themselves could afterward be carried out very speedily.
Finally a continuous stream of transports brought equipment for an army which, according to Mr. Churchill's idea and plans, was to be landed in Greece. As I have said, already we were aware of this. For months we watched this entire strange procedure with attention, if with restraint.
The reverses suffered by the Italian Army in North Africa, owing to a certain material inferiority of their tanks and anti-tank guns, finally led Mr. Churchill to believe that the time was ripe to transfer the theater of war from Libya to Greece. He ordered the transport of the remaining tanks and of the infantry division, composed mainly of Anzacs, and was convinced that he could now complete his scheme, which was to set the Balkans aflame.
THUS DID MR. CHURCHILL COMMIT ONE OF THE GREATEST STRATEGIC BLUNDERS OF THIS WAR. As soon as there could be no further doubt regarding Britain's intentions of gaining a foothold in the Balkans, I took the necessary steps.
Germany, by keeping pace with these moves, assembled the necessary forces for the purpose of counteracting any possible tricks of that gentleman. In this connection I must state categorically that this action was not directed against Greece.
The Duce did not even request me to place one single German division at his disposal for this purpose. He was convinced that with the advent of good weather his stand against Greece would have been brought to a successful conclusion. I was of the same opinion.
The concentration of German forces was therefore not made for the purpose of assisting the Italians against Greece. It was a precautionary measure against the British attempt under cover of the clamor caused by the Italo-Greek war to intrench themselves secretly in the Balkans in order to force the issue from that quarter on the model of the Salonika army during the World War, and, above all, to draw other elements into the whirlpool.
This hope was founded principally on two States, namely, Turkey and Yugoslavia. But with these very States I have striven during the years since I came into power to establish close co-operation.
Part II of III
It is possible that this sight strengthened Mr. Churchill in his firm determination to continue the war in this way, and we are no less determined to continue to retaliate, if necessary, a hundred bombs for every one of his and to go on doing so until the British nation at last gets rid of this criminal and his methods.
The appeal to forsake me, made to the German nation by this fool and his satellites on May Day, of all days, are only to be explained either as symptomatic of a paralytic disease or of a drunkard's ravings. His abnormal state of mind also gave birth to a decision to transform the Balkans into a theater of war.
For over five years this man has been chasing around Europe like a madman in search of something that he could set on fire. Unfortunately, he again and again finds hirelings who open the gates of their country to this international incendiary.
After he had succeeded in the course of the past winter in persuading the British people by a wave of false assertions and pretensions that the German Reich, exhausted by the campaign in the preceding months, was completely spent, he saw himself obliged, in order to prevent an awakening of the truth, to create a fresh conflagration in Europe.
In so doing he returned to the project that had been in his mind as early as the autumn of 1939 and the spring of 1940. It was thought possible at the time to mobilize about 100 divisions in Britain's interest.
The sudden collapse which we witnessed in May and June of the past year forced these plans to be abandoned for the moment. But by the autumn of last year Mr. Churchill began to tackle this problem once again.
In the meantime, however, certain difficulties had arisen. As a result, Rumania, owing to internal changes, dropped out of England's political scheme.
In dealing with these conditions, I shall begin by giving you a brief outline of the aims of Germany's policy in the Balkans. As in the past, the Reich never pursued any territorial or any other selfish political interest in the Balkans. In other words, the Reich has never taken the slightest interest in territorial problems and internal conditions in these States for any selfish reason whatsoever.
On the other hand, the Reich has always endeavored to build up and to strengthen close economic ties with these States in particular. This, however, not only served the interests of the Reich but equally the interests of these countries themselves.
If any two national economic systems ever effectively complemented one another, that is especially the case regarding the Balkan States and Germany. Germany is an industrial country and requires foodstuffs and raw materials. The Balkan States are agrarian countries and are short of these raw materials. At the same time, they require industrial products.
It was therefore hardly surprising when Germany thus became the main business partner of the Balkan States. Nor was this in Germany's interest alone, but also in that of the Balkan peoples themselves.
AND NONE BUT OUR JEW-RIDDEN DEMOCRACIES, WHICH CAN THINK ONLY IN TERMS OF CAPITALISM, CAN MAINTAIN THAT IF ONE STATE DELIVERS MACHINERY TO ANOTHER STATE IT THEREBY DOMINATES THAT OTHER STATE. IN ACTUAL FACT SUCH DOMINATION, IF IT OCCURS, CAN BE ONLY A RECIPROCAL DOMINATION.
It is presumably easier to be without machinery than without food and raw materials. Consequently, the partner in need of raw material and foodstuffs would appear to be more tied down than the recipient of industrial products. IN THIS TRANSACTION THERE WAS NEITHER CONQUEROR NOR CONQUERED. THERE WERE ONLY PARTNERS.
The German Reich of the National Socialist revolution has prided itself on being a fair and decent partner, offering in exchange high-quality products instead of worthless democratic paper money. For these reasons the Reich was interested in only one thing if, indeed, there was any question of political interest, namely, in seeing that internally the business partner was firmly established on a sound and healthy basis.
THE APPLICATION OF THIS IDEA LED IN FACT NOT ONLY TO INCREASING PROSPERITY IN THESE COUNTRIES BUT ALSO TO THE BEGINNING OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. All the greater, however, became the endeavor of that world incendiary, Churchill, to put an end to this peaceful development and by shamelessly imposing upon these States utterly worthless British guarantees and promises of assistance to introduce into this peaceable European territory elements of unrest, uncertainty, distrust and, finally, conflict.
Originally, Rumania was first won over by these guarantees and later, of course, Greece. It has, meanwhile, probably been sufficiently demonstrated that he had absolutely no power of any kind to provide real help and that these guarantees were merely intended to rope these States in to follow the dangerous trend of filthy British politics.
RUMANIA HAS HAD TO PAY BITTERLY FOR THE GUARANTEES, WHICH WERE CALCULATED TO ESTRANGE HER FROM THE AXIS POWERS.
Greece, which least of all required such a guarantee, was offered her share to link her destiny to that of the country that provided her King with cash and orders.
EVEN TODAY I FEEL THAT I MUST, AS I BELIEVE IN THE INTEREST OF HISTORICAL ACCURACY, DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE GREEK PEOPLE AND THAT THIN TOP LAYER OF CORRUPT LEADERS WHO, INSPIRED BY A KING WHO HAD NO EYES FOR THE DUTY OF TRUE LEADERSHIP, PREFERRED INSTEAD TO FURTHER THE AIMS OF BRITISH WAR POLITICS. To me this is a subject of profound regret.
Germany, with the faint hope of still being able to contribute in some way to a solution of the problem, had not severed relations with Greece. But even then I was bound in duty to point out before the whole world that we would not tacitly allow a revival of the old Salonika scheme of the Great War.
Unfortunately, my warning was not taken seriously enough. That we were determined, if the British tried to gain another foothold in Europe, to drive them back into the sea was not taken seriously enough.
The result was that the British began in an increasing degree to establish bases for the formation of a new Salonika army. They began by laying out airdromes and by establishing the necessary ground organization in the firm conviction that the occupation of the airdromes themselves could afterward be carried out very speedily.
Finally a continuous stream of transports brought equipment for an army which, according to Mr. Churchill's idea and plans, was to be landed in Greece. As I have said, already we were aware of this. For months we watched this entire strange procedure with attention, if with restraint.
The reverses suffered by the Italian Army in North Africa, owing to a certain material inferiority of their tanks and anti-tank guns, finally led Mr. Churchill to believe that the time was ripe to transfer the theater of war from Libya to Greece. He ordered the transport of the remaining tanks and of the infantry division, composed mainly of Anzacs, and was convinced that he could now complete his scheme, which was to set the Balkans aflame.
THUS DID MR. CHURCHILL COMMIT ONE OF THE GREATEST STRATEGIC BLUNDERS OF THIS WAR. As soon as there could be no further doubt regarding Britain's intentions of gaining a foothold in the Balkans, I took the necessary steps.
Germany, by keeping pace with these moves, assembled the necessary forces for the purpose of counteracting any possible tricks of that gentleman. In this connection I must state categorically that this action was not directed against Greece.
The Duce did not even request me to place one single German division at his disposal for this purpose. He was convinced that with the advent of good weather his stand against Greece would have been brought to a successful conclusion. I was of the same opinion.
The concentration of German forces was therefore not made for the purpose of assisting the Italians against Greece. It was a precautionary measure against the British attempt under cover of the clamor caused by the Italo-Greek war to intrench themselves secretly in the Balkans in order to force the issue from that quarter on the model of the Salonika army during the World War, and, above all, to draw other elements into the whirlpool.
This hope was founded principally on two States, namely, Turkey and Yugoslavia. But with these very States I have striven during the years since I came into power to establish close co-operation.
parsifal
Colonel
Hitlers speech to the reichstag 4 May 1941 Part III of IV
The World War actually started from Belgrade. Nevertheless, the German people, who are by nature so ready to forgive and forget, felt no animosity toward that country. Turkey was our ally in the World War. The unfortunate outcome of that struggle weighed upon that country just as heavily as it did upon us.
The great genius who created the new Turkey was the first to set a wonderful example of recovery to our allies whom fortune had at that time deserted and whom fate had dealt so terrible a blow. Whereas Turkey, thanks to the practical attitude of her leaders, preserved her independence in carrying out her own resolutions, Yugolsavia fell a victim to British intrigue.
Most of you, especially my old Party comrades among you, know what efforts I have made to establish a straightforward understanding and indeed friendly relations between Germany and Yugoslavia. In pursuance of this aim Herr von Ribbentrop, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, submitted to the Yugoslav Government proposals that were so outstanding and so fair that at least even the Yugoslav State of that time seemed to become increasingly eager for such close co-operation.
Germany had no intention of starting a war in the Balkans. On the contrary, it was our honest intention as far as possible to contribute to a settlement of the conflict with Greece by means that would be tolerable to the legitimate wishes of Italy.
The Duce not only consented to but lent his full support to our efforts to bring Yugoslavia into a close community of interests with our peace aims. Thus it finally became possible to induce the Yugoslav Government to join the Threepower Pact, which made no demands whatever on Yugoslavia but only offered that country advantages.
Thus on March 26 of this year a pact was signed in Vienna that offered the Yugoslav State the greatest future conceivable and could have assured peace for the Balkans. Believe me, gentlemen, on that day I left the beautiful city of the Danube truly happy not only because it seemed as though almost eight years of foreign policies had received their reward but also because I believed that perhaps at the last moment German intervention in the Balkans might not be necessary.
We were all stunned by the news of that coup, carried through by a handful of bribed conspirators who had brought about the event that caused the British Prime Minister to declare in joyous words that at last he had something good to report.
YOU WILL SURELY UNDERSTAND, GENTLEMEN, THAT WHEN I HEARD THIS I AT ONCE GAVE ORDERS TO ATTACK YUGOSLAVIA. To treat the, German Reich in this way is impossible. One cannot spent years in concluding a treaty that is in the interest of the other party merely to discover that this treaty has not only been broken overnight but also that it has been answered by the insulting of the representative of the German Reich, by the threatening of his military attache, by the injuring of the aide de camp of this attache, by the maltreating of numerous other Germans, by demolishing property, by laying waste the homes of German citizens and by terrorizing.
GOD KNOWS THAT I WANTED PEACE. But I can do nothing but protect the interests of the Reich with those means which, thank God, are at our disposal. I made my decision at that moment all the more calmly because I knew that I was in accord with Bulgaria, who had always remained unshaken in her loyalty to the German Reich, and with the equally justified indignation of Hungary.
Both of our old allies in the World War were bound to regard this action as a provocation emanating from the State that once before had set the whole of Europe on fire and had been guilty of the indescribable sufferings that befell Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria in consequence.
The general directions of operations issued by me through the Supreme Command of the German forces on March 27 confronted the Army and the Air Force with a formidable task. By a mere turn of the hand an additional campaign had to be prepared. Units that had already arrived had to be moved about. Supplies of armaments had to be assured and the air force had to take over numerous improvised airports part of which were still under water.
WITHOUT THE SYMPATHETIC ASSISTANCE OF HUNGARY AND THE EXTREMELY LOYAL ATTITUDE OF RUMANIA IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT MY ORDERS IN THE SHORT TIME ENVISAGED.
I fixed April 6 as the day on which the attack was to begin. The main plan of operation was: First, to proceed with an army coming from Bulgaria against Thrace in Greece in the direction of the Aegean Sea.
The main striking strength of this army lay in its right wing, which was to force a passage through to Salonika by using mountain divisions and a division of tanks; second, to thrust forward with a second army with the object of establishing connection as speedily as possible with the Italian forces advancing from Albania. These two operations were to begin on April 6.
Third, a further operation, beginning on the eighth, provided for the break-through of an army from Bulgaria with the object of reaching the neighborhood of Belgrade. In conjunction with this, a German army corps was to occupy the Banat on the tenth.
In connection with these operations general agreement had been made with our allies, Italy and Hungary. Agreements as to co-operation had also been reached between the two air forces. The command of the German Armies operating against Macedonia and Greece was placed in the hands of Field Marshal von List, who had already particularly distinguished himself in the previous campaigns. Once more and under the most exacting conditions he carried out the task confronting him in truly superior fashion.
The forces advancing against Yugoslavia from the southwest and from Hungary were commanded by Col. Gen. von Weick. He, too, in a very short time with the forces under his command reached his objective.
The Army and SS detachments operating under Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, as Commander in Chief, and the Chief of the General Staff, Col. Gen. Halder, forced the Greek Army in Thrace to capitulate after only five days, established contact with the Italian forces advancing from Albania, occupied Salonika, and thus generally prepared the way for the difficult and glorious break-through via Larissa to Athens.
These operations were crowned by the occupation of the Peloponnesus and numerous Greek islands. A detailed appreciation of the achievements will be given by the German High Command.
The Air Force under the personal command of Reich Marshal Goering was divided into two main groups, commanded by Col. Gen. Loehr and General von Richthofen. It was their task, first, to shatter the enemy air force and to smash its ground organization; second, to attack every important military objective in the conspirators' headquarters at Belgrade, thus eliminating it from the very outset; third, by every manner of active co-operation everywhere with the fighting German troops to break the enemy's resistance, to impede the enemy's flight, to prevent as far as possible his embarkation.
The German armed forces have truly surpassed themselves in this campaign. There is only one way of characterizing that campaign:
The World War actually started from Belgrade. Nevertheless, the German people, who are by nature so ready to forgive and forget, felt no animosity toward that country. Turkey was our ally in the World War. The unfortunate outcome of that struggle weighed upon that country just as heavily as it did upon us.
The great genius who created the new Turkey was the first to set a wonderful example of recovery to our allies whom fortune had at that time deserted and whom fate had dealt so terrible a blow. Whereas Turkey, thanks to the practical attitude of her leaders, preserved her independence in carrying out her own resolutions, Yugolsavia fell a victim to British intrigue.
Most of you, especially my old Party comrades among you, know what efforts I have made to establish a straightforward understanding and indeed friendly relations between Germany and Yugoslavia. In pursuance of this aim Herr von Ribbentrop, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, submitted to the Yugoslav Government proposals that were so outstanding and so fair that at least even the Yugoslav State of that time seemed to become increasingly eager for such close co-operation.
Germany had no intention of starting a war in the Balkans. On the contrary, it was our honest intention as far as possible to contribute to a settlement of the conflict with Greece by means that would be tolerable to the legitimate wishes of Italy.
The Duce not only consented to but lent his full support to our efforts to bring Yugoslavia into a close community of interests with our peace aims. Thus it finally became possible to induce the Yugoslav Government to join the Threepower Pact, which made no demands whatever on Yugoslavia but only offered that country advantages.
Thus on March 26 of this year a pact was signed in Vienna that offered the Yugoslav State the greatest future conceivable and could have assured peace for the Balkans. Believe me, gentlemen, on that day I left the beautiful city of the Danube truly happy not only because it seemed as though almost eight years of foreign policies had received their reward but also because I believed that perhaps at the last moment German intervention in the Balkans might not be necessary.
We were all stunned by the news of that coup, carried through by a handful of bribed conspirators who had brought about the event that caused the British Prime Minister to declare in joyous words that at last he had something good to report.
YOU WILL SURELY UNDERSTAND, GENTLEMEN, THAT WHEN I HEARD THIS I AT ONCE GAVE ORDERS TO ATTACK YUGOSLAVIA. To treat the, German Reich in this way is impossible. One cannot spent years in concluding a treaty that is in the interest of the other party merely to discover that this treaty has not only been broken overnight but also that it has been answered by the insulting of the representative of the German Reich, by the threatening of his military attache, by the injuring of the aide de camp of this attache, by the maltreating of numerous other Germans, by demolishing property, by laying waste the homes of German citizens and by terrorizing.
GOD KNOWS THAT I WANTED PEACE. But I can do nothing but protect the interests of the Reich with those means which, thank God, are at our disposal. I made my decision at that moment all the more calmly because I knew that I was in accord with Bulgaria, who had always remained unshaken in her loyalty to the German Reich, and with the equally justified indignation of Hungary.
Both of our old allies in the World War were bound to regard this action as a provocation emanating from the State that once before had set the whole of Europe on fire and had been guilty of the indescribable sufferings that befell Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria in consequence.
The general directions of operations issued by me through the Supreme Command of the German forces on March 27 confronted the Army and the Air Force with a formidable task. By a mere turn of the hand an additional campaign had to be prepared. Units that had already arrived had to be moved about. Supplies of armaments had to be assured and the air force had to take over numerous improvised airports part of which were still under water.
WITHOUT THE SYMPATHETIC ASSISTANCE OF HUNGARY AND THE EXTREMELY LOYAL ATTITUDE OF RUMANIA IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT MY ORDERS IN THE SHORT TIME ENVISAGED.
I fixed April 6 as the day on which the attack was to begin. The main plan of operation was: First, to proceed with an army coming from Bulgaria against Thrace in Greece in the direction of the Aegean Sea.
The main striking strength of this army lay in its right wing, which was to force a passage through to Salonika by using mountain divisions and a division of tanks; second, to thrust forward with a second army with the object of establishing connection as speedily as possible with the Italian forces advancing from Albania. These two operations were to begin on April 6.
Third, a further operation, beginning on the eighth, provided for the break-through of an army from Bulgaria with the object of reaching the neighborhood of Belgrade. In conjunction with this, a German army corps was to occupy the Banat on the tenth.
In connection with these operations general agreement had been made with our allies, Italy and Hungary. Agreements as to co-operation had also been reached between the two air forces. The command of the German Armies operating against Macedonia and Greece was placed in the hands of Field Marshal von List, who had already particularly distinguished himself in the previous campaigns. Once more and under the most exacting conditions he carried out the task confronting him in truly superior fashion.
The forces advancing against Yugoslavia from the southwest and from Hungary were commanded by Col. Gen. von Weick. He, too, in a very short time with the forces under his command reached his objective.
The Army and SS detachments operating under Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, as Commander in Chief, and the Chief of the General Staff, Col. Gen. Halder, forced the Greek Army in Thrace to capitulate after only five days, established contact with the Italian forces advancing from Albania, occupied Salonika, and thus generally prepared the way for the difficult and glorious break-through via Larissa to Athens.
These operations were crowned by the occupation of the Peloponnesus and numerous Greek islands. A detailed appreciation of the achievements will be given by the German High Command.
The Air Force under the personal command of Reich Marshal Goering was divided into two main groups, commanded by Col. Gen. Loehr and General von Richthofen. It was their task, first, to shatter the enemy air force and to smash its ground organization; second, to attack every important military objective in the conspirators' headquarters at Belgrade, thus eliminating it from the very outset; third, by every manner of active co-operation everywhere with the fighting German troops to break the enemy's resistance, to impede the enemy's flight, to prevent as far as possible his embarkation.
The German armed forces have truly surpassed themselves in this campaign. There is only one way of characterizing that campaign:
parsifal
Colonel
Part IV of IV
Nothing is impossible for the German soldier. Historical justice, however, obliges me to say that of the opponents that have taken up arms against us, MOST PARTICULARLY THE GREEK SOLDIERS, HAVE FOUGHT WITH THE GREATEST BRAVERY AND CONTEMPT OF DEATH. They only capitulated when further resistance became impossible and therefore useless.
But I am now compelled to speak of the enemy who is the main cause of this conflict. As a German and as a soldier I consider it unworthy ever to revile a fallen enemy. But it seems to me to be necessary to defend the truth from the wild exaggerations of a man who as a soldier is a bad politician and as a politician is an equally bad soldier.
Mr. Churchill, who started this struggle, is endeavoring, as with regard to Norway or Dunkerque, to say something that sooner or later might perhaps he twisted around to resemble success. I do not consider that honorable but in his case it is understandable.
The gift Mr. Churchill possesses is the gift to lie with a pious expression on his face and to distort the truth until finally glorious victories are made out of the most terrible defeats.
A British Army of 60,000 to 70,000 men landed in Greece. Before the catastrophe the same man maintained, moreover, that it consisted of 240,000 men. The object of this army was to attack Germany from the south, inflict a defeat upon her, and from this point as in 1918 turn the tide of the war.
I prophesied more correctly than Mr. Churchill in my last speech, in which I announced that wherever the British might set foot on the Continent they would be attacked by us and driven into the sea.
Now, with his brazen effrontery, he asserts that this war has cost us 75,000 lives. He causes his presumably not overintelligent fellow-countrymen to be informed by one of his paid creatures that the British, after having slain enormous masses of Germans, finally turned away from sheer abhorrence of the slaughter and, strictly speaking, withdrew for this reason alone.
I will now present to you the results of this campaign in a few short figures. In the course of the operations against Yugoslavia there were the following numbers of purely Serbian prisoners, leaving out soldiers of German origin and some other groups, 6,198 officers, 313,864 men.
The number of Greek prisoners, 8,000 officers and 210,000 men, has not the same significance. The number of Englishmen, New Zealanders and Australians taken prisoner exceeds 9,000 officers and men.
The German share of the booty alone, according to the estimates at present available, amounts to more than half a million rifles, far more than 1,000 guns, many thousand machine-guns and anti-aircraft machine-guns, vehicles, and large amounts of ammunition . . . .
The losses of the German Army and the German Air Force as well as those of the SS troops in this campaign are the smallest that we have ever suffered so far. The German armed forces have in fighting against Yugoslavia and Greece as well as against the British in Greece lost:
Army and SS Troops - Fifty-seven officers and 1,042 noncommissioned officers and men killed, 181 officers and 3,571 noncommissioned officers and men wounded, and 13 officers and 372 noncommissioned officers and men missing.
Air Force - Ten officers and 42 noncommissioned officers and men killed and 36 officers and 104 noncommissioned officers and men missing.
Once more I can only repeat that we feel the hardship of the sacrifice borne by the families concerned. The entire German nation expresses to them its heartfelt gratitude.
Taking the measures as a whole, however, the losses suffered are so small that they constitute supreme justification, first, for the planning and timing of this campaign; second for the conduct of operations; third, for the manner in which they were carried through.
The training of our officers is excellent beyond comparison The high standard of efficiency of our soldiers, the superiority of our equipment, the quality of our munitions and the indomitable courage of all ranks have combined to lead at such small sacrifice to a success of truly decisive historical importance.
Churchill, one of the most hopeless dabblers in strategy, thus managed to lose two theaters of war at one single blow. The fact that this man, who in any other country would be court-martialed, gained fresh admiration as Prime Minister cannot be construed as an expression of magnanimity such as was accorded by Roman senators to generals honorably defeated in battle. It is merely proof of that perpetual blindness with which the gods afflict those whom they are about to destroy.
The consequences of this campaign are extraordinary. In view of the fact that a small set of conspirators in Belgrade again were able to foment trouble in the service of extracontinental interests, the radical elimination of this danger means the removal of an element of tension for the whole of Europe.
The Danube as an important waterway is thus safeguarded against any further act of sabotage. Traffic has been resumed in full.
Apart from the modest correction of its frontiers, which were infringed as a result of the outcome of the World War, the Reich has no special territorial interests in these parts. As far as politics are concerned we are merely interested in safeguarding peace in this region, while in the realm of economics we wish to see an order that will allow the production of goods to be developed and the exchange of products to be resumed in the interests of all.
It is, however, only in accordance with supreme justice if those interests are also taken into account that are founded upon ethnographical, historical, or economic conditions.
I can assure you that I look into the future with perfect tranquillity and great confidence. The German Reich and its allies represent power, military, economic and, above all, in moral respects, which is superior to any possible coalition in the world. The German armed forces will always do their part whenever it may be necessary. The confidence of the German people will always accompany their soldiers
Nothing is impossible for the German soldier. Historical justice, however, obliges me to say that of the opponents that have taken up arms against us, MOST PARTICULARLY THE GREEK SOLDIERS, HAVE FOUGHT WITH THE GREATEST BRAVERY AND CONTEMPT OF DEATH. They only capitulated when further resistance became impossible and therefore useless.
But I am now compelled to speak of the enemy who is the main cause of this conflict. As a German and as a soldier I consider it unworthy ever to revile a fallen enemy. But it seems to me to be necessary to defend the truth from the wild exaggerations of a man who as a soldier is a bad politician and as a politician is an equally bad soldier.
Mr. Churchill, who started this struggle, is endeavoring, as with regard to Norway or Dunkerque, to say something that sooner or later might perhaps he twisted around to resemble success. I do not consider that honorable but in his case it is understandable.
The gift Mr. Churchill possesses is the gift to lie with a pious expression on his face and to distort the truth until finally glorious victories are made out of the most terrible defeats.
A British Army of 60,000 to 70,000 men landed in Greece. Before the catastrophe the same man maintained, moreover, that it consisted of 240,000 men. The object of this army was to attack Germany from the south, inflict a defeat upon her, and from this point as in 1918 turn the tide of the war.
I prophesied more correctly than Mr. Churchill in my last speech, in which I announced that wherever the British might set foot on the Continent they would be attacked by us and driven into the sea.
Now, with his brazen effrontery, he asserts that this war has cost us 75,000 lives. He causes his presumably not overintelligent fellow-countrymen to be informed by one of his paid creatures that the British, after having slain enormous masses of Germans, finally turned away from sheer abhorrence of the slaughter and, strictly speaking, withdrew for this reason alone.
I will now present to you the results of this campaign in a few short figures. In the course of the operations against Yugoslavia there were the following numbers of purely Serbian prisoners, leaving out soldiers of German origin and some other groups, 6,198 officers, 313,864 men.
The number of Greek prisoners, 8,000 officers and 210,000 men, has not the same significance. The number of Englishmen, New Zealanders and Australians taken prisoner exceeds 9,000 officers and men.
The German share of the booty alone, according to the estimates at present available, amounts to more than half a million rifles, far more than 1,000 guns, many thousand machine-guns and anti-aircraft machine-guns, vehicles, and large amounts of ammunition . . . .
The losses of the German Army and the German Air Force as well as those of the SS troops in this campaign are the smallest that we have ever suffered so far. The German armed forces have in fighting against Yugoslavia and Greece as well as against the British in Greece lost:
Army and SS Troops - Fifty-seven officers and 1,042 noncommissioned officers and men killed, 181 officers and 3,571 noncommissioned officers and men wounded, and 13 officers and 372 noncommissioned officers and men missing.
Air Force - Ten officers and 42 noncommissioned officers and men killed and 36 officers and 104 noncommissioned officers and men missing.
Once more I can only repeat that we feel the hardship of the sacrifice borne by the families concerned. The entire German nation expresses to them its heartfelt gratitude.
Taking the measures as a whole, however, the losses suffered are so small that they constitute supreme justification, first, for the planning and timing of this campaign; second for the conduct of operations; third, for the manner in which they were carried through.
The training of our officers is excellent beyond comparison The high standard of efficiency of our soldiers, the superiority of our equipment, the quality of our munitions and the indomitable courage of all ranks have combined to lead at such small sacrifice to a success of truly decisive historical importance.
Churchill, one of the most hopeless dabblers in strategy, thus managed to lose two theaters of war at one single blow. The fact that this man, who in any other country would be court-martialed, gained fresh admiration as Prime Minister cannot be construed as an expression of magnanimity such as was accorded by Roman senators to generals honorably defeated in battle. It is merely proof of that perpetual blindness with which the gods afflict those whom they are about to destroy.
The consequences of this campaign are extraordinary. In view of the fact that a small set of conspirators in Belgrade again were able to foment trouble in the service of extracontinental interests, the radical elimination of this danger means the removal of an element of tension for the whole of Europe.
The Danube as an important waterway is thus safeguarded against any further act of sabotage. Traffic has been resumed in full.
Apart from the modest correction of its frontiers, which were infringed as a result of the outcome of the World War, the Reich has no special territorial interests in these parts. As far as politics are concerned we are merely interested in safeguarding peace in this region, while in the realm of economics we wish to see an order that will allow the production of goods to be developed and the exchange of products to be resumed in the interests of all.
It is, however, only in accordance with supreme justice if those interests are also taken into account that are founded upon ethnographical, historical, or economic conditions.
I can assure you that I look into the future with perfect tranquillity and great confidence. The German Reich and its allies represent power, military, economic and, above all, in moral respects, which is superior to any possible coalition in the world. The German armed forces will always do their part whenever it may be necessary. The confidence of the German people will always accompany their soldiers
- Thread starter
- #36
Operation Sea Lion - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Deportation
This contradicts the supposed view of Hitler of the English as "equal to the Germans".
Deportation
This contradicts the supposed view of Hitler of the English as "equal to the Germans".
parsifal
Colonel
Now, if you read that speech and believe the litany of lies that it contains, then yes, Britain was offered a peace teaty.
In fact Britain was offereed the chance to submit and capitulate. And Britainmade clear that she was never going to agree to that unless the terms of her ultimatum of 1939 were met. You can add to that the restoration of soveriegnty for the occupied allies of Britain and the acceptance of surrender terms along the lines of versailles, until Casablanca, after which the unconditional surrender terms of the United Nations took effect.
Britain did not solely look to the Soviet Union for support in the days before June 1941. in fact they tended to view the Russians as an enemy. There was really no jooint agreement on war strate4egy with the Russians until June 1942. The British in fact pinned their hopes on the entry of the US into the conflict.
Even if Britain had been overrun, the british were not prepred to make peace on Hiterls terms. They had plans in place to evacuate in exile to Canbada and continue the war from there. They would never have stopped fighting. The only terms they would have accepted after the invasion of Poland was the surrender of Germany, and probably the arrest of Hitler.
In fact Britain was offereed the chance to submit and capitulate. And Britainmade clear that she was never going to agree to that unless the terms of her ultimatum of 1939 were met. You can add to that the restoration of soveriegnty for the occupied allies of Britain and the acceptance of surrender terms along the lines of versailles, until Casablanca, after which the unconditional surrender terms of the United Nations took effect.
Britain did not solely look to the Soviet Union for support in the days before June 1941. in fact they tended to view the Russians as an enemy. There was really no jooint agreement on war strate4egy with the Russians until June 1942. The British in fact pinned their hopes on the entry of the US into the conflict.
Even if Britain had been overrun, the british were not prepred to make peace on Hiterls terms. They had plans in place to evacuate in exile to Canbada and continue the war from there. They would never have stopped fighting. The only terms they would have accepted after the invasion of Poland was the surrender of Germany, and probably the arrest of Hitler.
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- #38
I found difficult to Germany overrun Britain. I already wrote: Fighter Command was totally different by 1941, and even in 1940 the Germans were not close to defeat it as popularily claimed. The British pilots were well trained, they flown in modern machines (Spitfires) and they had excellent ground control, which make the fighters much more effective. While the main oppositon was of medium bombers.
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parsifal
Colonel
British obstinancy is hard to understand unless you are british. Totally intransigent, illogical even to the point of self harm. we are the same. It annoys the hell out her enemies that we can behave and think like that
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- #40
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