Allied Fighter vs Fighter: Is it really necessary ???

[tail end charlie]

There has always been debates about how we should look back at the F4F wildcat
Was it a great carrier fighter ??? In the end its combat record stood at 6.9:1 for the entire war
So that should be the end of the argument right...but is it ???

The allies only carrier friendly aircraft was said to be out classed by the Zeke in every performance
category, climb, speed and range.The only advantages it had was armer and in a dive.
I really don't think we give enough credit to the U.S navy pilots training in combating the Zeke
The 'Thach weave', dive to escape and learning not to dogfiight with the Zero paid big dividends
I also believed that even before the Hellcat appeared the Japanese was already running out of
experience Pilots which might explain how the combat record of the wildcat greatly improved as
the War progressed

To back that argument the f6f Hellcat while a good naval fighter, I don't it was That much better
to warrant a 13 to 1 combat record against the Zeke. Which is really a bloodbath!
U.S pilot training should get some credit....just my 2 cents Timmy

I read that one Japanese ace got so frustrated with his radio never working he took it out and threw it on the ground as dead weight. If all pilots had the same experience then most of the time they were operating like WW1 planes against radar guided and radio equiped oponents so they were usually at a tactical disadvantage.

The zero was light with no armour self sealing tanks and constructed from an alloy which was light but brittle (according to wiki??? see below) which was fine so long as the enemy didnt shoot back. This may be a result of experience in China where the enemy had limited means to shoot back. If a wildcat was made to the same design philosophy it would have performed much better as an aeroplane but I doubt the pilots would prefer the changes.
quote
Every weight-saving method was used. Most of the aircraft was built of T-7178 aluminum, a top-secret aluminum alloy developed by the Japanese just for this aircraft. It was lighter and stronger than the normal aluminum used at the time, but was more brittle.
unquote

 

[Colin1]

The zero was light with no armour self sealing tanks and constructed from an alloy which was light but brittle (according to wiki??? see below) which was fine so long as the enemy didnt shoot back. This may be a result of experience in China where the enemy had limited means to shoot back. If a wildcat was made to the same design philosophy it would have performed much better as an aeroplane but I doubt the pilots would prefer the changes.

Every weight-saving method was used. Most of the aircraft was built of T-7178 aluminum, a top-secret aluminum alloy developed by the Japanese just for this aircraft. It was lighter and stronger than the normal aluminum used at the time, but was more brittle

Initially
Wildcats were made to the same design philosophy. It too was a pretty sparkly performer for its time. Intelligence reports coming in from Europe urged the implementation of self-sealing tanks and armour and thus burdened, the Wildcat became the restrained beast that eventually faced off with the A6M.

I don't know anything about 'brittle' aluminium but the skinning was thinner on the earlier A6Ms than their Allied counterparts, they beefed it up for the A6M7 but with a powerplant barely more powerful than the orginal Sakae 21, the type took a retrograde performance step in the face of Allied fighters that had already overtaken it.

 

[tail end charlie]

Initially
Wildcats were made to the same design philosophy. It too was a pretty sparkly performer for its time. Intelligence reports coming in from Europe urged the implementation of self-sealing tanks and armour and thus burdened, the Wildcat became the restrained beast that eventually faced off with the A6M.

I don't know anything about 'brittle' aluminium but the skinning was thinner on the earlier A6Ms than their Allied counterparts, they beefed it up for the A6M7 but with a powerplant barely more powerful than the orginal Sakae 21, the type took a retrograde performance step in the face of Allied fighters that had already overtaken it.

I looked in various sites on the 7178 alloy and although it didnt give an impact strength (charpy value) it did say that it was difficult to form in a radius less than 5 times wall thickness. Although this doesnt directly say its brittle such lack of ductility implies a brittle structure, the last thing you need when being hit by 12.5mm MGs

 

[davebender]

How did the P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47 and P-51 fare vs IJA fighter aircraft like the Ki-27, Ki-43 and Ki-61?

 

[timmy]

If USN pilots were achieving 6.9:1 in an aircraft outclassed by the Zeke in every performance category bar armour and dive, their excellence is, for me, implied

true

If they can achieve 6.9:1 in an outclassed F4F why is 13:1 in an F6F designed specifically to deal with the Zeke so difficult to believe? F4F pilots would transition to the F6F, bringing all their Zeke combat experience with them and exploiting it in a bigger, better bird.

Not hard to believe, just do not think it was a 13 to 1 better airplane. It all comes back to what I was saying earlier that some of the Wildcats success was due to superior pilot training and tactics

The F6F went into the ring with the Japanese mid-1943; I'm not that certain the IJN were a spent force by then, there was still a long way to go in the Pacific war so can I ask what the basis is for your argument that most of the IJN experience was eliminated prior to the F6F showing up?

Sorry didn't mean to word it as the IJN was a spend force more a case that a believe a lot of the creme had gone.I can't back it up, just something I'm sure I read some where. Maybe someone else here can help

 

[renrich]

Timmy, agree wholeheartedly with your post. In WW2, I believe that the pilots trained by the USN were some of the best trained in the world. From Lundstrom, "The First Team," the finest and best researched book about air fighting in WW2, IMO: "In philosophy of gunnery training and marksmanship, the pilots of the USN exercised a system superior to those of all of the world's air forces."

However, the performance of the Zeke, although outstanding, was not as superior to the F4F3s which were the first Wildcats to engage the A6M as it was compared to the F4F4 which supplanted the 3s just before Midway. The later FM2 regained pretty much the performance of the early F4F and it was pretty sprightly.

Because this forum is very Eurocentric, I find there is a lot of understandable prejudice and a general attitude that the main event was the ETO and what happened in the Pacific was kind of immaterial and contested by the second and third string. Also, I believe we are all too impressed by raw performance figures which we believe tell the tale in combat and we tend to ignore one performance factor which is range and are somewhat ignorant about another all important factor-seviceability. If the fighter is not in the fight then it's performance does not matter.

In the ETO, the Spitfire has a deserved redoubtable reputation and as an interceptor and air superiority fighter it was a premier fighter if it could get into the fight. In the Pacific and SE Asia, it was handicapped by it's short range and had serviceability issues which limited it's effectiveness. The British Isles from north to south is only 700 miles and from London to Warsaw is 800 miles. Those are short distances in the Pacific.

Many believe that the A6M was a flimsy firetrap with so so armament but in 41-42, flown by highly trained and experienced pilots it was probably the equal of any fighter in the world. Later it's armament was augmented and armor and protected fuel tanks added but it's performance could not be improved because of the added weight so it fell behind it's Allied opponents although it was still a worthy foe if flown by an experienced pilot. The KI43 was somewhat similar to the A6M and, well flown, was still formidable in 44-45.

 

[davebender]

In the ETO, the Spitfire has a deserved redoubtable reputation and as an interceptor and air superiority fighter it was a premier fighter if it could get into the fight. In the Pacific and SE Asia, it was handicapped by it's short range

Endurance was a handicap for the Spitfire in Europe too. During the invasions of Sicily, Salerno and Anzio Spitfires could not spend much time loitering over Allied ports and beach heads. Even though vastly outnumbered, the Luftwaffe learned how to strike quickly between Spitfire shift changes. That slowed the build up of Allied forces in the beach head, leading to desperate measures like reinforcing the beach head with paratroops.

 

[JoeB]

How did the P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47 and P-51 fare vs IJA fighter aircraft like the Ki-27, Ki-43 and Ki-61?

The IJA appeared in New Guinea and the Solomons right at the end of 1942, and beginning of 1943 respectively. So, other than AVG P-40's in early 1942 and USAAF P-40's in China later on, the USAAF itself rarely met the JAAF in 1942, just a few encounters with older Type 97's (Nate) in Philippines and Dutch East Indies where P-40 achieved <1 kill ratio. And, unfortunately IJA air records are less complete in general than IJN ones so the real story in 1943 is not as clear as it is in many cases of IJN air ops in '42 and '43. At least early combats, featuring P-38, P-39 and P-40 w IJN Zero units and IJA Type 1 (Oscar) units both appearing over NG, those that are really known, tended to come out somewhere close to even in reality. The situation surely deteriorated for the IJA overall as more US units deployed, and more had the advanced types like P-38 and P-47 (P-51 wasn't used in SWPA until late 1944); they also faced the famous relentless air attacks on their fields (those cool pictures of parafrag bombs landed next to IJA a/c but not detonated yet). By all accounts the IJA was in bad shape in NG by second half of '43, but I could not quote a specific typical fighter-fighter real kill ratio. It introduced the Type 3 (Tony) in the theater at that time, but even Japanese accounts are mixed about that a/c, some still clung to the idea that a Type 1 with alert pilot could always evade an Allied hit and run attack, and a Type 3 had less visibility and manueverability. OTOH sooner or later, formations would be caught unaware and suffer heavily; though on 'the third hand' the Type 3 was less serviceable (the Zero and Type 1 were apparently remarkably reliable and tolerant of poor field conditions, note example we went though mission by mission of Zeroes operating agianst Darwin in 1943, *no* operational losses if assume all 4 losses were downed by Spitfires, and probably were, pattern in NG is similar studying mission by mission, operational losses rare, mechanical aborts not so common either).

It may 'jumping in with ten league boots' again, but somebody quoted 6.9 ratio for F4F which is just not remotely realistic for real fighter-fighter kill ratio, that's the claimed ratio (approx anyway) v all types; the real ratio v Zero was around 1:1 in 1942, and doesn't seem to have dramatically risen in '43 Solomons combats before the F4F was phased out (not counting the FM-2's career in 1944-45). F4F's also met Type 1's over the Solomons in a few combats in early 1943 before the Japanese settled on using Army air units in NG and Navy ones in the Solomons. The outcomes were not vastly different than against Zeroes in those few cases, nor did the F4F pilots recognize immediately that they were facing a different opponent.

But again the original benchmark of most Allied types (USAAF P-39 and P-40 in early going, as well as Brit/CW and Dutch) v the Zero in early-mid 1942 was several:1 in Zero's favor; and IJA Type 1's maintained a several:1 kill ratio v Hurricanes all the way through 1943, and Spitfire's record v Zero in 1943 was similar.

Achieving kill ratio parity with Zeroes, or even Type 1's, even in early 1943 was not like falling out of bed. That was success relative to many Allied performances, and in the bigger picture of the war, where the Allies had much greater ability to replace losses: 1:1 fighter attriction combat was a disaster for the Japanese, given their lesser ability to replace losses. Then it got worse as kill ratios really shifted againt them, as '43 went on, in most theaters.

Joe

 

[davebender]

Apparently we need to review the historical timeline.

8 Dec 1941.
Japanese forces occupy Batan Island and Calayan Island (Philippine Island group). Both small islands were used as forward air bases for the invasion of Luzon.

9 Dec 1941.
Japanese forces occupy Makin (Gilbert Islands) for use as a seaplane base.

10 Dec 1941.
IJA siezes the Aparri, Luzon airfield. This allows them to base short range aircraft like the Ki-27 within support range of the main Luzon invasion.

10 Dec 1941.
IJA invades Burma.

12 Dec 1941.
Japanese seize Legaspi (southern Luzon) for use as an air base.

16 Dec 1941.
IJA invade Borneo.

17 Dec 1941.
IJA land at Sarawak, Borneo.

18 Dec 1941.
IJA invade Hong Kong.

22 Dec 1941.
IJA land at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon. This was the main Philippine invasion.

7 Jan 1942.
IJA land on Masbate (Philippines).

11 Jan 1942.
IJA invade East Indies and Dutch Borneo.

20 Jan 1942.
IJA begin "Operation R". The invasion of Rabaul and Kavieng.

30 Jan 1942.
IJA invade Ambon (Dutch East Indies).

2 Feb 1942.
IJA invade Java.

14 Feb 1942.
IJA invade Sumatra.

15 Feb 1942.
Singapore surrenders to IJA.

19 Feb 1942.
IJA invade Bali.

20 Feb 1942.
IJA invade Timor.

27 Feb 1942.
IJA seize the Calapan, Mindoro airfield.

5 March 1942.
IJA "Operation SR". Invasion of Lae and Salamuana, New Guinea.

As you can see the IJA moved very quickly when they wanted to. 8 December 1941 to 5 March 1942 must have set a world record for the number of amphibious landings. And they were all successful. By the end of March 1942 the IJA already controlled most of the New Guinea coast.

 

[JoeB]

Apparently we need to review the historical timeline.

. By the end of March 1942 the IJA already controlled most of the New Guinea coast.

I'm not sure I follow the point of that post. If it's in response to my post saying IJA *air* units seldom encountered the USAAF in 1942, I would reiterate that that's true. IJA air units were deployed initially mainly in Malaya and Burma (ie didn't encounter the USAAF). The 5th Air Division operated in the Philippines once bases were seized there after a few days, but JNAF units operating from Formoas had already greatly reduced the USAAF force by then. Most Far East Air Force 1941-2 JAAF-USAAF combats were in the PI but there weren't many. The P-40's and P-35's didn't even claim as many Type 97's (24th and 50th Sentai) as their own a/c lost in those combats (the exact Japanese losses aren't known in that episode). In most cases the few remaining US fighters were being used as recon or hit and run bombers and weren't seeking fighter combat. Interestingly however, after early January 1942 the JAAF withdrew most of their fighters from the PI (Zeroes were gone too) and the remaining single company of Type 97's barely if at all outnumbered the remaining US P-40's on Bataan till the end of the campaign in April. There were however very few combats in that period.

After the Japanese closed in on Singapore and as their air ops extended to Dutch East Indies, JAAF units in Malaya operated over Western DEI, JNAF covered operations over eastern DEI. USAAF fighter only met the JAAF in DEI once, a combat between Type 97's and P-40's where each side lost 1 a/c; again the opponents were mainly Zeroes which had very good success v the P-40's.

IJA operations in New Guinea and the Solomons in 1942 relied entirely on the Navy for air support until late December 1942 when the first JAAF fighter unit, 11th Sentai, was encountered over New Guinea, and same unit first flew against Guadalcanal in January '43. So 1942 NG air fighting was almost entirely USAAF/RAAF v the JNAF, and 1942 Solomons fighting mainly USN/USMC v JNAF with relatively minor participation by USAAF. Likewise defense of Australia in 1942 was USAAF v JNAF, same with Aleutians.

Again, the other exception to this pattern was 23rd Fighter Group (former AVG) from bases in China v Army Type 1's in Burma/China July-Dec 1942, JNAF fighters were not present in that theater at that time.

Joe

 

[RCAFson]

Endurance was a handicap for the Spitfire in Europe too. During the invasions of Sicily, Salerno and Anzio Spitfires could not spend much time loitering over Allied ports and beach heads. Even though vastly outnumbered, the Luftwaffe learned how to strike quickly between Spitfire shift changes. That slowed the build up of Allied forces in the beach head, leading to desperate measures like reinforcing the beach head with paratroops.

Range on Internal fuel (from RAF/FAA/RAAF data cards):

Hurricane I: 585
Spitfire FIX: 434
Spitfire LFVIIITrop: 740
Spitfire LFVIIITrop 50/90igal DT: 940/1265
Seafire IILC: 493
Seafire IILC 30/45igal DT: 682/755

FM-2: 595
F4F-4: 695
F6F-3: 538
F6F-3 56/180 igal DT: 762/1185
F4U-1: 673

The Spitfire VIII takes the cake for range, but the Seafire is not that far behind the F6F-3.

 

[fastmongrel]

It might not be far behind but its still a long way to swim if you run out of fuel

 

[davebender]

Apparently it still wasn't good enough over Sicily and Italy. "The Day of Battle" by Rick Atkinson lists all sorts of successful Luftwaffe hit and run attacks on Allied shipping in the Mediterranean.

What Spitfire type(s) were based on Malta and Sicily during 1943?

 

[davebender]

IJA operations in New Guinea and the Solomons in 1942 relied entirely on the Navy for air support

That's very unusual. Normally the IJA supplied their own air support. Just like the U.S. Army.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/jaaf.htm
The IJA had 5 hikodan (i.e. air force) during December 1941. Total of about 1,500 aircraft.
1st. China.
.....29th. I believe this consisted of detachments for deployment away from the parent hikodan.
2nd. Manchuria.

3rd. Indochina. They supported the Malaya operation. During January 1942 they began shifting assets to the Dutch East Indies.

5th. Formosa. They supported the Philippine operation. After Gen MacArthur was penned up on the Bataan Peninsula most of this hikoshidan moved to Thailand to support the invasion of Burma.

17th. Home Island defense.

 

[renrich]

RCAFson, Don't know where you get your numbers for your argument but they are totally at odds with reality. You may be confused about yardstick range and combat radius or perhaps kilometers and nautical miles. I can find no source that has ranges as short as you show for F6F and F4U. In fact, your numbers are ludicrous. The F4U1 according to Dean,"America's Hundred Thousand" with 361 gallons of internal fuel had a range of more than 1500 miles. The F6F5 with 250 gallons of internal fuel, more than 1300 miles. Those fighters could also carry 175 gallon drop tanks. The F4F3 with 147 gallons internal could make more than 1000 miles. The best Spitfire range I can find is a Mk VC at 470 miles on internal fuel and 1135 miles with 175 gallons (IMP) drop tank.

 

[Milosh]

renrich, it depends on how the ranges are obtained.

The F4U would get the 1500mi.+ using most economical cruise but what would its range be using a combat mission profile?

 

[JoeB]

That's very unusual. Normally the IJA supplied their own air support. Just like the U.S. Army.

The IJA had 5 hikodan (i.e. air force) during December 1941. Total of about 1,500 aircraft.
1st. China.

Unusual? I just described where the JAAF met the USAAF in '42; where their air opposition was often solely JNAF, even in theaters with ground combat like NG, Solomons and Aleutians. Likewise later in the war in Central Pacific the larger islands were defended by the Army (some like Tarawa defended by Special Naval Landing Forces), but the JAAF was not encountered in that area. Despite their intense rivalry the Japanese Army and Navy rationalized somewhat on who provided air power in different places.

Most of your post is just repeating what I already said from some link. But as the link says, there were 5 hikoshidan, Air Divisions, at the beginning of the war, not 5 hikodan. Actually, though the link doesn't mention it, right at the beginning of the war the division level entities were still called hikoshudan (飛行集団(which is usually translated 'Air Group', though not the same word as smaller naval air formations, 'kokutai' also usually translated 'Air Group'). From 1942 they were called hikoshidan 飛行師団. Shidan, the second two characters, is the regular word for 'division', same with an army ground division. 'Hiko', the first two characters, means 'flying' or 'aviation'. The 5th Air Division was used in the PI as I said, but also as I said, the JNAF units based in Formosa had greatly attrited the US air component in just the few days before the IJA fighters established bases in the PI. The Type 97 couldn't operate over Luzon directly from Formosa; the Zero could (and that was a big shock, in fact the IJN only decided it was possible, with the right cruise control training, weeks before the war). The extraordinary range of the Zero was a often a factor in cases where Navy rather than Army fighters covered Army operations in 1942.

Joe

 

[RCAFson]

Apparently it still wasn't good enough over Sicily and Italy. "The Day of Battle" by Rick Atkinson lists all sorts of successful Luftwaffe hit and run attacks on Allied shipping in the Mediterranean.

What Spitfire type(s) were based on Malta and Sicily during 1943?

It is certainly likely that even the Soitfire VIII range was considered insufficient but my point is that USN fighters, at that point in the war couldn't do a whole lot better. The USAAF 31st FG began combat operations with the Spit VIII on Aug 2 1943, over Sicily, where they were used as top cover for their Spit Vs:

http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/uncle-sams-spitfires.html

 

[RCAFson]

RCAFson, Don't know where you get your numbers for your argument but they are totally at odds with reality. You may be confused about yardstick range and combat radius or perhaps kilometers and nautical miles. I can find no source that has ranges as short as you show for F6F and F4U. In fact, your numbers are ludicrous. The F4U1 according to Dean,"America's Hundred Thousand" with 361 gallons of internal fuel had a range of more than 1500 miles. The F6F5 with 250 gallons of internal fuel, more than 1300 miles. Those fighters could also carry 175 gallon drop tanks. The F4F3 with 147 gallons internal could make more than 1000 miles. The best Spitfire range I can find is a Mk VC at 470 miles on internal fuel and 1135 miles with 175 gallons (IMP) drop tank.

I picked variants that would have been available in Mid 1943. The range data is from RAF/FAA/RAAF data cards that were used for mission planning, and all tankage capacity is in impgals. and all aircraft listed could use DTs to increase range:

Hurricane I, the Hurricane II and Sea Hurricane would have been quite similar, and the performance of the Sea Hurricane with 12 to 16lb boost is very similar to the FM-2:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-I-ads.jpg

Spit VIII Trop:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8adsaussie.jpg

Spit IX:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-lfix-ads.jpg

Seafire IILC,:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/seafirel2cads.jpg


I'm not sure that the FM2 would have been available but I included it for reference:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-VI-ads.jpg

F4F-4:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-IV-ads.jpg

I did make a mistake here and the F6F does have a 208 igal internal capacity and thus a 762 mile range on internal fuel which is slightly more than the Spit VIII, the way it was written made it appear to be using a 50igal DT:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f6f/f6f-3-ads.jpg

The data cards for the F4U state 192igal internal capacity, it may be that internal overload tanks made the aircraft unsuitable for combat:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4u/f4u-1-ads.jpg

 

[renrich]

Milosh, you are exactly right. The mission profile determines the combat radius or range of a fighter and combat radius is always substantially less than one half of the maximum range. It is useless, really, to throw out numbers that one finds in books and especially on the internet because one usually does not know how those numbers were obtained. I explained in an earlier post on this thread about the difference between "yardstick" range and combat radius. That explanation came from my "bible" on US WW2 fighters, Dean's "America's Hundred Thousand" which is the most authoritative book I know of on that particular subject.

The early F4U1, that began the war in February, 1943, in the Solomons, had the protected fuselage tank of 237 gallons and internal wing tanks, (unprotected, but with a CO2 purge system) with 62 gallons each in them. I know for a fact that these wing tanks were used on long escort missions. Obviously, like the Mustang's aft tank of 85 gallons, the Corsair wing tanks were drained first and then the CO2 was used to eliminate the fumes whereby the Corsair still had the fuselage tank to complete the mission. The F4U1D dispensed with the wing tanks in favor of drop tanks and later Corsairs did not have the wing tanks either. That early Corsair with full internal tanks and a 175 gallon drop tank was carrying a heavy load of fuel, 536 gallons X 6 equals 3216 pounds but of course the airplane could lift that load but it must have carried no other external ordnance. One had to be careful extrapolating also when using drop tanks as a way to extend range, (on paper) a 175 gallon drop tank did not extend range like 175 gallons of internal fuel because of the additional drag. F4U1Ds and later sometimes carried two drop tanks. Another factor in range considerations is that a fighter operating from a carrier could not have the combat radius of the same fighter operating from a ground base. Lundstrom in "The First Team" commented that the A6M had a 300 mile combat radius from a carrier and a 500 mile CR from a ground base.

Every book I have read about the Spitfire commented on how range challenged it was. I wonder why, if some people's claims about how it could be made to have a long range are true, it was such a failure as a long range escort fighter in every theatre, including the CBI late in the war.