tail end charlie
Senior Airman
- 615
- Aug 24, 2010
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There has always been debates about how we should look back at the F4F wildcat
Was it a great carrier fighter ??? In the end its combat record stood at 6.9:1 for the entire war
So that should be the end of the argument right...but is it ???
The allies only carrier friendly aircraft was said to be out classed by the Zeke in every performance
category, climb, speed and range.The only advantages it had was armer and in a dive.
I really don't think we give enough credit to the U.S navy pilots training in combating the Zeke
The 'Thach weave', dive to escape and learning not to dogfiight with the Zero paid big dividends
I also believed that even before the Hellcat appeared the Japanese was already running out of
experience Pilots which might explain how the combat record of the wildcat greatly improved as
the War progressed
To back that argument the f6f Hellcat while a good naval fighter, I don't it was That much better
to warrant a 13 to 1 combat record against the Zeke. Which is really a bloodbath!
U.S pilot training should get some credit....just my 2 cents Timmy
InitiallyThe zero was light with no armour self sealing tanks and constructed from an alloy which was light but brittle (according to wiki??? see below) which was fine so long as the enemy didnt shoot back. This may be a result of experience in China where the enemy had limited means to shoot back. If a wildcat was made to the same design philosophy it would have performed much better as an aeroplane but I doubt the pilots would prefer the changes.
Every weight-saving method was used. Most of the aircraft was built of T-7178 aluminum, a top-secret aluminum alloy developed by the Japanese just for this aircraft. It was lighter and stronger than the normal aluminum used at the time, but was more brittle
Initially
Wildcats were made to the same design philosophy. It too was a pretty sparkly performer for its time. Intelligence reports coming in from Europe urged the implementation of self-sealing tanks and armour and thus burdened, the Wildcat became the restrained beast that eventually faced off with the A6M.
I don't know anything about 'brittle' aluminium but the skinning was thinner on the earlier A6Ms than their Allied counterparts, they beefed it up for the A6M7 but with a powerplant barely more powerful than the orginal Sakae 21, the type took a retrograde performance step in the face of Allied fighters that had already overtaken it.
trueIf USN pilots were achieving 6.9:1 in an aircraft outclassed by the Zeke in every performance category bar armour and dive, their excellence is, for me, implied
Not hard to believe, just do not think it was a 13 to 1 better airplane. It all comes back to what I was saying earlier that some of the Wildcats success was due to superior pilot training and tacticsIf they can achieve 6.9:1 in an outclassed F4F why is 13:1 in an F6F designed specifically to deal with the Zeke so difficult to believe? F4F pilots would transition to the F6F, bringing all their Zeke combat experience with them and exploiting it in a bigger, better bird.
Sorry didn't mean to word it as the IJN was a spend force more a case that a believe a lot of the creme had gone.I can't back it up, just something I'm sure I read some where. Maybe someone else here can helpThe F6F went into the ring with the Japanese mid-1943; I'm not that certain the IJN were a spent force by then, there was still a long way to go in the Pacific war so can I ask what the basis is for your argument that most of the IJN experience was eliminated prior to the F6F showing up?
Endurance was a handicap for the Spitfire in Europe too. During the invasions of Sicily, Salerno and Anzio Spitfires could not spend much time loitering over Allied ports and beach heads. Even though vastly outnumbered, the Luftwaffe learned how to strike quickly between Spitfire shift changes. That slowed the build up of Allied forces in the beach head, leading to desperate measures like reinforcing the beach head with paratroops.In the ETO, the Spitfire has a deserved redoubtable reputation and as an interceptor and air superiority fighter it was a premier fighter if it could get into the fight. In the Pacific and SE Asia, it was handicapped by it's short range
The IJA appeared in New Guinea and the Solomons right at the end of 1942, and beginning of 1943 respectively. So, other than AVG P-40's in early 1942 and USAAF P-40's in China later on, the USAAF itself rarely met the JAAF in 1942, just a few encounters with older Type 97's (Nate) in Philippines and Dutch East Indies where P-40 achieved <1 kill ratio. And, unfortunately IJA air records are less complete in general than IJN ones so the real story in 1943 is not as clear as it is in many cases of IJN air ops in '42 and '43. At least early combats, featuring P-38, P-39 and P-40 w IJN Zero units and IJA Type 1 (Oscar) units both appearing over NG, those that are really known, tended to come out somewhere close to even in reality. The situation surely deteriorated for the IJA overall as more US units deployed, and more had the advanced types like P-38 and P-47 (P-51 wasn't used in SWPA until late 1944); they also faced the famous relentless air attacks on their fields (those cool pictures of parafrag bombs landed next to IJA a/c but not detonated yet). By all accounts the IJA was in bad shape in NG by second half of '43, but I could not quote a specific typical fighter-fighter real kill ratio. It introduced the Type 3 (Tony) in the theater at that time, but even Japanese accounts are mixed about that a/c, some still clung to the idea that a Type 1 with alert pilot could always evade an Allied hit and run attack, and a Type 3 had less visibility and manueverability. OTOH sooner or later, formations would be caught unaware and suffer heavily; though on 'the third hand' the Type 3 was less serviceable (the Zero and Type 1 were apparently remarkably reliable and tolerant of poor field conditions, note example we went though mission by mission of Zeroes operating agianst Darwin in 1943, *no* operational losses if assume all 4 losses were downed by Spitfires, and probably were, pattern in NG is similar studying mission by mission, operational losses rare, mechanical aborts not so common either).How did the P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47 and P-51 fare vs IJA fighter aircraft like the Ki-27, Ki-43 and Ki-61?
I'm not sure I follow the point of that post. If it's in response to my post saying IJA *air* units seldom encountered the USAAF in 1942, I would reiterate that that's true. IJA air units were deployed initially mainly in Malaya and Burma (ie didn't encounter the USAAF). The 5th Air Division operated in the Philippines once bases were seized there after a few days, but JNAF units operating from Formoas had already greatly reduced the USAAF force by then. Most Far East Air Force 1941-2 JAAF-USAAF combats were in the PI but there weren't many. The P-40's and P-35's didn't even claim as many Type 97's (24th and 50th Sentai) as their own a/c lost in those combats (the exact Japanese losses aren't known in that episode). In most cases the few remaining US fighters were being used as recon or hit and run bombers and weren't seeking fighter combat. Interestingly however, after early January 1942 the JAAF withdrew most of their fighters from the PI (Zeroes were gone too) and the remaining single company of Type 97's barely if at all outnumbered the remaining US P-40's on Bataan till the end of the campaign in April. There were however very few combats in that period.Apparently we need to review the historical timeline.
. By the end of March 1942 the IJA already controlled most of the New Guinea coast.
Endurance was a handicap for the Spitfire in Europe too. During the invasions of Sicily, Salerno and Anzio Spitfires could not spend much time loitering over Allied ports and beach heads. Even though vastly outnumbered, the Luftwaffe learned how to strike quickly between Spitfire shift changes. That slowed the build up of Allied forces in the beach head, leading to desperate measures like reinforcing the beach head with paratroops.
That's very unusual. Normally the IJA supplied their own air support. Just like the U.S. Army.IJA operations in New Guinea and the Solomons in 1942 relied entirely on the Navy for air support
Unusual? I just described where the JAAF met the USAAF in '42; where their air opposition was often solely JNAF, even in theaters with ground combat like NG, Solomons and Aleutians. Likewise later in the war in Central Pacific the larger islands were defended by the Army (some like Tarawa defended by Special Naval Landing Forces), but the JAAF was not encountered in that area. Despite their intense rivalry the Japanese Army and Navy rationalized somewhat on who provided air power in different places.That's very unusual. Normally the IJA supplied their own air support. Just like the U.S. Army.
The IJA had 5 hikodan (i.e. air force) during December 1941. Total of about 1,500 aircraft.
1st. China.
Apparently it still wasn't good enough over Sicily and Italy. "The Day of Battle" by Rick Atkinson lists all sorts of successful Luftwaffe hit and run attacks on Allied shipping in the Mediterranean.
What Spitfire type(s) were based on Malta and Sicily during 1943?
RCAFson, Don't know where you get your numbers for your argument but they are totally at odds with reality. You may be confused about yardstick range and combat radius or perhaps kilometers and nautical miles. I can find no source that has ranges as short as you show for F6F and F4U. In fact, your numbers are ludicrous. The F4U1 according to Dean,"America's Hundred Thousand" with 361 gallons of internal fuel had a range of more than 1500 miles. The F6F5 with 250 gallons of internal fuel, more than 1300 miles. Those fighters could also carry 175 gallon drop tanks. The F4F3 with 147 gallons internal could make more than 1000 miles. The best Spitfire range I can find is a Mk VC at 470 miles on internal fuel and 1135 miles with 175 gallons (IMP) drop tank.