Allison V-1710 vs. H.S. 12: another what if

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The French managed it and by a wide margin.

They not only insulted aerodynamics, they tried to bludgeon it out of existence with some of the ugliest aircraft aircraft ever built whose main styling cues seem to be from medieval castles
Is there a legal precedent for eyeball assault? :)
To be fair, some of those pre-date the Roc by a decade or so
 
At least none of those planes were fighters.
 
Actually, 3 of them are fighters.

the single engine, pusher, twin boom aircraft.

The twin engined airplane in the three that resembles some sort of beetle was supposed to replace the Potez 631 and so be sort of a French Bf 110 or Beaufighter.

And the Tandem wing aircraft was a fighter also.
LOL coulda fooled me
 
Allison developed the V-1710 on their own dime.
There were other, equally powerful forces at work that determined the fate of the US inline powerplant:

George Lewis, Director of Aeronautical Engineering at NACA took a trip to Germany in 1936 and this was NACA's first intimation that their Langley laboratory might be inadequate for the nation's future research needs.

In response to Lewis's report, NACA set up a special committee under General Oscar Westover, then Chief of the Army Air Corps. It took three years for the committee to address the question of the relation of NACA to defence of the US in the event of war.

Meanwhile, military aeronautical technology in Germany was rapidly overtaking that of the US. As early as 1937 John Jay Ide, NACA's technical assistant in Europe, warned of the results of German advances. He reported that Germany was producing extraordinary aeroplanes and engines that had enabled them, with their ally Italy, to set a 'holocaust of records' (an unfortunate term with hindsight). Ide noted that in the development of aircraft engines, there had been no spectacular breakthroughs. Steady incremental improvements were nevertheless pushing European engine development to new heights. Both England and Germany had developed liquid-cooled engines with two-speed superchargers to power fighter aircraft.

By 1939 Ide had concluded that, so great was the German emphasis on the development of new technology, the next war would be a 'war of workshops'. The country able to develop the most advanced aircraft would have a strategic advantage. Ide emphasized that for the Europeans it was speed above all that was important. The Germans had airplanes that could reach speeds of over 400 miles per hour. The fastest planes, he noted, all had liquid-cooled engines.

By 1939, with Europe converging inexorably on war, Charles Lindbergh had sensed the situation to be so serious, he headed home, meeting Hap Arnold straight off his ship. Arnold recalled it was the first useful information they had received on the Luftwaffe. Lindbergh subsequently chaired a Special Committee on Aeronautical Research Facilities, approving a second research centre (what would become Ames Aeronautical Research Facility in Sunnyvale, Calif) and critically:

Lindbergh was convinced that the development of liquid-cooled engines was not receiving sufficient attention in the US. Other high-level aviation experts shared his view. The periodical Science warned that the nation needed research facilities above all because of 'the superiority of foreign liquid-cooled engines'

The recognition of the gravity of the engine situation coincided with the strengthening of the leadership of NACA. The same day that Lindbergh made his recommendations, NACA elected Vannevar Bush to take charge of forging a wartime research program. A former Dean of Engineering and Vice President at MIT, Bush appreciated the value of research. He greatly admired NACA and looked upon its organization as a model for the mobilization of science. Known as both a scientist and a hard-headed practical engineer, he considered the best engineering to be applied science. For him, NACA exemplified this ideal.

The US had decided in the early 30s not to depend solely on radials, despite their commercial dominance but it was the same commercial dominance that saw only the V-1710 close to production in 1940.

Very interesting info.

Leads me to question govt economic stimulus spending during tough economic times - something relevant during the time of V-1710 development as well as today...
On the one hand, there were massive public works projects (CCC, WPA, etc) to help employ people and stimulate the economy.
At the same time, military spending and research were curtailed due to the poor economy.

It seems to me that large support for aeronautical and engine research development would have provided economic stimulus and prepared the nation for the next war.
Maybe take a few of the subsidized workers building park facilities and instead put them through schooling in support of the advancement of technology.
 
Very interesting info.

Leads me to question govt economic stimulus spending during tough economic times - something relevant during the time of V-1710 development as well as today...
On the one hand, there were massive public works projects (CCC, WPA, etc) to help employ people and stimulate the economy.
At the same time, military spending and research were curtailed due to the poor economy.

It seems to me that large support for aeronautical and engine research development would have provided economic stimulus and prepared the nation for the next war.
Maybe take a few of the subsidized workers building park facilities and instead put them through schooling in support of the advancement of technology.
Democratic administration, not a huge defense-spending bunch. In any case the very high taxes used to pay for those programs lengthened the depression.
 
and Roosevelt had been president since 1933. every time the economy showed signs of recovery they quelled it with tax rates of up to 70+% at the top. There's a reason almost nobody taxes that high anymore, even in Europe (where nowadays the taxes aren't that much higher than America)
 
No great Britain RR could not make enough Merlins. So an automobile company in england got the prints from RR and told RR they could not make the engine quite the same way. as the auto engines they made had closer tolerances than RRmade Merlins. I think it was Rover or maybe even Ford. When it came to tolerances and replacement parts that fit the inventors of the industrial revolution failed miserably. And that goes for electrical equipment too. British radios wandered all over frequency. Pathetic.
Basically the Allison engine was a better design. But it lacked the development and the supercharger that made the Merlin a more powerful engine.
 
It was Ford of England that "productionized" the Merlin, It was done before Packard got involves.

BTW American radios were so good that Early P-47 Groups had to have their american radios replaced by British ones so they could go on operations. Lots of people had radio troubles during the war. I have had two British cars and a British motorcycle form the 60s, nobody has to tell me how bad some British electrics can be but fair is fair.
 
I'd have to say that Rolls-Royce's method of production was fine for the number of units they would have to make normally, if not adequate for the number that ended up being required in WW2.
 
Just to reinforce Wuzak's comments...
RR Derby was a skills-based factory set up to produce small numbers of engines and incorporate modifications as and when necessary. RR Crewe was a production oriented factory set up with more jigs and fixtures than Derby and longer runs of each type produced, but still pretty skilled supervisors used to keep quality up.
RR Glasgow was a production factory that made most of its own components and had a foundry, etc.; but had a high degree of automation compared with other RR facilities. Ford at Trafford Park (where the Trafford Centre retail is now) set up to make one model of Merlin using special machines to do the job. Change was difficult in this factory as new machines had to be designed... but it meant the production rate was very high. They had a hundred people in Derby to make each component compare with RR drawing and then redraw to Ford Tolerances and practices. Packard similarly set up to 'churn out' Merlins having been presented with a set of drawings of the Merlin plus some later ones from Derby with the new two-piece head so they could be first to manufacture this modification. The four levels of 'automation' allowed RR to respond to in-service needs and put more performance out in small numbers to counter a threat then ramp up numbers for a roll out and if it became a standard to produce thousands. Seems a fantastic set up to me!
 
I have had two British cars and a British motorcycle form the 60s, nobody has to tell me how bad some British electrics can be but fair is fair.

Its not for nothing that Joseph Lucas was known as the Prince of Darkness. To be fair British motor electrics of the 60s werent too bad in comparison to most equivalents built outside of Germany. I had an Alfa Romeo and it used to switch all the lights off every time you hit a bump or pothole at anything more than 30mph. Switching on the rear demister was only done if you had a fire extinguisher handy and it used to eat indicator switches for breakfast.
 
Also, Germany was preoccupied with minimizing dependence on imports and avoiding balance of payments problems. If they had to spend money on licensing US technology, the DC-3 would have been a good place to start.

There were quite a few countries that were looking for aircraft engine technology in the 1930s: Japan, Italy, Soviet Union come to mind. The Japanese army and navy actually negotiated separate licences for the DB601. I think that at one point, France was even interested in buying DB601s.
 

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