Alternative German bomber use on the Eastern Front

[Acheron]

In the thread "Spitfire V Versus P-40E", S Schweik wrote

It's true and in part it is because the MiG-3 had a very large and heavy engine, which didn't generate much power down low. So it wasn't so much that it was better at high altitude, it was also not very good at low altitude. Specifically it was way too slow down below 5,000 ft. It couldn't outrun or escape German fighters and sometimes couldn't catch German bombers either. The MiG-3 was also kind of twitchy even by the standard of Soviet aircraft at the time, and didn't turn too well, so without a speed advantage it was basically in trouble.

Most of the fighting on the Russian Front was at low altitude mainly because the combat was primarily Tactical, meaning in direct support of the ground fighting. The main part of the Soviet Air Force, the VVS, was the Frontal Aviation force, meaning the planes which fought right over the Front. The Germans did some significant Strategic and Operational raids against the Russians particularly early in the war but they didn't have the kind of heavy high altitude bombers the US had and they too concentrated their efforts on the front line The most important German aircraft for the war-effort was the Stuka, which was a low altitude plane that dived down lower still to drop bombs (as a dive bomber). The longer ranged and higher flying Ju 88 was also used a lot in the dive bombing role, especially early in the war.

The most important Soviet aircraft conversely was the Il-2 attack plane, which was even more of a low altitude bird which came in strafing, shooting rockets and dropping bombs and bomblets. That is the weapon they used against German tanks and armored vehicles.

So in both cases, the fighters go where the bombers go. The other reason for the lower altitude combat was the weather. Something like 8 or 9 months out of the year depending which part of the gigantic front line you are talking about, there was often a fairly low cloud ceiling which prevented high flying planes from seeing the battlefield or lower flying aircraft.

The German fighters, particularly the Bf 109, were pretty good at both high and low altitude, though they were probably at their best up pretty high (~20' feet).

The Soviet fighters like the LaGG-3 and later La 5, the Yak -1, Yak -7, Yak -9 and later the Yak 3 were all basically low altitude fighters, best below 15,000 ft.

This was also true of the P-40s, P-39s and Hurricanes they got in pretty large numbers from the Anglo-Americans.

That got me thinking. I once read a complaint that the Luftwaffe was "squandered" playing firebrigade for the army and instead of being used more strategically. So I want to ask here, would a more strategic use of the Luftwaffe have been feasible and profitable? Especially a kind of deployment that took advantage of the Me-109s good high-altitude performance and the lack of a Soviet fighter with similar capabilities?

The big problem I see is the lack of heavy long-range bombers. So I would ask what good targets would there have been for the medium German bombers to attack? To me, infrastructure comes to mind, especially train stations and other rail facilities.

 

[Just Schmidt]

In the thread "Spitfire V Versus P-40E", S Schweik wrote

That got me thinking. I once read a complaint that the Luftwaffe was "squandered" playing firebrigade for the army and instead of being used more strategically. So I want to ask here, would a more strategic use of the Luftwaffe have been feasible and profitable? Especially a kind of deployment that took advantage of the Me-109s good high-altitude performance and the lack of a Soviet fighter with similar capabilities?

The big problem I see is the lack of heavy long-range bombers. So I would ask what good targets would there have been for the medium German bombers to attack? To me, infrastructure comes to mind, especially train stations and other rail facilities.

It seems that you are somewhat confusing high attitude with strategic, the one does not imply the other, and the short legs of the bf 109, as often historically apparent, did not suit it for strategic tasks, even if strategic does not uniformly mean long range. Die Luftwaffe did not possess many aircraft that could pose a serious threat from high up, even if they had a few that could reach very high attitudes. The late war prototypes does not come into consideration here. The most high flying 109's on the eastern front could do was survive, as they would be bothering no-body up there.

There were attempts in the beginning of 44 at using die Luftwaffe as a strategic weapon, surprisingly low profile on the web to judge from a cursory search. A brief overview can be found here, from p 245 on.

Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945

You will see that attempts to identify bottle neck targets like electric plants were made, and the overall desperate situation for Germany (and even ill advised strategic choices of bombing England again), all conspired to strangle this attempt in its infancy, not to mention that even with the use of the bombers to support the land battle, the forward airfields were lost or becoming untenable. If memory serves, the assembled bomber force was indeed used to bomb railway hubs, and famously, the B-17's at Poltava, though this was not the kind of targets Korten and his staff had originally envisaged for the strategic bomber offensive.

It is easy to blame Germany for squandering their different assets, as the outcome proved it did not avert defeat. That does, on the other hand, not prove that there existed a cause of action that would get significantly better results, there simply were too many problems that needed to be the very highest on the list of priorities. The most we can demand of them is to loose the war in a slightly more reasonable manner, and that does not sound all that reasonable.

 

[Schweik]

Luftwaffe raids on Operational / Strategic targets such as airfields, railyards, and factories were pretty effective in the early to mid war. They destroyed thousands of Soviet aircraft and as just one example, knocked out the factory that was going to produce the Yak-3 and ended up delaying that project by several months. Ultimately the problem was the lack of a long range fighter - the 109 couldn't escort bombers to Operational or Strategic targets deep in the rear areas. It took the Soviets a while to build up their PVO (air defense) forces but once they did the Ju-88s and He 111s couldn't do those missions alone any more.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Germans were aware of a need for strategic bombing and had proposals such as Bomber A, Ural bomber, etc. but were never focused on an efficient design that would allow for mass production.
Such things as building a design around a prototype engine or requiring dive-bombing abilities cost the Luftwaffe precious time and resources to the point where strategic bombing was no longer an option.

 

[Dimlee]

So I would ask what good targets would there have been for the medium German bombers to attack? To me, infrastructure comes to mind, especially train stations and other rail facilities.

I have provided a brief description of one strategic operation of German bombers in the East:
WW2 bombers. If Germany had the allies heavy bombers would they have won the war?
Until the end of 1943, Luftwaffe could reach many Soviet factories and power stations using Ju 88 and He 111. But they did not do that after June 1943.

Some more on the subject:
Bombing of Gorky in World War II - Wikipedia
Operation Eisenhammer - Wikipedia

 

[Schweik]

Which to me says the problem was the lack of an escort fighter.

 

[Juha3]

I once discussed on the subject with a Russian researcher, his comments:
On the Operation Eisenhammer, "...AFAIK the electricity network was not the Achille's heel of the soviet union but logistics, "communism + elecricity" programm launched by Lenin in 20ies was not just a propaganda slogan. The network was dense and oversecured by old unactivated stations working on peat or wood."
On attacks on Gorky,"the SU-76M made it's trials in may of 1943. First were delivered during Kursk battle in july. If the Luft bombing did not stopped or affected the process, it certainly did not facilitate it"

On the Wiki article, "...If the attack were to succeed in destroying just two thirds of the turbines ..." IMHO a tall order if we thing the effectiveness of the air attacks against electricity targets in 1942 - 43 in the ETO.

 

[Acheron]

Thanks for your answers, especially Dimlee
So, strikes deeper into the USSR soon could not be done without a fighter escort and the Me-109's weakness showed itself again in full force?

Question, what about the Me-110? I know it gave a poor showing at the BoB, but what would it have fought against on the Eastern Front?And at what altitude?

 

[Schweik]

It was fine at first, within it's range which was almost twice that of a 109, and it could handle I-16 or LaGG-3, but once Yak 7, Spitfires , Kittyhawk III etc. start showing up in the PVO units the 110 is no longer sufficient. And it never had the range of say a Ju 88 anyway.

 

[Dimlee]

So, strikes deeper into the USSR soon could not be done without a fighter escort and the Me-109's weakness showed itself again in full force?

If you mean the strikes deeper than in June 1943 - the range was an issue, not the escort. Luftwaffe could reach up to Astrakhan for anti-shipping ops but hardly further. And then the front line moved to the West.
Bombing raids that damaged the Soviet industry and infrastructure in May-June 1943 were done without fighter escort. Soviet night fighter force was small and non-experienced and failed to inflict any noticeable damage.

 

[Dimlee]

Which to me says the problem was the lack of an escort fighter.[/QUOTE

.

But not for night missions apparently

 

[Schweik]

Good point. Though night bombing is a lot less accurate.

 

[Dimlee]

I once discussed on the subject with a Russian researcher, his comments:
On the Operation Eisenhammer, "...AFAIK the electricity network was not the Achille's heel of the soviet union but logistics, "communism + elecricity" programm launched by Lenin in 20ies was not just a propaganda slogan. The network was dense and oversecured by old unactivated stations working on peat or wood."
On attacks on Gorky,"the SU-76M made it's trials in may of 1943. First were delivered during Kursk battle in july. If the Luft bombing did not stopped or affected the process, it certainly did not facilitate it"

On the Wiki article, "...If the attack were to succeed in destroying just two thirds of the turbines ..." IMHO a tall order if we thing the effectiveness of the air attacks against electricity targets in 1942 - 43 in the ETO.

Eisenhammer and electricity network.
His doubts are reasonable. However, this subject requires serious study. My current opinion is that German hopes were a bit exaggerated - but just a bit. There was definitely a spare capacity in power generation. The questions are: how much of total, to what extent (and how fast) it could replace damaged main power plants, what would be the effect on the industry and on the war effort.

Wiki/turbines.
Operation Carmen II (May-June 1943) demonstrated the accuracy achieved by Luftwaffe in night bombing raids. What would be the accuracy of Mistels against power plants, is a subject of speculation, of course.