GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
I believe there may have been a discrepancy in numbers because some were counting all airframes on hand while others were counting aircraft in service (available to fly).
American Fighters available after Pearl Harbor attack
- Thread starter Conslaw
- Start date
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MIflyer
Captain
Of course there were other attacks on HI by the IJN later, but they were night attacks by Emily flying boats, March 4-5 1942.
I found that at least two P-39D's were assigned to Wheeler (41-7017 and 41-7018). Both delivered to USAAF 14 Nov 41. One was condemned early Jan 1942. One not condemned til 1943. Would have been awfully quick in service with those delivery dates, but one condemned early Jan 42 without explanation is odd. I have not yet done a complete search of aircraft records to see if there were more, ran into these doing other research on P-39's.
MIflyer
Captain
I would assume it was damaged in the 7 Dec attack. The hangars and other stuff took a beating, too.
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
Nobody got court martialed.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,263
- Sep 30, 2021
Gives the list of USAAF aircraft Present on 7 December 1941, as previously mentioned.
P-39D 41-7017 and 7018 were allocated to the Philippines in December 1941, 41-7017 arrived in Hawaii in January 1942, looks like officially written off in May 1943, 41-7018 arrived in Hawaii in January 1942 looks like officially written off in April 1942.
Regarding Admiral Kimmel
Title: The "Magic" background of Pearl Harbor.
Publisher: [Washington] : Dept. of Defence, U.S.A. : for sale by
the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., [1978]
Description: 5 v. in 8 : maps (on lining paper) ; 27 cm.
It contains the cables, including decode dates, the transcripts of bugged Japan-US phone calls and state department assessments of the various meetings. Reading the messages tells you lots, things like the maps of Panama that were so good a courier was to take them to Japan. The ships in harbour messages from the other ports, not just Hawaii and so on.
Author: Komatsu, Keiichiro.
Title: Origins of the Pacific War and the importance of 'magic'.
Publisher: New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Where as part of the work the author looks at the problems with translating Japanese into English and what sort of effects mistranslations had.
Due to the evidence needed in any court martial, the intelligence they received, both Kimmel and Short waived their rights to ask for a court martial until 6 months after the end of the war, being part of the chain of command their decisions contributed to the result. The debate is how much responsibility they had. Kimmel's defence when asked was that he was deprived of information he needed, mainly messages from the local Japanese consulate and timely warning of the time the last Japanese message was supposed to be presented to the US.
In 1944 congress authorised separate Army and Navy Inquiries, the Army Board decided Generals Marshall and Gerow deserved censure for their role as well as General Short, the Navy decided Admiral Stark as well as Admiral Kimmel made errors. The Congressional investigation found against Kimmel.
1) Roberts Commission, 1941/42 found against Kimmel and Short
2) Hart Inquiry in 1944, mainly evidence collecting
3) Pearl Harbor Army Board in 1944, criticised Short, Marshall and Gerow.
4) Naval Court of Inquiry, exonerated Kimmel.
5) Clausen Investigation, 1944/45, mainly evidence gathering. (He wrote a book on it and gives Kimmel and Short the highest rankings in the contributors to the defeat list.)
6) Hewitt Inquiry, 1945, follow on to Naval court, Kimmel denied access, no report published.
7) Clarke Investigation, 1944/45 investigation into claims of documents being destroyed, found this not to be the case.
8) Joint Congressional Committee, 1945/46, Hawaiian commanders guilty of errors of judgement, not dereliction of duty, blame should be shared between Washington and Hawaii.
P-39D 41-7017 and 7018 were allocated to the Philippines in December 1941, 41-7017 arrived in Hawaii in January 1942, looks like officially written off in May 1943, 41-7018 arrived in Hawaii in January 1942 looks like officially written off in April 1942.
Regarding Admiral Kimmel
Title: The "Magic" background of Pearl Harbor.
Publisher: [Washington] : Dept. of Defence, U.S.A. : for sale by
the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., [1978]
Description: 5 v. in 8 : maps (on lining paper) ; 27 cm.
It contains the cables, including decode dates, the transcripts of bugged Japan-US phone calls and state department assessments of the various meetings. Reading the messages tells you lots, things like the maps of Panama that were so good a courier was to take them to Japan. The ships in harbour messages from the other ports, not just Hawaii and so on.
Author: Komatsu, Keiichiro.
Title: Origins of the Pacific War and the importance of 'magic'.
Publisher: New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999.
Where as part of the work the author looks at the problems with translating Japanese into English and what sort of effects mistranslations had.
Due to the evidence needed in any court martial, the intelligence they received, both Kimmel and Short waived their rights to ask for a court martial until 6 months after the end of the war, being part of the chain of command their decisions contributed to the result. The debate is how much responsibility they had. Kimmel's defence when asked was that he was deprived of information he needed, mainly messages from the local Japanese consulate and timely warning of the time the last Japanese message was supposed to be presented to the US.
In 1944 congress authorised separate Army and Navy Inquiries, the Army Board decided Generals Marshall and Gerow deserved censure for their role as well as General Short, the Navy decided Admiral Stark as well as Admiral Kimmel made errors. The Congressional investigation found against Kimmel.
1) Roberts Commission, 1941/42 found against Kimmel and Short
2) Hart Inquiry in 1944, mainly evidence collecting
3) Pearl Harbor Army Board in 1944, criticised Short, Marshall and Gerow.
4) Naval Court of Inquiry, exonerated Kimmel.
5) Clausen Investigation, 1944/45, mainly evidence gathering. (He wrote a book on it and gives Kimmel and Short the highest rankings in the contributors to the defeat list.)
6) Hewitt Inquiry, 1945, follow on to Naval court, Kimmel denied access, no report published.
7) Clarke Investigation, 1944/45 investigation into claims of documents being destroyed, found this not to be the case.
8) Joint Congressional Committee, 1945/46, Hawaiian commanders guilty of errors of judgement, not dereliction of duty, blame should be shared between Washington and Hawaii.
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
This is taken from Morison's Vol 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific
