An Allison V-1710 with a two-speed supercharger in 1942 (7 Viewers)

[Simon Thomas]

Geoffrey's post on the Typhoon in the data thread is a gold mine of information:

A Thread for Data Files

Hawker Typhoon

ww2aircraft.net

It includes data for the Tempest as well.
Of particular interest is the Sabre surplus/deficit information by date.
Keep in mind that the Bristol sleeve manufacturing technique was provided to Napier around December 1942. From that point the reliability of the sleeves improved considerably, however there was a huge backlog of engines requiring overhaul.

 

[MiTasol]

What I mean by wind down one and ramp up the other, is you don't necessarily close all Hurricane factories at once, and while switching to Beaufighters would be a major shift in some respects, I'm not sure I buy that switching from Hurricane to Spitfire was that big of a jump, and in fact they did spread out Spitfire production to many other factories.

Closing one factory at a time makes no difference.

Having worked on both the Hurricane and the Spitfire, and Beauforts which have a very significant percentage of common parts with the Beaufighter, I can assure you that there is very, very, little in common between the Hurricane and the Spitfire. Although it used wood technology, the Spitfire has infinitely more in common with the Beaufighter which used only metal technology.

I'm sure US could and did help with alloys and other strategic materials. Take some from P-39 production.

Every country had its own alloy compositions, heat treatments, have different properties and thickness systems. Because of that British alloys and American alloys are not directly interchangeable. There were charts to cover repairs but to change, say from 028 thick Brit alloy to 032 US alloy, is going to have significant weight penalties. Making one part stronger than the original part it replaces changes the load distribution and creates stress and fatigue problems

In some cases it will be necessary to go up one or two gauges and in others down one or two gauges. That requires redesign as well as adding a whole new stores section to stock and control the distribution of the US materials.

The same with alloy steels. The common British T55 and up are stronger than the US 4130 unless the 4130 is heat treated to a different temper which requires different heat treatment facilities than for alloys in a production environment. Again the material thicknesses are not the same.

In other words you are looking at significant issues unless designing specific components that are to only be produced using US metals. This was done for some components but those components that I am aware of were essentially license built US assemblies anyway and built around American engines. For example the powerplants in the Beaufort Mk II and Sunderland Mk V.

As for the spare engines, I think those could have been fitted to some of the very large numbers of Spitfire Vs they built

The people in the MAP obviously did not agree. Do not forget that they had access to information that is now long lost as those who knew that information have died.

 

[Engineman]

Another real-World factor in most WW2 production is that the majority of Aircraft and Aero-Engine production capacity was privately owned. There were huge issues with the protection of patents and manufacturing rights or intellectual property. Notwithstanding that production contracts were Government controlled, bids for contracts and designs/prototypes to Specifications were often competitive business deals. An example is the development of the Sleeve's for the Napier Sabre engine, where Bristol had to be forced to disclose their Sleeve technology to Napier.
Overall, the deals that were done on a tightrope between the Government agencies and the big Companies were big-Business. The Axis production was also similar.

Eng

 

[PAT303]

Spit VIII also had at least middling range like the Kittyhawk and was also a major help for the war effort in that Theater when they arrived though it was too few and too late. I'd love to take a closer look at how / where the extra fuel was added to the Spit VIII (was this one of the innovations that came from the Spit III?) and why couldn't that have been done earlier, it would have really helped make the Spit V much more useful. As would a Merlin XX.

The single biggest issue the Spitfire had was range, had it been given extra fuel like pretty much every other fighter in the war it could have achieved so much more in so many different theatres.

 

[PAT303]

If they could have ramped up Spitfire production at that time, they would have.

Regardless of the situation with Hurricane production.

What they could have done is used the satellite companies to make the improvements that were needed such as manufacturing and fitting auxiliary fuel tanks, refitting older models with updated improvements such as individual injector exhausts, streamlined cannon blisters, retrofitting all metal control surfaces and improvements to overall fit and finish. There was lots that could have been done to improve the Spitfire instead of just producing obsolete planes ( Hurricane ) or rubbish such as everything Blackburn produced.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Try yet again, 637 Hurricane mark I in 1941.

The following is from the US Study into industry efficiency, Republic Farmingdale, measured worker hours required to make 1 pound of airframe, actual acceptances, output if the factory started at December 1943 efficiency, output if the factory started at peak efficiency of 0.57 hours per pound.

month	hrs/lb	actual	better	best
Oct-42​	8.85​	2​	8.81​	31.05​
Nov-42​	8.85​	2​	8.81​	31.05​
Dec-42​	8.85​	6​	26.42​	93.16​
Jan-43​	6.45​	12​	38.51​	135.79​
Feb-43​	6.45​	21​	67.39​	237.63​
Mar-43​	7.26​	50​	180.60​	636.84​
Apr-43​	4.6​	52​	119.00​	419.65​
May-43​	3.79​	80​	150.85​	531.93​
Jun-43​	3.62​	82​	147.68​	520.77​
Jul-43​	3.62​	65​	117.06​	412.81​
Aug-43​	3.59​	90​	160.75​	566.84​
Sep-43​	2.78​	133​	183.95​	648.67​
Oct-43​	2.46​	136​	166.45​	586.95​
Nov-43​	2.23​	190​	210.80​	743.33​
Dec-43​	2.01​	220​	220.00​	775.79​
Total		1,141​	1,807​	6,372​

You want lots have long undisturbed production runs. When the British did their analysis they concluded it was about 18 months from first production to hitting the planned peak output.

Ford made a big effort to introduce true mass production methods to the B-24 but kept running into the reality steel was a very different material to the light alloys used by aircraft, it was not a simple transfer of knowledge, lots had to be learnt and successes were compromised by the frequent changes being ordered for the airframe.

Aircraft factories ranged from places that mainly assembled supplied components through to doing significant manufacturing from raw materials. It helps explain bombing the "factories" often did little to aircraft production numbers.

The western allies went from not enough aircraft to too many in a matter of weeks in 1944, with some exceptions like Mustangs. "Suddenly, Overnight" loss rates were falling, allied advances were accelerating, maximum force sizes had been met, the cuts already being done to trainers could be extended to combat types

In 1939 and 1940 the British economy went through major shocks, the cutting of trade with the continent, loss of Mediterranean routes, the U-boat blockade, before adding the direct attacks. The mid 1940 crisis drove fighter production to unsustainable levels, falling back over winter, air attack or its threat cut production from around September 1940 to May 1941 while the system adapted. There had to be more than one source of anything important, factories could only grow so big given they were subject to attack. All while weeding out the weapons that did not work for those that did. While ensuring enough weapons were ready for Battle of Britain second round.

The Spitfire arrived with a 1,375 pound engine, would it still be a viable flying machine with a 1,640 pound Merlin 61, how about a 1,980 pound Griffon? Would required changes mean a new design would be better?

Three Beaufighter lines, Bristol Filton, Bristol Weston, Fairey, the latter two in early 1941. Production 0 in 1939, 803 in 1940, 1,582 in 1941.

Three Hurricane lines, Hawker Brooklands, Hawker Langley and Gloster. (Ignoring the Austin Cameo) The Brooklands site was being absorbed into greater London, limiting its expansion ability. Langley and Gloster arrived in Q4/39 and did well, in 1940 the production split was roughly 1/4 Brooklands, 1/4 Langley, 1/2 Gloster. It was Langley that received most of the increases in capacity post 1940, with Brooklands ceasing production around September 1942, Gloster in March 1942. Hurricane production 1939 to 1941, 586, 2,521, 3,169, which was peak production year by a small amount, 1942 production 3,067.

Gloster built up to 140 to 150 Hurricanes a month in mid 1940 and largely held that output until a dip during the mark I to II change over, rebuilt to 144 in September 1941, then the wind down 119, 100, 71, 89, 41, 18, production ending in March 1942. Typhoon production had started in June 1941, slowly, it took until Q3/42 for output to reach around 100 a month, in airframe weight terms around that of 150 Hurricanes. By that stage the Sabre engine problems meant there was no point increasing airframe production. Gloster built 677 Typhoon in 1942, 150 Hurricane x 12 = 1,800 aircraft, in round terms the change over cost several hundred aircraft. IF you look at the production list, 1,874 Typhoon lost to end April 1945. Rapidly retired from RAF service in 1945.

Hawker had its patented construction methods, which needed to be changed for the next generation of aircraft, the Typhoon and later. Hurricane orders were increased as Typhoon problems continued, leading to the Hurricane V as the substitute for the Typhoon for Overlord, engine production had started before the order was cancelled. Note while the Hurricane was cleared for under wing 500 pound bombs or fuel tanks the Spitfire stayed at 250 pounds and no fuel tanks.

One irony in altitude terms the Typhoon was the best adapted to the war the 2nd TAF and 9th AF fought, all their other fighters were carrying around supercharging designed for best performance at 20,000 feet or higher when the missions meant 10 to 12,000 feet was considered high altitude.

The Supermarine works were judged too vulnerable to invest much into until 1942, dispersal was done instead, the division of work being Supermarine would do the small runs and initial versions, Castle Bromwich would do series production of preferred versions, the result it had about twice the worker efficiency of Supermarine. Spitfire output, Supermarine, 895, 1,079, 1,174, 1939 to 1942 (plus 168 Seafire in 1942). Castle Bromwich 345, 1,384, 2,550. Westland provided a cameo before switching to Seafires. Ignoring some prototypes, Spitfire production 1939 to 1942 was 435, 1,249, 2,519, 4,134.

Britain is not able to do much to its fighter production mix in 1941, which in turn locks in 1942 production. The US need for aircraft in 1942 meant promised aircraft were not delivered, increasing reliance on local output, further locking things in.

The USAAF was not very interested in the P-39 but it kept being ordered for similar reasons to the Hurricane, it could arrive soon, better safe than sorry, plus the commitments to and interest of the USSR. The P-47 was running late and reserved for the USAAF though 1943.

Austin at Longbridge managed to build around 50 or Fairey Battle a month in 1940, winding down to 11 in October and a final 1 in December, next came the 300 Hurricane, first one in February 1941, a total of 15 by end August 1941, production ending in October 1942, best monthly output 30. Short Stirling from March 1941 with 40 built in 1941, monthly output in the teens in 1942, peaking in the upper 20's in 1943 production ending in October 1944. Lancaster production began in March 1944, six by end June, to upper 20's per month in February 1945. By the looks of things the Stirling to Lancaster change cost around 100 aircraft, or about 4 months production, changing from the lancaster I to VII about a month's output.

When it comes to weapons costs, yes, they cost, actually how much is another question. Mass production was driving prices down, complexity driving them up. This is the money paid to Hawker per airframe, not the full amount for a complete aircraft. £4,750 for the first order, £4,275 from final order. Supermarine £5,782 for most of the first order, £6,208 for a Vb, £6,088 for a Vc as of mid 1942. With lots of variations with production time, version and factory.

 

[drgondog]

What they could have done is used the satellite companies to make the improvements that were needed such as manufacturing and fitting auxiliary fuel tanks, refitting older models with updated improvements such as individual injector exhausts, streamlined cannon blisters, retrofitting all metal control surfaces and improvements to overall fit and finish. There was lots that could have been done to improve the Spitfire instead of just producing obsolete planes ( Hurricane ) or rubbish such as everything Blackburn produced.

Which satellite companies (that were skilled, reliable and not encumbered by existing commitments?)?
Installing fuel tanks into existing aircraft is a Depot level task, requiring tooling and skilled (knowledgeable) labor.
Design questions:
What role do you want for the Spitfire? Is long range a priority because a.) the RAF has a critical mission for which the Spitfire is the best choice, and b.) no other aircraft is both available and able to achieve operations timing.
What are the design considerations? For additional fuel, how much?, where?, what are the performance degradations associated with the increase, including most importantly the center of gravity changes? Does the decided design present major modification to retrofit existing production? If not, what is the timeline from 'proceed' to complete design, plan production insertion point based on priorities of other model commitments, re-tool and re-train both factory and maybe subcontractors.
Will the future production of 'improved version' draw down on deliveries of still very important models without the new range requirements?
Will the operational imperative (more range) still be required when new production (plus modified existing models) attain wing level inventories to suit the RAF requirement?
Last, but not least - Does another aircraft in production fill the actual requirement Now, and may we obtain those sooner?

The range requirement within RAF doctrine was certainly not strategic bomber escort, but could escort US made and delivered A-20s and B-25s for daylight Tactical operations? However, the 9th AF (Mustangs and Thunderbolts) was tasked to 2 TAC so bomber escort leading up to D-Day was under RAF guidance when not tasked to 8th AF. Was that a strategic imperative worth reducing planned inventory of existing short-range models? Tactical Recon? The Mustang was already far superior in speed and range and on -order and delivery. The Mustang III and P-47 were already longer range high performance fighter bombers compared to Spitfire. The Typhoon and Tempest were exuivalent - and superior to any contemplated long-range Spitfire in fighter bomber role.

Many in this forum don't have an understanding regarding process and time to a.) increase productions, b.) introduce new plant, trained personnel, match tooling, closely watch Quality during early process and adjust quickly - for an EXISTING no change model.

Examples:
North American turned BPC and AAC down re: build P-40s because Kindelberger and Atwood could not deliver P-40#1 within two years due to a.) existing production commitments for the AT-6, BC-1, new B-25 and the Dallas plant was still in late planning stage, and b.) could not achieve desired Curtiss committed deliveries while Curtiss switched to P-46.
When Dallas Plant was in full production with AT-6, it took Dallas 10 months compared to Inglewood 4 months to start the production line on the P-51B. The issues were tooling transfer along with process plans, parts fabrication into assemblies, training new employees with a skeleton team from Inglewood to supervise - and communication issues between production/engineering at Inglewood and production at Dallas.
RAF wanted NAA to a.) build P-51B airframes and ship to UK for assembly to Merlin. The time estimates verged on two years, but ultimately was abandoned because NAA could not meet War Board demands when diluting the P-51B airframe deliveries between AAF and RAF.

Brewster was a failure at offloading F4U production, Curtiss was a failure with P-47G, Lockheed never could get a second plant authorized to increase P-38 production - again a two year lead time.

None of this narrative takes into consideration the mixing and changing of priorities within the logistics chain. In all cases the Ministry of Production and War Production Boards held the final say.

 

[Howard Gibson]

The Tempest started showing up in service squadrons in the early 1944, it was what the Air Ministry hoped the Typhoon would be back in 1939-40 but wasn't. Tempest was still not the 20,000ft plus fighter that was wanted but it was closer

People are also not looking at the cost, Hurricanes were relatively cheap. 2000hp Typhoons were expensive, very expensive with their Sabre engines. And nobody was dumb enough to send Sabre powered aircraft out of Europe until the war was over.

See above, except that the Typhoon in actual service was never a front line fighter. It went from a Spitfire replacement to a Spitfire back-up to tactical bomber. Poor altitude performance of the Typhoon due to Sabre engine and thick wing.

At some point, RAF policy was that Spitfires were to operate above 20,000ft, and some Hawker product below 20,000ft. They fixed the Sabre engine sleeve valves, and they fixed the structural problems by moving an elevator balance. The Hawker Typhoon became a good low altitude fighter. Its good low altitude performance, it ruggedness, and its ability to carry bombs made it a good ground attack machine. Typhoons were successful after D-Day. Flying at low altitude over the Wehrmacht put aircraft in extreme danger of ground fire. P-47s took a beating too. Air superiority, interception and bomber escort flown by Spitfires and Mustangs, were way safer missions.

In 1943 and 1944, if the Luftwaffe flew at 40,000ft over Great Britain, there would be something nasty waiting for them. The RAF were way more interested in reliability than they were in two-stage supercharged Sabre engines. In the absence of two-stage supercharged Merlins and Griffons, the RAF might have encouraged more supercharger development of Sabre engines.

 

[ThomasP]

re

The single biggest issue the Spitfire had was range, had it been given extra fuel like pretty much every other fighter in the war it could have achieved so much more in so many different theatres.

While this is true, as has been discussed many times before , the question re the Spitfire fuel load and range is what would have been practical in the time period currently under discussion.

I have mentioned before in other threads that for the purposes of wargaming I looked at the possibility of increasing the range of the SeaHurricane in practical measure. My parameters were how much fuel can be added without seriously having to change/redesign the basic structure of the Hurricane. The best solution I came up with was adding one fuel tank to each wing (about 20 USgal each) to allow an increase from 112 USgal to 152 USgal, all in SSFT. Removing 2x 20mm HS404 and replacing them with 4x .303 cal Browning, along with the addition of the wing fold mechanism, kept the combat weight with the new tanks empty about the same as the standard SeaHurricane Mk IIC with 4x 20mm. These mods effectively allowed a 50% increase in ROA with a take-off fuel load of 152 USgal internal and 2x 54 USgal DT. It also allowed the CG to be kept within the normal limits.

IMO the question with the Spitfire Mk III & Mk V is could something have been done similar to what I did with my what-if SeaHurricane (with or without the wing fold mechanism).

We know the Spitfire Mk III carried additional fuel in the fuselage (a total of 114 USgal vs the Mk V's 102 USgal). But this increase in fuel only managed to give the Mk III about the same ROA on internal fuel as the standard Hurricane.

Small 11.7 USgal wing leading edge SSFTs were added (at a later date) to the Seafire Mk XV (which used a strengthened universal wing). So that much should be practical also, while keeping the option of either 'B' or 'C' wing armament. The Seafire Mk XV (Griffon engine) had reduced fuel in its fuselage tanks (96 USgal), but a Spitfire Mk III & Mk V (both Merlin XX or 45) could have kept the same fuselage fuel volume (114 USgal and 102 USgal respectively).

Adding the Merlin XX (a major part of this discussion currently) would move the CG forward a bit, but again this was proven to be practical - with the Spitfire Mk III, and with a single standard Mk IIA and a single standard Mk VB being modified as one-offs. How much the Merlin XX/wing fuel tanks combination would have affected the CG I do not know.

There is the possibility of adding a small fuel tank behind the pilot, such as the one used on Mk V fighter variants allowed only when paired with the 170 Impgal ferry tank. But if this were practical for normal use I would think they would have added this tank to the 4-blade variants of the Seafire Mk II and Mk III. They did not. I have never run across any official reason why.

Spitfire Mk III with wing LE SSFT____137 USgal
Spitfire Mk V with wing LE SSFT____125 USgal

Any other practical increases in internal fuel load with SSFT seemed to require substantial redesign of the aircraft to accommodate the changes in CG.

 

[MiTasol]

What role do you want for the Spitfire? Is long range a priority because a.) the RAF has a critical mission for which the Spitfire is the best choice, and b.) no other aircraft is both available and able to achieve operations timing.

People tend to forget that the Spitfire was designed as an interceptor in the time before radar and that rate of climb was a critical factor in the aircrafts ability to perform its role. The purpose of an interceptor is to climb rapidly and defend the area around where it is based, not to escort bombers to Berlin.

• Cramming in more fuel reduces the climb rate and reduces the possibility that it can reach the enemy before they drop their bombs and depart the area.
• Cramming in the tanks to carry that fuel reduces the climb rate and reduces the possibility that it can reach the enemy before they drop their bombs and depart the area.

Without radar to inform the defenders that a swarm of bombers was on its way the first warning was the sound of engines in the distance. Do not forget that in the earliest parts of the war they actually used sound detection, not radar. There are many photos of British detectors so I am linking other detectors as they are less known.

https://www.thevintagenews.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/65/2016/01/4.-Horn-like-sound-locators-of-the-US-Army.gif

As the war changed so did the Spitfire but the changes were somewhat limited by the original design combined with the continuing requirements of achieving maximum performance while structural changes must be kept low so as to keep production levels high.

Brewster was a failure at offloading F4U production, Curtiss was a failure with P-47G, Lockheed never could get a second plant authorized to increase P-38 production - again a two year lead time.

And those companies were not only adding types that that shared fabrication methods and tooling with other aircraft the company produced but companies with vast experience in the manufacture of aircraft.

They were not throwing out nearly all the tooling and retraining people who knew one type of fabrication so that they could use totally unrelated fabrication methods and tooling like Hurricane factories would need to. Nor were they a new start with absolutely no aircraft manufacturing experience like all the small factories that built so many of the Spitfire components.

One advantage of the Spitfires wooden tech was that Joe Bloggs in his shed could assemble wing ribs or other components. Ironically those same wing ribs required extruded alloy sections and stretch presses and form rolling to shape those extrusions and channel sections which required more high tech tooling than just stamping out the ribs like done on Avro, Bristol, Fairey, Handley Page, Shorts, etc, and US aircraft of the time. Joe Bloggs could make the parts for or assemble fabric covered control surfaces relatively easily but could not do the same for all metal control surfaces.

None of this narrative takes into consideration the mixing and changing of priorities within the logistics chain. In all cases the Ministry of Production and War Production Boards held the final say.

Amen.

 

[PAT303]

Which satellite companies (that were skilled, reliable and not encumbered by existing commitments?)?
Installing fuel tanks into existing aircraft is a Depot level task, requiring tooling and skilled (knowledgeable) labor.
Design questions:
What role do you want for the Spitfire? Is long range a priority because a.) the RAF has a critical mission for which the Spitfire is the best choice, and b.) no other aircraft is both available and able to achieve operations timing.
What are the design considerations? For additional fuel, how much?, where?, what are the performance degradations associated with the increase, including most importantly the center of gravity changes? Does the decided design present major modification to retrofit existing production? If not, what is the timeline from 'proceed' to complete design, plan production insertion point based on priorities of other model commitments, re-tool and re-train both factory and maybe subcontractors.
Will the future production of 'improved version' draw down on deliveries of still very important models without the new range requirements?
Will the operational imperative (more range) still be required when new production (plus modified existing models) attain wing level inventories to suit the RAF requirement?
Last, but not least - Does another aircraft in production fill the actual requirement Now, and may we obtain those sooner?

The range requirement within RAF doctrine was certainly not strategic bomber escort, but could escort US made and delivered A-20s and B-25s for daylight Tactical operations? However, the 9th AF (Mustangs and Thunderbolts) was tasked to 2 TAC so bomber escort leading up to D-Day was under RAF guidance when not tasked to 8th AF. Was that a strategic imperative worth reducing planned inventory of existing short-range models? Tactical Recon? The Mustang was already far superior in speed and range and on -order and delivery. The Mustang III and P-47 were already longer range high performance fighter bombers compared to Spitfire. The Typhoon and Tempest were exuivalent - and superior to any contemplated long-range Spitfire in fighter bomber role.

Many in this forum don't have an understanding regarding process and time to a.) increase productions, b.) introduce new plant, trained personnel, match tooling, closely watch Quality during early process and adjust quickly - for an EXISTING no change model.

Examples:
North American turned BPC and AAC down re: build P-40s because Kindelberger and Atwood could not deliver P-40#1 within two years due to a.) existing production commitments for the AT-6, BC-1, new B-25 and the Dallas plant was still in late planning stage, and b.) could not achieve desired Curtiss committed deliveries while Curtiss switched to P-46.
When Dallas Plant was in full production with AT-6, it took Dallas 10 months compared to Inglewood 4 months to start the production line on the P-51B. The issues were tooling transfer along with process plans, parts fabrication into assemblies, training new employees with a skeleton team from Inglewood to supervise - and communication issues between production/engineering at Inglewood and production at Dallas.
RAF wanted NAA to a.) build P-51B airframes and ship to UK for assembly to Merlin. The time estimates verged on two years, but ultimately was abandoned because NAA could not meet War Board demands when diluting the P-51B airframe deliveries between AAF and RAF.

Brewster was a failure at offloading F4U production, Curtiss was a failure with P-47G, Lockheed never could get a second plant authorized to increase P-38 production - again a two year lead time.

None of this narrative takes into consideration the mixing and changing of priorities within the logistics chain. In all cases the Ministry of Production and War Production Boards held the final say.

Every fighter in WW2 got extra fuel and every fighter that got extra fuel had limits or conditions put on their use until the fuel was burnt off, the Spitfire had the same restrictions the P51 had in this regard but it was mostly Portal that was against the concept of long range single seaters. Everything you read about the Spitfire always, and it is always says it's lack of range was it's biggest negative, there's more than enough room in the airframe to fit tanks and more than enough performance once the 60 series Merlin's came online, even before that to be honest, fitting the 29G rear tank in the Mk V instead of the slipper didn't have the drag penalty while allowing higher cruising speeds over France which very much helped in 1941.

 

[PAT303]

Any other practical increases in internal fuel load with SSFT seemed to require substantial redesign of the aircraft to accommodate the changes in CG.

The Spit didn't need any redesign to carry extra fuel, all it needed was the rear upper 42G aux tank to be burnt off en route before combat just like the P51 did.

 

[PAT303]

Last, but not least - Does another aircraft in production fill the actual requirement Now, and may we obtain those sooner?

In 1941-42 I can't think of any aircraft of that era that was better than what they already had, there's lots of information on how much performance was gained via small improvements to the Spitfire that could have been done by smaller satellite factories, Malory's leaning on France cost many pilots lives in aircraft that could have had better performance and used better tactics if airframe improvements and added fuel initiatives were implemented.

 

[PAT303]

People tend to forget that the Spitfire was designed as an interceptor in the time before radar and that rate of climb was a critical factor in the aircrafts ability to perform its role. The purpose of an interceptor is to climb rapidly and defend the area around where it is based, not to escort bombers to Berlin.

• Cramming in more fuel reduces the climb rate and reduces the possibility that it can reach the enemy before they drop their bombs and depart the area.
• Cramming in the tanks to carry that fuel reduces the climb rate and reduces the possibility that it can reach the enemy before they drop their bombs and depart the area.

Extra fuel allows them to be at altitude and waiting to bounce incoming raids instead of climbing up underneath them, extra fuel also allows for changes or rerouting if needed, it allows fighters to start harassing the bombers before they cross the coast, the biggest one, it gives the Spitfires an extra 10 minutes to climb above the escort so the Hurricanes can focus on the bombers, extra fuel opens up so many more options which is why fighters got more and more as the war carried on. People forget the Spitfire and 109 designs were restrained by 1930's engine power, from 1940 onwards that was no longer a concern.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

At some point, RAF policy was that Spitfires were to operate above 20,000ft, and some Hawker product below 20,000ft. They fixed the Sabre engine sleeve valves, and they fixed the structural problems by moving an elevator balance. The Hawker Typhoon became a good low altitude fighter. Its good low altitude performance, it ruggedness, and its ability to carry bombs made it a good ground attack machine. Typhoons were successful after D-Day. Flying at low altitude over the Wehrmacht put aircraft in extreme danger of ground fire. P-47s took a beating too. Air superiority, interception and bomber escort flown by Spitfires and Mustangs, were way safer missions.

In 1943 and 1944, if the Luftwaffe flew at 40,000ft over Great Britain, there would be something nasty waiting for them. The RAF were way more interested in reliability than they were in two-stage supercharged Sabre engines. In the absence of two-stage supercharged Merlins and Griffons, the RAF might have encouraged more supercharger development of Sabre engines.

Makes you wonder why they had to make all those LF Spitfire mods? A Merlin XX would probably remove that need...

I think this formula was making a virtue out of necessity.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Extra fuel allows them to be at altitude and waiting to bounce incoming raids instead of climbing up underneath them, extra fuel also allows for changes or rerouting if needed, it allows fighters to start harassing the bombers before they cross the coast, the biggest one, it gives the Spitfires an extra 10 minutes to climb above the escort so the Hurricanes can focus on the bombers, extra fuel opens up so many more options which is why fighters got more and more as the war carried on. People forget the Spitfire and 109 designs were restrained by 1930's engine power, from 1940 onwards that was no longer a concern.

All that plus, extra fuel would allow Spit V to escort light / medium bombers (A-20 / DB-7, Martin Baltimore, B-25, B-26) out to their full range in North Africa and the Med, in Northern Australia for the Aussies, and in Burma and India for the British.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

If there are three active Hurricane factories in Britain I'd say convert one right away and begin switching it over to Spitfires. Once that's up and running convert the second one, and so on. Hopefully you'll have them all churning out Spits before 1944...

 

[Shortround6]

Hopefully you'll have them all churning out Spits before 1944...

Maybe, maybe not. Including Canada there were 4 factories that produced Hurricanes.
I say factories but I could be wrong. There were 4 companies that produced Hurricanes. I don't know if 1 or 2 companies had more than 1 factory.
Once we take Canada out we are down to 3 and one, Austin, seems to have built only 300 planes, 244 MK IIBs and 56 MK IICs.
Austin later built about 620 Short Stirlings, built parts for Beaufighters. Austin built about 300 Horsa I fuselages and 65 Horsa II (fuselages or complete? and they finished the war making 330 Lancasters.
Now it gets a bit interesting, Gloster built 1850 Hurricane Is but only 900 Hurricane IIs made up of 33 MK IIAs and 867 MK IIBs and no cannon armed IICs.
Quite possible because Gloster tooled up and built all but 15 of the 3330 Typhoons built. You want Gloster to make Spitfires? fewer or no Typhoons built.
This may not be a bad thing depending on which types of Spitfires get built but the Idea that there 3 factories churning out Hurricanes in late 1943 and 44 needs to be not put to bed but taken out and buried.
OH, Gloster was designing, developing, flying and starting Production of the Meteor Jet and had gotten a requirement for 250 production planes June of 1941 but things proceeded slowly.

 

[MiTasol]

Extra fuel allows them to be at altitude and waiting to bounce incoming raids instead of climbing up underneath them,

Yes but that was not the way they were designed to be operated and not how they were operated early in the war. Much better fuel supplies enabled the later tactics you describe and actual combat experience showed that this was a viable option when the weather and other conditions were suitable. Sending aircraft up for long periods when the weather changed and prevented them landing was an additional risk as forecasting was nowhere near as good as it is today. Add to that sending them up just in case, as would have been the case before radar matured, is a good way to end up with aircraft undergoing maintenance when they are needed and pilots too exhausted to be safely flying combat.

Having pilots sitting at altitude, freezing their butts off, burning fuel which is in short supply and breathing oxygen is not only tiring but was only possible if you had lots of pilots, lots of fuel and spare aircraft so that pilots had an aircraft to fly when their usual one was undergoing maintenance. Most aircraft of the day needed maintenance every forty to sixty hours, depending on the type.

Fatigued pilots are more likely to become victims instead of victors.

extra fuel also allows for changes or rerouting if needed, it allows fighters to start harassing the bombers before they cross the coast, the biggest one, it gives the Spitfires an extra 10 minutes to climb above the escort so the Hurricanes can focus on the bombers,

As above - not the way they were designed to be operated (and actually were operated in the early stages of the war).

extra fuel opens up so many more options which is why fighters got more and more as the war carried on.

Which is a result of the operating experience that only the Germans and Spanish had before ww2 yet, despite this knowledge, the Germans had not given the 109 the range it needed in the early ww2 models.

Hindsight is always perfect, especially if you ignore the knowledge the people making the decisions actually had in 1939.

 

[PAT303]

Yes but that was not the way they were designed to be operated and not how they were operated early in the war. Much better fuel supplies enabled the later tactics you describe and actual combat experience showed that this was a viable option when the weather and other conditions were suitable. Sending aircraft up for long periods when the weather changed and prevented them landing was an additional risk as forecasting was nowhere near as good as it is today. Add to that sending them up just in case, as would have been the case before radar matured, is a good way to end up with aircraft undergoing maintenance when they are needed and pilots too exhausted to be safely flying combat.

Having pilots sitting at altitude, freezing their butts off, burning fuel which is in short supply and breathing oxygen is not only tiring but was only possible if you had lots of pilots, lots of fuel and spare aircraft so that pilots had an aircraft to fly when their usual one was undergoing maintenance. Most aircraft of the day needed maintenance every forty to sixty hours, depending on the type.

Fatigued pilots are more likely to become victims instead of victors.


As above - not the way they were designed to be operated (and actually were operated in the early stages of the war).


Which is a result of the operating experience that only the Germans and Spanish had before ww2 yet, despite this knowledge, the Germans had not given the 109 the range it needed in the early ww2 models.

Hindsight is always perfect, especially if you ignore the knowledge the people making the decisions actually had in 1939.

The tactics used by the RAF were dictated by the short range of the fighters, the short range was a result of lack of engine power, as engine power increased along came the ability to carry more weight in guns, ammunition or fuel so the use of fighter tactics should have moved with it.