An early 2-engined carrier based aircraft - worth the effort?

[davparlr]

They weren't sitting on the status quo in 1938-39-40. The requirement that lead to the Curtiss SB2C was issued in August of 1938. The Navy only ordered a few replacement TBD Devastators to make up for attrition (crashes) as they knew they wanted something better. and considering in 1935-36 the Devestator "It was the first widely used carrier-based monoplane as well as the first all-metal naval aircraft, the first with a totally-enclosed cockpit, the first with power-actuated (hydraulically) folding wings;" and the Navy was looking to replace it 1938-39 doesn't seem like "biplane mentality" to me. The requirement for the Avenger was issued in 1939 after the Navy thought about what they wanted. And a top speed of 300mph and a ceiling of 30,000ft hardly seem like "biplane mentality" either. Granted they did not get all they that wanted (they didn't even get the 17ft width dimension with wings folded they wanted) but it is doubtful that a navalized DB7 would have given them the speed, altitude and range they originally requested either. Perhaps 2 out of 3

Yes, I agree with you. Technically, both the Navy and AAF were thinking ahead with the likes of the TBF/F4U and B-25/B-26, but in 1939 when the Navy got its first A-20A, operationally they only been out of a biplane cockpit for only two years! I cannot help but think that the A-20A had two big strikes against it. One, it was an AAF bomber and the Navy and AAF had great disregards for the other service, and, it exceeded its estimation of what you could put on a carrier because they were used to slow with low wing loading planes. No thought was made to how effective the plane could be and could it be made to work. Ideally though, the decision to make a dedicated Navy bomber with this type of performance would have had to been made many years before.

The Navy was very conscious of handling and accidents because they could seriously degrade a Carriers operational capability in just a few weeks in a combat zone. With dozens of cap and search flights being put up every day that weather allowed flying at all even an accident rate of 2% could cut into combat strength in just a couple of weeks. ( one reason for those planes/parts hanging from the hanger ceiling).

I certainly agree to this. Having grown up in Pensacola in the 50 and 60s, it seemed like every Carrier Qual cruise on, first the Antietam, and then the Lexington, came back with one missing plane and student. I think during this period, non-combat losses of the Navy was very high.

Avenger prototypes used it before the F4F-4 Wildcat did.

I guessed I watched a show on the F6F where they discussed the method and made a quick assumption.

Technically the twin engine scout/torpedo plane may be possible and it may be possible a year or more before the Avenger shows up. Wither on the whole, it would have been as useful or as effective (given the space requirements to store) as a greater numbero f Avengers may be subject to question.

My feeling is that high speed would be a significant advantage for the A-20 type Naval bomber as it was for the Mosquito, even over the TBF. At Midway, four B-26s and six TBFs, unescorted, attacked the Japanese Naval fleet. Of this attacking group, two B-26s out of four were shot down, three made it to release points. Five out of the six TBFs were shot down, an unknown number made it to their release point. While this is a small sample, I think of most significance is the comment by the Japanese. While not mentioning the TBFs, they said that the B-26s were blazing fast and difficult to bring down (according to "Shattered Sword"). The A-20 type bomber would have significantly faster than the B-26s which carried their torpedoes externally and, as such, almost impossible for the Zeros to intercept. If those eight planes had been A-20 type planes with trained crews and, if they carried torpedoes, good ones, they could have done severe damage to the Japanese, ending the invasion right there, maybe with small loses. So, yes, I think the reduction of aircraft would have been worth it from an effectiveness point of view.

 

[Shortround6]

A problem with carrier "ops" is that is an every day thing. And in "The First Team" they weren't losing a plane and/or pilot per cruise but several a week while in a combat zone even without combat.

While the carriers in a task group could take turns providing the aircraft the task group need 2-4 plane airborne for a CAP during any/all daylight hours. EVERY radar contact had to be investigated to see if it was a returning search plane (more later) or an enemy "snooper". 4 planes are better because you can investigate 2 contacts at once with paired aircraft. One contact 30-40 miles west of carrier and on 30-40 miles east of carrier? Now to have 4 planes in the air at ALL times (daylight) you have to launch the relief flight before you land the existing CAP so there is no gap in coverage. You also have to launch in time to give the recovering planes enough reserve (30 min or more?) in-case of a take-off or landing accident. You don't want to loose the pilots/planes at the end of the cue to ditching due to no fuel in addition to the crashed plane. So how many flights (sorties) per day, every day that it is possible to fly because even if the weather is iffy where your carriers are it may be just enough better 200-300 miles away where the enemy carriers are for them to launch.
The Search planes are the early warning system, they are not only looking for targets but looking for the enemy threat (enemy fleet/carriers or to lesser extent, enemy air activity or subs) You need search planes in the air from dawn till dusk ( or at least be landing you last search planes at dusk) and they need to be able to fly 200-300 miles from the carrier/s, stay on station (fly pattern or arc) for a period of time and then fly back with 2nd or 3rd searches flown each day as weather and conditions dictate. Now you may not need 360 degree coverage each day or on each search (270 degree or 180 degree searches) of the day but that is still a lot of flights (sorties) per day.
It may be one thing to accept a slightly higher accident rate from an airplane that has a lower loss rate in combat but for this every day flying a higher loss rate can leave you short of aircraft when combat is joined. (Several US carriers were down four F4Fs or more at Coral Sea despite leaving Pearl with full loads IIRC). You also have the fuel problem, if the "twins" are burning even 100 gals more per flight then even swapping of duties with a second carrier could see a carrier burning 1000-2000 gals of av-gas more per day every other day for 8-10 days easy. In other words the twins could cause the carrier to be down 10% of it's total AV-gas supply before the first strike mission is flown ( and the carrier could be down 30-40% of it's av-gas supply even with single engine planes)
Requiring more frequent rendezvous with support ships.

As an extreme example look at the Seafires at Sicily. A problem for the US was that in Pacific the carriers could be 1500-2000 miles from a supply point. Planes lost due to operational accidents cannot be replaced in a few days.
Once the US carrier fleet expands with arrival of the Essex class carriers perhaps the number of planes per carrier (or their handling requirements) can be relaxed a little. Nobody knew before hand of course but in late 1942 the US had only two operational carriers in the Pacific.

 

[davparlr]

I know this is not rational considering it would have taken the Navy recognition of the effectiveness of low level bombing or developing a good fast working torpedo but I guess my dream is that instead of carrying 50+ obsolete bomber/torpedo, the carriers could have carried 25 much faster and more effective low level bombers, leaving much more room for fighters, like 40/carrier versus 30, maybe more. At Midway, a 50% penetration to weapon delivery point (I think it would be more like 75% with escorts) means that 8 bombers are releasing against four carriers, certainly enough to wreck havoc. In addition, sixty F4Fs could be overhead (sixty left to protect the carriers) to escort against 72 Zeros (assuming no Zeros supporting a Japanese strike force.)

Now if we could just put GPS on the aircraft we could really do some damage.