Ok, you proved me wrong.
However, I was clearly speaking of the P47 in 1942 and 43, the critical time for the only plane capable of performing escort duties in Europe for all the reasons listed by others above. The one plane that might have mitigated the horrific losses.
I'll admit that I didn't know all those previous generations of lower performance airplanes had drop tanks. But now you've piqued my interest.....if drop tanks were "normal," why the memo doing away with them? Perhaps because the brass thought self protecting bombers didn't need them?
To Ferry tanks and Army regulations and AAC doctrine, pre-1939.
Advantage of extended range in CONUS was deemed less valuable than the hazard of unsealed fuel tanks to flight safety. The AC encroached on the USN when they demonstrated that a B-17 could intercept the Rex 600 miles out from shore. That jump started increased funding for the B-17. There was no formal strategic bombing directive until AWPD-1 was codified - to wit - destroy the enemy's industrial capacity. AWPD-1 was completed Sept 1941 and codified what became and remained the only War Plan that survived the war.
As stated many times, the role and concepts Pursuit, pre-war, was interception and local air superiority -not long range escort. Plans changed when the 8th AF was smacked in the mouth - and please note that the B-17 did not suffer major losses in any other theatre, with or without escort, but the MTO proved the value of 'long-range' escort by the P-38
To P-47 as the 'only plane'?
Actually No and it wasn't not even the best available. Eaker asked for the only escort fighter with any significant range - the P-38.
Those were taken from him afterdeveloping operational experience and dispatched to MTO, circa Nov 1942 - where they were HIGHLY effective as bomber escort. This was a major seback to Eaker and crippled VIII BC ability to fly beyond Spitfire escort until the new (and very buggy) P47C became operational almost six months afterwards.
Eaker had no say in the matter, his choice was 'salute and go' or asked to be relieved. He had to fight with what he had.
You, and Greg, are certainly entitled to your opinions and outrage regarding technical events, or lack therof. Do some personal resarch into the technology of developing a self sealing tank capable of withstanding a .50 cal round without exploding, pressurized so that an auxiliary pump may withdraw fuel above 18-20K - getting the design into testing, re-design the failure, re-test - approve and issue production orders - then tool up and produce.
Ask yourself the questions - independent of the pace of Tech.Div. isn't it certain that Goodyear,B.F. Goodrich would be stimulated to enter and get a toehold as the primary supplier for such equipment - a market with unit potential sales exceeding aircraft production?
So, what concrete evidence do you have that Materiel Command intentionally ignored a Specific directive from the Chief? Or that industry dragged their feet?
You have clear evidence that Kartveli did not prioritize either an increase of internal fuel or developing racks with sway braces for cenerline bomb or fuel tank, or designing wing pylons to carry droppable tanks along with fuel feed scheme to pressurize delivery to the engine.
A last point which should seem obvious to you - even WITH two aerodynamically sound 150gal pressurized tanks, the premier 56th FG was never assigned target escort deep in Germany UNTIL the P-47D-25 with 65 gal extra fuel were in sufficient operation squadron strength to make a long range mission as a combat unit.
A year after Greg hypothesized Schweinfert was doable with a leaky, draggy unpressurized 205gal tank