Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released.

[BarnOwlLover]

I sense a troll chumming the waters. I may be wrong - if Greg isn't your alter ego you have remarkably similar beliefs.

Couple of points AAC and AAF-hq prohibited external tanks pre-WWII (use Dec 7 for relevance). They were deemed a hazard to airmen' and pressurized tank and droppable tanks were strictly forbidden. February 20 1942 Arnold hosted the Fighter Conference in his office - focused dominantly on increasing range for fighter aicraft 'now that war in Pacific demands long ferry ranges'. The main agreement resulted in a Technical Instruction from Arnold to Tech Div at Wright Field - Increase Range of Pursuit, Dive Bomber, Light Bombardment Aircraft' dated March 2, 1942.

The Arnold instruction was preceded on 24 Feb, 1942 by DC/AS Gen Chidlaw to Chief, Tech.Div Mat.Cmd "Design leak proof Combat Tanks for all Fighter".

Lacking on ALL existing fighters were external pylons with release mechanisms and sway bars.

While Materiel Division sought input from Firestone, Goodyear, etc on the technical issues of designing a combat tank - the question of materials remained s well as Priority or critical material (i.e. steel, Jute, Paper, Alumi, etc, rack mechanisms to release in flight, etc. NAA and Lockheed and Curtiss and Bell developed wing and belly pylons for same detach as bombs. Not Republic.

While NAA installed wing racks on the first Mustang ordered by the Army, Lockheed designed centerline and wing racks, Bell and Curtiss designed centerline racks/sway bars and fuel feed lines.. Not Republic.

When the first steel combat tanks (52gal and 60 gal) were released - they were all immediately installable in late 1942/early 1943. Not Republic, which only rleased the B-7 bomb/fuel tank rack in summer 1943. The 205 gal paper, unpressurized ferry tank as delivered in March/May to ETO in 1943 had no provision to release from four attach points in flight - and deemed a 'hazard to flight safety'. The tanks were modified by VIII ATS, flight tested and released for combat ops - but the slave system from vacuum pump could only squeeze fuel up to 18-20K. Consequently ETO ops stated 80-100 gal only as th tanks must be droped before entering combat.

Greg can state without much argument that pre-war policies hindered pre Dec 1941 thinking with respect to external fuel tanks - but the need was immediately apparent for contemplated range extension or escort - and orders were given. Specifically after the Feb 1942 Fighter Conference and after the July 1942 Fighter Aircraft Range Extension Program.

Debtable is whether a more competent leader than Oliver Echols at Wright Field to drive a harder schedule to co-ordinate subcontractors in the design, testing and production orders for 75and 110 gal steel combat tanks.

Debateable is whether or not a more aggressive puruist of British suppliers at Botwater- Lloyd todesign and build pressurized 110 gal impregnated tanks locally.

Debatable is whether or not Kartveli could be suitably horsewhipped into action to develop first centerline fuel tank/sway bar for P-47B through D-6, or start design of a wing with pylons and fuel feed for delivery in 1942 like NAA and Lockheed, instead of Spring 1944 with P-47D-15,or design of increased internal fuel as stipulated by General's Muir Fairhild and Giles - but not delivering until (ETO ops) until May 1944 in units of 1-2 per squadron.

By contrast, the first flight of P-51B w/90gal ss prototype tank was mid July 1943 -Six months before the production drawing for the P-47D-25 370gal combined tank internal fuel was Released to production! Ditto P-38J with 2x55gal LE fuel tanks. Both the P-51B /85 fuse gal tanks and P-38 with 110gal wee flying combat ops in Dec/Jan 1944.

Summary - was Eaker over-optimistic that his 8th AF could win a war of attrition if given the inventory of 600 bombers materialized? Yes. Was Eaked VERY concerned that increased Fighter escort capability and quantity would be necessary for strikes into Germany? Yes, but in is memoirs he believed that a.) the B-17 gunnerswere taking a huge toll of LW, and b.) his attacks needed critical mass to break the outer ring of defense. Did Eaker and Asst Secy War Lovett pleaded with (and got) support from Arnold to divert P-38s and P-51s ASAP.

The issue is that at no time could Eaker tell Arnold - let's take a timeout, this is going to be too hard.

Not everyone, particularly Greg understood what a setback (and blow) to Eaker 8th AF plans caused by Eisenhower's insistence that the P-38 FGs gaining experience in 8th AF - be extracted and sent to Torch - completely emasculating VIII FC until start of P-47C combat ops in April 1943.

IMO Greg never has truly grasped the importance of remaining internal fuel, after dropping tanks to enter combat, fight for 20min, cruise back and have the 45gal for loiter on return. The initial Combat Radius charts as originally published were not only straight line clear weather flight to a point, fight and return but failed to account for group warm up, take off, assemble switch to external tank cruise to altitude to R/V but then account for escort flight speed (or increase flight length due to essing at 220 IAS when the bombers are at 150IAS at 25,000 feet.

No accounting for re-routing around thunderstorms or 90kt headwinds that complicate real world planning for 8th AF.

BTW - if this is you Greg, now is time to drop kimono and come out of the closet? These gentlemen would like to know.

You said it better than I could. I do doubt that said poster is a troll or Greg, but even when I chimed in he or she did seem to miss some of my points. Fact is that Republic did slag off and trail behind NAA and Lockheed for sure (and even Bell and Curtiss--Curtiss of all companies at this stage of the war!) in carrying drop tanks and increased internal fuel storage. And for some reason, USAAF brass was never able to browbeat them into doing what Arnold from early 1942 was asking of the rest of the industry until it was mostly too late to make an positive impact for Republic turning the P-47 into a decent long range fighter (the P-47N resulted, but was exclusively used in the Pacific Theater). That and there not being enough P-38s to go around in northern Europe did lead to, as in the title of the book, the Mustang becoming the bastard stepchild that did more than any other machine to save the 8th AF's bacon when it needed it the most.

Fact is that the P-51--even more so I've found in recent months--was simply a great aircraft that did some remarkable things and did them extremely well, just like the Spitfire, Mosquito, P-38, P-47 and other designs. Granted, it did come at the expense of the P-47, which was largely relegated in the European Theater to being a tactical fighter, but it seems that it was Republic themselves who were mostly to blame for that. The Mustang being as great as it was was just the last nail in the casket until the P-47N, which to my knowledge was never fielded in the ETO.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

Ok, you proved me wrong.

However, I was clearly speaking of the P47 in 1942 and 43, the critical time for the only plane capable of performing escort duties in Europe for all the reasons listed by others above. The one plane that might have mitigated the horrific losses.

I'll admit that I didn't know all those previous generations of lower performance airplanes had drop tanks. But now you've piqued my interest.....if drop tanks were "normal," why the memo doing away with them? Perhaps because the brass thought self protecting bombers didn't need them?

As pointed out above, the USAAC/USAAF seemed to have judged them for a time to be potential liability (fire/explosion hazard). Why the decided that when USN/USAAC planes had used drop/detachable tanks before with seemingly little issue is sort of beyond me and it'd probably be bast to ask someone more expert than I on why the USAAC came to that decision for a few years until Pearl Harbor. But it seems that in particular that pressurized external tanks made certain officials in the USAAC cringe and became haram and anathema to them.

Of course, when the crap hit the fan after Pearl Harbor, that opinion changed out of obvious necessity. And let's not forget that Hap Arnold as early as 1940 (maybe even earlier) was trying to find ways to obtain high performance escort-capable fighters, based on lessons learned from the Battle of Britain and the Spanish Civil War. Though it took a while (probably longer than he wanted), the P-51 especially, as well as the ultimate versions of the P-38 and P-47 did give him that. And don't get me started with stuff like the P-51H and P-82, which were probably the USAAF's ultimate piston engine fighters, let alone ultimate escort fighters

 

[PlanesandShips]

You said it better than I could. I do doubt that said poster is a troll or Greg, but even when I chimed in he or she did seem to miss some of my points. Fact is that Republic did slag off and trail behind NAA and Lockheed for sure (and even Bell and Curtiss--Curtiss of all companies at this stage of the war!) in carrying drop tanks and increased internal fuel storage. And for some reason, USAAF brass was never able to browbeat them into doing what Arnold from early 1942 was asking of the rest of the industry until it was mostly too late to make an positive impact for Republic turning the P-47 into a decent long range fighter (the P-47N resulted, but was exclusively used in the Pacific Theater). That and there not being enough P-38s to go around in northern Europe did lead to, as in the title of the book, the Mustang becoming the bastard stepchild that did more than any other machine to save the 8th AF's bacon when it needed it the most.

Fact is that the P-51--even more so I've found in recent months--was simply a great aircraft that did some remarkable things and did them extremely well, just like the Spitfire, Mosquito, P-38, P-47 and other designs. Granted, it did come at the expense of the P-47, which was largely relegated in the European Theater to being a tactical fighter, but it seems that it was Republic themselves who were mostly to blame for that. The Mustang being as great as it was was just the last nail in the casket until the P-47N, which to my knowledge was never fielded in the ETO.

I'm sure I've missed some of your points. I've been chiming in off and on while doing life today.

I assure you I'm not Greg, he has much more expertise than I, and I have never met him. I'm also not a troll. Just an interested bystander. I've learned a lot today, the amount of expertise on the forum is amazing. And that was quite a post from Drgondog that you quoted.

Drgondog - Thanks for that information. The part about Eaker reinforces my belief that he had an unrealistic view of the capabilities of aerial gunnery. I think I saw somewhere once, can't remember where, that the claims by aerial gunners on bombers were approximately 10x what they really shot down. Your comment about switching back and forth on the tanks was also illuminating. Greg did mention that, and I think Chuck Yeager did in his book also, that if the fuselage tank in the P51 wasn't burned down fairly significantly, maneuverability suffered because of aft CG IIRC. So sometimes/often the P51 was dumping quite a bit of remaining useable fuel when they shed the externals.

The portions of the book I referenced earlier, The Cold Blue Sky (I think I had the title wrong earlier) where the author referenced coming back to an empty hut because all the other crews had been shot down was very touching. He also relates coming back into the parking area and the ground crews asking, "Where are all the other planes?" And he just said, "They're gone." I first became interested in the book because I have a distant family member who went down in a B-17 that the author captured in a picture.

 

[GrauGeist]

It literally takes years to develop an aircraft, even if it's spun off of an existing design.
If the war in the Pacific had lasted into 1946 as anticipated, then the late-comers would have seen combat, including British types.

 

[Shortround6]

Ok, you proved me wrong.

However, I was clearly speaking of the P47 in 1942 and 43, the critical time for the only plane capable of performing escort duties in Europe for all the reasons listed by others above. The one plane that might have mitigated the horrific losses.

I'll admit that I didn't know all those previous generations of lower performance airplanes had drop tanks. But now you've piqued my interest.....if drop tanks were "normal," why the memo doing away with them? Perhaps because the brass thought self protecting bombers didn't need them?

I don't know the answer. A lot of these tanks/installations went away in mid 30s, no reason/s seem to make it into the short histories. I am guessing that the tanks were used for relocating, recon or training ? the big attack planes were blocking off some their bomb capacity.
The Curtiss Hawk biplane fighters could carry a bomb on on center rack, they could also carry 2/4 bombs under wing but although one museum aircraft has both the bombs and the under wing tank that might not be correct ( a lot of weight for a small engine).
There may have been accidents? Pilot didn't switch tanks or didn't switch fast enough? or fuel line leaked or ????
Maybe it was case of if the Navy does it the Army isn't going to do it

Curtiss Helldiver. Several squadrons were in service on US carriers in 1938 and the last came ashore in 1940.
This picture is from 1941, the squadron was supposed have been using the planes from Samoa until June of 1943.
The Navy bought over 250 of them and in 1940 they were selling some them to both the French and the British.
On wiki the page shows US, French and British versions with the drop tank.
What I don't know is if it was a quick drop or if it was a semi-permanent installation. Detachable not quick drop.

The whole story about Curtiss looking for the US government to fund drop tank development for the P-36s sound more than bit fishy.
Curtiss had been hanging belly tanks on a number of aircraft during the 30s and as shown the Helldiver of that period sure looks like they had most of the problems solved.
Maybe there was a problem with high altitude use? But that also smells as the P-36, P-39, and P-40, didn't normally fly at the altitudes that the P-47 had trouble with.


maybe it was funding?
Why did the P-40 and P-40B had little or nothing for bomb racks and yet many accounts claim they were designed/purchased for low altitude ground attack?
Standard US ground attack planes (like of the ones pictured above) carried four .30 cal guns for strafing and bombs, many of the old biplanes could carry a pair of small bombs under wing. The P-36 could carry 4 or 5(?) 50lb bombs. The P-35 could carry 350lbs of bombs, but the P-40 was usually credited with ZERO bombs? And the XP-40 had only two . 50 cal guns.
Maybe if the congress thought the P-40 could do ground attack the congress would not give the army any money for A-20 attack planes????
There is lot of stuff in the older accounts that do not add up. Most of it is not sourced or traced back to real documents like Bill Marshal is doing.

And a lot of internet talking heads are repeating the same stuff from 60 year old books.

 

[BarnOwlLover]

And that is a point that also must be emphasized. Planes like the P-51 going from the Allison to a Merlin wasn't a simple bodge job. Were Merlin P-51s flying in late 1942? Yes. Were they 100% ready? No, not quite. Was the Spitfire IX an expedient? Yes. Did it take significant changes to put a two stage Merlin in where a single stage one previous sat? Absolutely. And increasing fuel capacity in a plane isn't always an easy thing. But I do again have to say the point about Arnold asking for more internal fuel and carrying drop tanks on fighters was something foreseen in 1942, and NAA and Lockheed (and others) were working on it. Why Republic held off for so long, I don't know, but you'd think that they would've jumped on it.

Though to be fair, early P-47s weren't exactly 100% combat worthy, and had quite a few early problems. But I don't know if that's a 100% valid excuse, given that Arnold's RFPs dated from early 1942. Granted, I'd say that it's obvious that desperation didn't set in until 1943.

 

[MiTasol]

View attachment 765893

There are more.
Some may have been detachable instead of dropped inflight, at least one supposed to dropped in flight in case of emergency (fire?).
one more.
because of the landing gear it is often hard to tell if they were carrying a bomb or tank, no fins on this one.

Okay. I will bite. What the heck is that first aircraft?

 

[GrauGeist]

Merlin powered Mustangs (Mustang Mk.X and P-51B) were under development in 1942, but didn't see combat until 1943.

Also, the P-51B, while being upgraded with the Merlin, was fitted with the A-36 bomb rack, which could be used for a drop tank.

 

[Shortround6]

Of course, when the crap hit the fan after Pearl Harbor, that opinion changed out of obvious necessity. And let's not forget that Hap Arnold as early as 1940 (maybe even earlier) was trying to find ways to obtain high performance escort-capable fighters, based on lessons learned from the Battle of Britain and the Spanish Civil War. Though it took a while (probably longer than he wanted), the P-51 especially, as well as the ultimate versions of the P-38 and P-47 did give him that.

Problems here is that the P-39 and P-40 were never going to be high performance bomber escort fighters for B-17s. The B-17s in the early years (1938 and after) with turbo chargers were going to be operating thousands of feet higher than the P-39s and P-40s could manage. Turns out the B-17s could not operate at 30,000ft like they thought and with the addition of more guns practical ceiling (and lack of pressurization) force operation altitudes around the 25,000ft area, which was still way to high for the P-39s and P-40s as built, to deal with.
the P-51 was not going to work either until it got the Merlin engine. The Mustang had NOT been designed around a two stage Allison.
I don't know what Arnold was thinking but the B-17C was supposed to carry 4000lbs of bombs 2400 miles, max range was 3400 miles but that maybe ferry range. Problem with the range is that is around 9-10 hours at cruising speed and the chances of building a 1939-40 single engine fighter to fly for that long were about zip.

Why Republic held off for so long, I don't know, but you'd think that they would've jumped on it.

Republic may have been trying to fix other things. The summer of 1942 saw several planes crash due to compressibility problems. They lost several other planes due to in flight fires.
They had built 5 planes in March of 1942 and then stopped the production line for May while they changed over to metal covered alerions. Sept 1942 sees them change from the B to the C model with the 8in longer fuselage, they built 171 (?) Bs, none would go overseas. Sept also sees the first P-47 roll out of the Evansville plant. The Fall of 1942 also sees Curtiss rolling out their first few P-47s. The guys at Farmingdale seem to have been a bit busy

As noted earlier, the P-47s were the longest ranged single engine fighter the Army had, it just wasn't long ranged enough.

 

[Shortround6]

Though to be fair, early P-47s weren't exactly 100% combat worthy, and had quite a few early problems. But I don't know if that's a 100% valid excuse, given that Arnold's RFPs dated from early 1942. Granted, I'd say that it's obvious that desperation didn't set in until 1943.

As noted above, Farmingdale was trying to set up two additional production lines, hundreds of miles away, and was trying to sort out some pretty basic things like changing to metal alerions instead of fabric covered ones in early 1942. Development at Farmingdale is rather rapid, they had orders for 850 P-47Ds before the first P-47B was flown. So in the spring of 1942 they are trying to build the P-47Bs, tool up for the P-47C at Farmingdale, look ahead to the P-47Ds at Farmingdale, build the plant at Evansville for P-47Ds and help Curtiss with the P-47Gs. Now in 1940 Republic had built just over 100 planes (only one Lancer) for the entire year. Republic was finishing up the last of the P-43A Lancers in March of 1942.

 

[Shortround6]

Okay. I will bite. What the heck is that first aircraft?

Curtiss A-8 with the conqueror V-12 engine
The last plane is a Curtiss A-12 (same airplane with an R-1820 engine)

 

[MiTasol]

Thanks

 

[SaparotRob]

Okay. I will bite. What the heck is that first aircraft?

Curtiss A-8. It says so above the picture if you click on the pic in your link.

 

[MiTasol]

Curtiss A-8. It says so above the picture if you click on the pic in your link.

Darn. I did not know you could do that. The things I learn on this site continue to amaze me

 

[pbehn]

Ok, you proved me wrong.

However, I was clearly speaking of the P47 in 1942 and 43, the critical time for the only plane capable of performing escort duties in Europe for all the reasons listed by others above. The one plane that might have mitigated the horrific losses.

I'll admit that I didn't know all those previous generations of lower performance airplanes had drop tanks. But now you've piqued my interest.....if drop tanks were "normal," why the memo doing away with them? Perhaps because the brass thought self protecting bombers didn't need them?

The memo was written in 1939 wasnt it, there was no aircraft capable of escorting bombers and the USA didnt have enough bombers to make a raid at the time. date edited.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey pbehn,

The memo is from 16 May 1939, but your above statement is still true at that time.

 

[pbehn]

Hey pbehn,

The memo is from 16 May 1939, but your above statement is still true then.

It may have been certain to everyone, particularly in Europe that war was coming, however with politics the way they were in USA in 1939 I dont think anyone could openly discuss getting involved in it in any way, particularly a strategic bombing campaign against one side or other.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

By the way for this discussion copyright reserved in all the information I present. Permission required to quote or use it elsewhere.

I said USAAC/AAF leadership dominated by bomber guys,... I think the basic assertion is that the bomber mafia dominated the USAAF, and that their biases affected force structures, and thus outcomes. ... I confess I don't know the percentages, but it APPEARS that the bomber mafia had undue influence over decision making,

And so far your entire evidence for this is to say someone else said it while incorrectly noting the number of unescorted 8th Air Force raids and losses. There were many unescorted heavy bomber raids in the Pacific all through the war which usually took light losses due to the strength of the defences and warning times, plenty more in the Mediterranean during the North African fighting, at least early, again due to the size of the defences and the warning times given.

It appears that you have shown that I over-stated the bomber crew casualties caused by lack of fighter escort in the early part of the war. Having said that, those casualties were still very significant, far more than were anticipated.

To use it appears in the above statement requires counter evidence to show I could be wrong, instead of the initial estimate of about 10 times the deaths is apparently to be forgotten as that does not matter, the numbers are still rated as significant. Followed by far more than anticipated, is that per aircraft or per sortie? Then later we have staggering, the adjectives continue the theme even as the numbers involved drop by a factor of 10 or more When you look at the early USAAF heavy bomber casualties per loss the death rates decrease during 1943 thanks to better training and innovations on safety equipment.

Whenever I listen to videos or read narratives from USAAF veterans, I always ask myself WHEN they were in combat. There aren't very many from 1942/43, a staggering number were killed. It would appear that the life expectancy of a bomber crewman arriving in the theatre in June/July/Aug/Sept of 1943 was very short indeed.

The above statement indicates to me a tick and flick on the data I provided. Firstly the fact men in combat in 1942/43 would be likely to have done a second tour, Paul Tibbets is not an example of such but look at his record. Secondly I would be asking when the USAAF was in action, like combat sorties, ETO 1,034,052 MTO 659,513, Pacific 59,101, Far East 415,979, CBI 148,029, Alaska 7,318, 20th Air Force 38,808 and of these 2,362,800 sorties 392,840 were done before 1944, or 16.6%, and while using sorties is not the same as counting crews it is a crude measure to note about 1 in 6 of USAAF personnel seeing combat did so before the end of 1943. So what does not many from 1942/43 mean, relative to the number of veterans?

So as it would "appear" what was the life expectancy of the mid 1943 crew lives? Provide the evidence, because so far you started with 10 times over inflated losses and now use adjectives instead of facts to maintain the same ideas. Still believe Mosquitoes and B-26 could substitute for B-17 and B-24 for example? Flak suppression sorties? How ineffective the bomber gunners were?

If I was FDR or Marshall, and Eaker said that to me, I would have unloaded on him,

Meantime I would note on 10 October 1943 two forces of B-17, 1st division 141 B-17 claimed 4 kills while having 1 B-17 missing, while 3rd division 133 B-17 claimed 179 kills while having 29 missing and that there were 216 P-47 in the air or about 4 fighters to 5 bombers, the P-47 claiming 19 kills. While the Luftwaffe fighter sorties probably outnumbered the USAAF escort around 2 to 1. Then I would note 4 of the USAAF B-17 losses were considered due to flak and 7 more to flak and fighters, while 1 B-17 ran out of fuel, 1 more hit by a shot down B-17. There were 34 bomber losses including write offs. All this is after the 108 gallon external tanks were available. I prefer to know the facts when working out what happened. I assume Greg has this level of detail, the number of escorts for example.

I would also note the day before while the Anklam raid was heavily opposed, 18 missing out of 115 sent while the 163 sent to targets in what is now Poland had 8 missing. While the 15 September 1940 Luftwaffe raids on London had 2 or more fighters per bomber and still took unacceptable bomber losses.

I still see Greg's central argument as valid: the lack of drop tanks was scandalous and unforgiveable. (By "lack of drop tanks" I mean the whole program for tactical use: engineering, design, testing, implementation, production, training, etc.)

Actually Greg's central argument as being badly presented here is basically invalid, the P-47 in the ETO had the ability to use 200 gallon ferry tanks from the start, so the fittings were there, it was a case of making the tanks, then enabling them to draw fuel at height. The USAAF had the choice of where to send its small numbers of long range high performance fighters, that meant more active fronts than Britain in 1942 and early 1943, but did mean Britain as of mid to late 1942, before operation Torch was agreed to. So the 8th Air Force planning has to make the adjustment then wait months for new fighters to arrive and become combat worthy before being long range combat worthy.

I haven't seen anyone really refute that, and will look forward to the "debate" if and when it happens.

I haven't seen you really refute any of the data I presented, which puts holes in your ideas of Greg's ideas and will look forward to the "debate" if and when it happens.

Until the end of July 1943 the Luftwaffe minimised its day fighter strength in the west, concentrating on the Kursk offensive and the defence of Sicily. After failures there and the July/August 1943 heavy bomber raids the fighter defence of Germany was strengthened, including reforming a number of twin engine day fighter units. There is a trouble with snapshot figures for fighters in Germany as that is where refits occurred before returning to the front, however, day fighters in Germany in 1943, 163 on 20 January, 188 on 20 April, 343 on 20 June, 677 on 20 September, 572 on 20 December. The ranges of the Bf109 and Fw190 and the size of Germany meant not all could intercept most raids, the Germans began to issue drop tanks to the home defence fighters, initially the Bf109 external tank could not be jettisoned. Now for the outrage, the Germans had been using external tanks in 1940, yet failed to have them available in 1943 to inflict many more losses on day raids. The obvious long reach of the bomber mafia clearly evident.

But it appears to me, as a non-expert, that the USAAF asking in 1943 (when in 1943?) for greater internal fuel and drop tanks was way too late.

Except as people have shown they were asking in early 1942.

The sheer amount of anger and vituperation that I see on this forum is alarming.

Please provide say 6 examples, because I see the anger and vituperation coming from you directed at the USAAF leaders of the time.

I'm not sure why anyone would be so triggered by differing viewpoints about something that happened 70 years ago, and which have at least an element of truth to them.

Stand in front of a mirror and read out your descriptions of USAAF command, while a sign in front of you keeps noting all the factual errors being employed.

We've been lied to so many times by our government (and by corporate America) that I have a healthy degree of skepticism towards those in positions of authority.

Greg is in a position of authority according to you. None of us are, so by definition discount Greg, up rate us.

For example, "dropping a bomb in a pickle barrel from 20,000 feet," when in reality, what was the statistic? Fewer than 5% of the bombs fell within one MILE of the target or something like that? They KNEW they were lying about the pickle barrel.

Pre war in the USAAF to qualify as a Bombardier 3rd Class, officers had to be able to drop practice and live bombs from 20,000 feet of altitude with a maximum Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 500 feet for day missions and 600 feet for night missions. This accuracy derived in part from high training standards, in part from the Norden bombsight and the B-17 bomber, and in part from the fact that most but not all bombing practice was conducted in clear weather. Pickle barrel was publicity.

There is a USSBS bombing accuracy report which notes for September to December 1944 for the 8th Air Force, visual bombing in good weather saw 82.4% of bombs within 1 mile of the target, in poor weather 58%, using G-H 65%, Micro-H 52.4%, H2X in 4-5/10 cloud 48.5%, H2X in 6-7/10 cloud 36.5%, H2X in 8-9/10 cloud 22.5%, H2X in 10/10 cloud 5.6%. The 15th Air Force was around twice as accurate using non visual bombing as it could spend more time training the personnel.

Congratulations, the Mosquitoes replacing B-17, the 5% bombing accuracy, the massive exaggeration of casualties, the incorrect time lines, means you are telling us mostly how little you know about the air war beyond the usual it was all wrong ideas. Lots of people repeat the same lines. Throw in the standard very incorrect Merlin story as a bonus.

I'm glad to see your last two paragraphs above, though I doubt a lot of thunderstorms were deviated around in western Europe. More likely, in my non-expert opinion, were deviations around known flak batteries.

And your evidence for the thunderstorm frequency and route choices are what? Opinion?

However, I was clearly speaking of the P47 in 1942 and 43, the critical time for the only plane capable of performing escort duties in Europe for all the reasons listed by others above. The one plane that might have mitigated the horrific losses.

How many more P-47, it was range and numbers, given the size and experience of the Luftwaffe fighter defences. And where are the P-47 to come from?

I'll admit that I didn't know all those previous generations of lower performance airplanes had drop tanks. But now you've piqued my interest.....if drop tanks were "normal," why the memo doing away with them? Perhaps because the brass thought self protecting bombers didn't need them?

I did give a list of reasons in my original message, look at them. Add the other contributions. Then throw in where the external tank was considered to have caused or help cause accidents or increase the personnel or material losses. After trying the idea the USAAF decided they were not worth the risk in peace time. It is interesting to note how someone claiming to be a "swing voter" yet again comes up with a USAAF command is bad reason.

Heavy bombers were designed such that you cannot carry maximum bombs and maximum fuel at the same time, 2 or more tons of fuel takes you quite a distance, until June 1940 the USAAF bombers required long range to justify their original ideas, anti shipping sorties and reconnaissance on enemy fleets approaching the US.

Republic Farmingdale / Evansville employees (CAA report)
1,543 / 0 February 1940
2,355 / 0 January 1941
5,574 / 0 January 1942
14,445 / 2,923 January 1943 (Evansville 0 until May)
16,452 / 5,209 January 1944

Farmingdale 1 P-47B in December 1941, 5 in March then May to September 1942. Evansville first production October 1942, P-47D, Curtiss in September, P-47G

P-47C September 1942 to February 1943. P-47C-1 introduced the ferry tank (112 built), so if the USAAF could fly missions below 20,000 feet the P-47C could carry 200 gallons unprotected external fuel assuming the tank could be modified for jettisoning. The P-47C-2 with metal covered control surfaces in November 1942, a pressing need in 1942 was figuring out why a P-47 could not pull out of dives at times.

P-47D February 1943 on. D-6 allowing normal belly tank July 1943, D-15 wing shackles October 1943, D-25 more internal fuel April 1944.

Francis Dean ideal ranges P-38G around 810 miles with 300 gallons, P-47C to D-22 around 950 miles with 305 gallons.

Richard Davis figures, 8th Air Force sorties to German targets, 32 raid days, bomber sorties and losses
27-Jan-43 attacking: 55, missing: 1
04-Feb-43 attacking: 39, missing: 5
26-Feb-43 attacking: 64, missing: 7
04-Mar-43 attacking: 16, missing: 5
18-Mar-43 attacking: 97, missing: 2
22-Mar-43 attacking: 84, missing: 3
17-Apr-43 attacking: 106, missing: 16
14-May-43 attacking: 126, missing: 8
15-May-43 attacking: 135, missing: 6
19-May-43 attacking: 158, missing: 6
21-May-43 attacking: 123, missing: 12
11-Jun-43 attacking: 218, missing: 8
13-Jun-43 attacking: 182, missing: 26
22-Jun-43 attacking: 183, missing: 16
25-Jun-43 attacking: 167, missing: 18
17-Jul-43 attacking: 34, missing: 2
25-Jul-43 attacking: 217, missing: 18
26-Jul-43 attacking: 199, missing: 24
28-Jul-43 attacking: 94, missing: 22
29-Jul-43 attacking: 193, missing: 10
30-Jul-43 attacking: 134, missing: 12
12-Aug-43 attacking: 243, missing: 25
17-Aug-43 attacking: 315, missing: 60
06-Sep-43 attacking: 165, missing: 25
27-Sep-43 attacking: 246, missing: 7
02-Oct-43 attacking: 341, missing: 2
04-Oct-43 attacking: 247, missing: 11
08-Oct-43 attacking: 357, missing: 30
09-Oct-43 attacking: 225, missing: 22
10-Oct-43 attacking: 207, missing: 30
14-Oct-43 attacking: 229, missing: 60
20-Oct-43 attacking: 113, missing: 8
Total attacking: 5,312, missing: 507

 

[pbehn]

Yet, they told the public in what amounts to little more than propaganda that strategic bombing could win the war, another lie.

Having been to the peace park in Hiroshima I think you should re think that statement. As far as I can see you are taking your present day view of things and using it to project your thoughts onto history, with the USAAF to blame in all cases, even for a prototype crash. It was not obvious that a fleet of heavily armed bombers would suffer massive losses, only a retrospectoscope tells you that. It was not obvious that results on a US bombing range could not repeated while under fire over an enemy target in a European winter. If you perceive any anger and vituperation maybe its because your chosen historian deletes comments correcting his videos, incorporates those comments in another video while leaving the original unchanged and calls those correcting him "butt hurt authors". From what I remember he has 4 theories on P-47 range all o which contradict each other in fact and time line, I am not giving him any more clicks to prove the point, because I am not his target audience, you are.

 

[PlanesandShips]

Wow, Mr. Sinclair, that was a lot of words. And also skillful use of the software to carve out quotes and respond to them individually. Well done. I don't have the time or interest to respond point by point. I have no expectation that anything I write on an internet forum has any copyright value btw.

The points remain that even Eaker himself apparently stated that escorts would have decreased casualties significantly, and that said escorts were not available, for the multiplicity of reasons listed throughout the thread, and for which USAAC/F leadership bears total responsibility. It is interesting that even in the discussion of the Merlin comments, there are some instances quoted that gave Packard some credit for some improvements. Doing so doesn't impugn RR at all.

I can't resist commenting on the prevalence of thunderstorms in Northern Europe, which should be really common sense for anyone involved in aviation. Munich is north of Montreal on the latitude scale. I did a quick (less than a minute) web search and found multiple hits documenting that the incidents of TS in Europe are not very significant. Here is one link: Severe thunderstorm potential is *four times bigger* across the United States as compared to Europe, a new research study finds. IMHO (alert: incoming opinion not meeting the evidentiary standards of the legal system, which is apparently required here), much more fuel was used taxiing, taking off, climbing, and especially organizing formations than was expended dodging TS in the EU.

pbehn - We weren't talking about the Pacific, although I did say "the war." My mistake. Having said that, even in the Pacific there exists to this very day debate about whether or not the use of the atomic bomb was necessary or justifiable. I feel safe in saying that debate is not appropriate to have now. I don't believe that strategic bombing "won the war," in Europe, and I believe (in retrospect) that the air war in EU could have been run a lot better. IMHO (more opinions!) the EU war was decided at Stalingrad.