Anti Aircraft Weapons....
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parsifal
Colonel
its their effective ceiling as opposed to service ceiling that you need to take into account. Deighton in his book "blitzkrieg" brought this out very well. At a horizontal rage of just 5 km, your 88, with a theoretical vertical ceiling of 33000 ft, was down to 28000 ft vertical, At eight kilometres horizontal range, the effective ceiling had droped to just 25000 ft. But that does ot explain the problem in its full entirety either. Effective ceiling is a combination of factors, with the generally accepted effective ceiling (even by German sources) for the Flak 88/36 being 26000 ft ( which is about 8000 metres).
This is acknowledged in wiki
Comparatively, the 88 was not as powerful as its Allied counterparts. In the anti-aircraft role it fired a 9.2 kg (20.3-pound) shell at a muzzle velocity of 790 m/s (2,600 ft/s) to an effective ceiling of 7,900 m (26,000 feet) (at maximum 10,600 m, 32,000 ft). Although this was useful during the U.S. daylight raids, which typically took place at 7,600 m (25,000 ft), many aircraft could fly higher than its maximum effective ceiling.
As henning points out, this has to be accepted as at least one reason for the drop in effectiveness of the flak arm. Its effectiveness dropped to 25% of that achieved in 1942. henning is saying that this was due to the increase altitude of the US Bomber stremas. since the US streams travelled at heights of 26000-30000 ft (geneerally, it follows that the 88s were much less effective at heights about 25000 (or thereabouts)
I dont fully accept the explanation that the drop in German effectiveness can be attributed solely to the height at which the US bombers were attacking. Its one factor. other factors in my opinion included the barrel wear, the decreasing crew efficiencies, and the decreasing effectiveness of german radar guidance due to allied countermeasures.
That German AA effectiveness suffered a collapse in 1944 is fairly well documented, if not widely known. The reasons for that collapse are still debated. my opinion is that it was the result of a number of factors.
At a guess, if asked to rate the importance, in a descending order of importance, I would rate them as follows
1)decreased crew training
2)Increased attack Altitudes for the bombers
3)Allied countermeasures to decrease german radar effectiveness
4)Excessive Barrel wear leading to degraded performance of ordinance
5)Possibly, Ultra benefits that allowed flak concentration s to be avoided, to a degree
This is acknowledged in wiki
Comparatively, the 88 was not as powerful as its Allied counterparts. In the anti-aircraft role it fired a 9.2 kg (20.3-pound) shell at a muzzle velocity of 790 m/s (2,600 ft/s) to an effective ceiling of 7,900 m (26,000 feet) (at maximum 10,600 m, 32,000 ft). Although this was useful during the U.S. daylight raids, which typically took place at 7,600 m (25,000 ft), many aircraft could fly higher than its maximum effective ceiling.
As henning points out, this has to be accepted as at least one reason for the drop in effectiveness of the flak arm. Its effectiveness dropped to 25% of that achieved in 1942. henning is saying that this was due to the increase altitude of the US Bomber stremas. since the US streams travelled at heights of 26000-30000 ft (geneerally, it follows that the 88s were much less effective at heights about 25000 (or thereabouts)
I dont fully accept the explanation that the drop in German effectiveness can be attributed solely to the height at which the US bombers were attacking. Its one factor. other factors in my opinion included the barrel wear, the decreasing crew efficiencies, and the decreasing effectiveness of german radar guidance due to allied countermeasures.
That German AA effectiveness suffered a collapse in 1944 is fairly well documented, if not widely known. The reasons for that collapse are still debated. my opinion is that it was the result of a number of factors.
At a guess, if asked to rate the importance, in a descending order of importance, I would rate them as follows
1)decreased crew training
2)Increased attack Altitudes for the bombers
3)Allied countermeasures to decrease german radar effectiveness
4)Excessive Barrel wear leading to degraded performance of ordinance
5)Possibly, Ultra benefits that allowed flak concentration s to be avoided, to a degree
I can agree with much of what you say Parsifal, but I don't believe that barrel wear was really an issue worth talking about. The barrels on the 88 were easily exchangable and were changed after a specific number of rounds had been fired. And as to the quality of the barrels, again it remained unchanged until wars end.
In short the falling effectiveness of the German Flak arm cannot in any way be attributed to the equipment, but rather the change in the experience of the crew manning it and the increasing height at which Allied bombers began to fly at.
This also explains the reason behind why that there were probably more accidental barrel explosions by 1944 compared to earlier. This phenomenon was most likely to occur when the barrel wasn't kept properly clean, something an inexperienced crew could forget.
In short the falling effectiveness of the German Flak arm cannot in any way be attributed to the equipment, but rather the change in the experience of the crew manning it and the increasing height at which Allied bombers began to fly at.
This also explains the reason behind why that there were probably more accidental barrel explosions by 1944 compared to earlier. This phenomenon was most likely to occur when the barrel wasn't kept properly clean, something an inexperienced crew could forget.
Erich
the old Sage
it's called dismantling 8.8cm's and removing the installation and sending the guns as AT platforms to the OST.
In fact during 1945 the Flak was about the only thing and with inclusion of the Me 262 units and a few props from JG 300/301 there was no defense against the might Allied armada
In fact during 1945 the Flak was about the only thing and with inclusion of the Me 262 units and a few props from JG 300/301 there was no defense against the might Allied armada
parsifal
Colonel
well, the amount of ammunition expended per successful shootdown is fairly well known, and the amount needed to shoot down each alied aircraft went up dramatically in 1944. From that basic fact one has to seek an explanation. One has to explain that ammunition expenditure per shoot down went up from around 4000 per kill to over 16000 per kill. Some of this was due to improving allied countermeasures, but surely it is not that hard to accept that some of it was due to falling standards of various kinds within the defenders themselves.
Germany was trying to withstand attacks from nearly every angle in 1944, why is it so hard to accept that the whole structure was teetering on the brink. This has to be the model that pervades nearly every aspect of german endeavour at the end of the war. It otherwise becomes a variation of the WWI excuse that led to hitlers rise, the so called "stabbed in the back" mentality
With regard to the barrel wear, the number of accidents went up dramatically, whilst the total inventory did not. I am working from memory, but as I recall, the Flak arm commanded something like 4-5000 guns in 1942. in 1944, it commanded over 10700. Yet disproportionally, the number of burst guns went up from a monthly average of 20 in 1942, to well over 300 per month in 1944. if this does not point to a worn out artillery park I dont know what does
Germany was trying to withstand attacks from nearly every angle in 1944, why is it so hard to accept that the whole structure was teetering on the brink. This has to be the model that pervades nearly every aspect of german endeavour at the end of the war. It otherwise becomes a variation of the WWI excuse that led to hitlers rise, the so called "stabbed in the back" mentality
With regard to the barrel wear, the number of accidents went up dramatically, whilst the total inventory did not. I am working from memory, but as I recall, the Flak arm commanded something like 4-5000 guns in 1942. in 1944, it commanded over 10700. Yet disproportionally, the number of burst guns went up from a monthly average of 20 in 1942, to well over 300 per month in 1944. if this does not point to a worn out artillery park I dont know what does
Parsifal don't you read what others write ?
The increase in barrel explosions was no doubt caused by the inexperience of the crew manning the guns. It has nothing to do with the quality of the material, rather the maintenance of it. Burst guns usually means one thing: A filthy barrel!
The increase in barrel explosions was no doubt caused by the inexperience of the crew manning the guns. It has nothing to do with the quality of the material, rather the maintenance of it. Burst guns usually means one thing: A filthy barrel!
parsifal
Colonel
I do read what others write, but that does not mean that it is necessarily true
As for poor maintenance of guns, well, you are sort of right. but only partially. The dirt in the barrel does not lead to the explosion of the gun, the pressures in the block or the barrel do. Now, a dirty barrel as we both know can increase those pressures and are therefore a cause of the explosion, but it is nevertheless the explosion that does the damage, and not the dirt. A gun explosion is caused by the the gun design pressures being exceeded, which may be due to the dirt in the barrel, but can equally be the result of a weakened barrel due overuse (which will cause those tolerances to decrease, without the operators even being aware of the problem). Both have the same effect. And whereas there is hard data that proves that the guns were overused by 1944, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that the guns were not being cleaned properly. Sure the crews were more poorly trained, but that does not necessarily mean that they were not cleaning their guns properly. Probably, but not definately.
So no, dirty barrels do not cause the failure of a barrel, they are a factor that lead to explosion of the barrel. the failure of the gun is caused solely by bursting (either the barrel or some other part of the mechanism) which is the sole cause of failures. Its just whether you want to believe its the result of the gun design tolerances being exceeed due to poor maintennce, or whether the guns tolerances had been lowered as a result of overuse
Excessive use of the LW flak park is well documented. all you need to do is look at the annual or monthly ammunition expenditure rates to find that out. Even thougth the 88 was able to be relined in the barrel, and was very strong (although I suspect that at half the weight of the british 3.7", it simply lacked the mass to absorb sustained punishment of the kind it was subjected to in 1944), I dont think this would help in the area around the block, or stop a bursting barrel, if that barrel had been too weakened by overuse. And the amount of ammunition these guns had fired by 1944 was phenomenal.
Excessive gun usage leads to a decrease in the tolerances for the weapon, which will decrease its performance. this phenomena, incidentally is based on observations made by the germans themselves.
As for poor maintenance of guns, well, you are sort of right. but only partially. The dirt in the barrel does not lead to the explosion of the gun, the pressures in the block or the barrel do. Now, a dirty barrel as we both know can increase those pressures and are therefore a cause of the explosion, but it is nevertheless the explosion that does the damage, and not the dirt. A gun explosion is caused by the the gun design pressures being exceeded, which may be due to the dirt in the barrel, but can equally be the result of a weakened barrel due overuse (which will cause those tolerances to decrease, without the operators even being aware of the problem). Both have the same effect. And whereas there is hard data that proves that the guns were overused by 1944, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that the guns were not being cleaned properly. Sure the crews were more poorly trained, but that does not necessarily mean that they were not cleaning their guns properly. Probably, but not definately.
So no, dirty barrels do not cause the failure of a barrel, they are a factor that lead to explosion of the barrel. the failure of the gun is caused solely by bursting (either the barrel or some other part of the mechanism) which is the sole cause of failures. Its just whether you want to believe its the result of the gun design tolerances being exceeed due to poor maintennce, or whether the guns tolerances had been lowered as a result of overuse
Excessive use of the LW flak park is well documented. all you need to do is look at the annual or monthly ammunition expenditure rates to find that out. Even thougth the 88 was able to be relined in the barrel, and was very strong (although I suspect that at half the weight of the british 3.7", it simply lacked the mass to absorb sustained punishment of the kind it was subjected to in 1944), I dont think this would help in the area around the block, or stop a bursting barrel, if that barrel had been too weakened by overuse. And the amount of ammunition these guns had fired by 1944 was phenomenal.
Excessive gun usage leads to a decrease in the tolerances for the weapon, which will decrease its performance. this phenomena, incidentally is based on observations made by the germans themselves.
parsifal
Colonel
There were flak uits fighting in the west as well, as both frontline forces (opposed Monty in the final Rhine crossings, and elswhere, less well known), and still firing at Allied aircraft as well. Something I am not sure of.....were these "flak" formations at the front, just fighting as Infantry, or were they still mostly equipped with flak weaponary
Erich
the old Sage
yes understood, but many Flak defenses were set into the Ost being carried on the mobil carriages to support underarmed-AT units against overwhelming Soviet tank support supplying the necessary back up to close the holes punched by Russian armor. Now of course these then increased in size to more than just batteries operated by the Heer, then the LW. this was also the case as the war progressed into LW units aiding trouble spots in Normandie.
whatever you took away from bombed cities the weaker the Flak arm was to become until newer batteries were to be equipped, and some were with either outdated arms or captured equipment
whatever you took away from bombed cities the weaker the Flak arm was to become until newer batteries were to be equipped, and some were with either outdated arms or captured equipment
parsifal
Colonel
Thankyou Erich, on the basis of what you are saying, then, one would have to add another causal factor to the drop in AA effectiveness, ie a decrease in equipment standards....the good stuff was all at the front, the chaff was left to defend the cities.......I must admit had not thought of that
Do you think it was a major factor, or am i reading too much into it?
Do you think it was a major factor, or am i reading too much into it?
Erich
the old Sage
you also mentioned the use of jamming radar techniques which was vital, more so later war when the Germans lost France and their early warning systems.
a little reflection on some of the bomber vet crews I have interviewed, none wanted to fly over Berlin ever or Vienna due to the 128mm zwillings, they did not know what was planted at these plaes but the Flak was always intense till wars end. The Ruhr gebeit from 43 onward got stronger and stronger with more heavier flak types like the 105mm and single 128mm pieces and these were rail bound - meaning they were mobil. for one raid into a certain firing position and then moved at night to another spot sometimes 15-20 miles distant so dealing with fewer number it could be made to look that the Flak perimeters had increased in dimension and when you think about it they did.
When my freind served on a KM 8.8cm Flak fun in a batterie of 8 guns outside of Kiel they were first in a planted type position covered with dirt, sandbags and wooden supports within a year they were then placed individually on a mobil dock in Keil harbor and then moved ona weekly basis to throw Allied intel off - again this appeared for the most part that Keil permiter anyway had grown and it had because other caliber Flak weapons were moved in and to the outskirts of the city.
does this make some sense ?
E ~
a little reflection on some of the bomber vet crews I have interviewed, none wanted to fly over Berlin ever or Vienna due to the 128mm zwillings, they did not know what was planted at these plaes but the Flak was always intense till wars end. The Ruhr gebeit from 43 onward got stronger and stronger with more heavier flak types like the 105mm and single 128mm pieces and these were rail bound - meaning they were mobil. for one raid into a certain firing position and then moved at night to another spot sometimes 15-20 miles distant so dealing with fewer number it could be made to look that the Flak perimeters had increased in dimension and when you think about it they did.
When my freind served on a KM 8.8cm Flak fun in a batterie of 8 guns outside of Kiel they were first in a planted type position covered with dirt, sandbags and wooden supports within a year they were then placed individually on a mobil dock in Keil harbor and then moved ona weekly basis to throw Allied intel off - again this appeared for the most part that Keil permiter anyway had grown and it had because other caliber Flak weapons were moved in and to the outskirts of the city.
does this make some sense ?
E ~
Hi Parsifal,
>well, the amount of ammunition expended per successful shootdown is fairly well known, and the amount needed to shoot down each alied aircraft went up dramatically in 1944.
Do we have figures for other years as well? And are there other indicators for the "well-documented collapse of Flak effectiveness in 1944"?
>Yet disproportionally, the number of burst guns went up from a monthly average of 20 in 1942, to well over 300 per month in 1944.
You don't have to look at the numbers of barrels present, but rather at the number of shots fired per barrel. I'd imagine that the fewer barrels in 1942 saw a lot less use than the greater number in 1944, explaining why they had fewer bursts as well ...
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>well, the amount of ammunition expended per successful shootdown is fairly well known, and the amount needed to shoot down each alied aircraft went up dramatically in 1944.
Do we have figures for other years as well? And are there other indicators for the "well-documented collapse of Flak effectiveness in 1944"?
>Yet disproportionally, the number of burst guns went up from a monthly average of 20 in 1942, to well over 300 per month in 1944.
You don't have to look at the numbers of barrels present, but rather at the number of shots fired per barrel. I'd imagine that the fewer barrels in 1942 saw a lot less use than the greater number in 1944, explaining why they had fewer bursts as well ...
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
parsifal
Colonel
It makes a lot of sense
All of the contributions thus far have had value IMO. They are are all valid and good points to an issue that is still not well understood IMO. Even during the war, Milch constantly harped about the inneffectiveness of the flak arm, without relaizing its real purpose and achivements. The actual losses to flak amounted to something like 40-50% of total allied losses, according to westermann,. The real contribution of flak was to force the bombers to fly high, and to bomb les accurately, a lot less accurately. It was a critical role IMO.
The point that you make about shifting assets around would therefore make allied recon and other intelligence extremely important.
I used to work for a guy when I was a teenager, who had been captured on Crete. in 1943 he was woeking in Schweinfurt. He was part of an intelligence gathering ring, and his job was to count trains, and report when a certain factoriy or factories came back into production. other members of the ring had to report on the sate of the defences. Apparently this information was viewed as vital by the 8AF command. I hope so. 8 members of the ring were strung up with piano wire when the germans cottoned onto the leak, .
All of the contributions thus far have had value IMO. They are are all valid and good points to an issue that is still not well understood IMO. Even during the war, Milch constantly harped about the inneffectiveness of the flak arm, without relaizing its real purpose and achivements. The actual losses to flak amounted to something like 40-50% of total allied losses, according to westermann,. The real contribution of flak was to force the bombers to fly high, and to bomb les accurately, a lot less accurately. It was a critical role IMO.
The point that you make about shifting assets around would therefore make allied recon and other intelligence extremely important.
I used to work for a guy when I was a teenager, who had been captured on Crete. in 1943 he was woeking in Schweinfurt. He was part of an intelligence gathering ring, and his job was to count trains, and report when a certain factoriy or factories came back into production. other members of the ring had to report on the sate of the defences. Apparently this information was viewed as vital by the 8AF command. I hope so. 8 members of the ring were strung up with piano wire when the germans cottoned onto the leak, .
parsifal
Colonel
Hi henning
having trrouble with my connections at the moment
Do we have figures for other years as well? And are there other indicators for the "well-documented collapse of Flak effectiveness in 1944"?
Yes, i do, but its in bits and pieces throughout the book. Without attempting to "cherry pick", here are a few examples from westermanns book
1.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 13
Heavy Flak expenditure 154456
Rounds per Kill: 11881
2.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 38
Heavy Flak expenditure 234550
Rounds per Kill: 6339
4.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 31
Heavy Flak expenditure 476907
Rounds per Kill: 10250
4.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 62
Heavy Flak expenditure 282270
Rounds per Kill: 4553
Total for this period
Shoot downs: 144
Heavy Flak expenditure 989035
Rounds per Kill: 8250
Avg No Hvy AA: 3888
Est Year Ammo exp: 2.9 million shells
Calc expediture per gun: 763
Avg Monthly Gun losses: Not known - Negligible
1942
Shoot downs: 409 (April-December)
Heavy Flak expenditure 1, 758 ,700 (April-December )
Rounds per Kill: 4300
Avg No Hvy AA: 4772
Est Year Ammo exp: 2344933 shells (see note below)
Calc expediture per gun: 491
Avg Monthly Gun losses: 23
Note the percentage of total expenditures toward the flak arm in the latter half of 1942 reflected the Fuhrers directive to establish 900x 8gun hvy batteries, 750 Lt batteries 200 searchlight batteries and 25 barrage balloon batteries by the beginning of 1943. Between July and the end of the year, flak weapons consumed 28% of budgetry outlays for all forces, and expenditures for ammunition amounted to 17%, whereas previously in 1941- 42, the figures had been 22 and 15 percent respectively. I have had to estimate flak ammunition expenditure taking this change into account.
1943
In 1943, 29% of military outlays were spent on flak weapons, and 14% of the budget was spent on ammuniton expenditures. however the ammunition expenditures proved insufficient, as fully 35% of total ammunition expensiture, as a percentage of total armed forces expenditure, amounted to fully 35% for the last two quarters of 1943. this was undoubtedly due to the wholesale adoption of barrage fire defences IMO.
Shoot downs: 319 (Jan-Jun)
Heavy Flak expenditure 3140000 (Jan-Jun )
Rounds per Kill: 10000
Avg No Hvy AA: 8520
Est Year Ammo exp: 7 to 9 million shells
Calc expediture per gun: 939
avg gun losses/month: 173
1944
1944 saw the staggering ammunition expenditure of an average of 3.125 million shells per month. Without doubt, according to Westermann, the most ominous shortage faced by the flak arm was ammunition. In the first two quarters of 1944, flak ammunition amounted to 17% of total military expenditures. These represented a decrease from the previous two quarters, when reserve stocks had already been eaten into to dangerous levels. The full effects of the ammunition shortage hit from the fall of 1944
Shoot downs: 2343
Heavy Flak expenditure 37500000
Rounds per Kill: 16000
Avg No Hvy AA: 13500
Est Year Ammo exp: 37500000
Calc expediture per gun: 2778
Avg Monthly Gun losses: 384
you don't have to look at the numbers of barrels present, but rather at the number of shots fired per barrel. I'd imagine that the fewer barrels in 1942 saw a lot less use than the greater number in 1944, explaining why they had fewer bursts as well
Well yes, but even so a large number of guns failed than either the proportions of guns would suggest. Erich points out that this might be due to the large number of captured guns "drafted" into the flak arm. this is confirmed by Westermann, who says that large number s of Russian 76.2mm and other cpatured weapons were re-chanmbered to take 88mm flak ammunition- this had to be a dangerous practice
Even so the the home produced guns were over-used. In 1944, each of them were, on average fired nearly 3000 times, any that had been in existence previously would have been fired more than 3000 times, which has to be a matter for concern.
having trrouble with my connections at the moment
Do we have figures for other years as well? And are there other indicators for the "well-documented collapse of Flak effectiveness in 1944"?
Yes, i do, but its in bits and pieces throughout the book. Without attempting to "cherry pick", here are a few examples from westermanns book
1.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 13
Heavy Flak expenditure 154456
Rounds per Kill: 11881
2.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 38
Heavy Flak expenditure 234550
Rounds per Kill: 6339
4.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 31
Heavy Flak expenditure 476907
Rounds per Kill: 10250
4.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 62
Heavy Flak expenditure 282270
Rounds per Kill: 4553
Total for this period
Shoot downs: 144
Heavy Flak expenditure 989035
Rounds per Kill: 8250
Avg No Hvy AA: 3888
Est Year Ammo exp: 2.9 million shells
Calc expediture per gun: 763
Avg Monthly Gun losses: Not known - Negligible
1942
Shoot downs: 409 (April-December)
Heavy Flak expenditure 1, 758 ,700 (April-December )
Rounds per Kill: 4300
Avg No Hvy AA: 4772
Est Year Ammo exp: 2344933 shells (see note below)
Calc expediture per gun: 491
Avg Monthly Gun losses: 23
Note the percentage of total expenditures toward the flak arm in the latter half of 1942 reflected the Fuhrers directive to establish 900x 8gun hvy batteries, 750 Lt batteries 200 searchlight batteries and 25 barrage balloon batteries by the beginning of 1943. Between July and the end of the year, flak weapons consumed 28% of budgetry outlays for all forces, and expenditures for ammunition amounted to 17%, whereas previously in 1941- 42, the figures had been 22 and 15 percent respectively. I have had to estimate flak ammunition expenditure taking this change into account.
1943
In 1943, 29% of military outlays were spent on flak weapons, and 14% of the budget was spent on ammuniton expenditures. however the ammunition expenditures proved insufficient, as fully 35% of total ammunition expensiture, as a percentage of total armed forces expenditure, amounted to fully 35% for the last two quarters of 1943. this was undoubtedly due to the wholesale adoption of barrage fire defences IMO.
Shoot downs: 319 (Jan-Jun)
Heavy Flak expenditure 3140000 (Jan-Jun )
Rounds per Kill: 10000
Avg No Hvy AA: 8520
Est Year Ammo exp: 7 to 9 million shells
Calc expediture per gun: 939
avg gun losses/month: 173
1944
1944 saw the staggering ammunition expenditure of an average of 3.125 million shells per month. Without doubt, according to Westermann, the most ominous shortage faced by the flak arm was ammunition. In the first two quarters of 1944, flak ammunition amounted to 17% of total military expenditures. These represented a decrease from the previous two quarters, when reserve stocks had already been eaten into to dangerous levels. The full effects of the ammunition shortage hit from the fall of 1944
Shoot downs: 2343
Heavy Flak expenditure 37500000
Rounds per Kill: 16000
Avg No Hvy AA: 13500
Est Year Ammo exp: 37500000
Calc expediture per gun: 2778
Avg Monthly Gun losses: 384
you don't have to look at the numbers of barrels present, but rather at the number of shots fired per barrel. I'd imagine that the fewer barrels in 1942 saw a lot less use than the greater number in 1944, explaining why they had fewer bursts as well
Well yes, but even so a large number of guns failed than either the proportions of guns would suggest. Erich points out that this might be due to the large number of captured guns "drafted" into the flak arm. this is confirmed by Westermann, who says that large number s of Russian 76.2mm and other cpatured weapons were re-chanmbered to take 88mm flak ammunition- this had to be a dangerous practice
Even so the the home produced guns were over-used. In 1944, each of them were, on average fired nearly 3000 times, any that had been in existence previously would have been fired more than 3000 times, which has to be a matter for concern.
Parsifal there's no need to be anal about the subject.
The most frequent cause of burst guns is improper cleaning of the barrel, this causes excessive pressure to built up which can cause the gun to fail. Esp. if happens again and again that the crew forgets to clean the barrel, the repeated overpressure the gun is subjected to will lower the tolerances. This is what I suspect happened. The inexperienced crew weren't cleaning the barrels regularly as they should, and this put extra strain on the gun each time it was fired, until finally it would fail.
Now regarding the British QF 3.7 Inch, it was no more solidly built than the 88mm FlaK 18/36. The difference in weight comes from the different carriages and platforms used, the German went through great work to keep them as light as possible.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
While I agree that falling standarts, increased altitudes and many more aspects may be traced down in these numbers I would like to stress that without knowledge of the conditions and targets (B-17 and P-47 may be harder to kill than Whitley and Battles?) one has to be very careful not to draw Scheinkorrelations from the database as a result of interpretation.
From my experiences with meaningful statistic analyses, an appearing statistical relationship between aspect A and B with a high degree of significancy may be related to the influence of another, yet unrevealed aspect C. The established relationship between A and B is in this case virtual and not high (or from a quantitative point of view, the relationship is less pronounced). This is a common way to mess up descriptive statistics when uncritically applied to a databse. A multidimensional factor analysis (Varimax-Kaiser rotation preferred) with screeplot may be used in order to exclude Scheinkorrelations.
Replace the 88mm FLAK by US 90mm guns -do You reasonably expect better or worser results everything else (environmental conditions, ammo, targets, altitudes, firecontroll, crew quality and logistics) beeing equal?
ratdog
Airman
has anyone touched on the wasserfalle?? for those who dont know it was the germans atempt and pretty successful at making a self guided missile
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
The C2W was still a developmental weapon system by the time it was ordered to be abandoned in february 1945.
Hi Parsifal,
>Yes, i do, but its in bits and pieces throughout the book. Without attempting to "cherry pick", here are a few examples from westermanns book
Ah, thanks a lot for summarizing the addtional data!
>4.41 (Over germany western europe) [note: probably 3.31 here?]
>Shoot downs: 31
>Heavy Flak expenditure 476907
>Rounds per Kill: 10250
>4.41 (Over germany western europe)
>Shoot downs: 62
>Heavy Flak expenditure 282270
>Rounds per Kill: 4553
This seems to indicate that the effectiveness of the Flak could vary considerably depending on external factors or tactics used, even when crew qualification and hardware quality were identical.
>Shoot downs: 144
>Heavy Flak expenditure 989035
>Rounds per Kill: 8250
>Avg No Hvy AA: 3888
>Est Year Ammo exp: 2.9 million shells
Hm, here I'm confused ... 144 * 8250 = 1.188.000. This does neither match "heavy flak expenditure" nor "est. year ammo exp."
Seems I don't understand how to read your data yet ... could you explain?
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>Yes, i do, but its in bits and pieces throughout the book. Without attempting to "cherry pick", here are a few examples from westermanns book
Ah, thanks a lot for summarizing the addtional data!
>4.41 (Over germany western europe) [note: probably 3.31 here?]
>Shoot downs: 31
>Heavy Flak expenditure 476907
>Rounds per Kill: 10250
>4.41 (Over germany western europe)
>Shoot downs: 62
>Heavy Flak expenditure 282270
>Rounds per Kill: 4553
This seems to indicate that the effectiveness of the Flak could vary considerably depending on external factors or tactics used, even when crew qualification and hardware quality were identical.
>Shoot downs: 144
>Heavy Flak expenditure 989035
>Rounds per Kill: 8250
>Avg No Hvy AA: 3888
>Est Year Ammo exp: 2.9 million shells
Hm, here I'm confused ... 144 * 8250 = 1.188.000. This does neither match "heavy flak expenditure" nor "est. year ammo exp."
Seems I don't understand how to read your data yet ... could you explain?
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
