Arc Light One

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While many of SAC's actions in Vietnam were fairly badly executed, this one actually seemed to decently well thought out, as initially planned.
As with all thing Vietnam warish: Sorta - Kinda:
On 15 June, VC forces were discovered near Ben Cat at a regional headquarters 10 miles north of Saigon, and a raid was scheduled for 18 June. Johnson, fearing negative world reaction from the use of the B-52s, demanded assurance that no civilian areas would be hit during the raid. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor instructed Brig Gen George Simler, chief of Operations, 2d Air Division (AD), to accompany the mission in a C-123 Provider to guarantee tight command and control so no bombs would accidentally fall on nearby villages. Plans called for 30 B-52Fs of the 7th BW and 320th BW to launch from Guam at 0100 hours, rendezvous for aerial refueling over Luzon, Philippines, and meet over the target at 0730 hours. There were 10 three-aircraft cells; 24 planes carried fifty one 750 lb bombs, while six carried 1,000 armor-piercing bombs. Things began as planned, but tailwinds from a typhoon in the eastern Pacific pushed the bombers ahead of schedule. When the first cell banked 360 degrees to slow for the arrival of the refuellers, they ran into the path of the second cell in the dark skies over the South China Sea. Two planes collided and crashed into the sea. Eight crew members perished, while the four survivors and one body were recovered. Only 27 of the bombers refueled. The 28th bomber, with a broken hydraulic pump and radar, landed in Okinawa. The remaining bombers crossed the Vietnamese coast at 0630 hours and dropped their first bombs 15 minutes later from about 20,000 feet. Guiding off a beacon placed in the area the night before, they bombed a one-by-two-mile target box with 1,300 bombs. Half the bombs hit inside the box. They then flew south to avoid the Cambodian border, and near Saigon they turned east toward Guam. One bomber was forced to land at Clark AB, Philippines, because of electrical problems. The last bomber landed exactly 13 hours after the first one had departed. Shortly after the raid, three US-led 36-man Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) reconnaissance teams inspected the area and found no enemy bodies and little damage to the camp area. Later, MACV discovered that the VC had fled on a tip from a spy in the local ARVN unit.

By spring 1966 President Johnson had become less concerned with the negative impact of the B-52s on public opinion, believing they were effectively curtailing enemy infiltration and hurting enemy morale in South Vietnam. Adm U. S. G. Sharp—commander in chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC)— was given approval for target designation. Instead of facilitating use of the powerful B-52 weapon, the new policy only compounded tensions between airmen and their Army and Navy counterparts. Airmen had been upset that Army ground commanders were ordering a strategic bomber ever into a ground support role, but now to have a naval officer pick targets was simply unbearable. Target restrictions and lack of target flexibility was nothing new for airmen; to them it had always been an annoying feature of Rolling Thunder. In the case of Rolling Thunder, the restrictions and target approvals came directly from the White House, thus reducing target value and increasing response time. While General Westmoreland was pleased with the new Arc Light policies, Westmoreland's direct control over these strategic air assets caused Gen William W. "Spike" Momyer, Seventh Air Force commander, to worry openly that the entire process not only violated the basic concept of a separate strategic and tactical air force run by airmen trained in such combat but that "Westmoreland's employment of the B-52s as long range artillery to suppress 'what may or may not be suspected concentrations or supply areas' was questionable and relatively ineffective." Momyer wanted to use the B-52s against specific targets, reserving just two squadrons to fly approximately 150 sorties each month, while using tactical aircraft to strike enemy concentrations. This disagreement came about partly because no one had any hard evidence regarding how effective US air forces were; since there were no "quantifiable assessments, each general adopted a position that fit his preconception of the role of airpower." Normal Air Force intelligence and data collection were all but completely absent during the Vietnam War. In previous wars the Air Force had kept a data catalogue for airmen to use in planning operations. They did not do so in SEA until 1968 during the Tet Offensive and siege at Khe Sanh. Their lack of ability to select ground targets or use their assets in close air support (CAS) roles also meant that it was all but impossible to commit reconnaissance assets to establish the effectiveness of Arc Light or any other raids in Vietnam. In the words of World War II Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada—USAF, retired—after returning from a special fact-finding tour of Vietnam in early 1966. In his evaluation of the use of airpower (especially B-52s) in Vietnam he declared, "Our effort in Vietnam . . . to me as far as air power was concerned was a little bit of what I used to refer to as operational masturbation. I have always felt that the B-52s were to a large extent bombing forests . . . It was just clear to me that tactical airpower as being exercised in that theater was the product of the Army and Army thinking."
One of the main reasons B-52s had to do the job normally reserved for tactical air assets was that most tactical assets were being used in Operation Rolling Thunder. Another reason was the lack of fighters of the kind needed (ones that flew lower and slower) to carry out CAS or other important tactical roles, especially in the South. Tactical weapons development and fighter pilot training had reduced the US fighter advantage in all areas, especially air-to-air combat. Dr. Futrell observed that, "It was tragic irony that the air war in SEA would necessitate an agonizing relearning process and a hurried adaptation of weapon systems back into an arena thought to have been eliminated [conventional tactical fighter operations]." The numbers show just how far the US fell between Korea and Vietnam. During World War II, the best figures available indicate that in Europe 7,422 enemy fighters were shot down while the US lost 1,691, a ratio of 4.4:1. In Korea, the numbers were 874 to 122, or a ratio of 7.2:1. In Vietnam, the North lost 195 fighters—139 to Air Force fighters and 56 to Navy fighters—while the US lost 61 Air Force fighters and 16 Navy fighters, totaling 77. The ratio was 2.53:1. The numbers changed once better aircraft, antiradar jammers, and targeting systems like Teaball were employed. After 1972, the ratio reached 5:1, with better training also making a big difference.
 
GrauGeist said:
I'm sure the President and JCoS had good intel regarding the heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and China
One would think, but when it came to that period -- you had people keeping secrets from each other and withholding stuff now and then.
If the U.S. and China got into a shooting war, the Soviet Union may have just sat back and let China take a beating
It would be logical to assume that our side would have realized that after China got battered into the stone-age, the USSR might be emboldened to assert it's dominance and face nuclear war over it?

Many thanks to Zipper730 for mentioning this book
I would suggest you get a version called "Collision over Vietnam" same author. It's more recent and has more pages in it.

The author has made a few errors about the origin of SAC (LeMay didn't create SAC, for example), but much of the rest was definitely accurate over the mission planning and execution...
 
tyrodtom said:
Not just communist aligned nations had personnel in North Vietnam, but French and Japanese nationals were present, I've heard of a few from Ireland too..
Doctors, sanitation engineers, agriculture experts, etc.
Fascinating...
A lot of the rest of the world didn't have the same viewpoint of the war as the US government.
We saw it as protecting South Vietnam from North Vietnam's aggression.
A lot of the rest of the world saw it as the US trying to impose it's will on one side of a civil war.
It was, in a way, both...

On 29 Jauary 1955, congress passed a resoultion that authorized the use of force against China if they persisted in their attacks against Taiwan. It was after this, that Dulles announced in a public address that the use of nuclear weapons were being considered. . . So the prospect of nuclear war with the U.S. seemed to have changed Mao's mind.
He seemed to become more aggressive by 1964...
 
One would think, but when it came to that period -- you had people keeping secrets from each other and withholding stuff now and then.
The U.S. had a good picture of what was going on.

It would be logical to assume that our side would have realized that after China got battered into the stone-age, the USSR might be emboldened to assert it's dominance and face nuclear war over it?
The Soviet Union would have been a contender, but aside from a few hardware designs that proved on a par with Western equipment, they were roughly 20 years behind the west - that in itself would be the basis for a long and interesting thread.
He seemed to become more aggressive by 1964...
Chairman Mao knew that China was playing hard catch up in the late 50's. His military had been bled in Korea, his series of purges and mass civilian relocations had caused a great deal of disarray internally and his industrial base took a while to get things moving foreward.
After Eisenhower was no longer President, several cold-war leaders thought they had an edge with this young "nobody" Kennedy, so they tested the waters and found out he was not one to fool with - but they tried.
 
The U.S. had a good picture of what was going on.
That's good to know
The Soviet Union would have been a contender, but aside from a few hardware designs that proved on a par with Western equipment, they were roughly 20 years behind the west - that in itself would be the basis for a long and interesting thread.
It actually is...
Chairman Mao knew that China was playing hard catch up in the late 50's. His military had been bled in Korea, his series of purges and mass civilian relocations had caused a great deal of disarray internally and his industrial base took a while to get things moving foreward.
After Eisenhower was no longer President, several cold-war leaders thought they had an edge with this young "nobody" Kennedy, so they tested the waters and found out he was not one to fool with - but they tried.
Supposedly the Communists understood the Republicans very easy, but not democrats.
 
This is a video from a B-52 the Don Harten (Lt. Col., USAF, Ret.) was involved in the mid-air collision during the Arc Light 1 mission: I'm not sure if all his conclusions are right based on what was said throughout the discussions here (particularly the part about Russia cheering us on during the February to June 1965 period), but it's an interesting speech.



It's been awhile since I've visited this thread, but looking at Vietnam, there were a bunch of overarching themes that had taken hold, and these are probably over-summarized, (and I'm willing to stand corrected if I'm wrong), but listed for brevity...

1. Distrust of The JCS: President Johnson seemed concerned about the JCS (probably LeMay in particular) being overeager to escalate the war, expanding into China, with a seeming lack of concern about the possibility that this could lead to nuclear war. While he might not have been as cosmopolitan as Kennedy, he did know about the Mukden Incident, which served as a pretext for invading Manchuria in 1931, and might have felt that the JCS would be looking for any excuse to expand the conflict's scale.​
While I'm not sure what the prospects for Soviet intervention actually were, it's possible that Johnson might have seen their attitude as cavalier. If the attitudes of the intelligence agencies didn't line up with each other and/or the JCS, I could imagine that would only create more distrust over the matter.​
2. Concern of the war expanding: It seemed that there were basically several concerns about the expansion of the war​
a. Chinese Intervention: The Chinese could send hordes of people across the border and cause mayhem. I'm not sure if there was any discussion as to the possibility that they could stir up trouble in Korea (after all, the war never didn't "end" with a peace treaty, but an armistice), or something else.​
b. Soviet Responses: Would they come to the Chinese aid if we attacked China?​

3. Concern of public outrage over the War: Johnson had apparently criticized a General who pointed out his idea went against air-power doctrines that generally called for massive force applied with surprise, and consistency, rather than piecemeal application that would waste time, money, and lives. He basically told the General that he wanted to hammer North Vietnam while simultaneously convincing the American public that he wouldn't be expanding the war.​
4. Quantity and Proficiency in Conventional Warfare: I'm not sure how large our conventional stockpile was by 1964-65 compared to the Korean War, but there were numerous cases where there were arms shortages. Additionally, it seemed there was just a lot of personnel who didn't seem to understand the nuances of conventional warfare in the nuclear age.​
5. Lack of Creativity in Counter-Insurgency Operations: While that doesn't require much, there was some kind of idea that involved a General (Blackburn?) who wanted to train hatchet-forces. mikewint mikewint , mentioned this before, and it largely fell by the wayside because the Ambassador in Laos. Whether Mike explained this before or not, I'm not sure if this occurred during LBJ or JFK's time in office, and why Johnson didn't simply replace the Ambassador if he didn't comply with his demands.​
GrauGeist GrauGeist & X XBe02Drvr : Your thoughts?
 
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One would think, but when it came to that period -- you had people keeping secrets from each other and withholding stuff now and then.

By 1960-61, the split was public, with each nation verbally attacking the other at a conference in Bucharest in Nov 1960. By 1962, China had broken off diplomatic relations with the USSR.
 
By 1960-61, the split was public, with each nation verbally attacking the other at a conference in Bucharest in Nov 1960. By 1962, China had broken off diplomatic relations with the USSR.
Okay, so there was a negative relationship with the USSR & China even prior to 1965?
 
Okay, so there was a negative relationship with the USSR & China even prior to 1965?

Yes. I had to use Wiki to confirm the dates I remembered from classes, but it started unfolding in the late 50s and by 1962 was very big news. The Wiki article I used to confirm my remembered dates is a fairly concise and accurate article in my opinion. Even a broken clock, etc etc, heh.

Pertinent particularly to this thread is the following paragraph:

Geopolitically, despite their querulous "Maoism vs. Marxism–Leninism" disputes about interpretations and practical applications of Marxism-Leninism, the USSR and the PRC advised, aided, and supplied North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, which Mao had defined as a peasant revolution against foreign imperialism. In socialist solidarity, the PRC allowed safe passage for the Soviet Union's matériel to North Vietnam to prosecute the war against the US-sponsored Republic of South Vietnam.

So while they were having an open, public spat, both nations not only supported North Vietnam, China co-operated materially by allowing transit for Soviet arms.

As was noted above, it's complicated.
 
So while they were having an open, public spat, both nations not only supported North Vietnam, China co-operated materially by allowing transit for Soviet arms.
So, there would have been a concern by some that the USSR would have joined in if the war was taken into China? Was it valid or not?
 
So, there would have been a concern by some that the USSR would have joined in if the war was taken into China? Was it valid or not?

There's no way to know what concerns are valid for a situation that never happened, is there ?

My take at the time was a lot of people in the military, and civilians, thought the rift between the USSR and China was all a charade put on to encourage the USA and NATO, etc, to lower their state of readiness. Just my opinion.
 
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So, there would have been a concern by some that the USSR would have joined in if the war was taken into China? Was it valid or not?

That's not my reading at all. I don't think either USSR or China wanted to be involved with boots, inside VN, or in an invasion of China. Nor do I think any American strategist thought going into southern China was a good idea. Probably because it ain't.

I think China was willing to support Vietnam for 1) Comintern optics of helping a peasant country out and 2) (and more importantly!) they once again did not want an American army up on their borders. North Vietnam meant something to them as a buffer state, just as DPRK did in 1950.

The USSR supported NVN because 1) they could show they were just as friendly as the Chinese, and 2) Vietnamese ports could prove useful, if the Soviets could extend their navy down there for power-politics purposes, not military purposes.

As happens many times in history, the interests of two nations overlap but do not coincide. So they set aside differences for each their own reasons, none of which had to do with actually deploying forces against Americans troops.
 
I've read (can't remember where) that North Vietnam wanted closer ties to the U.S.S.R than China. It was precisely because of the shared border with China. "Better to smell Russian stuff than to eat Chinese stuff". I was paraphrasing.
 
I've read (can't remember where) that North Vietnam wanted closer ties to the U.S.S.R than China. It was precisely because of the shared border with China. "Better to smell Russian stuff than to eat Chinese stuff". I was paraphrasing.

I can imagine they'd feel that way, much like the Caribbean island-nations felt about us Americans after the Banana Wars, or Poland vis-a-vis Russia or Germany. It's pretty hard to trust the giant on your doorstep.
 
There's no way to know what concerns are valid for a situation that never happened, is there ?
I can imagine they'd feel that way, much like the Caribbean island-nations felt about us Americans after the Banana Wars, or Poland vis-a-vis Russia or Germany. It's pretty hard to trust the giant on your doorstep.

We may forget Vietnam's history , but they don't .
They fought for independence from China several different times in their history.
They were more than just a little wary of China.
They'd never been invaded by Russia.
 
China (like the USSR) wanted a buffer zone along its border, in order to help prevent being invaded again. China figured it was safe from invasion by anti-communist regimes via the overland routes through Russia, Manchuria, and through the Himalayas.

The Korean War was an attempt to remove one base (ie South Korea) from the equation, a route of invasion used by the Japanese before WWII.

After the Japanese occupied/invaded Indochina at the start of WWII, Japan used it for a base of operations that greatly increased their ability to prosecute the war against the forces of Mao, Chang, and Ho - to the point that it was feared that the Japanese would be able to cut off the resistance and destroy any major organized threat.

After WWII and the rearrangement of the bordering states, China realized that it was in the same position as before the war, but with a much bigger and more capable potential invader (ie the US and others).

The prevention of a US friendly state (ie a US puppet state) in Vietnam that could be used for operations and invasion of southern China (as Japan had used it in WWII) was of significant importance. At some point in the 1960s China made it quite clear to Johnson that a border state that was subservient to an openly declared enemy of communist China (the US) was not acceptable.

At some point during Operation Linebacker 2, it was communicated to Nixon (by our CIA and DIA) that North Vietnam would be out of AA missiles within a week, and only a little longer than 2 weeks to run out of AAA projectiles larger than 57mm. If this happened it was believed (with high confidence) that North Vietnam would have to surrender/sue for peace/? shortly there after.

The mining of the harbors (including the most recent mining of Haiphong) had stopped ~all resupply of heavy war materials. And by that point in time China was no longer allowing Russia to send material through China.

However, the unwillingness of China to accept a hostile border state was re-communicated to Nixon during the early seventies "most strongly", and it was believed by our intelligence agencies that China would most likely become a main actor in the war by invading North Vietnam.

This is most likely a basis for the ending of the war in the form that it took (ie the US sitting back and not supporting South Vietnam - in breach of promise - during North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam in 1975).
 
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We may forget Vietnam's history , but they don't .
They fought for independence from China several different times in their history.
They were more than just a little wary of China.
They'd never been invaded by Russia.

It's very easy for us Americans to overlook that. We don't really understand what it means to live next to a giant, because we are the giant, in our neck of the woods. We haven't suffered that sort of insecurity.

Vietnam and China were shooting at each other in late 78 -- early 79, and currently there are big problems looming with China's building artificial bases and claiming sovereign sea rights over fishing grounds. This history of distrust you lay out above is ongoing.

During the war, of course, they took help where they could get it.
 
There's no way to know what concerns are valid for a situation that never happened, is there?
I was curious what the JCS, intelligence guys, and the politicians thought at the time, and what was actually valid (we have the luxury of knowing things they didn't know back then).
My take at the time was a lot of people in the military, and civilians, thought the rift between the USSR and China was all a charade put on to encourage the USA and NATO, etc, to lower their state of readiness. Just my opinion.
So a lot of people didn't believe the rift was all that serious, and if anything happened to China, the USSR would respond aggressively?

That's not my reading at all. I don't think either USSR or China wanted to be involved with boots, inside VN, or in an invasion of China. Nor do I think any American strategist thought going into southern China was a good idea. Probably because it ain't.
General LeMay did want to take his B-52's into China to hammer Lop Nor.
 

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