Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
So INO it is neither true to say she was a dud, or a paper tiger, nor is true to claim she was unstoppable, or vastly superior to her allied contemporaries. She was a great ship, with great power, but she had weaknesses just like any other ship...
These ideas can be challanged from very many perspectives.
[A] ammo tactics:
shell technology
[C] torpedo damage
In addition to serious shell damage, LÜTZOW received a torpedohit in the bow by HMS FALMOUTH 18:25 from 5,500 yards which compromised the watertight integrity of the adjacent sections. Altough J. Campbell refuses this hit (without discussing it or citing evidence against it) in his outstanding book, it was claimed by both, FALMOUTH and surviving crewmembers of SMS LÜTZOW to have struck the bow. Correspondingly, it appears in the german post Jutland discussion of the damage received by LÜTZOW.
[D] damage distribution
The damage distribution of the ship greatly enhances flooding of the bow. Successive damage to the principal holding bulkhead was caused by an attempt to flee the area of fighting with a speed faster than was advisable after the flooding had been brought under controll already.
I'd have to say this is making a virtue of a weakness. Seydlitz's survival was trigger thin and luck (and sea state) played a large factor in her survival. Another factor in her survival appears to have been lack of flooding above the main armor deck. Yes….underwater torpedo rooms were common to most pre and WW1 designs. Emphasizing my point, modern BB's post Nelson class pretty much eliminated this feature because they were viewed increasingly as a weak point in a capital ship's underwater defensive scheme while the chances of successfully torpedoing another BB were slim to none.[E] large torpedo flat
The large torpedo flat actually saved SEYDLITZ. It didn´t doomed LÜTZOW but worked against it but when undamaged as in case of SEYDLITZ, it provided enough buoyancy reserve to keep the bow aflot, while the rest of it is already subject to flooding. This design feature is common to all period BB´s and BC´s, not just german ones.
Finally, the idea to provide armour protection to the bow as well is a rather good idea by ww2 standarts. Altough no BB scale protection has been applied. The example of BISMARK at Denmark Street when hit by a british 14in APC in the bow demonstrates that the projectile went through the 60mm Wh inclined armoured plating, through 20mm deck and exited the other side through the Wh armour plating without detonating.
A note on the displacement of the battleships considered.
Off all BB´s laid down after the end ww1, only the NELSON-class, the SHARNHORST-class and the DUNKERQUE-class adhered to the 35,000 ts stand. limit.
All other BB´s did not.
You may quibble about the margin but there is little difference how LITTORIO, RICHELIEU and BISMARCK
ended up with (in within about 1,000 ts to each other) and the difference to KING GEORGE V as completed in standart tonnes is in within only 3,650 ts.(38,030 ts stand. as opposed to 41,673 ts stand.) The two US fast BB´s fall in between them but more closer to the first group than to the british BB, this means that the distance in displacement towards BISMARCK is in all but the case of KING GEORGE V much narrower than to the official limit of 35,000 ts stand, which was not adhered by them except for the classes mentioned above.
A note on the displacement of the battleships considered.
Off all BB´s laid down after the end ww1, only the NELSON-class, the SHARNHORST-class and the DUNKERQUE-class adhered to the 35,000 ts stand. limit.
All other BB´s did not.
You may quibble about the margin but there is little difference how LITTORIO, RICHELIEU and BISMARCK ended up with (in within about 1,000 ts to each other) and the difference to KING GEORGE V as completed in standart tonnes is in within only 3,650 ts.(38,030 ts stand. as opposed to 41,673 ts stand.) The two US fast BB´s fall in between them but more closer to the first group than to the british BB, this means that the distance in displacement towards BISMARCK is in all but the case of KING GEORGE V much narrower than to the official limit of 35,000 ts stand, which was not adhered by them except for the classes mentioned above.
The USN viewpoint was considered by Friedman to take a longer view on the future of naval warfare in which ranges would open up (as they did at Jutland compared to pre-WWI expectations) and where Capital Ships would be threatened by bigger, improved shells capable of disabling/crippling such a warship with a few penetrative blows. Without resorting to ships of huge displacement, the only logical recourse was to do what the USN did…maximize armor over the vitas at the expense of non-vital areas. Post WWI other navies such as the UK had to go the same way, even more so in the light of naval treaties that limited maximum displacement. The German ships were stoutly built and well armored but in light of Cambell's analysis it was also equally apparent that the UK defective shells played an equal and vital role in the survival of the German ships that were heavily hit. Proper 'Greenboy' type shells by the UK would have made the medium and light armors of the German ships more a liability vs. an asset. USN experience vs costal defenses are cited by Friedman as supporting USN views on damage to unarmored portions of the ship.
There are different figures aviable. KGV´s design was finalized with a design standart weight of 36,730 ts, such as suggested by the source You mentioned. This in fact means that it was designed (and thus intended) to become a treaty violation. However, when completed, she was measured to be slightly over 38,000 ts standart and I took this figure to be representative. It can be found in Garzke Dulin as well as in other sources. The displacement then went up to more than 39,000 ts stand. due to wartime additions.
Correspondingly, WASHINGTON´s design displacement was 36,600 ts stand. This is not the displacement when she was completed. It also should be stressted that US definitions of standart weight used by measuring the ships when commissioned (only partly equipped, lacking RPC and firecontroll gears) would not be tolerated by britishor german officials. There is no need to overblow the case, You know- everyone cheated a bit here.
.
I'd say the larger factor here that worked in favor of Bismarck was the narrow width of the bow. Fortunately the shell worked correctly in regards AP.
Campbell does state the claimed torpedo hit was incorrect. If Campbell dismisses it however I by default remain skeptical as to the validity of this alleged hit. I've seen no other source suggest it.
There are different figures aviable. KGV´s design was finalized with a design standart weight of 36,730 ts, such as suggested by the source You mentioned. This in fact means that it was designed (and thus intended) to become a treaty violation. However, when completed, she was measured to be slightly over 38,000 ts standart and I took this figure to be representative. It can be found in Garzke Dulin as well as in other sources. The displacement then went up to more than 39,000 ts stand. due to wartime additions.
Then it´s still a design factor of the ship and that´s my point. The long -for the period- waterline belt terminated not far away fromt the bow, where the hull was narrowed down a lot, correctly as You say. This made a habit of using the a-o-n principles of period projectiles (and more concrete, it´s fuse delay) against them. A shorter citadel couldn´t have done the same thing. Armour at the bow- as long as it isn´t strong enough to apprciably slow the projectile down in penetration may fuse it without consequences in a way of provoking inboard high order detonations. The hull there is narrow enough to "allow" some armour without compromising a-o-n principles and the projectile likely exits it before it has a chance to go up high order.
He sais so. But he also knows about it and that it was claimed officially by FALMOUTH in his narrative. What he doesn´t do- and that puzzles me- is giving details to it or a discussion why he comes to his quite substantial reconsideration of the validity of the hit. He doesn´t cite any sources against it and he doesn´t explain why.
These projectiles -even if big like the british 15in ones- hardly are able to penetrate medium (half calibre) armour in a condition fit to burst at any obliquity. But they do wreac havoc in soft parts of the ship. So for most of the "future conflict", which by the point of view from 1911 design environment of this class certainly was not world war 2 but the GREAT WAR to come, the scheme adopted was inadeaquate and weigth inefficient (in fact, thinner armour but larger coverage would project effective protection against period projectiles over a larger area of the whole ship, thus improving it).
I don´t think that Friedmann explains the -for the period- heavy deck armour of this class either. While longer ranges were expected, the NEVADA class and it´s successor were given guns limited to an elevation with 15 degrees, which renders any deck penetration through plating larger than splinter protection rather impossible (the fuses do not make it intactly through by ww2 some navies introduced special graze fuse sensitivity to adress this problem, which were intended to work at obliquities larger than 70 degrees but neither of them worked reliably in service).
After reading Campbell multiple times, I don´t confess that Your assess with the GREENBOY shell is correct.
Altough it may have been desirable to have it, it doesn´t remove the medium armour problem. This projectile still had a defective fuse with a very unpredictable fuse delay. Exact ballictic test for the projectile with an inert filler were good but service tests with armed shells returned disappointing results, ranging from instantious to ultra long fuse delay randomly when hitting under identic conditions, compare the BADEN trials of 1921 well after the end of ww1.
In Jutland these shells would have increased damage in some cases and reduced damage in other cases. You can roll a dice for the result, it´s a random function.
[/quote]What really would have helped the british side, and Campbell is explicit in stating this multiple times, would be a more stable propellant to prevent or delay catastrophic magazine conflagrations such as experienced by at least five large british warships in the battle.
Who exactly in the Kreigsmarine hierachy didn't think that carriers had a place in modern warfare? I mean, didn't they see the RN building carriers, the USA building carriers, even the IJN? With such an emphasis on the Luftwaffe and divebombing in the 30s I would think that they would incorporated aircraft with their surface fleet more substantially.