Agreed.
Ark Royal vs Bismark
- Thread starter pinsog
- Start date
Agreed.
Hi,
Pre-WWI, and arguably, during WWI, incremental armor designs had merit from several angles. Factors included expected range, rate of fire of main armaments, and quality of AP shells and a persisting faith in the power/virtue of HE type shells. Lastly UK shells pre-Jutland proved to be even more unreliable than the UK figured (except to John Jellicoe) thx to oversensitive bursters and the use of Lyddite.
The USN viewpoint was considered by Friedman to take a longer view on the future of naval warfare in which ranges would open up (as they did at Jutland compared to pre-WWI expectations) and where Capital Ships would be threatened by bigger, improved shells capable of disabling/crippling such a warship with a few penetrative blows. Without resorting to ships of huge displacement, the only logical recourse was to do what the USN did…maximize armor over the vitas at the expense of non-vital areas. Post WWI other navies such as the UK had to go the same way, even more so in the light of naval treaties that limited maximum displacement. The German ships were stoutly built and well armored but in light of Cambell's analysis it was also equally apparent that the UK defective shells played an equal and vital role in the survival of the German ships that were heavily hit. Proper 'Greenboy' type shells by the UK would have made the medium and light armors of the German ships more a liability vs. an asset. USN experience vs costal defenses are cited by Friedman as supporting USN views on damage to unarmored portions of the ship.
Campbell does state the claimed torpedo hit was incorrect. If Campbell dismisses it however I by default remain skeptical as to the validity of this alleged hit. I've seen no other source suggest it. Agreed that Lutzow's maintaining of high speed too long contributed to her loss.
I'd say the larger factor here that worked in favor of Bismarck was the narrow width of the bow. Fortunately the shell worked correctly in regards AP.
Pre-WWI, and arguably, during WWI, incremental armor designs had merit from several angles. Factors included expected range, rate of fire of main armaments, and quality of AP shells and a persisting faith in the power/virtue of HE type shells. Lastly UK shells pre-Jutland proved to be even more unreliable than the UK figured (except to John Jellicoe) thx to oversensitive bursters and the use of Lyddite.
The USN viewpoint was considered by Friedman to take a longer view on the future of naval warfare in which ranges would open up (as they did at Jutland compared to pre-WWI expectations) and where Capital Ships would be threatened by bigger, improved shells capable of disabling/crippling such a warship with a few penetrative blows. Without resorting to ships of huge displacement, the only logical recourse was to do what the USN did…maximize armor over the vitas at the expense of non-vital areas. Post WWI other navies such as the UK had to go the same way, even more so in the light of naval treaties that limited maximum displacement. The German ships were stoutly built and well armored but in light of Cambell's analysis it was also equally apparent that the UK defective shells played an equal and vital role in the survival of the German ships that were heavily hit. Proper 'Greenboy' type shells by the UK would have made the medium and light armors of the German ships more a liability vs. an asset. USN experience vs costal defenses are cited by Friedman as supporting USN views on damage to unarmored portions of the ship.
Campbell does state the claimed torpedo hit was incorrect. If Campbell dismisses it however I by default remain skeptical as to the validity of this alleged hit. I've seen no other source suggest it. Agreed that Lutzow's maintaining of high speed too long contributed to her loss.
I'd have to say this is making a virtue of a weakness. Seydlitz's survival was trigger thin and luck (and sea state) played a large factor in her survival. Another factor in her survival appears to have been lack of flooding above the main armor deck. Yes….underwater torpedo rooms were common to most pre and WW1 designs. Emphasizing my point, modern BB's post Nelson class pretty much eliminated this feature because they were viewed increasingly as a weak point in a capital ship's underwater defensive scheme while the chances of successfully torpedoing another BB were slim to none.
I'd say the larger factor here that worked in favor of Bismarck was the narrow width of the bow. Fortunately the shell worked correctly in regards AP.
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I wouldn't call it quibbling and Scharnhorst and Dunkerque were not 35,000 ton designs. Scharnhorst was originally slated to be 26,000 tons, which in 35 was increased to 31,053 as issues surfaced. While the USN and UK's final completed 35k battleships did exceed the set limit (Standard displacement) they were largely compliant while in the German and Italian case, the design requirement flagerantly dispensed with the design requirement. (Bismarck "design" was finalized at 41,000 tons for example but crept up to 44,734 on completion)
Scharnhorst - 1934 design 26,000 tons
1935 mod 31,053(31,132) GN
full load displacement /37,224/37,303 Scharnhorst 39,019 war overload 1943
Bismarck - 44,734 design 49,628 battle load (48,626 full)
KGV 38,031 standard 42,237 full load (1940)
PoW 44,786 full load
North Carolina 36,600 standard 44,800 full load
(1942)
South Dakota
38,664 tons standard (44,519 full load) (34,563 light ship)
Iowa (45,000 ton escalator clause invoked)
48,425 standard 57540 full
In the French case, the design displacement of 37,832 did baloon to 42,875 under normal load conditions, 47,721 full load.
U.S. battleships: an illustrated design history, By Norman Friedman, p278 states the standard displacement of KGV as 36,730 tons and Washington as 36,600 tons. I'm sure that all ships gained weight as the war progressed.
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delcyros
Tech Sergeant
There are different figures aviable. KGV´s design was finalized with a design standart weight of 36,730 ts, such as suggested by the source You mentioned. This in fact means that it was designed (and thus intended) to become a treaty violation. However, when completed, she was measured to be slightly over 38,000 ts standart and I took this figure to be representative. It can be found in Garzke Dulin as well as in other sources. The displacement then went up to more than 39,000 ts stand. due to wartime additions.
Correspondingly, WASHINGTON´s design displacement was 36,600 ts stand. This is not the displacement when she was completed. It also should be stressted that US definitions of standart weight used by measuring the ships when commissioned (only partly equipped, lacking RPC and firecontroll gears) would not be tolerated by britishor german officials. There is no need to overblow the case, You know- everyone cheated a bit here.
The displacement of BISMARCK given above by NIKEDAMIUS refers to her post AVKS upgrade state in 1940 with metric tons (stand. is measured in long tons as You know, which is a bit less), neither how she was designed (intended to be with 41,670 ts) nor how she was completed (B&V measurings). The case of TIRPITZ also shows that the weight of this class massively grew in wartime.
Correspondingly, WASHINGTON´s design displacement was 36,600 ts stand. This is not the displacement when she was completed. It also should be stressted that US definitions of standart weight used by measuring the ships when commissioned (only partly equipped, lacking RPC and firecontroll gears) would not be tolerated by britishor german officials. There is no need to overblow the case, You know- everyone cheated a bit here.
The displacement of BISMARCK given above by NIKEDAMIUS refers to her post AVKS upgrade state in 1940 with metric tons (stand. is measured in long tons as You know, which is a bit less), neither how she was designed (intended to be with 41,670 ts) nor how she was completed (B&V measurings). The case of TIRPITZ also shows that the weight of this class massively grew in wartime.
tail end charlie
Senior Airman
- 615
- Aug 24, 2010
In all this discussion about armour it occurred to me that the man who fires the guns is almost in the safest part of the ship while the captain is in one of the most dangerous. A bit like putting a wing commander in a balloon above Biggin Hill to direct activities.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
These viewpoints as outlined above by N. Friedmann are difficult to share from an US Naval point of view. In fact, I remain to be highly sceptical about it´s validity in a sense of in this regard intentional engeneering at all. ut let me explain my problems with Friedmann´s thesises:
The arguments recaptured by Yourselfe circle around two points:
[A] increasing battleranges in future naval warfare.
improved future shell technology.
Note that the all-or-nothing scheme was invented by the US during the design process of the NEVADA-class, a ship from the 1912 building program, with the basic armour design finalized even late in 1911.
By that time, no Jutland experiences are aviable and the US considered decisive ranges to be 6,000 to 8,000 yards. Hardly a long range. US shell technology is poor with soft capped APC using instantious fuse delay. Most navies put emphasize on HE and common projectiles to deliver a harder blow to the enemy. These projectiles -even if big like the british 15in ones- hardly are able to penetrate medium (half calibre) armour in a condition fit to burst at any obliquity. But they do wreac havoc in soft parts of the ship. So for most of the "future conflict", which by the point of view from 1911 design environment of this class certainly was not world war 2 but the GREAT WAR to come, the scheme adopted was inadeaquate and weigth inefficient (in fact, thinner armour but larger coverage would project effective protection against period projectiles over a larger area of the whole ship, thus improving it).
I don´t think that Friedmann explains the -for the period- heavy deck armour of this class either. While longer ranges were expected, the NEVADA class and it´s successor were given guns limited to an elevation with 15 degrees, which renders any deck penetration through plating larger than splinter protection rather impossible (the fuses do not make it intactly through by ww2 some navies introduced special graze fuse sensitivity to adress this problem, which were intended to work at obliquities larger than 70 degrees but neither of them worked reliably in service).
Even if You admit ultra long term planning, how did the USN developed in ww1? Not so much in this regard, the shells stayed the same, elevation of the guns was not improved. Even after the end of ww2, it took really a while for these ships to become what Friedmann thinks the USN was planning from the begin with them:
The guns weren´t modernized until the 30´s to+30 deg. elevation, >20 years after the armour design was closed.
And US shells didn´t overcome the problems until the introduction of the VD7F variable delay fuse accepted 1928 into services, which became standart in 1931, again, 20 years after the design of the armour arrangement of NEVADA finalized.
Do You really think US designers were deliberately designing their capital ships not for THE future conflict but one in a distant future with very many variables occuring in the time in between?
And why then took it so long (almost quarter a century) to make them fit a-o-n long range doctrines?
After reading Campbell multiple times, I don´t confess that Your assess with the GREENBOY shell is correct. Altough it may have been desirable to have it, it doesn´t remove the medium armour problem. This projectile still had a defective fuse with a very unpredictable fuse delay. Exact ballictic test for the projectile with an inert filler were good but service tests with armed shells returned disappointing results, ranging from instantious to ultra long fuse delay randomly when hitting under identic conditions, compare the BADEN trials of 1921 well after the end of ww1. The japanese, which copied the MkV GREENBOY design still had the same problems during their TOSA trials with unreliable fuse delay and the much discussed diving hit, starting their own research project into diving shells appears to have been one of these faulty fuses with ultra long delay, while other shells burst on plates when penetration should be possible, indicating no fuse delay at all.
In Jutland these shells would have increased damage in some cases and reduced damage in other cases. You can roll a dice for the result, it´s a random function. I don´t think this would have helped the british side in general, the results may be different, to the worse or good, however. It should also be stressed that it was the Jutland shock to give the necessary impetus, which eventually lead to the design of this projectile family in the first place, it was not a step by step evolution.
What really would have helped the british side, and Campbell is explicit in stating this multiple times, would be a more stable propellant to prevent or delay catastrophic magazine conflagrations such as experienced by at least five large british warships in the battle.
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LOL, KGV wasn't completed until late 1940. Washington wasn't completed until mid 1941, and war started (and thus treaty restrictions ended) in Sept 1939. Of course there was weight increases due to such things as radar additions and light AA growth and other various and sundry causes, but if war had not occurred it seems likely that the treaty would have been scrupulously observed by the RN and USN as it was prior to Sept 1939.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
Then it´s still a design factor of the ship and that´s my point. The long -for the period- waterline belt terminated not far away fromt the bow, where the hull was narrowed down a lot, correctly as You say. This made a habit of using the a-o-n principles of period projectiles (and more concrete, it´s fuse delay) against them. A shorter citadel couldn´t have done the same thing. Armour at the bow- as long as it isn´t strong enough to apprciably slow the projectile down in penetration may fuse it without consequences in a way of provoking inboard high order detonations. The hull there is narrow enough to "allow" some armour without compromising a-o-n principles and the projectile likely exits it before it has a chance to go up high order.
He sais so. But he also knows about it and that it was claimed officially by FALMOUTH in his narrative. What he doesn´t do- and that puzzles me- is giving details to it or a discussion why he comes to his quite substantial reconsideration of the validity of the hit. He doesn´t cite any sources against it and he doesn´t explain why. In other cases he is very careful to explain them with range issues (5,500 yards means well inside the range of the TT) or wrong settings. But not so in this case. Therefore his rejection is based on nothing else than his athoritative (and therefore dogmatic) statement. Don´t take me wrong, I highly regard his work, other than most (even recent) books on this subject he had access to sources from both sides and spent a long time in the Bundesarchiv at Freiburg.
I have reposted a survivor statement (primary source) to this hit, found originally in the Freiburg Archive but circulated in period public press around (particularely in the english press with a bad translation and some addenda not found in it originally) from a crewmember aboard SMS LÜTZOW confiming, both place and time over there on the navweaps board some time ago but I think You may also find it online as well (at least the english translation of it) and that causes me to reiterate the question.
You have a tactically possible hit (in within the technical limitations of range, context and setting of both, the torpedo and the target ship) when one ship involved carried out a torpedo attack from quite close range and infact claimed to have hit LÜTZOW in the bow with it. And then You have surviving crewmembers from aboard the other side confirming the event. Finally, You see a damage picture which, agreed is obscured by many shell hits but not in contradiction to this event. If anything, it would have supported the chain of events.
-and then Campbell comes with one sentence dismissing the event without explaining why these sources should be ignored. I am not statisfied with this reconsideration and in fact, it rings some bells in my head.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
Turret weight, triple and twin ones.
My two cents on the issue.
I consider it problematic to compare inter national turret designs owing to different engeneering solutions behind. A weight comparison should at least stay in the same national ballpark.
Based upon the known weights for turrets, including their revolving structure below, the mounts and armour plates (but NOT the barbette and it´s associated weight or the ammunition weight of the magazine below) I found a not so worse fitting curve, attached below.
Judging from it, let´s take a hypothetical test 38cmL50 twin turret (I don´t want to obscure our example with real turrets from BADEN or BISMARCK, it should only be treated as an example), the red curve shows that it would weight in about 1,000 metric tons each. That makes for 4,000 ts for a four turretted, eight gun battery.
It´s a simple example so far, if You both agree so far, I will continue to extrapolate the weight for a corresponding german 38cmL50 triple turret.
My two cents on the issue.
I consider it problematic to compare inter national turret designs owing to different engeneering solutions behind. A weight comparison should at least stay in the same national ballpark.
Based upon the known weights for turrets, including their revolving structure below, the mounts and armour plates (but NOT the barbette and it´s associated weight or the ammunition weight of the magazine below) I found a not so worse fitting curve, attached below.
Judging from it, let´s take a hypothetical test 38cmL50 twin turret (I don´t want to obscure our example with real turrets from BADEN or BISMARCK, it should only be treated as an example), the red curve shows that it would weight in about 1,000 metric tons each. That makes for 4,000 ts for a four turretted, eight gun battery.
It´s a simple example so far, if You both agree so far, I will continue to extrapolate the weight for a corresponding german 38cmL50 triple turret.
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parsifal
Colonel
I often daydream a bit to think what might have happened if the Germans had not attempted to build a battleship navy. Specifically I consider the following to be interesting possibilities
1) The Germans did not build their Bismarck class, and instead used these resources to build carriers and light escorts, such as the Type M Light Cruisers. Very roughly speaking, the cost per tonne for battleship construction is roughly twice as great as carrier construction
2) The Germans embarked on a true carrier development program from 1932, and allowed their FAA to develop unfettered.
This would realistically mean the germans would go to war with four carriers, each carrying around 50 aircraft (with wing folding. The operational types would probably be Me 109T (with folding wings), Fi167 and Ju87T
3) The existing Light Cruisers were sold, and replaced by more heavily built true Light cruisers with long range, relatively light weight main armament (say 6 x 6in), and an efficient AA suite
4) The heavy cruisers were built along th lines of the Spees, but with 8" guns. This type of ship might be armed with 6 x 8", have a displacement of around 17000 T, and be armoured better than the Spees. They would have a range of around 12000 NM, and a top sped of just under 30 Knots.
4) The destroyersd were built with long range tanks, lighter armament and a DP AA weapon. This would probably have meant AA destroyers with long range and better sea keeping abilities. Typically I would see German DDs armed with 4 or 5 x 4.1 and a range of 6-8000 NM. These ships might have a effective sea speed of around 28 knots, have much reduced top weight and a torpedo brioadside of at least 8 x 21in
5) With this sort of force structure and with the same expenditure of resources as historicali, I can see the germans going to war with three or four carriers, the two Scharhorsts, the Pocket battleshipss , probably 5 heavy cruisers and about 10 Type Ms. The germans would probably have about 40 Long range destroyeres
The quid pro Quo is that the British would not build their KGVs. Roughly this would enable them to build a further 10 Light carriers with air groups, and to modernize the FAA equipment. The RN would go to war with something like the rejected Gloster fighter design, a better development of the Skua, and some development of the Albacore.Because of the age of the british battlefleet, the british would probably be forced to build at least two of its KGVs
This would have led to a totally different war, and I think, a very intersting one for the historians. Not sure if the final outcome would have been different, but I think the germans would have possessed a far greater potential for upset than following a traditional battleship strategy
1) The Germans did not build their Bismarck class, and instead used these resources to build carriers and light escorts, such as the Type M Light Cruisers. Very roughly speaking, the cost per tonne for battleship construction is roughly twice as great as carrier construction
2) The Germans embarked on a true carrier development program from 1932, and allowed their FAA to develop unfettered.
This would realistically mean the germans would go to war with four carriers, each carrying around 50 aircraft (with wing folding. The operational types would probably be Me 109T (with folding wings), Fi167 and Ju87T
3) The existing Light Cruisers were sold, and replaced by more heavily built true Light cruisers with long range, relatively light weight main armament (say 6 x 6in), and an efficient AA suite
4) The heavy cruisers were built along th lines of the Spees, but with 8" guns. This type of ship might be armed with 6 x 8", have a displacement of around 17000 T, and be armoured better than the Spees. They would have a range of around 12000 NM, and a top sped of just under 30 Knots.
4) The destroyersd were built with long range tanks, lighter armament and a DP AA weapon. This would probably have meant AA destroyers with long range and better sea keeping abilities. Typically I would see German DDs armed with 4 or 5 x 4.1 and a range of 6-8000 NM. These ships might have a effective sea speed of around 28 knots, have much reduced top weight and a torpedo brioadside of at least 8 x 21in
5) With this sort of force structure and with the same expenditure of resources as historicali, I can see the germans going to war with three or four carriers, the two Scharhorsts, the Pocket battleshipss , probably 5 heavy cruisers and about 10 Type Ms. The germans would probably have about 40 Long range destroyeres
The quid pro Quo is that the British would not build their KGVs. Roughly this would enable them to build a further 10 Light carriers with air groups, and to modernize the FAA equipment. The RN would go to war with something like the rejected Gloster fighter design, a better development of the Skua, and some development of the Albacore.Because of the age of the british battlefleet, the british would probably be forced to build at least two of its KGVs
This would have led to a totally different war, and I think, a very intersting one for the historians. Not sure if the final outcome would have been different, but I think the germans would have possessed a far greater potential for upset than following a traditional battleship strategy
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Glider
Major
Its an interesting thought. Some years ago I went to a lecture and his basic premise was that, if a ship is too important to lose then its of no practical good and simply a drain on resources.
His main time period was around 1912 when the South American countries were almost bankrupting themselves to build one Battleship when they would never have used them as they were to important to risk. The same basic rule applies to the German Navy who were not really allowed to use them if there was a chance of them being sunk.
His main time period was around 1912 when the South American countries were almost bankrupting themselves to build one Battleship when they would never have used them as they were to important to risk. The same basic rule applies to the German Navy who were not really allowed to use them if there was a chance of them being sunk.
parsifal
Colonel
The questiuons that arise from this concept are numerous. Firstly, is it a relaistic estimate of german capability, unfettered by a mania to build a battlefleet? Secondly, is it a relaistic estimate of what they might get if they exchanged their BBs for lesser warships. Thirdly if they could create such a weapon, how best to use it?
Glider
Major
The first thing to do would be decide the limits of what you want to achieve. Personally I would ditch any idea of operating surface ships in the N Atlantic. Its one big trap as one lucky hit would reduce the chances of getting home to almost nil. Even if the voyage is a huge success, you still have to get home and there are some obvious choke points where the RN would concentrate its vessels.
This leaves the N Sea up to Norway. I would concentrate my building on a standard average DD something like a faster Hunt with 4 x TT and 6 x 4in DP. These to be supported by LC similar to the Nurenburg but slightly larger with more AA guns.
These could be built in some numbers and be used to escort and strike at British convoys in the area. They are big enough to deal with the light forces in the area and shold the RN send anything larger would be vulnerable to AA attack.
This leaves the N Sea up to Norway. I would concentrate my building on a standard average DD something like a faster Hunt with 4 x TT and 6 x 4in DP. These to be supported by LC similar to the Nurenburg but slightly larger with more AA guns.
These could be built in some numbers and be used to escort and strike at British convoys in the area. They are big enough to deal with the light forces in the area and shold the RN send anything larger would be vulnerable to AA attack.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
Who exactly in the Kreigsmarine hierachy didn't think that carriers had a place in modern warfare? I mean, didn't they see the RN building carriers, the USA building carriers, even the IJN? With such an emphasis on the Luftwaffe and divebombing in the 30s I would think that they would incorporated aircraft with their surface fleet more substantially.
As 'completed' the USN and UK ships were only slightly above the agreed on limit of 35,000 tons, which represents to me an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the treaty. Wartime weight additions are irrelevent as at that point as the nations were at WAR, the Escalator Clause was in effect and the US and UK were fast becoming allies. In contrast the Germans (and the Italians) deliberately violated the Treaty and designed warships with a standard displacement far in excess of the 35k limit which balooned further on completion. To claim that "oh everybody cheated so its ok" is a straw man. Its akin to saying "No harm...no foul!"
Unless the shell doesn't act as you predict and in fact is set off by said armor....or if a smaller caliber shell strikes it.
I don't choose to see conspiracies just because Campbell didn't elaborate on this detail. I've seen this same kind of reverse logic used to attempt to cast doubt on other highly statistical laden works. (Clay Blair is probably the best example.) A book can only be so big. For you to expect him to fully investigate each claim of a hit with mounds of detail is unreasonable. Lots of people made claims during the war. This is an air sub-forum after all. We all know about claims made by one side and the other. Much of the time they are in fact proven to be incorrect. Just because a Lutzow survivor claims a torpedo hit the ship doesn't necessitate that it occured. (This reminds me of the Canberra controversy) I agree that Campbell's work is excellent, considered by many to be the definitive analysis of the battle. Hence i give him the benefit of the doubt regarding the claimed hit on Lutzow and his statement that it was not correct in lieu of more substantial and convincing evidence.
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Hi,
I believe i also stated that at the time around WWI, incremental armor designs still had merit because the ranges of the time and the state of AP shells, combined with a persisting belief in the value of HE shells validated them to a degree. Further, costs to field armor of the required (or at least adequate) thickness had not hit the ceiling yet in terms of overall displacement with a notable exception of deck armor whose thicknesses were on the verge of being inadequate.
Per Friedman, the logic of the A/N system was that at "Very long ranges" the principle attack device would be the AP shell which could hit anywhere on a ship. HE would be useless against heavy armor (deck or belt) so only the heaviest armor was worth using. RN practice at the time, as mentioned thought HE would be extremely effective, based on part on their observations of Tsunshima and used considerable levels of medium armor as a result. This belief was not supported by the results of Jutland same as they were for the Germans. Ranges at Jutland and in other small skirmishes also confirmed the USN forward view that battle ranges were or soon would greatly expand.
That was the whole point. The USN fielded battleships as early as 1914 with deck armor all but completely proof against any forseeable opponent. While no deck armor was penetrated at Jutland it was a very near thing on more than one occasion. Post WWI saw the victorious RN saddled with a large battlefleet that was not only worn out but now largely vulnerable. In the post WWI era the US deck schemes did not require substantial upgrading.
Your argument that USN shell technology was deficient and therefore disproves the USN's long view on protection does not make any sense to me. Did the RN's issues with it's shell techology somehow invalidate it's forward looking decision to convert to oil fuel over coal? Postwar, The RN adopted the A/N scheme as did most other nations along with deck armors greatly augmented over the WWI designs with the exceptions of the USN Standards who's deck armor was considered sufficient that subsequent and currently building designs incorporated much the same level of protection through the South Dakota I class. Built Standards did not require massive armor upgrades in the 1920's and remained first class vessels though that decade and into the 1930's. You say shell technology remained imperfect but none the less it was still substantially improved as the Baden tests also showed and nations had to react to this and build stronger, newer battleships to counter it as well as conduct expensive upgrades on those units deemed worthy of it.
Disapointing results? The Baden trials of 1921 revealed overall a much improved performance of the British AP shell. I'm sure how this disproves what i wrote? The shells among other things directly penetrated the frontal glasis of one of Baden's turret's...a clean penetration.(13 3/4 inch) True it burst while 2/3rd through the armor but the nose ended up inside the turret and considerable damage was done to the roller path as a result. Another cleanly penetrated the 13 3/4 barbette armor of X Turret. Another penetrated cleanly the 10in upper belt at a 14.5 degree angle, and burst 38 feet later against the funnel casing, having also gone through a 1.2in bulkhead and a 1/2 inch deck along the way. The boiler room below ended up being sprayed with fragments. The 14inch conning tower did resist a hit at a 30 degree angle. IIRC, only 3 UK shells penetrated heavy armor at Jutland. Had they used Greenboys, they might very well have disabled and/or sunk more German captial ships. Conversely, had the Germans focused on AP vs AP/HE mixtures, they might have gotten better results as well as only in two cases did the shells burst inside properly. The others all burst while either holing or displacing armor. With more stable powder and flash protection, it's possible none of the British BC's would have been result under such a perfomance. [DK Brown - Grand Fleet]
Brown also goes on to state that the Baden trials showed that the new British shells would penetrate thick armor and the new fuses made possible bursts up to 40 feet beyond the point of impact. They don't seem too defective to me.
The Japanese motivaiton for developing the Type 91 was indeed their observations regarding the potential threat of diving shells. They were the only nation to actively pursue this and deploy a shell designed to do so. Seperate issue.
No, it isn't. A shell has it's greatest chance to do damage if it cleanly penetrates armor and bursts inside. This was the true lesson of Tsunshima, and that of Jutland. A shell that bursts outside of armor expends most of it's energy outside leaving the vitals intact. Structural damage may result and you might eventually disable the ship but in general it will take far more of these types of hits in comparison to shells that are penetrating vitals protected by heavy armor.
[/quote]
Cambell was explicit in stating that the UK was lucky that more of it's barbettes and turrets were not penetrated given the tendancy for it's powder to ignite violently. The USN, as far back as the immediate post Jutland era was correct in pointing out that it was the powder and it's handling arrangements that were of most importance in the loss of the 3 British BC's, not the armor arrangement. This didn't change it's viewpoint on the All or Nothing concept...in fact it validated it in conjunction with better damage control and powder handling arrangements. (for example the use of flash tight baffles inside magazines.) Jutland also did not result in a major modification of the USN A/N scheme in the Standard class BB's because they it already maximized armor in those critical locations.
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parsifal
Colonel
A better question was who in the KM did see a role for carriers.The provision of carriers in the "Z" Plan was one of its weakest aspects. I think by 1946 it called for only two to be added to a fleet that if allowed to grow unchallenged, would have otherwise have eclipsed most other navies.
The Germans suffered from a number of problems in the development of carriers and carrier aviation. The first was a complete lack of design experience. This was reflected in their Graf Zeppelin which was a mish mash of contradictory ideas and suffered as a design because the Germans were unable to grasp what was important in carrier design and what wasnt. Though there was a slow and gradual increase in interest in carriers, there never was a "guderian of the Navy" to take hold of the issue and run with it. KM leadership was very conservative, and in their procurement policy this was reflected in their mania to stick with what they knew...They knew battleships, so thats what they wanted to build.....they also knew subs, and pursued a policy of submarine development. My opinion is that during WWI they never really got the cruiser or destroyer requirements wuite right, and this carried forward (with different problems) into WWII. Destroyers for example were probably too light in WWI, there appears to have been a reaction in Post War, and the result was that German DDs were grossly over-armed, over complex, to the point they were barely seaworthy. In cruiser development there were a plethora of problems....the Nurnbergs were too light, the Spees suffered a poor armour layout, the Hippers were too short ranged.
In respect of carriers, the second problem was the aircraft control issue. Goring controlled all the major airborne assets, and refused for a long time to put much effort into carrier aircraft development, and refused to give up even the tactical control of carrier borne assets. This would have had to be addressed in order for the germans to have any hope of developing carriers.
If the Germans had built carriers, they would have had the opportunity to expeiment with how to use them...ie as their primary strike weapon, not as a support element to the battle line, and much more than just a scouting element. They would have reaqlized the value of grouping carriers over having a single carrier working by itself. I believe that carrier task forces were within the grasp of the germans to develop, and these making short foreays into the western approaches, to dislocate the defences, and allow U-Boats into the Convoys once so dislocated, would have just about brought England to her knees, unless the Brits developed an effective counter in the pre-war period....ie carriers of their own, with more competent aCAGs and aircraft types.
Don't see how things could have turned out much differently. According to James Corum, Raeder the CiC of the Kreigsmarine was a firm believer in the primacy of the battleship in war and that it was he who convinced Hitler regarding this on the basis of International prestige being identical to the scale of it's naval strength. The weakness of the Z-plan was that it was meant to be completed by 1947. War came far earlier than Raeder and co. were told. Four carriers were preposed under the plan but their exact role was vague....being more "prestige" items than anything else. Priority for CV's was actually below that of CL's.
Interestingly, it was the Luftwaffe, not the KM that was responsible for most of the naval aviation and naval air doctrine development. It only grew slowly however from 1936 - 39 (for example by 37 there were only four coastal airgroups in service) A protocol signed between the navy and the Luftwaffe in Jan of 1939 specified that the KM would have it's own air arm by 1941, consisting of 9 x long distance squadrons, 18 coastal recon squadrons, *12 carrier squadrons* and two onboard observation squadrons. The navy's point of view [per Corum] was that naval avaition's primary role was to serve as a patrol and recon force, and an auxillary arm of the fleet vs. a true striking force.
A major problem re: strike force was the lack of reliable air dropped torpedo, it not having been developed by the late 1930's. Eventually much of these would be supplied by the Italians, contriubting to a torpedo shortage on their part.
A completed carrier or two might have made things more lively for the RN but ultimately they had the assets to counter it.
Interestingly, it was the Luftwaffe, not the KM that was responsible for most of the naval aviation and naval air doctrine development. It only grew slowly however from 1936 - 39 (for example by 37 there were only four coastal airgroups in service) A protocol signed between the navy and the Luftwaffe in Jan of 1939 specified that the KM would have it's own air arm by 1941, consisting of 9 x long distance squadrons, 18 coastal recon squadrons, *12 carrier squadrons* and two onboard observation squadrons. The navy's point of view [per Corum] was that naval avaition's primary role was to serve as a patrol and recon force, and an auxillary arm of the fleet vs. a true striking force.
A major problem re: strike force was the lack of reliable air dropped torpedo, it not having been developed by the late 1930's. Eventually much of these would be supplied by the Italians, contriubting to a torpedo shortage on their part.
A completed carrier or two might have made things more lively for the RN but ultimately they had the assets to counter it.
