August 19, 1942

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Part III

The Codebooks

To apply the Kurzsignale, the Kriegsmarine used several different codebooks. The two most important codebooks were the Kurzsignalheft for all kinds of operational messages, and the Wetterkurzschlussel for weather reports. The Kurzsignalheft contained tables that converted sentences into four-letter groups. All kinds of expressions in many different topics were listed. Logistic matters such as refueling and rendez-vous with supply ships, positions and grid lists, names of harbors, countries, weapons, weather conditions, enemy positions and ships, date and time tables. All possible situations and topics were listed. Another codebook contained the Kenngruppen and Spruchschlussel, resp key identification and message key, that is the start position to the rotors of the Enigma. The codebooks were printed on special paper with red, water soluble, ink . If the codebooks could be captured, they were destroyed by throwing them into water.
Composition of the Kurzsignale

"It is best to try and explain the operation of Kurzsignale, using as an example a Short Message, encoded with the 1944 edition of the Kurzsignalheft. This edition was more complex than the previous alpha and beta versions. The Kurzsignalheft 44 consisted of two parts, Heft I and II. Heft I contained the Satzbuch or sentence book, to convert sentences into four-figure groups, and the Schlusselzahltafel or key number table. Heft II, called Buchgruppenheft, was used to convert four-number groups into four-letter words. In addition, to sign messages or identify other U-boats in a message, the Kriegsmarine used a codebook called Marinefunknamenliste or Naval Callsign List. This was a list with all existing U-boats and trigrams, three letter words, assigned to each U-boat. Unfortunately for the Kriegsmarine, the more complex 1944 edition didn't came into service on time to change the odds for the decimated U-boat fleet in the Atlantic."

The Kriegsmarine transmission procedures and message format were different from the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe. The key sheets for the Enigma settings were also different. Importantly, Heer and Luftwaffe messages were largely solved by april 1942. With the introduction of the beta code methods, KM and uboats coding procedures remained a mystery for 10 months longer, and attempts to break this code had nothing to do with Dieppe.

The Wehrmacht used one table with rotors, ring settings, plugs for each day of a given month. The Kriegsmarine used various code sheets. The Kriegsmarine TRITON code sheets consisted of two parts.

The first sheet, called Schlusseltafel M Algemein - Innere Einstellung, contained the three rotors and their ring settings, the thin beta or gamma rotor and the reflector, and this for all odd days of a whole month. The second sheet, called Schlusseltafel M Algemein - Aussere Einstellung, contained the plugs and Grundstellung or start position for each day of the month.

The Kriegsmarine Sonderschlussel M, used for private conversations between the Commander of the U-Boat Fleet and a particular U-boat, had a special key sheet with only three inner settings, and three plugboard settings, each for a period of ten days, and a list of Spruchschlussel or message keys, designated by a code word. The Sonderschlussel M was similar to the Schlusseltafel M Offizier from TRITON. Examples of the Kriegsmarine keys on.

In order to prepare the message for transmission, the operator had to encipher the message with the Enigma cipher machine. The internal settings and plugboard of the Enigma would already be set. The operator selected a Kenngruppe and Spruchschlussel from his Kenngruppenheft codebook. A Spruchschlussel or message key was the initial start position of the Enigma rotors prior to enciphering. The Kenngruppe was a trigram to identify the Spruchschlussel. The kenngruppenheft was a fixed codebook, which was not regularly replaced. It had three parts: The first part is the Zuteilungsliste, a table where you could find sets with ranges of numbers, according to the day an radio net. Within a range that was derrived from the table, the operator selected a figure. The second part was Teil A, where you could look-up the figure and find the Kenngruppe and Spruchschlussel behind it. The Spruchschlussel was set as startposition on the Enigma and the Kenngruppe (in our example RDF) was added (not encrypted!) at the beginning of the message to identify the Spruchschlussel. The receiving operator would look-up the Kengruppe in the third part of his codebook, Teil B, and find the figure that was related to that Kenngruppe. With this figure, he could now find the appropriate Spruchschlussel (message key) to decipher his message.

The completed message contained the following information:
a. The introduction signal (beta beta)
b. The Kenngruppe trigram, non enciphered
c. All signal groups, enciphered
d. The signature, enciphered
e. The repeated non enciphered Kenngruppe

An experienced radio operator could easily transmit this little message in morse in about 20 seconds.

At the end, the operator used 7 tables or key sheets to encipher his message! The Kurzsignalheft Heft I with its Satzbuch to convert sentences into four-figure groups and the Schlusselzahltafel to add the key number, Heft II with the Buchgruppenheft to convert the four-figure groups into four-letter groups, the Marinefunknamenliste to identify the U-boats, the two key sheets Schlusseltafel M for inner an outer settings of the Enigma machine and finally the Kenngruppenheft to select the message key. No wonder they were confident their communications were secure. Nonetheless, Allied codebreakers succeeded in breaking into the U-boats communications as you can read in Enigma and the U-boat War.

The Wetterkurzschlussel

Weather reports were vital tactical information for the Kriegsmarine, and it was through intercepts of the weather reports beginning in june 1942 that the system was eventually and initially cracked (ther was no definitive point where KM codes were finally and completely cracked….it was a never ending battle right to th end of the war). Every few hours, the U-boats had to send detailed weather reports by radio. However, each broadcast from a submarine increased the risk of detection by Allied direction finding systems. Therefore, it was important to put as much as possible information into a message that was as small as possible. The Wetterkurzschlussel or WKS did just that. Each Wetterkurzsignal consisted of 23 or 24 letters, representing a certain weather condition. Thirteen tables determined which letter or letter combination was used for a particular weather condition. These included barometric pressure, clouds, winds, visibility, rain fall and so on. Thanks to the Wetterkurzschlussel a large amount of weather variables was compressed in only a few letters.
 
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Part IV

The Kurier System

In August 1944 the Kriegsmarine began testing an experimental system called "Kurier", designed as a counter-measure against the High Frequency Direction Finding. It was a system, based on a principle now known as burst-encoding. The Kurier device was connected to a radio transmitter. The main component of Kurier was the pulsgenerator KZG 44/2, a drum with 85 small adjustable bars. Each bar represented a signal pulse. When started, an arm with a magnetic pickup element made one single rotation, passing the 85 pre-set bars. Each pulse was 1 millisecond long and there was a 3 milliseconds gap between each pulse. Together with start pulses and pauses, the complete transmission of the short message took never more than 460 milliseconds! The Kurzsignal that had to be sent was converted into Morse code. Each dot was set on the Kurier device as one puls, a dash was two pulses. Between dots and dashes there was a pause of one pulse length, and between letters two pauses. The Kurier receiver KGR-1 converted the pulses into a lightbeam that was projected on a rotating drum with photosensitive paper

The Kurier system was to be used to transmit Kurzsignalen and Wetterkurzsignalen, and combined with a complex schedule of frequency changes with frequency shifts of plus or minus 200 KHz. Each Kurier Wetterkurzsignalen was seven letters long. Each letter of the Kurzsignal stands for a value, obtained from a table in the Kurier book. For instance: if the first letter of the Wetterkurzsignal is G this means 1034 millibar. As always with kurzsignalen, each message was to be enciphered with Enigma prior to transmission with the Kurier device.
By the end of 1944 Berlin made the Kurier tests a top priority but the program was interrupted before the Kurier system was operational on the U-boat fleet. Events would finally catch up with the program and the end of the war stopped further experiments. Had the Kurier system been operational at an earlier stage of the U-boat war, it could have resulted in serious consequences. Allied intelligence would have been deprived of direction finding and monitoring kurzsignal messages. This would not only mean loss of U-boat positions but would also deprive the codebreakers in Bletchley Park from the essential cribs to break the Enigma keys, used to encrypt the Kriegsmarine message traffic. This could have changed the outcome of the war in the Atlantic.


And the above four parts is just a fraction of the overall battle
 
"... Dieppe was not the event that turned the corner so to speak."

You're reading meaning and intent into this that is not intended. No one - not me, not PB. not O'Keefe has said a word about turning any corners ... only interested in one question "Why Dieppe?". I notice that you conveniently side-step that question.

And a side-bar not mentioned until now ..... why were (many) Canadian troops carrying hand-cuffs ....? There were clear thoughts that if the mission was "successful" there were going to be "prisoners" going back to GB -- and you can bet they weren't intended to be German "grunts".

I don't care whether or not they were after enigma wheels, radar vacuum tubes, or Frau Gobbels' schnitzel receipe, Parsifal, Dieppe was a pinch raid - and the 5,000 Canadians didn't follow the RM Commando group in --- they LED. They were the tip .... of something else.

Dieppe had German Naval HQ, it had advanced radar, and it was home port to a large fleet of trawlers which were suspicious ....

As for this, Parsifal, "... I wish that i could give the canadian survivors some solace about this sad event but i cannot, at least not to say that their efforts made a huge difference n the itelligence war".

Didn't you learn anything about presumption during your service in the Navy ....?

MM
 
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The doc was good and showed the lengths the Admiralty was willing to go to pinch the material needed. It does look like the orders came from the top and were designed to get the enigma material they needed. But key to any such op was to make it look like 'the pinch' was just a lucky 'happenstance'. There were numerous occasions when KM had good reason to question enigma security , but like or not the Germans always fell back on their believe in the infallibility of the machine system. I gather that after the war the Germans were truly shocked to learn how much the allies knew, showing the misinformation campaign worked well.

To bad they had to use so many canucks to sacrifice. Next time do your own dirty work.

I wonder if there will be a book coming from this?
 
"... Dieppe was not the event that turned the corner so to speak."

You're reading meaning and intent into this that is not intended. No one - not me, not PB. not O'Keefe has said a word about turning any corners ...


O'Keefe says exactly that...he claims that dieppe was the event that turned the corner in the "enigma war". Provided it is accepted that all except the M4 issue were basically under control in 1942, he is clearly the one "reading too much into the issue". There was no progress in cracking the Kurzsignalle Beta Codes until after October, and that progress did not require thye acquisition of the M4 enigma machine

only interested in one question "Why Dieppe?". I notice that you conveniently side-step that question.

No, I am not sidestepping the issue, neither is it of great interest to me, and neither is it incumbent on me to prove that. im not the one pedalling a conspiracy theory that the war was won by the actions at Dieppe, or that Dieppe was chosen because of Intell requirements. What I am saying is that Dieppe failed to produce such results, and, more to the point was unlikely to have ever had this as its primary objective, because breaking down the front door of an enemy to get Intell in the end compromises that Intell. Finally, the stated reason by Okeef, for the raid, namely to acquire an M4 Enigma machine was not needed as the the british already possessed that technology (I( do stand corrected here....they didnt actually posses an M4 machine, but they were reading traffic generated by the M4 (by the army and the LW) well before April 1942).

And a side-bar not mentioned until now ..... why were (many) Canadian troops carrying hand-cuffs ....? There were clear thoughts that if the mission was "successful" there were going to be "prisoners" going back to GB -- and you can bet they weren't intended to be German "grunts".


In the sense that the whole operation was one big overblown raid, that doesnt surpise me. the claim being made by OKeefe is much more than that. he is claiming that significant benefits or information and equipment crucial to the oputcome of the Battle Of The Atlantic was being sought. Thats the bit i am disputing.

I don't care whether or not they were after enigma wheels, radar vacuum tubes, or Frau Gobbels' schnitzel receipe, Parsifal, Dieppe was a pinch raid - and the 5,000 Canadians didn't follow the RM Commando group in --- they LED. They were the tip .... of something else.

I agree, but thats not the claim at issue. the claim is that an Enigma M4 machine was targetted and that the raid was crucial to the outcome of the battle of the Atlantic. An M4 was not crucial at that stage, as other means and machinery were available, and the result or objectives of the raid were not critical to the outcome of the BOTA.

Dieppe had German Naval HQ, it had advanced radar, and it was home port to a large fleet of trawlers which were suspicious ..
..

And the laast thing the allies would want to do was attract attention to the fact that they were very interested in their activities. the RN had already captured a trawler/weather ship in June, and would not want to arouse any suspicion that they were very interested in these ships by blundering about in the middle of the enmy HQ, or home port. Donitz was already suspicious that his intell was compromised...the British would not want to arouse theose suspicions further.

As for this, Parsifal, "... I wish that i could give the canadian survivors some solace about this sad event but i cannot, at least not to say that their efforts made a huge difference n the itelligence war".

Didn't you learn anything about presumption during your service in the Navy ....?

What has my service got to do with anything on this issue.
 
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" .... Not that i have seen the doco.." ... but I have a predetermined opinion about it. and I don't have to see it cause I've read the reviews.

Enough said.

MM
 
I havent seen the documetary, thats true, and im only relying on one review. thats true as well. And I would even concede that the issue is not really resolved until i do rectify those problems.

However, having conceded all those points, it is not valid to conclude that I cannot criticise or make observation about these sorts of claims. i have been very specific about what it is I dont agree with, and I base that on a bit more than seeing just one documentary, or relying on just one opinion or source. I am comparing what i know or have learned from other sources, and there are many, to the small amount that I know about OKeefes work. Okeefe is known around the traps incidentally, and he does have a bit of a reputation of being a sensationalist. His claim here is very much sensationalist, and from what i know of it, Im not buying it. thats based on a lot of other source material that is in direct contravention to his claims. not all that source material is old. Some is, but that does not necessarily make it unimportant.

Things that I havent done is view the original source material, but I have read a lot from peope that were right in the thick of the Enigma war, and do have more than a few friends includig a former professor at Oxford who have specialised in this field of research. We have had many discussions over the years about the origins and progress of the enigma story. Its complex, and I no longer believe that one single point in time or event led to the allied victory. it was a complex menage pf events, but never before has the Dieppe raid been offered as a factor, much less a major factor in that story.

Im not completely dismissing the claim, but it is far from proven, on the basis of one documentary. There is simply too much very good contrary evidence to allow that claim to stand.
 
The article is not supportive of okeefe. it claims that a british radar expert was sent in to take a look at the freya radar. ive heard similar accounts, and other missions of the same kind were carried out in brittany some time previously i believe.

That is entirely plausible but unproven. The british needed the operating frequency(ies) that the freya operated on to develop effective countermeasures needed to view the equipment to determine that.

but thats an entirely different claim to the one okeefe is making. hios claims are very specific, and very unproven. Moreover every raid undertaken by the british had intell gathering as secondary objectives. It would not be unusual for Dieppe to be the same. But intell on the enigma codes and enigma machines was simply far too sensitive to risk compromising by such an overt claim as is made by okeefe
 
Ian Fleming and the 30 Assault Unit

During the Second World War, Ian Fleming — the legendary author of the James Bond spy series novels — acted as a personal assistant to Britain's head of naval intelligence, Admiral John Godfrey.

He, along with other naval intelligence specialists, created the No. 30 Commando or the 30 Assault Unit (30AU) — a team of special commandos that were put into the Dieppe operation under the unit name No. 40 Royal Marine Commando.

According to the newly-discovered files, while Fleming and the 30 AU were looking to hit various German vessels that were in Dieppe's harbour, their primary target was the German headquarters, located at Hotel Moderne near the main harbour in Dieppe.

A search plan revealed that British naval intelligence considered Hotel Moderne to be the German naval headquarters and control centre. They believed the hotel room would house Enigma coding machines and a safe with enough material regarding German war operations for the next six to eight months.

On August 18th, the 30AU was put on the British ship HMS Locust, whose mission was to breach the inner channel and deliver the Royal Marine Commando into port. Despite several attempts to reach the harbour, the unit was later sent in on landing craft that also failed to reach the main beach.

HMS Locust (T28) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Meanwhile, Fleming was located on the destroyer HMS Fernie with instructions to return to British port with any material the 30 AU unit obtained. No pinched material reached HMS Fernie and Fleming and the ship returned to Britain empty-handed.

Had the pinch raid been successful, Beal believes it would have had a substantial effect on the war.

Several months after the failed operation in Dieppe, the minds at Bletchley Park broke the code of the four-rotor Enigma machine.
 
Having now found a quiet moment to view the film, I'm intrigued about this fresh view of the raid. The use of archival documentation was impressive revealing that although some elements of the raid could have been viewed as a diversion, at least two forces are purported to have had clear roles in direct support of the pinch operation. The landing on blue beach to the east by the Royal Regiment of Canada was assigned to take out the guns protecting the harbour to allow the "Locust" to slip into the harbour to unload the pinch party. The Essex Scottish on red beach had the trawlers as objectives presumably to capture intelligence documents and equipment on board.

One disappointment I found in the documentary was that, whereas it was acknowledged in the first half that it was of utmost importance to pinch the code books, logs, and even a 4 wheel enigma without the Germans knowing these were taken, ultimately O'Keefe, at least in this 90 minute film, did not reveal archival evidence of how this would have been done. Not sure how you disguise a raid on German naval headquarters as anything but an attempt to steal intelligence. But then 15 years of research compressed into 90 minutes can not be easy an invariably something will be left out of the thesis.

I'd be interested to hear comments from reputable historians about how they view O'Keefe's findings rather than what newspapers seem to think. I've not yet read some of the links above but will do when I have some time. At the moment I'm prepared in the absence of any refuting argument to give this documentary the benefit of the doubt.
 
Its kind of odd to argue about a documentry when you've never even seen it?

We arent arguing or discussing the documentary directly. it was fed into the debate subsequent to the topics definition.

Post 1 of the Thread stated

August 19, 1942

"... The brutality of Aug. 19, 1942 is contrasted by the kindness bestowed upon the raid since, namely its designation as "a rehearsal" for D-Day. The lessons supposedly learned from the disastrous attack are easily refuted, yet are routinely used as justification for the raid. On this subject West was particularly succinct: "Since the time of the Roman legions, it's been known that there is no possibility of dislodging a well-entrenched enemy without superior fire power. I don't know of any lessons we learned at Dieppe....."


There was also a link to a rather flimsy book review unreferenced and a cutting from a populist online newspaper

At Post 6 Michael stated

I watched a new Canadian documentary on History just now .... the thesis being that, first and last Dieppe was a "pinch raid" ... to steal updated 4-rotor enigma machines, code books and 4-month code schedules from German Naval headquarters in the Hotel Modern. The pinch was to be achieved by a small commando unit formed by none other than Ian Flemming and (having failed to penetrate the port, this unit was then embedded with Royal Marine units and an attempt was made to penetrate on the beach -- it too failed. The chaos of the larger operation on 5 fronts was expected to conceal the prime objective -- local German naval intelligence - and enigma.

A 15 minute delay cost the Canadian troops the element of surprise and the cover of darkness for objective 1. It fell apart from there .

Which does kinda refine what his sources are. They are not the only sources in this issue. So, the object of the debate is not directly the doco. Its the reasons and value if any of the Dieppe raid. I dont have to see Okeefes documentary to comment on that, there are other sources, for which there are some very partisan attempts being made here to shut down th debate. Being the dumbass I am, I didnt realize this thread was a propaganda rave not designed to discuss the issue intelligently, rather an exercise in Canadian Xenophobia.

Just to be clear, this is the point I am making. I am not convinced there is good evidence that the primary mission of the Dieppe raid to capture an M4 Enigma machine. I am not convinced that the primary mission was to penetrate the (U-Boat)"Naval Headquarters" at Dieppe (which it wasnt, incidentally, that was at St Nazaire and Lorient). I am happy to concede that intell gathering of a general nature was a secondary mission for the operation. I am also happy to accept that one special op that is plausible is the gathering of information on Freya operating frequencies.

Despite all the abuse that has been hurled at me for not accepting lock stock and barrel the claims made by OKeefe, no-one has produced really good alternative evidence to support his claim. Maybe that will emerge with time as Okeefes findings are new, but until then, his claims are just that, claims, and i prefer to be cautious and stick to the mainstream history rather than run around believing every gossamer thin story and legend that people can dream up ...does not mean I wont change my view, doesnt mean I am rejecting Okeefes hypothesis. just means that there is a larger, well researched and supported body of evidence that needs some strong refuting before it just melts away to nothingness.
 
Your point about the original thread is certainly a fair one, Parsifal. An anniversary post, no more, no less.

However, your prose on this point is ... well ... vivid (trying for PURPLE here) "... Despite all the abuse that has been hurled at me for not accepting lock stock and barrel the claims made by OKeefe.."

The word I used was "fresh" to describe O'Keefe's work ... not jaw dropping or world changing or gob smacking, Fresh.

And - as stated previously - I don't care what the assets to be "pinched" were specifically - IMO they may well have been enigma operators, human assets, and they would be extracted with the RM commando. What I DO care about is knowing there was an OBJECTIVE - a purposeful objective to the raid and not just some mumbo jumbo c*ck-a-mimmi, after-the-fact story about testing German defenses. The Ian Flemming connection is not trivial or casual. Flemming never went on missions he planned - but - he was off-shore on HMS Fernie on this one. That says to me that the "catch" was very likely human. A machine or a code book wouldn't change much between capture and analysis back in the UK. But a human - might be wounded - might not survive - etc.

I am usually supportive of your lengthy, detailed rebuttals, Parsifal, but on this topic you piled on the fuel - 3 lengthy posts worth of fuel - all related to enigma. And only enigma. So you are knowledgeable about enigma - good on you, pal - but you bullied us all the way to 1944 with you enigma posts yet haven't seen the controversial documentary .... maybe ... if you were nice to Mr_C River he'd dub you a copy of the video and I'll pay postage .... :).

Chairs,

MM
 
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I do apologize Michael. i did not realize that you were posting a tribute thread. i thought that you were posting a discussion about the reasons for Dieppe, and suggesting that the reason was to gather information about enigma.

Ill get clear so you can carry on with your tribute mate
 
No need to apologize or clear out, Parsifal .... I wasn't even aware of the documentary in discussion, when I first posted the thread and then the doc showed up ....

chairs,

MM
 

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