Avenger or Dauntless

and also whats ur opinion on the better plane...dauntless or hell diver and give a few reasons why plz.

Thanks davparlr for the info on TBU . I did not know they had been produced. Have seen a photo of one and it was a good looking A/C. The Corsair was effective as a dive bomber because the landing gear was designed to be partially lowered and was used as a speed brake. It was also a steady diving beast with not a lot of retrimming necesary in the dive. If I was picking between the SBD and the TBF I would go with the SBD because of it's overall contribution during the war. Those dive bomber pilots from the Enterprise and Yorktown changed the course of the war in about 10 minutes not to mention all the other battles the SBD fought in. Of course it is well to remember that the American torpedoes left a lot to be desired until late in the war.

spitfire101 said:

ok say a duntless just drpeed its bombs, and a zero was attacing it does it have good enough likea rmor and was it able to defend itself beacause it was a dive bomber?

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Armor was improved in later models but for the most part any well placed 20mm shells would bring down any aircraft regardless of armor. The Dauntless was maneuvarable and this was a great defensive asset.

spitfire101 said:

and also whats ur opinion on the better plane...dauntless or hell diver and give a few reasons why plz.

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The Helldiver turned out to be a better aircraft but it was plagued with developmental problems. Many SBD crews who transitioned into her didn't like the the Helldiver initially. She was a big heavy and complicated machine when compared to the SBD. Once these problems were overcome by the factory or by training, the Helldiver served well as one of the last true dive bombers.

I'd take the Dauntless. It was an extraordinary part of the Pacific Theater, not to mention it's huge versatility. I saw a segment on "Dogfights" where a guy got jumped by three or four A6M's in his Dauntless. He brought down several of them (one by the other pilot ramming him), and mostly without his tailgunner who was useless due to continuous high-g turns. The pilot was transferred to a Wildcat squadron after his dogfighting talents were realized.

Aww jeeezz, he's back again

The system tells me this is way, way too long, so I am going to chop it into 3 more manageable pieces. Thought I might offer some meat to chew on in the Avenger-Dauntless debate and toss in the Helldiver as well. So, Part 1 of 3.

First of all, as I go through this I'm going to use the generic "TBF" when referring to both the TBF and the TBM, and the generic "SB2C" when referring to the S2BC and the SBW; with apologies to the purists. Secondly, I'm going to deal ONLY with US carrier operations (but including USMC VMTB carrier operations) and leave out USN/USMC land based operations (even though the SBD served, essentially, to the end of the war as a land based dive bomber after being replaced on carriers by the SB2C and numerous land-based VT and VMTB squadrons toiled diligently right up to the end). Lastly, I'm going to address the Pacific war, only, and leave out Atlantic Mediterranean operations. I'm going to walk through the combat result statistics and see what conclusions can be drawn.

As we know, there were utilized in the Pacific two types of US carrier dive bombers, the SBD and SB2C, and two types of US carrier torpedo planes, the TBD and TBF. The TBD, already approaching combat obsolescence when the war started, was removed from combat operations after the Battle of Midway, replaced by TBF. The SBD served on carriers through July of 1944, being gradually replaced by the SB2C starting in November of 1943. An intersecting point for examining the combat operations for these aircraft is the common denominator, "action sorties."

An action sortie is defined as the number of planes taking off on a mission that resulted in an attack on an enemy target or in aerial combat, or both. The US Navy's basis for this calculation was the number of planes of one squadron taking off on a mission. If any of these planes had action, the entire squadron's planes on the mission were counted as action sorties, including abortive planes, planes that reached the target, but did not attack, and planes which escorted or patrolled, but did not engage in combat. Thus if 16 SB2C's took off on a mission, 2 returned early, 10 dropped bombs, and 4 did not, all 16 were counted as action sorties. Likewise, if 10 TBF's took off for a mission, and only 5 dropped torpedoes (or bombs) on the targets found, all 10 were action sorties. On the other hand, if 8 VF took off for a strike escort, and none engaged in any sort of attack or combat, then none were counted as action sorties, even though they reached the target, and even though the escorted bombers attacked the target. Alternatively, neither CAP planes missions, none of whose planes engaged in combat, nor search/strike missions that came up empty handed, counted as action sorties.

Yearly carrier based action sorties for each type were as follows:
1942
SBD, 1,370
TBD, 182
TBF, 183

1943
SBD, 1,213
SB2C, 247
TBF, 1,326

1944
SBD, 3,468
SB2C, 11,687
TBF, 16,033

1945
SB2C, 6,874
TBF, 18,518

Totals for the war
SBD, 6,051
SB2C, 18,808
TBD, 182
TBF, 36,060

These action sorties were sourced as follows:
From CV's
SBD, 5,852
SB2C, 18,808
TBD, 182
TBF, 18,254

From the CVL's
TBF, 6,379

From CVE's
SBD, 196
TBF, 11,427

There were a total of 147,094 action sorties flown from carriers of all types during the Pacific War, thus, these aircraft, flying a combined action sorties total of 61,098, comprised some 41.5% of all carrier based action sorties. Breakdown by aircraft type, as a percentage of the total:
TBF 24.5%
SB2C 12.8%
SBD 4.1%,
TBD 0.1%

The remainder of carrier action sorties (85,993 or 58.5%) were flown by VF aircraft: F6F, F4U, FM, F4F, with 42.4%, 6.5%, 8.8%, and 0.75%, respectively. Breakdowns by carrier type can be made for VF types, but since they really aren't germane to the subject, I won't bother. We can thus see that the TBF led in the 61098 VT/VB action sorties with 59.0% followed by the SB2C (30.8%), the SBD (9.9%), and, lastly, the TBD (0.3%)

With this information, we can now look at comparative loss rates. This will give us some idea of relative survivability. Losses were basically of five types, from enemy aircraft, enemy anti aircraft fire, operational action sortie related, non action sortie flights, and lost, but not flight related, while on the carriers themselves. Non action sortie flights and losses on the carriers have little, if anything, to do with the question of combat survivability, so, even though interesting, I won't enter those figures into our survey. Reported losses, overall were, to aircraft TBF, 27; SB2C, 18; SBD, 43; and TBD, 25. Losses to anti aircraft fire were TBF, 353; SB2C, 268; SBD, 40; and TBD, 11. Operational losses were: TBF, 231; SB2C, 218; SBD, 48; and TBD, 8. Total action sortie losses were TBF, 611; SB2C, 504; SBD, 131; and TBD, 44.

The percent chance, therefore, that a given aircraft would be lost on a given action sortie were, for the TBF: 0.07% to enemy aircraft, 0.98% to enemy anti aircraft fire, and 0.64% operationally, or 1.69%, overall. For the SB2C percentages were 0.10%, 1.42%, and 1.16%, or 2.68%, overall; for the SBD percentages were 0.71%, 0.66%, and 0.79%, or 2.16%, overall; and for the TBD percentages were 13.74%, 6.04%, and 4.40%, or 24.18%, overall. Thus the relative survivability on a given action sortie, by plane type, can be ranked as TBF, SBD, S2BC, and TBD. More importantly, the TBF results show it to be slightly less than 29% more survivable as the second ranked SBD (1.69% vs 2.16%). If we look at just 'combat' losses, i.e., to enemy aircraft or anti aircraft fire, the overall rates decrease. The overall percent chance a given aircraft would be lost to enemy aircraft or anti aircraft fire on a given action sortie were, for the TBF of 1.05%, the SB2C, 1.52%; the SBD, 1.37%; and the TBD, 19.78%. The relative survivability, then, on a given action sortie, by plane type, remains ranked as TBF, SBD, S2BC, and TBD, with the TBF slightly more than 30% more survivable than the SBD (and slightly more than 44% more survivable than the SB2C). The percent chance a given aircraft would be lost to enemy aircraft only, per action sortie, leave us with a ranking of TBF, S2BC, SBD, and TBD. The percent chance a given aircraft would be lost to enemy anti aircraft fire only, per action sortie, leaves a ranking of SBD, TBF, S2BC, and TBD. Additionally, the specific results for action sorties encountering enemy anti aircraft fire for the SBD, SB2C, and TBF (TBD data not readily available) reaffirm the SBD, TBF, and S2BC rankings in terms of (a.) Losses per 100 action sorties, (b.) Planes hit per 100 action sorties, (c.) Losses per 100 attacks with anti aircraft fire present, and (d.) Percent lost of planes hit by anti aircraft fire: for the SBD the results are 0.29 losses per 100 action sorties, 4.73 planes hit per 100 action sorties, 0.54 losses per 100 attacks with anti aircraft fire present, and 12%of planes hit by anti aircraft fire lost. TBF results were 0.91, 7.74, 1.45, and 19%. SB2C results were 1.28, 6.47, 1.76, and 27%, respectively.

These numbers pretty well dispel any theory that the TBF might be more vulnerable than either the SBD or the SB2C. Only in the case of loss percentages resulting from enemy anti aircraft fire does the TBF not come out on top as the most survivable and, even then, it was still almost 45% more survivable than the more predominant (in terms of action sorties) of the two dive bombers, the SB2C. Overall, comparing VT loss percentage per action sortie to VSB loss percentage per action sortie, the VT aircraft (despite the aura of the tragic TBD losses at Midway) come out far and away more survivable than the VSB aircraft. For VT aircraft, losses were (# of losses or percent of action sorties): to enemy aircraft, 52 or 0.14%, to enemy anti aircraft fire, 364 or 1.00%, operationally, 239 or 0.66%, and overall, 655 or 1.81%. For VSB aircraft, the same numbers are: 61 or 0.25%, 308 or 1.24%, 266 or 1.07%, and 635 or 2.55%, respectively. This shows that VT aircraft, generally, were slightly less than 41% more survivable overall and enjoyed survivability rates that were 71.0% higher for loss by enemy aircraft, 23.3% higher for anti aircraft fire, and 62.3% higher for operational losses when compared to the VSB aircraft the losses.

To digress some, in relationship to losses, how did these planes fare against their aerial opponents? We can look at five factors: a.) Sorties engaging aircraft, b.) Percent sorties engaging aircraft, c.) Enemy planes claimed and credited, d.) Number of type lost to enemy aircraft, and e.) Ratio of enemy losses to type losses. For the TBF, 429 sorties reported engaging aircraft. This was 1.2% of total TBF action sorties. 72 enemy planes were claimed and credited versus 27 lost. Thus the credited enemy loss to TBF loss ratio was 2.7 to 1. For the SB2C, results were: 237, 1.3%, 43, 18, 2.4 to 1. And for the SBD, results were 301, 5.0%, 106, 43, and 2.5 to 1. So we can see that the types were fairly evenly matched in their reported performance against enemy aerial opponents.

End of part 1 of 3

Part 2 of 3

Now we can address ordnance delivery and look at bombs first, as the common weapon among these aircraft. I am, at this point, going to, rather arbitrarily, eliminate further consideration of the TBD. The TBD only served six months in combat and delivered less than half of a percent of the total carrier aircraft bomb tonnage in the course of the war. So, therefore, in discussion relevant to bomb delivery, when I speak to carrier aircraft, generally, and VT aircraft, specifically, I am not including the statistics for the TBD.

Carrier aircraft of all types delivered some 45,525 tons of bombs on targets in the course of the Pacific War. Of that total, 38037, or 83.6%, were delivered by the SBD, SB2C and the TBF, with a combined .62 tons delivered per action sortie. We can look at several items of interest for each of the three types: (1) tons of bombs delivered, (2) percent of overall total, (3) percent of VB/VT total, (4) percent of type (VB or VT) total, and (5) type tons of bombs per action sortie. The results are as follow: SBD 2524 tons, 5.5% of overall total, 6.6% of the VB/VT total, 18.7% of VB total, and .42 tons per action sortie. The SB2C results were 10994 tons, 24.1% of overall total, 28.9% of the VB/VT total, 81.3% of VB total, and .58 tons per action sortie. For the TBF, results were 24549 tons, 53.9% of overall total, 64.5% of the VB/VT total, 100% of VT total, and .68 tons per action sortie. Hence, in terms of bomb delivery, the TBF comes out as the leader of the three, delivering more than half of all carrier aircraft bomb tonnage, more than twice as many tons as the SB2C and almost ten times as many tons as the SBD. Significantly, and more than a simple function of volume, the TBF delivered 62% more tons per action sortie than the SBD and 18% more than the SB2C.

To further illustrate, in July, 1944, for example, there were 8 CV's and 7 CVL's and 11 CVE's in action. In these forces, there were a total of 1242 aircraft: F6F 526 from 19 squadrons; SB2C 218 from 7 squadrons; TBF 327 from 28 squadrons; SBD 40 from 2 squadrons; F4U 3 from 1 squadron, and FM 128 from 9 squadrons.

Operationally, we can see a pattern similar to that of the overall statistics for the entire war in terms of a.) Total flights, b.) Action Sorties, and c.) Tons of bombs delivered. For the F6F the results were: 10579 flights, 5624 action sorties, and 720 tons of bombs. For the SB2C, the results were 3465, 2698, and 1506. For the TBF, the results were 7379, 3144, and 1970; the SBD's were 252, 154, and 70; the FM's were 2454, 748, and 0; and the F4U's were 13, 1, and 0, respectively. This data provides us with the ability to make these operational comparisons: a.) Flights per plane, b.) Action sorties per plane, and c.) Action sorties per flight. For the F6F, the results were 20.1 flights per plane, 10.7 action sorties per plane, and 0.53 action sorties per flight. The SB2C results were 15.9, 12.4, and 0.78; TBF, 22.6, 9.6, and 0.43; SBD, 6.3, 3.9, and 0.61; FM, 19.2, 5.8, and 0.30; and the F4U at 4.3, .3, and 0.08.

And for ordnance delivery we can determine a.) Tons per plane, b.) Tons per action sortie, and c.) Percent of overall tonnage expended. Since the FM's and the F4U's had no credited bomb tonnage for the month we cab dispense with their results. For the remaining four, starting with the F6F results were: F6F, 1.37 tons per plane, 0.13 tons per action sortie, and 16.9% of overall tonnage expended; SB2C was 6.91, 0.56, and 35.3%; TBF was 6.02, 0.63, and 46.2%; and the SBD was 1.75, 0.45, and 1.6%. So, the TBF squadrons, for July, 1944, with only 69 (11.8%) more aircraft delivered more combat sorties and more tons of bombs than the combined VB squadrons, or, to look at it another way, flew 292 (4.9%) more combat sortie and delivered 393 (11.1%) more tons of bombs at a rate of .13 more tons of bombs per action sortie.

Another facet to the discussion is the general employment of these types as the war progressed. Consider targets attacked by carrier aircraft by examining the percent of action sorties flown against land targets and shipping targets. By year these figures were: For 1942, 53.3% land targets and 47.7% shipping targets; for 1943, 87.3% and 12.7%; for 1944, 77.0% and 23.0%; 1945, 86.5% and 13.5%; and in total, 81.2% land targets and 18.8% shipping targets. Alternatively, we can make the same examination using the annual bomb tonnage expended on land targets versus shipping targets: For 1942, 38.5 tons on land targets and 61.5 tons on shipping targets; for 1943, 83.1 and 16.9; for 1944, 76.8 and 23.2; 1945, 84.4% and 15.6; and in total, 80.0 land targets and 20.0 shipping targets. For shipping targets alone, we can assess the percentage of action sorties attacking either a.) Warships or b.) Merchant shipping. The annual results of total sorties attacking targets was: 1942, 36.9% against warships and 11.1% against merchant ships; 1943, 7.4% and 5.3%; 1944, 5.9% and 17.2%; 1945, 4.9% and 8.6%; and, in total for the entire war, 5.9% and 12.9%.

For the SBD, SB2C, and the TBF, the breakdown was: for the SBD, 796 sorties attacking warships and 860 sorties attacking merchant ships; for the SB2C, 1562 and 3261; and for the TBF, 2149 and 3582. And in carrying out these attacks, ordnance expenditures were: for the SBD, 636 tons of bombs and 93000 rounds of ammunition; for the SB2C, 2725 tons, 195 rockets, and 514000 rounds; and for the TBF, 4636 tons, 2398 rockets, and 619000 rounds.

We can conclude from this data that TBF attacking sorties made up 47.7% of the sorties attacking warships and 46.5% of attacking sorties on merchant shipping; overall, that is 46.9% of all sorties attacking shipping. We can also see that TBF's were responsible for 58.0% of bomb tonnage delivered, 92.5% of rockets, and 50.5% of rounds of ammunition.

If we look at aerial torpedoes, we essentially limit ourselves to the TBF and the TBD, which, between the two, delivered some 98% of the 1460 torpedoes dropped against targets. Of these, 89.9%, or 1311, were dropped by carrier based VTs. Torpedoes accounted for 12% of the total weight of bombs, torpedoes, and mines expended by USN and USMC aircraft (carrier and land based) during the war. The important thing to remember is that torpedo expenditures were a function of the tempo of operations and the availability of targets. Torpedoes made up slightly more than 35% of the weight of ordnance expended against enemy warships and slightly less than 10% against merchant shipping. Torpedoes expended as a percent of total ordnance tonnage dropped by carrier aircraft per year were, for 1942 19.8%, 1943 6.7%, 1944 3.7%, and 1945 1.4%, thus illustrating the declining trend in the use of the torpedo as a primary offensive weapon. The trend can be further illustrated by looking at the number of torpedoes expended per year per VT action sortie: 1942 131 torpedoes or 0.287 per action sortie, 1943 116 torpedoes or .094 per action sortie, 1944 772 torpedoes or .048 per action sortie, and 1945 292 torpedoes or .016 per action sortie.


End of Part 2 of 3

Part 3 of 3

Enemy naval and merchant targets became scarcer as the war dragged through 1944. By the end of that year there were two major missions for carrier aircraft: 1.) Deal with the kamikaze threat and 2.) Provide close air support mission for troops ashore until the USAAF could establish itself on captured territory (which sometimes seemed to take an awful long time).

The solution to the kamikaze problem was more fighters. It had been established that the existing fighters could carry sufficient bomb tonnage and deliver it accurately. Moves were made to reduce the number of VB squadrons by converting them to VBF squadrons flying fighters. This was the logical step, as to go the other way and eliminate the VT squadrons for VBF squadrons would have eliminated what ever small advantage remained from having the ability to reliably deliver torpedoes on shipping targets. Additionally, TBF's operated more easily from CVE's and CVL's than the SB2C, in fact, SB2C's only operated from CV's; thus the air groups assigned to these ships consisted of fighters, F6F, F4U, or FM, and TBF's. By January of 1945, there were 8 CV's, 5 CVL's, and 18 CVE's in action, with 13 squadrons of F6F's (663 planes), 2 squadrons of F4U's (36 planes), 18 squadrons of FM's (364 planes), 5 squadrons of SB2C's (75 planes), and 31 squadrons of TBF's (372 planes) (compare to just 6 months before, above). By then the TBF was delivering 61.8% of the overall bomb tonnage compared to the SB2C's 16.5%. Almost 4 out of every 5 tons of bombs expended by these two aircraft were delivered by the TBF.

The greater bomb capacity of the TBF over its VB counterpart, the SB2C, recommended its use as a horizontal bomber against land targets. When coupled with the TBF's demonstrated greater stability and mission survivability, the availability of a new weapon, the rocket, created an opportunity for the TBF to again demonstrate its utility. Rockets were introduced in January of 1944. Carrier aircraft rocket expenditures that month totaled 228 and reached their monthly peak in June, 1945 with 17184. Carrier aircraft expended a total of 182569 rockets on targets for the war, with the F6F expending 70417; the TBF, 55568; the FM, 28337; the F4U, 23669; and the SB2C, 4578. Only slightly more than 7.5% of rockets expended by carrier aircraft were fired against shipping, naval or merchant. The remaining 92.5% were fired on land targets. For the SB2C, 4.3% of rockets fired were fired on shipping of those, 67.7% were fired on warships. The TBF fired 2.1% on shipping with 9.1% of those expended on warships.

The question of additional VB squadrons utilizing armor piercing bombs to replace TBF squadrons similarly does not stand up under scrutiny of the combat results data. Over the course of the war, the tonnage of armor piercing bombs expended by carrier squadrons, mostly SB2C's, as a percentage of total ordnance dropped was only 0.7%. If you include the 500 lb (about 30% of which were dropped by TBF's) and 1000 lb Semi Armor Piercing bombs (1.7% and 3.8%, respectively), the percent of total ordnance tonnage for all three types comes to 6.2%. This can be compared to other weapons: general purpose bombs less than 500 lbs were 17.8%, 500 lb GP was 48.1%, 1000 lb GP was 13.3%, 2000 lb GP was 4.2%. Torpedoes made up 2.9% of the total tonnage, napalm canisters were 1.5%, other incendiaries were 1.3%, fragmentation (mostly 260 lb introduced late in the war) were 2.9%, depth charges were 1.7%, and mines were 0.1%. AP and SAP bombs simply were not used to any great extent when compared to the GP 250, 500, and 1000 pound bombs with 66.3% of the total.

The conclusions that can be drawn from the data become fairly obvious. The TBF was a mainstay for a variety of reasons. Operationally, it was easier to operate from the CVL's and CVE's. Easily half or better of the TBF squadrons in action in the latter part of the war operated from those carrier types. SB2C's only operated from CV's. As the war progressed there was an increasing need to deal with land targets. The TBF had horizontal bombing capability, a much safer way of dealing with the problem than dive bombing. Then there are torpedoes. If you want to sink a capital ship, you need torpedoes ... you've got to poke holes in the hull below the waterline. Both the Musashi and the Yamato showed that those ships could absorb a lot of bombs and rockets. Without torpedoes, they would have eventually have sunk, but with torpedoes it was quicker.

Thus as the war spiraled to it's conclusion, the planning on composition of air groups evolved to meet the requirements of combat realities and the potential capabilities of potential enemies. Most important of these was that there would probably never again be a necessity to take on a navy of the size and make-up of the Imperial Japanese Navy; operations would increasingly become a power projection from the sea affair. The immediate effect, post war was to see the SB2C go away entirely. In the evolution, air groups would be made up of squadrons with high performance fighters for point defense (F8F, followed into the 1950s by the F2H, then quickly by the F9F), high performance fighters for both fleet defense and air to surface attack (F4U), and the multipurpose attack aircraft (AD) that could fill the role previously occupied by dedicated VB and VT types. This is the configuration we see active in the Korean War, though even by then we see that the line between the point defense craft (F9F) and the fleet defense/air to surface attack (F4U) fighters was already blurring as the F9F assumed an increasingly prominent role in the ground attack world. That trend would continue even unto today.

Just some gentle musings

Oh, and just on looks, I'd prefer the SBD.

Rich

End

Great info!

Thanks.

The pilot was transferred to a Wildcat squadron after his dogfighting talents were realized.

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You are, no doubt, referring to VS-5's Swede Vejtasa. He received his orders to VF-10 BEFORE the Battle of the Coral Sea and any adventure with A6M2s. In fact he had to get Jim Flatley, XO of VF-42, (who had orders to report as CO of the same VF-10) to go to bat for him with Yorktown's Capt Buckmaster for the same permission Flatley had received to delay departure until after the looming action. Good thing, too, as had he left before the battle it would have aboard USS Neosho.

Rich

Yeah, that's the guy. Couldn't remember his name. Good call!

R Leonard is right, another one of those wonderful WW2 myths...

thx for all the info guys, ii took some pics of my first model not completely done but the pics are on my phone. so anyone know how to put them up?

lesofprimus said:

R Leonard is right, another one of those wonderful WW2 myths... .

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Capt Vejtasa is one of the good guys. One of my father's friends, too.

Rich

Rich, Mighty fine post on the effectiveness of the various carrier a/c in the Pacific. Wouldn't it have been tragic if the Navy VB squadrons at Midway had been equipped with the SB2U rather than the SBD. The Pacific war may have turned out differently.

I can't believe that nobody in this thread commented on the importance of the TBF/TBM (mostly TBM) in the antisubmarine campaign. Most people don't realize that although the naval war in the Pacific gets most of the attention, for the first year of the war, the United States was suffering far more serious losses in the Atlantic, almost all to U-Boats. Prior to the assemblage of CVE-led hunter/killer groups in the Atlantic, U-boats had a comfortable safety zone in the mid-Atlantic in which they could refuel and rearm from milchcow supply submarines. Using Ultra code breaking and HFDF radio direction finding, the Hunter killer groups could hunt down the U-boats in the previously safe zones, and in a relatively short period of time, losses to U-boats declined drastically, much as confirmed kills of U-boats increased.

The prime attack aircraft used by the CVEs was the TBM Avenger. The big fuselage of the Avenger gave the Navy a "place to put their stuff" (as George Carlin would say). The Avenger had room for radar, homing torpedoes, sono-buoys, depth charges. The Avenger could be armed with magnetic anomaly detection equipment, high powered spotlights, and just about any secret weapon the tech boys could come up with. The Avenger was also used for carrier on-board delivery and for electronic countermeasures. In essence, the Avenger was the prototype for all of the specialty aircraft that currently serve on US carriers.

The Hollywood movie Dive Bomber was made in 1940 and released in 1941, before the war. The job of the dive bomber pilot was far more glamorous than the anti-submarine jockey. (I reach my limit on a roller coaster going down 300 feet at 65 MPH at a 50 degree angle. I can only imagine what it is like going down 10,000 feet at 60+ degree angle, 250 MPH with people shooting at you and no track to ensure a safe landing.) As boring as it sounds, I'd rather fly a TBM on antisubmarine missions than dive bomb in a SBD.

I don't wish to appear rude, or pedantic, but perhaps you might like to alter your post to state 'Before America's entry into the war'. The 'war' (World War 2) started in September 1939, not 1941.

A real tossup for me.

I lean towards the barge (Dauntless) though the Avenger was more versatile in it's weapons loads.

But then, Flyboy brought up a good point a few years ago about silk scarves.....

"... the Avenger was the prototype for all of the specialty aircraft that currently serve on US carriers. "

Agreed .... a real work horse. Still spraying Spruce Bud infestions over the forests of New Brunswick, too.

MM

What a way to revive a 5 year old thread.

One little known fact about the Avenger - it was the aircraft used in New Zealand to invent aerial top dressing with phosphate fertilisers. Not quite as glamorous as some of our other firsts, like climbing Everest or splitting the atom, but at least it didn't directly involve sheep.
Incidentally, did you know that the price of lamb in NZ has just gone up? It's now $25 - per hour...