B-29 Losses

[davparlr]

Some data on the B-29 range versus payload can be found here:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/B-29_Superfortress_SAC_-_19_April_1950.pdf

There's no doubt that the B-29 had impressive specs, but in 1944 it was very underdeveloped and the engines were not reliable at prolonged high power, yet to operate over Europe the B-29 would have to climb quickly to cruise altitude of 25 to 30,000 ft and use much more fuel than the SAC mission data suggests. For a mission against Berlin, and carrying a 20,000lb bomb load, I would suggest that TO weight would be 130,000 lbs. Service ceiling at this weight is about 30,000 ft and time to climb to 20,000ft would be about 45 minutes so form-up and climb to cruise would have to be done outside of Luftwaffe flak and Luftwaffe controlled airspace. Formation Cruise speed would be about 275 mph and average cruise altitude would be between 25 and 30,000 ft. These speeds would be higher than previously encountered by the Luftwaffe but neither the average speed or altitude would have been beyond the reach of the Fw-190

The mission planners still have 10k lbs to play with so adapting the mission to allow penetration altitude prior to entry into enemy airspace should be no problem.

 

[JoeB]

Wow another very old thread resurrected!

But B-29 *formations* in fact were quite interceptable by Japanese fighters. Not as easily as B-17/24 formations, but still, it happened all the time, kind of weirdly ahistorical to discuss how Japanese fighters couldn't intercept B-29's or only with extreme difficulty. Formation speeds were in the mid 200's-mph, not at the plane's nominal maximum speed. And while altitudes started out as high as 30k ft, the bombing was too inaccurate from that high, so the altitudes were progressively reduced, even in daylight bombing, except for the nuclear attacks. Lone F-13's (photo-recon B-29's) were difficult for Japanese fighters to intercept, because not as loaded down and could use the plane's max speed and altitude capabilities. Likewise the nuclear attacks were conducted by a few planes at high altitude, and by that time, August 45, the Japanese weren't usually bothering to try to intercept lone or small groups of B-29's they assumed were recon planes. But B-29 formations were intercepted all the time, and over Germany would also have been, without any super-duper advancements in German fighters, and there would have been the same problem of what the bombers could hit from 30k ft.

A few B-29's very late in WWII were equipped with APG-15 fire control radars for the tail guns, with the optical central fire control (CFC) system and the other turrets removed. This system wasn't used in Korea but rather the standard CFC system with remote turrets and manual tail position. The tail-only radar controlled arrangement was only suitable for night operations (a/c also equipped with apq-7 precision bombing radar) and high altitude nuclear operations (the 'nickel plate' B-29's), not for day formation attacks where again the B-29's weren't going that fast, and many or most of the attackers approached from azimuths other than tail-on, head-on being popular with the Japanese fighters as it was for German fighters v B-17/24's. The Japanese fighters often aimed to ram the B-29's so had to close to zero range, and would brave return fire for a much shorter time doing that head on.

Joe

 

[buffnut453]

It doesn't matter how good a plane was in WWII, if you only had 25 of them, you made no difference to the war effort

Beg to differ, old boy! Thinking of 4 FTS in Habbaniyah which, with 64 aircraft (9 fighters and 55 "bombers"), effectively repulsed and ended the Iraqi Revolt in May 1941. Ok, it wasn't 27 aircraft but it's a similar order of magnitude (or minitude if you prefer).

 

[pinsog]

Beg to differ, old boy! Thinking of 4 FTS in Habbaniyah which, with 64 aircraft (9 fighters and 55 "bombers"), effectively repulsed and ended the Iraqi Revolt in May 1941. Ok, it wasn't 27 aircraft but it's a similar order of magnitude (or minitude if you prefer).

I believe Greg's point is, 25 fighters won't make a difference against a 1,000 bomber raid escorted by 800 fighters.

 

[Siegfried]

Wow another very old thread resurrected!

But B-29 *formations* in fact were quite interceptable by Japanese fighters. Not as easily as B-17/24 formations, but still, it happened all the time, kind of weirdly ahistorical to discuss how Japanese fighters couldn't intercept B-29's or only with extreme difficulty. Formation speeds were in the mid 200's-mph, not at the plane's nominal maximum speed. Joe

Why was the speed limited? The need to maintain a tight formation or the need to conserve fuel? Once can immagine that an increase to maxium cruise speed to over 300mph would be beneficial but would only be required for about the last 150 miles before the enemy coast was reached. If so the 'planners' may have made a grim calculation weighing up losses against bomb load versus greater fuel for greater speed.

 

[Siegfried]

I agree. WW2 was a continuing upgrade to weapons often to counter enemy upgrades and it occurred amazingly fast, and quite equally. Germany would would have had to counter the B-29 and would apply technology to do so. The B-29 would certainly have added complexity to the problem of attacking lumbering bombers. Increases in speed and altitude was probably a geometric increase in complexity for the defense, not only affecting power but of maneuverability and endurance. Another mile or two of altitude and a 25%+ reduction in exposure time would be a significant challenge to defensive forces. The added altitude would have little affect on the bomber in that they were flying straight and level at 20-25k and were also flying straight a level at 30-35k. It was the maneuvering fighters that was impacted. It would have applied more stress to an already stressed war machine.

The Kurfurst site indicates and extraordinary number of simple modifications to the Me 109 that would accumulate to perhaps as much as 20mph speed again (from its lower speed range) fairly simple mods to gun bulges, tailwheel and a general achievable (in mass production) improvement in airframe tollerance and smoothness, probably no better than were routine for the US industry. Yet production requirement drove Me 109 performance down to a more mediocre level. It achieved manhour production requirements of less than 2000 hours in 1944. The oversized supercharger variants could possibly be brough forward likely with restricted boost levels that would impact low altitude performance; there migh also be prop mods. We see a similar situation in regards to the P-38K which supposedly would have given a fantastic improvement in performance for the cost of only 2 weeks of production.

I am somewhat skeptical over the claim that this was totally short sighted by the USAAF as I believe engine supply was considered an major issue and likely the real issue. I have no doubt however that had high altitude bombers been attacking the USA in 1943 that the K model would see at least limited production.

 

[davparlr]

Wow another very old thread resurrected!

But B-29 *formations* in fact were quite interceptable by Japanese fighters. Not as easily as B-17/24 formations, but still, it happened all the time, kind of weirdly ahistorical to discuss how Japanese fighters couldn't intercept B-29's or only with extreme difficulty. Formation speeds were in the mid 200's-mph, not at the plane's nominal maximum speed. And while altitudes started out as high as 30k ft, the bombing was too inaccurate from that high, so the altitudes were progressively reduced, even in daylight bombing, except for the nuclear attacks. Lone F-13's (photo-recon B-29's) were difficult for Japanese fighters to intercept, because not as loaded down and could use the plane's max speed and altitude capabilities. Likewise the nuclear attacks were conducted by a few planes at high altitude, and by that time, August 45, the Japanese weren't usually bothering to try to intercept lone or small groups of B-29's they assumed were recon planes. But B-29 formations were intercepted all the time, and over Germany would also have been, without any super-duper advancements in German fighters, and there would have been the same problem of what the bombers could hit from 30k ft.

Tinian is 1500 miles from Tokyo. Those planes bombing Tokyo were maxed out with bombs and fuel on takeoff and probably needed optimum cruise continuously to make it back. The Jet Stream was mostly abeam of their flight path giving the aircraft a reduced flight vector along the flight path both coming and going. Berlin is 600 mile from London, less than half the distance, with much less fuel required, high combat cruise speed can maintain for quite a while, and riding the Jet Stream could help. As far as accuracy is concerned, I suspect that it wasn't speed or altitude that affected accuracy so much as it was cross wind velocity. Trying to aim a bomb with a 30 degree drift has got to be almost impossible. I had to fly final once with 30 degree drift angle and I am telling you even that was a fight. However, with a 125 mph direct tailwind, accuracy should be reasonable if the bomb sight can handle the ground speed, and the B-29 had the endurance to flight plan weapon approach along the Jet Stream. And, if it was still too inaccurate, they could make a descending approach down to 25k probably 150 mph faster than a B-17/24. Egress could be planned away from the Jet Stream.

For the ETO, the B-29 would give a huge increase in options to the war planner over the B-17/24s in speed, altitudes, ranges, and bomb loads. Options cause problems for the defenders.

Joe[/QUOTE]

 

[davparlr]

Why was the speed limited? The need to maintain a tight formation or the need to conserve fuel? Once can immagine that an increase to maxium cruise speed to over 300mph would be beneficial but would only be required for about the last 150 miles before the enemy coast was reached.

High speed formation flying should not be an issue.

If so the 'planners' may have made a grim calculation weighing up losses against bomb load versus greater fuel for greater speed.

Very astute. More bombs verses higher altitude. More bombs verses faster bomb run. More bombs verses dead crewmen. I not sure Curtis LeMay would tend to the crew survival side!

 

[GregP]

I never said B-29's were "uninterceptable," I said it was difficult if the B-29 guys used their airplane to make it so. The low loss rate shows that interception of a B-29 did not equal a shootdown.

The Ta-152 made no impression during the war, so, to me, it is an interesting anecdote in aviation, nothing more. As anyone who knows me will tell you, I like obscure planes and prototypes, so I like the Ta-152 series. But if I were going to war, I'd take a proven performer with a solid war record over a prototype any day of the week.

Many peoplpe like the late-war German planes a LOT, and they are entitled. I am interested, but not all that impresed because they didn't DO what they were designed to do in the real-life, actual war. They showed signs of having the potential to do so, but didn't get the job done. It may well be through no fault of the aircraft themselves, but the facts remain.

Hey, it happen in modern times, too. The Northrop F-20 Tigershark qwas abslutely the best fighter never to win a production contract, and it would outfly an F-16 ... but resembled the F-5 too much for PR purposes. Doesn't mean the F-20 wasn't a top candidate for the bets foghter ... it WAS, in spades. It just never made it and is an interesting footnote in fighter history, nothing more. I bet it will remain the LAST time a company funds a modern figher on their own money!

 

[buffnut453]

I believe Greg's point is, 25 fighters won't make a difference against a 1,000 bomber raid escorted by 800 fighters.

Maybe what was meant but not what was said. Doesn't matter...I was simply being contrary. )

 

[tyrodtom]

I not sure Curtis LeMay would tend to the crew survival side!

Doing maximum damage to the enemy the over a shorter period of time might result in less crew being lost overall.

Lemay didn't believe in "***** footing around", he belived in hitting hard right from the start. Real "shock and awe".

 

[GregP]

True about Lemay! In spades. He was tough to work for.

Sometimes I like to be contrary, too (maybe too often?), but I don't mean any insult to anyone. A lively discussion seems like a pretty good goal.

For instance, I put out a number thaht amounts to kills per month for an aircraft type as measure of success. It was pooh-poohed by some people.

I think a better number would be [(number of action sorties) * (4 x kills) - (2 * losses) / number of aircaft in the area] / time period.

The problem is getting the information for the types you want to compare. I have a VERY involved formula that takes almost all aspect into account, but the data are almost impossoble to get! So I suppose that while it is a very good comparison number, it is almost incalculable for most types. So, that makes it almost ueslees although it WOULD be a good comparison number otherwise.

Statistics for the figthers, bombers, recon, etc. are HARD to get as far as action sorties, kills, losses due to combat and losses due to other, number of that type in the area, time of employment, and types of missions. If we had the data, maybe some of the lesser thought of types would look much better in retrospect due to their employment and mission. Due to lack of data, we are left with impressions formed from less than good information.

 

[JoeB]

Why was the speed limited? The need to maintain a tight formation or the need to conserve fuel? Once can immagine that an increase to maxium cruise speed to over 300mph would be beneficial but would only be required for about the last 150 miles before the enemy coast was reached. If so the 'planners' may have made a grim calculation weighing up losses against bomb load versus greater fuel for greater speed.

Save fuel, moreover save engines and therefore save airplanes from operational losses: the B-29's engines were not very reliable circa late 1944-early 1945, got better in the final months of the war, but prolonged operation at high power, besides takeoff when unavoidable, might well have increased total losses beyond any tactical benefit. And just the nature of formation flying: that is, if a formation changes direction, the planes on the outside of the turn have to throttle up relative to those on the inside, which creates a limitation on the average speed if there is to be margin to maneuver, catch up if straggling for some reason, etc. Also, again the proposed idea is a combination of high speed and altitude when it was shown in the actual campaign in late 44 early 45 that 30k ft bombing altitude didn't work well in terms of accuracy or engine strain even at realistic cruising speeds.

And flying at far below max speed when in formation was not something unique to the B-29 over Japan. B-17/24's almost always flew well below maximum speed in formation. IMHO it's rather implausible to assume planners would have slapped their foreheads and said 'why I didn't I think of that!?!' if they could read web board posters suggesting max speed formations 60-some years later

So in the real world, B-29 formations were not highly difficult to intercept over Japan, which is what *was* implied. It wasn't said that it was 'impossible'... but I didn't say that was said. It was said or implied it was very difficult, but in fact it was wasn't tremendously difficult at least for the mid-late Japanese fighter types (Type 3 aka Tony, Type 2 aka Tojo, Type 2 two-seat aka Nick, and the types introduced in '44-45, like Type 4 and 5, Shiden, Raiden etc). A brief reading of any good resource on the campaign should clarify that.

The altitude of the early raids v the aerodynamic capabilities of Japanese fighters cut down the losses somewhat compared to what B-17/24's would suffer unescorted, but there were also simply fewer operational Japanese fighters than say over Germany, and a less well developed integrated defense system. The B-29's defensive systems were also somewhat more capable, and the firepower of the Japanese fighter types typically lower than German, especially versions of German fighters with specially enhanced anti-bomber armaments. OTOH again a significant % of B-29 losses to fighters were from ramming, around 40% in the sample of late 44-early 45 daylight raids described in detail from both sides in Sakaida's "B-29 Hunters of the JAAF".

Also note that B-29 losses to fighters in WWII seem to be somewhat understated in sources like the USAAF Statistic Digest. A/c which made it a good way back to the Marianas but ditched or crash landed seem to have fairly often been counted in the operational category in those stats, regardless of original cause of damage. So the official numbers of 74 B-29 lost to Japanese fighters and 19 to a combination of AA and fighters may be a significant understatement. But AFAIK no one has tallied an accurate plane by plane loss analysis for B-29's over Japan. Plane by plane analysis of B-29 losses in Korea shows: 1953 Stats Digest gives 17 B-29's lost in air combat, one in July 1950 which was to a Yak-9, the other 16 from Nov 1950 would be to MiG-15's, a few of which were write offs of a/c which did return to base. But it omits 2 RB-29's (albeit column heading is 'B-29') and 1 B-29 outright loss shown in detailed records, 1 a/c believed lost to AAA which may in fact have been lost to MiG's, 1 a/c written off due to MiG damage, 2 a/c which may have been written off due to MiG damage (seriously damaged by MiG's, their Individual A/c Record Cards cannot be found), 1 a/c which may have been written off to either AAA or MiG. So perhaps 21-25 B/RB-29 were actually lost due to enemy fighter action in Korea v 17 in the Stats Digest. My anecdotal impression is that B-29 losses to fighters in WWII in the USAAF stats digest may be more understated than that.

Joe

 

[muscogeemike]

Maybe of relevance, maybe just a side note, but B-29's were also lost in the Korean war.

 

[Southron]

Actually, the great "Killer" of B-29's and their crews in 1944 1945 WAS NOT JAPANESE FIGHTERS NOR JAPANESE AA, but the Curtiss-Wright corporation!
Thanks to wartime secrecy, even today most people don't realize what a flying disaster World War II B-29's were.

Curtiss-Wright produced the R 3350 Engines that still had a lot of "Bugs" in them. The standard "accident sequence" was that one of the R 4450's would catch on fire, and since the casing of the engine was magnesium-it would burn at white hot temperatures thereby causing the wing spar to heat up and fail OR the gas in one of the wing tanks to explode, either way the B-29 went down in a hurry and often the crew did not have a chance to bail out.

One of the problems was that Curtiss-Wright had very poor "quality control" procedures at their engine factory and if I recall correctly, several Curtiss-Wright executives were prosecuted by the War Department and went to federal prison for fudging inspection and test data on some of the 3350's used on the B-29's.

Finally, the "Bugs" were worked out of the R 3350's and they became fairly reliable engines, so much so that in the post-war era of the 1950's they powered prop airliners like the DC-7's and Lockheed Connies. Matter of fact, R 3350's were even installed on the AD-1`Skyraiders of Viet Nam War fame.

Interestingly enough, the SINGLE MOST EXPENSIVE WORLD WAR II project undertaken by the U.S. Government WAS NOT the Manahttan [atomic bomb] Project. The Manhattan Project was only #2 in terms of expense. The most expensive project was development and manufacture of the B-29! Too bad Curtiss-Wright failed their part of the B-29 project so abysmally. That might explain that while Curtiss-Wright is still around today, they have very little to do with aviation (at least compared to their World War II activities.)

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Actually, the great "Killer" of B-29's and their crews in 1944 1945 WAS NOT JAPANESE FIGHTERS NOR JAPANESE AA, but the Curtiss-Wright corporation!
Thanks to wartime secrecy, even today most people don't realize what a flying disaster World War II B-29's were.

Curtiss-Wright produced the R 3350 Engines that still had a lot of "Bugs" in them. The standard "accident sequence" was that one of the R 4450's would catch on fire, and since the casing of the engine was magnesium-it would burn at white hot temperatures thereby causing the wing spar to heat up and fail OR the gas in one of the wing tanks to explode, either way the B-29 went down in a hurry and often the crew did not have a chance to bail out.

One of the problems was that Curtiss-Wright had very poor "quality control" procedures at their engine factory and if I recall correctly, several Curtiss-Wright executives were prosecuted by the War Department and went to federal prison for fudging inspection and test data on some of the 3350's used on the B-29's.
Finally, the "Bugs" were worked out of the R 3350's and they became fairly reliable engines, so much so that in the post-war era of the 1950's they powered prop airliners like the DC-7's and Lockheed Connies. Matter of fact, R 3350's were even installed on the AD-1`Skyraiders of Viet Nam War fame.

Interestingly enough, the SINGLE MOST EXPENSIVE WORLD WAR II project undertaken by the U.S. Government WAS NOT the Manahttan [atomic bomb] Project. The Manhattan Project was only #2 in terms of expense. The most expensive project was development and manufacture of the B-29! Too bad Curtiss-Wright failed their part of the B-29 project so abysmally. That might explain that while Curtiss-Wright is still around today, they have very little to do with aviation (at least compared to their World War II activities.)

I'd like to know your references for the first statement as far as jail time is concerned. There were government investigations of Curtiss Wright

The Curtiss-Wright Corporation

Curtiss Wright didn't secure any post war contacts and in the end got out of the airframe manufacturing business. The company downsized and found it's niche in manufacturing accessories.

The B-29 was problematic but by the spring/ summer of 1945 many of the bugs were worked out and the aircraft served its role well. Talk to some of the men who flew them, but then again it was a jump ahead in technology.

 

[model299]

.......even today most people don't realize what a flying disaster World War II B-29's were.

I think that's engaging in a fair amount of hyperbole to call them "flying disasters."

Compared to the B-17, the B-29 was a huge leap forward in term of aeronautical technology in just about every aspect.

Part of the problem was the wartime rush to get it into production and active service, while still working out a lot of problems the designers were encountering for the first time.

I also think it's exaggeration to lay the deaths of airmen "At the hand of the Curtiss Wright Corp." Remember that a lot of the overheating problems were due to the tight engine cowls used by Boeing.

Add to those problems the fact that production workers whose idea of "high tech" was a Philco tube radio with pushbuttons were getting on the job training using tools and techniques they'd never encountered before in their lives.

EDIT: Spanked by FLYBOYJ!

 

[model299]

When I volunteered at the now-closed Planes Of Fame museum at Flying Cloud Airport, I had the chance to meet a group of B-29 crewmembers who were having a mini-reunion, and were touring our facility. I talked to several pilots, and to a man, they all professed their love of the aircraft and admiration of its capabilities.

One told me that when fully (Usually over-) loaded with fuel and ordinance, they used every inch of the Marianas runways to get in the air. Then getting up to cruising speed and altitude took careful flying as well. But, he also told me that when rid of the bombs and ammunition, and with a reduced fuel load, the plane "was a delight to fly. Fast and responsive to a light fingertip touch on the yoke." That was his direct quote. I remember it well. He also said that since the war, he always flew on Boeing products if he had anything to say about it.

 

[buffnut453]

Ask any pilot and he'll defend his aircraft against all-comers. I'm not discounting the accounts of these veterans, simply stating a fact. A pilot who doesn't like his aircraft isn't effective in his job. Look at the accounts from pilots of "less able" aircraft such as P-39s and most, if not all, will evince affection for their steeds. This is a truism that's as alive today as it was back in WWII.

 

[model299]

I'm quite aware of that. I was just relating an experience of mine.