Battle of Britain - 80yrs Ago This Summer - Discussion Thread

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As it's now "onto another page", I'd like to chuck-in several rarer, more unusual period photographs for discussion.


First-off, THIS rather unusual shot, of a 109-'Emil' approaching, then over-flying The Eifel-Tower, summer 1940.


Perhaps someone would like to suggest the unit/staffel/JagdGeschwader & perhaps, maybe even the ACTUAL date ("If" they know ?)








I'll add some more (yet), so, please DO check-back, later this eve' !



Here's another superlative shot, of 32 Sqdn at dispersal/readiness, during Summer 1940

I've ALWAYS been particularly taken by their large/massive oversized 'GZ' squadron-fuselage-codes

LOVE this shot, as it has everything...... (Am also a huge fan of Pete Brothers, but he's NOT in this particular shot)

Hornchurch said:

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It does often make me wonder as to 'how' the Finns def' got "the best" out of the (admittedly) obsolete Buffalo, against the Russians.

BTW ; What happened to 'the one' that got salvaged from the lake, then, dubiuosly, got sent to Pensacola ?

Did they keep it in it's original Finnish-markings/camo'/insignia, like they should ?

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The Finnish Brewster is on loan to the Finnish Air Force Museum, although it's still owned by the USN Museum at Pensacola. Thankfully, the airframe is retained in its "as recovered" condition, complete with original paint and markings (image source: Wikipedia):




The Finns did so well with the Brewster for a number of reasons. Firstly, their pilots were highly experienced and so knew how to wring out every last ounce of performance from the aircraft. The same can be said of their groundcrew who found ways to overcome some of the flaws in the Wright Cyclone engine, notably its propensity for shedding oil during flight.

For much of its operational life, Finnish Brewster pilots were up against relatively inexperienced and poorly-trained Russian adversaries, often flying inferior aircraft. That aspect of the combat record is often overstated, however, because the Brewster continued to score successes late in its career against more advanced Russian aircraft, including Spitfires and P-40s.

The Finns established a robust warning system so they could engage in situations where they were likely to meet with tactical success. They also did a great job of dispersing and camouflaging their aircraft, while still enabling them to contribute to the fight.

Finally, I think the Finns benefited from their fight being something of a sideshow for the Russians compared to the threat posted by the German invasion. Thus the Finnish Brewsters never had to face the full force of USSR air capabilities. This latter point may be a little contentious but I think it has some bearing on the Continuation War.

Hornchurch said:

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It does often make me wonder as to 'how' the Finns def' got "the best" out of the (admittedly) obsolete Buffalo, against the Russians.

BTW ; What happened to 'the one' that got salvaged from the lake, then, dubiuosly, got sent to Pensacola ?

Did they keep it in it's original Finnish-markings/camo'/insignia, like they should ?


Also, as for the RAF P.39's (of 601), I both saw & loaded those 'superb' press-shots (Duxford), that made the 'net, some 10-years ago.

IIRC, the (then) commander of 601 Sqdn had a MAJOR 'downer' on the Bell product & did EVERYTHING he could, do get it 'out of service' w/601


.

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I was quoting another poster, it had some interesting stuff on the BoB.

buffnut453 said:

The Finnish Brewster is on loan to the Finnish Air Force Museum, although it's still owned by the USN Museum at Pensacola. Thankfully, the airframe is retained in its "as recovered" condition, complete with original paint and markings (image source: Wikipedia):

View attachment 591272


The Finns did so well with the Brewster for a number of reasons. Firstly, their pilots were highly experienced and so knew how to wring out every last ounce of performance from the aircraft. The same can be said of their groundcrew who found ways to overcome some of the flaws in the Wright Cyclone engine, notably its propensity for shedding oil during flight.

For much of its operational life, Finnish Brewster pilots were up against relatively inexperienced and poorly-trained Russian adversaries, often flying inferior aircraft. That aspect of the combat record is often overstated, however, because the Brewster continued to score successes late in its career against more advanced Russian aircraft, including Spitfires and P-40s.

The Finns established a robust warning system so they could engage in situations where they were likely to meet with tactical success. They also did a great job of dispersing and camouflaging their aircraft, while still enabling them to contribute to the fight.

Finally, I think the Finns benefited from their fight being something of a sideshow for the Russians compared to the threat posted by the German invasion. Thus the Finnish Brewsters never had to face the full force of USSR air capabilities. This latter point may be a little contentious but I think it has some bearing on the Continuation War.

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Yeah Buff', I was already aware of the "low-rent" training/calibre (Soviet-Pilots/crew), however, DID NOT know about Wr/Cyc', "shedding-oil" (Wow).

Must say, many thanks for replicating THAT photograph - That's THE one I always think of, when THAT Buffalo gets mentioned.

My wife's parents travelled over the Atlantic-Ocean to go visit Pensacola (amongst others), but it was JUST before the Buffalo arrived.

BTW ; to all lads reading ; I'm not doubting this MAY have worn 'other shades' BEFORE it reached Finland, BUT, these ARE the combat-colours it wore.

Am hoping/praying that "common-sense" dictates & that this SUPERB 'war-veteran' stays in her magnificent Finnish scheme/markings.

Lasty BTW, 'Buff' = I ALWAYS enjoy reading your posts, as I know you're pretty clued-in & your posts always DO make interesting reading (for me).

Cheers, 'H.C' = P.S, am NOW going back to TRY to post that wonderful 32-Squadron shot, at dispersal, of 'GZ' coded Hurricanes......

(Which reminds me - There's also a lovely Mk.I Hawker Hurricane, in Finland, today, 21st-Century, that wears it's original 1940's Finnish-paint/camo')

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I'm going to take a shot at answering. The Finns had the original B-239 Buffalo. The B-239 was lighter due to lack of SSFT and armor. It was favorably compared to other American aircraft at the time of its introduction. This was the version that was faster than the Zero. As it was the original version, it PROBABLY did not have the poor build quality of the B-339 (the F2A3). I believe that due to the climate, the B-239 suffered less from overheating.
I eagerly await correction.

pbehn said:

Park was knackered and his removal, although cast as LM hunting for glory (and I think there was an element of that) and Douglas getting shot of Dowding's loyal lieutenant lest he be awakward (again, some truth), was in fact very wise. He needed a rest and putting him in Training Command to prepare fighter pilots for the anticipated 2nd round of the Battle was not, in fact, a stupid idea. Park later grudgingly admitted that the decision was probably correct and that he'd have been no good after late 1941 had he stayed on.

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Great overall perspective, pbehn and highlights that the reasons behind those circumstances that came about and are endlessly debated are through cause and effect. Dowding was also tired; he had been in his post for four years, which for a staff officer at the time was a while, certainly at his rank. There were questions regarding his removal sooner, but under the circumstances he remained in his post for as long as he did at Churchill's behest.

Good that you acknowledge the use of Fighter Command resources against France, as wasteful as they proved to be, with a little context. In late 1940, the British government and Air Ministry could not have predicted that the German offensive against the UK would take a different form and that preparations for Barbarossa in the East changed the Nazis' focus, certainly the Blitz provided ample excuse for Fighter Command to launch the "lean into France" as Sholto-Douglas put it, given that the British nightfighter effort was just finding its feet and soldiered on with less than ideal aircraft, such as the Defiant and Blenheim until better machines like the Beaufighter overcame their bugs. That it was a failure was down to many factors, some of which could have been predicted, but overall, it appeared to be a reasonable policy following the defeat of the German offensive in late 1940. That Sholto-Douglas and Mallory, the biggest advocates for the idea should be promoted to put it into action made sense, at the time, of course.

Regarding Park and the Big Wing debate, both Mallory and Park had good reasons to believe their stances; yes, Park had used large formations before, but tactically in light of how the situation had evolved, his decisions made sense and his arguments had enormous weight, evidenced by the results being witnessed with the advent of 12 Group's Big Wings on the battlefront. Regardless of Mallory's rising star, Park was a superior tactician and he was to reapply the same logic during the defence of Malta. Getting modern fighters to the action on the beleaguered island was largely his doing.

Like all of us here, I too have read about these exchanges and these guys' dismissal and it is very easy to believe that there was some misgivings behind Park and Dowding's sudden exit from their positions, but overall, in histories, official and unoffical, the pair come out of the Battle of Britain as the heores of the story and rightly so. That Mallory comes off looking a bit like a villain is not necessarily fair, but under the circumstances might be a little valid - again however, it does boil down to perspective.

The Buffalo is one of the stars at Tikkakoski and in its original state is something to behold. I wouldn't say that in 1940/1941 the Buffalo was obsolete though, that it was problematic is a given, but it was a modern fighter, just not to the standard expected of modern armed forces equipping themselves with the best equipment at the time. The Finns got the most out of it because they did with everything they had, be it Bristol Blenheims, Gloster Gladiators, Gloster Gauntlets, Fokker D.XXIs, Fiat G.50s and other equipment they had, which could have been classed as second rate at the time.

There are examples of each of these aircraft surviving in Finland with the exception of the G.50, and the D.XXI is a partial wreck only.

Hello Nuuumannn
in fact we have had a restored D.XXI at least from 2007 onwards, in fact several years earlier but my earliest digiphoto of it is from 2007.

SaparotRob said:

I'm going to take a shot at answering. The Finns had the original B-239 Buffalo. The B-239 was lighter due to lack of SSFT and armor. It was favorably compared to other American aircraft at the time of its introduction. This was the version that was faster than the Zero. As it was the original version, it PROBABLY did not have the poor build quality of the B-339 (the F2A3). I believe that due to the climate, the B-239 suffered less from overheating.
I eagerly await correction.

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In fact Finns put in pilot's back armour before the beginning of the Continuation War (25 June 1941 - 4 Sept 1944) against the USSR. Finns also used different tactics against different Soviet fighters. Against more maneuverable I-153s Finns tried to use the boom and zoom tactic and when against much faster but less maneuverable MiG-3s they tried to lure them to a turning fight.
And B-239 was not as fast as Zero, its max speed was 484 km/h (301 mph)

nuuumannn said:

Great overall perspective, pbehn and highlights that the reasons behind those circumstances that came about and are endlessly debated are through cause and effect. Dowding was also tired; he had been in his post for four years, which for a staff officer at the time was a while, certainly at his rank. There were questions regarding his removal sooner, but under the circumstances he remained in his post for as long as he did at Churchill's behest.

Good that you acknowledge the use of Fighter Command resources against France, as wasteful as they proved to be, with a little context. In late 1940, the British government and Air Ministry could not have predicted that the German offensive against the UK would take a different form and that preparations for Barbarossa in the East changed the Nazis' focus, certainly the Blitz provided ample excuse for Fighter Command to launch the "lean into France" as Sholto-Douglas put it, given that the British nightfighter effort was just finding its feet and soldiered on with less than ideal aircraft, such as the Defiant and Blenheim until better machines like the Beaufighter overcame their bugs. That it was a failure was down to many factors, some of which could have been predicted, but overall, it appeared to be a reasonable policy following the defeat of the German offensive in late 1940. That Sholto-Douglas and Mallory, the biggest advocates for the idea should be promoted to put it into action made sense, at the time, of course.

Regarding Park and the Big Wing debate, both Mallory and Park had good reasons to believe their stances; yes, Park had used large formations before, but tactically in light of how the situation had evolved, his decisions made sense and his arguments had enormous weight, evidenced by the results being witnessed with the advent of 12 Group's Big Wings on the battlefront. Regardless of Mallory's rising star, Park was a superior tactician and he was to reapply the same logic during the defence of Malta. Getting modern fighters to the action on the beleaguered island was largely his doing.

Like all of us here, I too have read about these exchanges and these guys' dismissal and it is very easy to believe that there was some misgivings behind Park and Dowding's sudden exit from their positions, but overall, in histories, official and unoffical, the pair come out of the Battle of Britain as the heores of the story and rightly so. That Mallory comes off looking a bit like a villain is not necessarily fair, but under the circumstances might be a little valid - again however, it does boil down to perspective.

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It isn't actually my "post" I found it on another forum thrown up after Wiki on a Google search, it is by a poster called "Archimedes" as per my first line in the post, I thought it raised some great points. As far as the LM v Park Dowding debate, it was what it was, with points on both sides until those remaining in the RAF decided to write Dowding and Park out of history, which they undoubtedly tried to do. This showed them for what they were, a self seeking, self reinforcing clique. They were a group of friends of Trenchard, former university chums, Oxbridge barristers and veterans of the RAF as a force multiplier for artillery. If they belonged to the same London gentlemans club I am sure it would have been very agreeable and had "knock out blow" somewhere in the motto.

The whole thing about the big wing was it was based on absolutely nothing. When it had a success, that was only because Bader said it had. When it had a bad day, Bader and so Leigh Mallory blamed someone else. The claims were huge but there were never the destroyed machines on the ground to back it up. On the 15th September Park said it was ridiculous to claim 200 planes shot down, Leigh Mallory took pride in his "Big Wing" shooting down 100. It was a theory and strategy that accepted anything as proof. Bader was bounced on the afternoon and spun out when he climbed back up and there were no enemy aircraft they had obviously all been shot down, not gone somewhere else at 200MPH so couldn't be seen. Bader's Big Wing was overclaiming by five or ten times the actual situation, which placed all discussions of "strategy" on fantasy island where they remained throughout 1941. The Big Wing didn't deliver decisive results and if you put the claims made against the losses suffered at airfields they left unprotected it was actually a gift to the LW. Leigh Malloy always maintained at the time and later that he would deliver such a crushing blow to attacking bombers that they wouldn't return. In fact he would have inflicted few losses and his squadrons would have returned to bombed out fields having to explain where they were, this was something Bader and Leigh Mallory didn't have to do but Park and Dowding did. The Dowding system relied on squadrons being controlled from the ground as part of a group defence, Bader managed to get himself in control of 5 squadrons which was between 10 and 20% of the "A" squadrons in the RAF as his own personal tool, he could decide what to do while preparing for take off and Leigh Mallory would back him up.

Dowding wasn't liked because he told the truth as he saw it. When asked about night fighter defences, instead of berating him for being negative about the many mad cap ideas put forward, why not throw everything into what he said would work, like radar guided planes carrying short range radar themselves. After retirement he went to USA and was unpopular there, telling people to concentrate on development of fighters when they had such wonderful bombers under develpment, he may have been unpopular, but he was right

Thanks for the reply, pbehn. I agree entirely with what you add. The niggling issue I have with the Big Wing debate is not just the flaw in the concept but the single mindedness of Bader and Mallory in undermining others to get their point across. Sure, it's certainly not the first or only example where ambition gets in the way in fighting a battle, but the entire episode reeks of self-interest at the expense of the goal at hand.

Juha3 said:

in fact we have had a restored D.XXI at least from 2007 onwards, in fact several years earlier but my earliest digiphoto of it is from 2007.

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Oh that's marvellous! Is it a restoration of the wreck or a different airframe?

I did some digging. The aircraft was restored with the Karelian Wing 1984–1989 under the leadership of aircraft mechanic Heikki Äimälä. The restorers used parts from FR-110 (fuselage), FR-81 (eg propeller, small parts) and FR-137 (fuselage and cockpit parts). The engine was obtained from a Valmet Vihuri aircraft (VH-25) stored at the Finnish Aviation Museum. During the restoration, the FR-110 was practically completely rebuilt, among other things, the wing of the plane is completely new production. The restoration took about 10,000 man-hours. The FR-110 ended the war in one piece even if it had suffered a fair number of accidents during its combat career but it was always repaired. Total flying time 671 h 30 min. Ace WO V. Pyötsiä achieved 7½ air victories while flying it during the Winter War. During the Continuation War it was used by Lentolaivue 12, which was something like an Army Co-operation squadron, equipped usually with Fokker D.XXIs and Fokker C.X light bombers, where pilots flying it got 2 more kills. FR-81 was shot down on 2 Feb. 1940, its pilot, Danish volunteer Lt. Rasmussen KIA. FR-137 was lost in accident, spinning into quagmire, pilot KIFA on 19 May 1941 during the Interim Peace, time between the Winter War and the Continuation War.

Hornchurch said:

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Here's another superlative shot, of 32 Sqdn at dispersal/readiness, during Summer 1940

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I can say for sure that photograph is one of well known official photographs, at the time of a Fox film unit's arrival at Hawkinge on Monday 29 July 1940. It was a day with some decent summer weather, in the middle of a miserable spell.
On this day Nos. 32 and 610 Squadrons had flown in from Biggin Hill (Hawkinge was a satellite field). There is an equally famous photograph taken of the 610 Squadron pilots after their return from action over the Channel. They had claimed two Do 17s damaged (one was). P/O S C Norris, flying P9503, DW-D was also damaged, landing at Biggin Hill. The 610 pilots are noticeably more excited and tense than those of 32 Squadron.
The one posted shows some 32 Squadron pilots (particularly A Flight) relaxing on the grass at readiness. There is also a famous long shot of A Flight's dispersed Hurricanes. The location is on the west side of the airfield with Gibraltar Lane in the background and the same group of pilots visible in the foreground.
A couple of weeks later, when the airfields started to be bombed, such visits by civilian film units were deemed unsafe and stopped. It's why these photographs became almost iconic images of the battle, even though they were taken before it really got going. The image very similar to the one you posted found its way onto a postage stamp in 2015!

I can't date the Bf 109 flying by the Eiffel tower, but I would bet soon after the fall of France. Notice the high camouflage demarcation and lack of any camouflage on the RLM 65 of the aircraft's flank.
The emblems are blurry but I reckon the shield is that of JG 26 'Schlageter' and the 'black blob' under the cockpit is the diving cartoon raven, 'Hans Huckebein' of 5./JG 26 on the grounds that I can't make it fit any of the other emblems of the unit at the time, but it's not certain. That might help date the event.

Here is a picture of Uffz. Karl Schieffer and his Bf 109, taken at Marquise in 1940 and showing the two emblems in question (just).

nuuumannn said:

Thanks for the reply, pbehn. I agree entirely with what you add. The niggling issue I have with the Big Wing debate is not just the flaw in the concept but the single mindedness of Bader and Mallory in undermining others to get their point across. Sure, it's certainly not the first or only example where ambition gets in the way in fighting a battle, but the entire episode reeks of self-interest at the expense of the goal at hand.

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I don't think Leigh-Mallory was the villain of the piece in the way portrayed today. He was wrong about Big Wings, but more imortantly he got a lot of pilots killed for nothing in 1941.

The removal of Dowding, and to a lesser extent Park, had much to do with Air Ministry politics.

Wind the clock back to May 1940, when Sinclair assumed his office as Air Minister.

Dowding was due to retire on July 14th and Sinclair wanted to hold him to this date. This Sinclair mentioned to Churchill who wrote an angry letter to Sinclair declaring his support for Dowding and then concluded by saying that not only should Dowding's appointment be extended 'while the war lasted' but, crucially, that this would not exclude him being 'moved to a higher position, if that were thought necessary'.

Much is made of the Big Wing controversy, and Dowding's inability to counter the Luftwaffe's night bombing (nobody could have in October 1940), and it is true that these were later sticks used to beat Dowding, but they were not at the bottom of the cesspool of Air Ministry politics.
The seemingly innocuous suggestion by Churchill set alarm bells ringing in the Air Ministry. Sinclair discussed it with his colleagues of the Air Council and it certainly reached the ears of Trenchard and Salmond.

The implication was that Dowding might become, in the future, Chief of the Air Staff, a nightmare scenario in the opposition camp. The entire independent existence of the Royal Air Force, of which Trenchard was the architect, was based on the doctrine that the air would become a decisive strategic arm in its own right and determine the outcome of future wars. Salmond was both Trenchard's disciple and successor. The strategic role of the bomber was the raison d'etre of the Air Force, it was the ruling doctrine to which everything else was secondary. If Fighter Command was successful in defeating the Luftwaffe that might be negated. It would mean that defence checkmated offence and their lives' work would amount to nought. The reaction at the highest level of the RAF was that Dowding must be stopped.

The men who would eventually put the removal of Dowding to Churchill were Sinclair and Portal, but they had broad support across the Air Ministry, on the Air Council and at all levels of the RAF. Initially Churchill wavered, it took nearly two days for Churchill to finally agree that Dowding should go. He, like Beaverbrook and other senior politicians, abandoned him. Churchill did not fire Dowding, though it would have been almost impossible to remove him without the PMs approval.

It has been argued by some (including Deighton) that Churchill abandoned Dowding ('threw him to the wolves') because of an earlier disagreement about sending fighters to France, but I see little merit in this argument. I can't possibly present them all in a reply like this, but I believe it was Portal's argument that swayed Churchill. Portal acknowledged that Dowding was superb in defence, but questioned his offensive capabilities. This surely touched a nerve in Churchill, who was never happy in defence, but revelled in aggression. The resources put into Bomber Command would amply demonstrate the results of this.

To be fair to Churchill, when the Air Ministry tried to write Dowding (and Park) out of the official history of the Battle of Britain, he sprang to Dowding's defence, writing in forthright terms to Sinclair that 'The jealousies and cliquism that have led to this offence are a discredit to the Air Ministry…'

Dowding's reaction to his removal is revealing.

"Churchill told me that I was to be replaced as C-in-C Fighter Command. He told me of his surprise at this recommendation should have been made 'in the moment of victory', but did not indicate any personal opposition. It seemed natural enough to me: The Air Council had been anxious to be rid of me since before the start of the war, and this seemed to be an appropriate moment."

BTW, after his removal Dowding was told by Sinclair that he was to lead a technical mission to the US, it was Beaverbrook's idea. Dowding told Churchill that he did not wish to do so, but was convinced to go. His objective was to convince the Americans to build the Napier 'Sabre' engine. He initially convinced Roosevelt that the Americans should do so, but the decision was reversed. Dowding also managed to create a diplomatic furore ('unexpected commotion' in Dowding's words) with remarks he made about the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund which had launched a fund raising campaign in the US from the Washington Embassy. Dowding thought it a matter for the British public, referred to it as 'barefaced panhandling' and upset a lot of people on both sides of the Atlantic, including Churchill! Even his most ardent apologists, of which I am one, would not claim that he was an easy man.

Letter from Churchill to Archibald Sinclair.

Personally... I dont buy the "oh they were tired ..... were due to retire anyway" arguments for a second. Its perfectly clear (to me) that there was a concerted and organized conspiracy against both Park and Dowding.

This doesnt imply that neither made mistakes, but both were forced out, gleefully. I think Mallory was a nasty piece of work. Even in 1941 it was a scandal.

A few days later (12/4) Churchill wrote to Sinclair in no uncertain terms.

"The jealousies and cliquism that have led to the committing of this offence are a discredit to the Air Ministry, and I do not think any other Service Department would have been guilty of such a piece of work.
What would have been said if the War Office had produced the story of the Battle of Libya and had managed to exclude General Wavell's name, or if the Admiralty had told the tale of Trafalgar and left Lord Nelson out of it!...It grieves me very much that you should associate yourself with such behaviour. I am sure you were not consulted beforehand on the point, and your natural loyalty to everything done in your department can alone have led you to condone what nine out of ten men would unhesitatingly condemn."

Churchill seems to have felt that he was conned into colluding in Dowding's dismissal. He made subsequent efforts to have Dowding appointed to an operational command, first in March 1941 to Army Cooperation Command where he told Sinclair that 'nothing but good will come of it' and that it would 'give confidence to the Army'. According to Martin Gilbert, after the Crete debacle in May his first thought was to appoint Dowding to in the Middle East, though eventually it was Tedder that replaced Longmore. Dowding's retirement was gazetted on October 1st.

I would have some sympathy for Leigh Mallory, Douglas and the rest of the clique if they had anything to offer other than grand declarations of taking the fight to the enemy and delivering knock out blows. They learned nothing from the Battle of Britain because they didn't want to, they were perfectly happy with fantasy overclaiming because it suited their purpose, it still suited their purpose in France because it turned defeats into victories. The BoB proved fighters with long range were vital, did they order any? What were the British using at Dieppe in August 1942? Park completely ignored some fighter sweeps over south east England, why did Leigh Mallory believe his fighter sweeps wouldn't be ignored over France?
In July 1934 the British issued a spec/requirement for a night bomber, where was the requirement for a proper night fighter? The actual night fighters used by the British were the Beaufighter and Mosquito, both of which were designed by their manufacturers as something they thought the RAF might need, but nightfighter wasn't part of it, obviously Dowdings fault too.

IMHO the transfer of Park out of the command of No. 11 Group might not be a mistake. He has been under enormous stress many months and his health has been somewhat frail for years.

pbehn said:

In July 1934 the British issued a spec/requirement for a night bomber, where was the requirement for a proper night fighter? The actual night fighters used by the British were the Beaufighter and Mosquito, both of which were designed by their manufacturers as something they thought the RAF might need, but nightfighter wasn't part of it, obviously Dowdings fault too.

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Hi

Please define what you would class as a 'proper night fighter' in 1934 pre-radar development terms? A two-seat fighter with two pairs of eyes? With turret as in F.9/35 the following year (that's the specification for a two-seater Day and Night fighter that resulted in the Defiant and Hotspur)?

Mike