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One that could shoot down a Whitley. Dowding was a keen advocate of the only method that would work (RADAR) but was negative about the mad cap proposals that wouldn't work. Unless he was supposed to develop airborne radar and Beaufighters himself the "nightfighter" angle to his dismissal was pure fiction.Hi
Please define what you would class as a 'proper night fighter' in 1934 pre-radar development terms? A two-seat fighter with two pairs of eyes? With turret as in F.9/35 the following year (that's the specification for a two-seater Day and Night fighter that resulted in the Defiant and Hotspur)?
Mike
So, give him a nice desk job as a consultant, to be consulted as to what he would do if he was a LW commander in France faced with the RAF proposals for "leaning forward into France".IMHO the transfer of Park out of the command of No. 11 Group might not be a mistake. He has been under enormous stress many months and his health has been somewhat frail for years.
So, give him a nice desk job as a consultant, to be consulted as to what he would do if he was a LW commander in France faced with the RAF proposals for "leaning forward into France".
Personally... I dont buy the "oh they were tired ..... were due to retire anyway" arguments for a second. Its perfectly clear (to me) that there was a concerted and organized conspiracy against both Park and Dowding.
It seems to me that there were a lot of people on both sides of the Channel and both sides of the Atlantic who preferred to shoot the messenger rather than look at facts. In this instance both Goering and Leigh Mallory/Douglas were convinced that some massive aerial "Waterloo" would see them stride away from the battle as victors while Park and Galland knew they wouldn't.Bill Newton Dunn wrote a sympathetic biography of Leigh-Mallory, 'Big Wing' (maybe in response to Vincent Orange's hatchet job in his biographies of Park and Dowding) in which he illustrates a pit fall that catches far too many writers on the period. On the 7th September conference at which Park, Dowding and Evill tried to cajole Douglas into a sense of reality, Dunn wrote
"He [Dowding] was tired of the strain of the Battle and his readiness to admit defeat, expressed at the conference on 7 September, could have been interpreted as a lack of will to win."
The question is interpreted by who? By Douglas or by Dunn? Another writer might interpret Dowding's response as having the courage to see and state things as they really were, without attempting to escape the fact that they were his responsibility. Nothing that Dowding wrote, said or did would give any rational person cause to believe that he was ever ready to admit defeat.
It seems to me that there were a lot of people on both sides of the Channel and both sides of the Atlantic who preferred to shoot the messenger rather than look at facts. In this instance both Goering and Leigh Mallory/Douglas were convinced that some massive aerial "Waterloo" would see them stride away from the battle as victors while Park and Galland knew they wouldn't.
Totally agree.Galland indulged in a lot of self justification after the war, usually exonerating himself (the General of the Jagdflieger) from any responsibility for its manifest failure against the Anglo-American bombing offensives at the expense of those no longer able to defend themselves, many because they were dead.
His responses above ignore the fact that the most success that German fighters ever had against the Americans in daylight came when raids were intercepted both on the way to and from the targets by a succession of units, often having diverted or stripped away fighter escorts...exactly as Park did in 1940.
I always have a bucket of salt handy when reading Galland's post war interrogations and later opinions.
I always felt that there was a strong element of self preservation in this. Galland and Baders preferred option when they got to choose was to have as many wing men as possible around them. Even in theory Baders tactic doesn't work, you cannot be "up sun" with a 60 aircraft formation attacking a formation almost 40 miles long and 8 miles wide.Interestingly this role-reversed later in the war when the strategic bombing ramped up after the Casablanca conference. Galland was trying to get 1000 fighter`s up at once agains the Allied formations. Göring turned his idea down after months of preparation as he wanted to divert much of the fighter force towards the Allied forces which had come onto the mainland after Normandy. Galland and Milch made the case that if they let the industry get bombed the war was over anyway, so it had to have priority despite the invasion. Apparently the main issue Galland reported with the logistics of getting the fighters up was weather, and it took months of waiting to get the right conditions across Germany to permit it, by which time Göring gave it the "no" vote. Galland stated that he was therefore never able to get together a German "super-big wing". This is all from an Allied interrogation of Galland in late 45.
Galland indulged in a lot of self justification after the war, usually exonerating himself (the General of the Jagdflieger) from any responsibility for its manifest failure against the Anglo-American bombing offensives at the expense of those no longer able to defend themselves, many because they were dead.
His responses above ignore the fact that the most success that German fighters ever had against the Americans in daylight came when raids were intercepted both on the way to and from the targets by a succession of units, often having diverted or stripped away fighter escorts...exactly as Park did in 1940.
I always have a bucket of salt handy when reading Galland's post war interrogations and later opinions.
Galland indulged in a lot of self justification after the war, usually exonerating himself (the General of the Jagdflieger) from any responsibility for its manifest failure against the Anglo-American bombing offensives at the expense of those no longer able to defend themselves, many because they were dead.
His responses above ignore the fact that the most success that German fighters ever had against the Americans in daylight came when raids were intercepted both on the way to and from the targets by a succession of units, often having diverted or stripped away fighter escorts...exactly as Park did in 1940.
I always have a bucket of salt handy when reading Galland's post war interrogations and later opinions.
Si parva licet componere magnis... (Virgil).
By my personal point of view, the Luftwaffe Blitz in 1940 and the Allied air offensive were not at all, by my personal point of view, exactly comparable ...
His closest associates in his role as inspector of fighters were Kesselring, Milch, Goring, Tank, Heinkel and Messerschmitt. All of whom were alive and perfectly well during the time he was interviewed.
One shouldn't forget how young these guys were, Galland being only 33 at the end of the war.
Personally... I dont buy the "oh they were tired ..... were due to retire anyway" arguments for a second. Its perfectly clear (to me) that there was a concerted and organized conspiracy against both Park and Dowding.
This doesnt imply that neither made mistakes, but both were forced out, gleefully. I think Mallory was a nasty piece of work. Even in 1941 it was a scandal.
'Turns out from the constructor's plate located only just recently under layers of old paint that this was an original He 111 H-16 produced in Germany in or around 1943 - and then shipped to Spain where it acquired the RR engines. There are even some bullet holes suggesting that it saw 'active' service with the Luftwaffe. I was lucky enough to be present when the original 02 Grau primer was revealed on the internal wing parts. The paint for the new finish was manufactured especially for the renovation by a local automotive respray shop. The local modelling group was allowed access for photos...