Battle of Britain Claims for Victories

[BombTaxi]

I would like to thank you ALL for your excellent replies, which have given me a totally different (and more accurate) perspective of air combat and the factors affecting 'victory rates'.

I did forget that RAF aircrfat had rifle calibre m/c guns whilst the LW had cannon, sparking a long and bitter arguement in the RAF as to which way to go. As I understand it Tuck was pro cannon Bader against but - eventually (and AT LAST) - the RAF did instal cannon but after BoB was over.

Thank you all again,

weinace

I *think* I'm right in saying that a very few cannon-armed Spit IIs were deployed at the very end of the BoB. However, problems with the guns jamming made them unsuccessful, and the lessons learned were incorporated into the design of the Spit V, which, as we all know, was much more successful

 

[BikerBabe]

Something that made a difference as well, were the fact that Luftwaffe pilots rarely went on leave (- basically, it sounds like the nazi "Fight until you die"-philosophy applied), while the RAF pilots were rotated more frequently.
Thus the german pilots gathered a lot more experience, racking up victories - and were as such more skilled because of their experience - I guess.

 

[Glider]

For all practical purposes the RAF didn't use cannons in the BOB. One Spitfire squadron had them but these were soon changed back to normal Spits with 8 x 303. In addition one Hurricane (not one squadron) had 2 x 20mm which worked but the mounting impacted performance. It had some success but was shot down during the battle.

 

[Jabberwocky]

The LW experten were also protected by their squadron mates and given more scoring opportunities, often to the exclusion of less experienced/talented pilots.

I liken the tactic to teams in the Tour de France (quite appropriate, considering its on at the moment). You have one or two 'ace' riders (Armstrong, Schleck, Contador ect) that are supported and defended by their slightly less stellar, but still talented, domestiques. These guys do almost as much work as the 'aces' but don't get as much of the glory.

 

[Juha]

IIRC the British had not yet established their rotary system at the time of the BoB, IIRC it was sometimes in 1941 when RAF established its rotation system. Before that it was up to S/L, F/Lt, sqn MO, station commander or the pilot himself to suggest/order/ask reposting. IIRC one reason to the change of system was that some MOs complained to upper hierarchy that sometimes battle fatigue was noticed too late. Of course the FC rotated sqns between hectic 10/11 Groups and calmer12/13Groups during the BoB, so pilots had time to easy their nerves.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

The LW experten were also protected by their squadron mates and given more scoring opportunities, often to the exclusion of less experienced/talented pilots.

I liken the tactic to teams in the Tour de France (quite appropriate, considering its on at the moment). You have one or two 'ace' riders (Armstrong, Schleck, Contador ect) that are supported and defended by their slightly less stellar, but still talented, domestiques. These guys do almost as much work as the 'aces' but don't get as much of the glory.

In fact the majority of LW pilots were a LOT less experienced and talented than the elites. This situation got progressively worse as the war progressed.

as a rough rule of thumb, the Luftwaffe was losing about 1:1 from the second half of 1940 through to the middle of 1942 (except on the eastern front). Exchange rates then started to nosedive, such that by the middle of 1944 exchange rates were running at between roughly 3:1 and 7:1 against the LW.

This poor exchange rate was first evidenced in the polish campaign, wher Lw losses were greater than the frontline strength of the entire PAF, despite the latter being heavily outnumbered and with greatly superior types at their disposal.

To be fair, it is the norm rather than the exception that most of the killing in the air is done by a relatively small number of the pilots. Most pilots are simply there to act as decoys so as to protect experienced guys....padding if you like. this applied to the Lw, just like most of the other air forces at that time

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
I'm not so sure that your figures are correct, still in July 43 109s and 190s had a slight upper hand against Spitfires in ETO, in Nov 43 Spitfires tended to win the combats against 109s and 190s. In 41 FC claims and losses over France were in balance, but in real world FC was losing heavily, only rather bad overclaiming by FC pilots tended to hid the fact.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Hello Parsifal
I'm not so sure that your figures are correct, still in July 43 109s and 190s had a slight upper hand against Spitfires in ETO, in Nov 43 Spitfires tended to win the combats against 109s and 190s. In 41 FC claims and losses over France were in balance, but in real world FC was losing heavily, only rather bad overclaiming by FC pilots tended to hid the fact.

Juha

Hi Juha

I am still wading through a book titled 1941 - Part II - the Blitz to the non-stop offensive - The Turning Point John Foreman, Air Research Publications 1994. This book looks at the daily combats for a 7 month period, and reports the actual losses for each side. The claims previously made in this place and others about the RAF losing heavily over France in 1941 are not true, if Foreman is to be believed. And his meticulous attention to detail suggests to me he is a very good source.

Another online source, which I have not verified, looks at overclaiming. Whilst I have not checked the veracity of the claims properly, a rough check suggests this online source is broadly in agreement with the published figures by Foreman

Here is the link to the online page, if you would like to have a look.

1.JmA - luftwaffe experten, claims and facts

 

[Glider]

Rule of thumb seems to be to half all claims

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
thanks for the comments, I have both parts of 1941 on my bookselves, don't recall that Foreman revealed anything new on exchange rate, but it was fairly long ago when I read the books. But Norman Franks in his RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968 (1992) p.136 in 1941 FC figures said that up to early Sept FC had lost 273 fighters, claimed 460 destroyed, but LW losses, from all causes, for the whole of 1941 were less than 200, IMHO meaning the losses in the area where FC operated, and that was the situation just when Fw 190A began to arrive into scene.

Juha