Battle of Midway, a better plan

buffnut453 said:

You're not addressing my fundamental question of how all this was going to me controlled, nor have you addressed the assumption that the IJN aircraft might do something different than the historical record. I'm ducking out of this pointless conversation until you actually address the valid issues that are being raised.

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I'm not sure exactly why the Japanese 'doing something different' is so insurmountable. All the US fighters really need to do is inflict some massive losses on the bombers and as many as they can on the zeros also. Unlike an attack on a carrier, they don't necessarily need to do it before they drop their bombs, although that would be nice. The Japanese can't sink Midway, and historically they didn't do a lot of damage, the holes that appeared in the runway were quickly filled. Since they can't sink it, it really isn't a huge difference if they destroy the bombers on the way in or if they chase them away from the island and pick them off one at a time (getting the Kates would be 1st priority to me).

During the 2 Yorktown attacks and all of the different attacks on different carriers and Henderson field during the Guadalcanal campaign, sometimes the Japanese tried doing different things, during an attack. The US just tried to get Wildcats behind bombers and shoot them down. Not much finesses, just hitting a nail with a hammer.

If they split their force in 2, then maybe all our fighters crush one force and on the way in and then chase down the other as they retreat. Maybe the US splits their force and attacks both at once. Without a specific example of what the Japanese might do, I can't tell you what the US would do

In fact come too think of it, splitting their force would be great for the US. Everything we have aloft hit one force with only 18 Zeros vs 50-96 US fighters, depending on how many were in position. Then, after laying waste to that group, they attack the other group as they try to retreat. I would hit the dive bombers while they had their bombs if I had the choice because they are more accurate and they are more nimble without them. The Kates would be much less accurate and they are not nimble, in fact, if stripped of their escorts, they would be easy meat to wipe out.

I think all we are saying is that things aren't that easy. Command and control is hard. Identifying targets with closing speeds at hundreds if miles an hour is hard.

As for just adding more each additional plane is more space, more fuel, more parts, bullets, pilots, maintenance crew, etc. More supplies might mean more ships to carry it and so on.

When they loaded it out I'm sure they considered if there were other assets available to send and then did the calculus on where on the strength vs. cost vs. supply chain vulnerability vs opportunity cost. I've sat and talked with the planners for the Pacific fleet (circa 2000) there are an immense array of variables and they know their stuff. I'm sure it was the same during WW2. Though clearly they learned as they went along.

I understand command and control, but when you have 108 planes coming to your tiny little airstrip it isn't a huge planning issue. You get your fighters off the ground and as high as they can get as quickly as possible. Thats it. You can plan for a month, but you have a 1 square mile area they HAVE to cross, thats it. "Oh look they are coming from the north" "Oh look they are coming from the west" "Oh look they are coming from the east and west" I mean just how many variations can there be on tactics? This isn't a lot of planning or end runs or being sneaky, this is about as simple as a battle can be. On this morning we will be here at about this time. It's a bar room brawl pure and simple. I think the key is to bring more friends to the brawl than they did since we had a bit of trouble with performance.

Last try. They have to get off the ground and form up into a useful array to attack. There is very little time for them to do so. That's tricky.

Also, if the attackers see a much larger force than expected, what do they do? Maybe they jettison and run. Do you chase them? If you want to destroy their planes yes. If you want to defend the island maybe not. If you want to sink the carriers you should have likely been doing that in the first place.

Nobody is saying more planes
at Midway would have been a bad idea. We are saying that more planes is more complexity and that it would have been hard to get better results than historical. It was about 10:1 personnel losses and a 4:1 carrier loss ratio. Planners will take that kind of result any day. Boosting it to 11:1 or even 12 for increased logistical tail isn't going to sway many.

Not much comfort if you or your loved one is among the lost, but that's not how battles are planned.

Don't know if the resources existed but if the US forces had stationed 20 B-26s, piloted by AAF, Navy, or Marine crews, trained and with experience to the level of the carriers torpedo bombers, throw in some good torpedoes, and I think they could have decimated the Japanese carrier force. As it was, three out of the four B-26s attacking the Japanese reached launch range, one actually flying over the deck of one carrier machine gunning the Japanese on deck, and one almost crashing into into the island of a carrier. 15 successful attacks with each carrying two torpedoes could have done tremendous damage.

Davparlr: I agree with that assessment. Or, even better, if they could skip bomb. But, they didn't know how to skip bomb and our torpedoes were awful.

My plan is completely historical, all planes were there and just had to be loaded onto the carriers. At least the 15 Yorktown and 10 replacement Wildcats. Pilots would be displaced Lexington pilots. AAF pilots had flown P36's off a carrier before, Enterprise I believe, and there were 22 of them.

Tkdog, when, at the beginning of the war, did the Japanese EVER run from a fight? In the historical battle I believe it was cloudy since some of the defending fighters made as many as 3 passes before the Zeros intervened.

Early Wildcats were capable of about a 3 hour patrol before drop tanks, so I would put half of my force up in the air on CAP. That means the first 50 could make a pass through the Zeros and break up the formation, giving any scrambling aircraft time to climb. Since they are coming from the north, maybe the scrambling fighters climb heading south until they reach proper altitude and then turn and engage. I imagine maybe half would get to proper altitude ready to fight as the rest were strung out behind them. Bust up that first group of Zeros and the other 46 fighters are going to thin the now unescorted bombers out in a hurry

davparlr said:

Don't know if the resources existed but if the US forces had stationed 20 B-26s, piloted by AAF, Navy, or Marine crews, trained and with experience to the level of the carriers torpedo bombers, throw in some good torpedoes, and I think they could have decimated the Japanese carrier force. As it was, three out of the four B-26s attacking the Japanese reached launch range, one actually flying over the deck of one carrier machine gunning the Japanese on deck, and one almost crashing into into the island of a carrier. 15 successful attacks with each carrying two torpedoes could have done tremendous damage.

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The minimum speed of a B-26 exceeded the maximum drop speed of the U.S. air-launched torpedoes. Maybe that's why they used a bomb rather than torpedo launch

Speculation is a wonderful thing: If we had some Ham we could have Ham and Eggs, IF we had some Eggs that is...

While by no means denigrating the losses of VT-8 (Det), the USAAF B-26's, VT-8, and VT-6, all of them made their attacks, and sacrifices, before the various SBD squadrons, VT-3, and the VF-3 escort arrived on the scene. It was, in my opinion, the one-right-after-another frequency of the VT attacks that kept the Japanese off balance, impacted the coordination of their CAP, and kept their attention riveted to defensive zones closer to sea level. The VT-3 attack was the culmination of these repeated strikes.

One has to remember that the Japanese had a very good torpedo plane and even better torpedo technology. As far as they were concerned, torpedoes were the critical danger. Note that Yorktown was able, with effort, to shrug off bomb hits (a function of damage control); it was the later B5N delivered torpedoes that brought her to a final halt and started her down the road to her eventual loss.

US torpedoes, on the other hand were another issue altogether. First of all we know there were no, none, zip, zero, nada torpedo hits on any of the ships of the Kido Butai. In fact, the only torpedo hit scored by any US plane during the period of the Midway action was dropped in a night attack of a PBY on the Japanese invasion force in the wee hours of 4 June, striking a tanker, but with only minor damage as a result. For all of the bad things one can say about US torpedoes at the time of Midway, atrocious, almost suicidal, delivery profile; slow speed; short range; faulty firing mechanisms; and so on; the salient point is that the vast majority of the TBDs that were shot down on 4 June 1942 went down before being able to drop their weapon towards a given target. Probably not more than 30% of torpedo planes, including the B-26, were actually able to drop a torpedo in the general direction of a target. Certainly a gallant effort, but in the absence of fighter escorts, in sufficient numbers, they were pretty much doomed from the start.

Of course, the month before at Coral Sea, Shoho was struck by at least seven TBD delivered torpedoes. There was plenty of time to set up and execute their attacks. There is some evidence that the torpedoes dropped in this case by VT-5 had been subject to some rather meticulous maintenance rather than just being hoisted up from the magazine, given a quick once-over, and loaded on the planes. There was also a small issue of production runs. The torpedoes used by VT-5 on Shoho were of a later production run, i.e., they were newer than the remaining torpedoes aboard the ship. VT-5 losses were none, the VF-42 F4Fs had already cleared out what CAP there was and the AAA was as typical of those days, a lot of smoke and noise. Two days later, against Shokaku and Zuikaku things did not work out so well. While TBD losses were minimal, VT-5 lost none and VT-2 lost, as I recall and without looking it up, 2, the torpedo performance was abysmal, no hits at all, any that came near a Japanese ship were easily avoided.

The torpedo plane business was recognized long before the war as a quick way to ones reward

what major carrier force during WWII was ever decimated by land based air. the nearest I can think of is HMS illustrious, 10 jan 1941, in which 41 on the spot, backed up by over 70 a/c overall, not including RA assets that were also thrown into the fight, managed to surprise the CAP of just 3 a/c and nearly sink the Illustrious.

why all of a sudden have the US forces, who were incomparably less well trained than the germans in January 1941, developed skills that no other land based force, some of them with years of anti shipping experience, were ever able to achieve during the war.

Sorry guys, but im not buying any of it.

Agree with Parsifal. My plan would be, after first Japanese wave is repulsed/crushed, US carriers launch all dive and torpedo bombers with huge escort of Wildcats and P36's. fighters launch from island as carriers launch bombers saving form up time and fuel. 50-100 Wildcat and P36 escorts take historical 101 dive and 41 torpedo bombers to Japanese carriers, sweep aside Zeros and dive and torpedo bombers crush Japanese carriers. Yorktown is not lost, aircraft losses are light.

Again with the flawless navigation. They have to find the carriers to attack them. The bombers have to get there second, the fighters have to get there in time to "smash" the zeros, not an easy task.

The torpedos are probably not going to work. Bombs will work more or less as historical. Exact timing of all the above may or may not protect Yorktown.

A couple of points: 1. If I was a carrier skipper, there's no way you're going to get me to sail my ship into harm's way with a deck stacked full of stiff-wing land-lubber airplanes! No way in hell! Sure, P-36s had been delivered from carrier decks, but that was a delivery in a low-threat zone, not a combat launch, and with only a few planes on deck at a time, as they needed most of the deck for takeoff. Army pilots need considerable special training before being launched off a carrier, and the preparations for Midway were something of a mad scramble, IIRC.
2. Most of these pilots hadn't ever seen a Zero and were trained in tactics that were suicidal against it. The true appreciation of the Zero's strengths and weaknesses, and the training to counteract them, had not taken hold yet. The Akutan Zero was still in the future. I think pinsog's massive fighter force would have been in for a nasty surprise, especially as their huge numbers on a small strip would have resulted in a strung-out launch and a piecemeal arrival at the furball. The Kido Butai would have had their own "Great Midway Turkey Shoot", and the only Zeros lost might have been a few of those who expended all their ammunition.
3. Of course they didn't realize it at the time, but American torpedoes were a waste of effort, and because of its speed the B-26 was a poor choice for a torpedo bomber, besides being a tricky bastard to takeoff and land, so the idea of whipping up a force of USN/USMC crewed B-26s on short notice is absurd.
I think the historical outcome of Midway was about the best we could have expected, given the circumstances. We were granted a healthy dose of luck, which might not have blessed a revised script, so let's not rewrite history, OK?
Cheers,
Wes

Said it before and I'll say again (not being a jerk) DOCTRINE. The USN adhered to what they thought/knew was their best shot at winning the battle as did the IJN. I believe XBe02Drvr hits the nail on the head not once but three times.

Also, you have to consider that stationing your carriers south of Midway totally erases the threat of a "flanking" maneuver the USN was trying to achieve. Enterprise Hornet and Yorktown were at a spot calculated to be the surprise "gotcha" angle the IJN wasn't (hopefully) expecting.

The only thing I've ever thought could be better is if Hornet's attack hadn't gotten off track and would have put paid to Hiryu before she got off a strike on Yorktown, or that Yorktown hadn't been abandoned for so long before they tried to save her the final time.

In any event, again, I fail to see how you could improve on what was accomplished historically.

Tkdog: Historically, all the aircraft attacking from Midway flew straight to the enemy carriers and straight back to Midway (those that were left). They had the coordinates of the Japanese fleet sent to them from the Catalinas that had found them. They were flying to a precise position from a fixed position. Not even the army flyers got lost. They would also have no trouble flying back to Midway since it hadn't moved.

XBe02Drvr: If you were skipper of the USS Wasp you would have delivered a load of fixed wing Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

If you were skipper of the USS Wasp, after all the Spitfires you just delivered were destroyed as they arrived/landed, you would have delivered a second load of Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

(Spitfire pilots had 0 carrier training. All of them took off just fine and 1 even landed back aboard the Wasp without a tail hook because his drop tank wouldn't feed)

If you were skipper of the Hornet, you would have delivered 16 B25's off the coast of Japan, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

In my Midway plan, the extra Wildcats and P36's would have been delivered a couple of days before the start of the battle, with one carrier hauling a full deckload of fighters as the other provided escort, with Yorktown arriving a couple days later. They were not under fire, no one knew they were there, the only thing they had to worry about was submarine attacks and historically there were no subs in the area. The extra 15 F4F-3's from the Yorktown would be flown by Lexington fighter pilots just back from fighting Zeros at Coral Sea.

No pilot ever saw or fought a Zero until the first time he saw and fought a Zero. At the end of Midway, the F4F Wildcat was at about a 1 to 1 kill ratio with the Zero. The P36's at Pearl Harbor shot down 2 Zeros for the loss of 1, the P36's only had 1 30 caliber machine gun installed.

None of the US Navy fighter pilots at Coral Sea and most of them at Midway had ever seen a Zero, and yet, they finished up the end of these 2 battles with a 1 to 1 kill ratio.

50 of the 95 fighters on Midway would be flying CAP, Japanese appear, the other 45 are scrambled, the initial 50 jump the 36 Zeros with a diving firing pass, blowing the Japanese formation apart, scattering them, undoubtedly knocking down at least a few on the first pass while zooming up for more altitude and a second pass. Meanwhile, the other 45 planes are scrambled, because, just like in the real battle, they are in the cockpit with the engine running. If they take off 2 at a time with a 15 second interval, they can all be off the ground in 6 minutes.

The first PBY reported finding the Japanese fleet at 0534, then "many planes headed Midway" was radioed in the plain at 0544. Historically, all Midway planes were aloft by 0600, over half of these were bombers. US fighters made their first pass at 0621. That means, if, in my plan, 50 fighters are already at altitude, the absolute last guy off the runway has 21 minutes to climb up and form up with the rest of the group. Even an F4F-4 in over load can climb to 20,000 feet in 14.7 minutes. This means the very last guy off the runway should be at 20,000 feet by 0615, 6 full minutes before they historically made their first pass.

B26's carrying torpedoes should be left at Pearl Harbor. With perfect hindsight, all US torpedo bombers should have been left at home and replaced with fighters, but they didn't know that.

Peter Gunn: I am not changing any US Navy doctrine, the US Navy barely had any carrier doctrine at the time. I am saying, carry a full deckload of fighters to Midway, fly them off to Midway a couple of days before the battle and keep the carriers far enough south that they cant see them and use Midway as an unsinkable radar picket to both sight enemy raids and crush them, or at least soften them up before they get to the US carriers, which they still don't know are there.

So, historically:

The first PBY reported finding the Japanese fleet at 0534, then "many planes headed Midway" was radioed in the plain at 0544. Historically, all Midway planes were aloft by 0600, over half of these were bombers. US fighters made their first pass at 0621.

That means, if, in my plan, 50 fighters are already at altitude, the absolute last guy off the runway has 21 minutes to climb up and form up with the rest of the group. Even an F4F-4 in over load can climb to 20,000 feet in 14.7 minutes. This means the very last guy off the runway should be at 20,000 feet by 0615, 6 full minutes before they historically made their first pass.

If nothing else, even if they are not completely formed up in a perfect attack group, at the very worst there should be 96 US fighters at 20,000 feet in a big gaggle making a diving pass at the Japanese formation. This doesn't take into account that all 3 US carriers are 50 or so miles south and haven't contributed a single plane to the engagement. Lets keep US carriers hiding south of Midway and out of action for now.

US pilots have not fought Zeros yet? The 15 F4F-3's from the Yorktown would be flown by orphan pilots from the Lexington, they had just seen battle. The P36's could hold there own with a Zero in an old-fashioned dogfight (according to allied pilots who flew them against KI43's. They said the P36 could out climb a KI43 and turn with it above 180-200 mph. US tests said the P36 was faster below 10,000 or 12,000 feet) Historically, with about equal numbers meeting in combat, after Midway the Wildcat had a 1 to 1 kill ratio. 96 fighters could actually all make a single pass at the 72 bombers before the Zeros had time to intervene, then all 96 turn on the Zeros (not what i would do, but just tossing out different plans)

pinsog said:

*SNIP*

Peter Gunn: I am not changing any US Navy doctrine, the US Navy barely had any carrier doctrine at the time. I am saying, carry a full deckload of fighters to Midway, fly them off to Midway a couple of days before the battle and keep the carriers far enough south that they cant see them and use Midway as an unsinkable radar picket to both sight enemy raids and crush them, or at least soften them up before they get to the US carriers, which they still don't know are there.

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Respectfully I believe you should rethink that statement. I'm not a navy guy but I'm pretty sure the USN had been running fleet problems for about a decade and a half that included CV's in the mix. At Midway they most certainly did have a doctrine.

Not to harsh your mellow but I think I'll bow out as well, I don't see this as a viable alternative to historical, on paper it appears to work. On paper I am a dead ringer for Errol Flynn (google him if you're too young).

Cheers

Peter Gunn said:

Respectfully I believe you should rethink that statement. I'm not a navy guy but I'm pretty sure the USN had been running fleet problems for about a decade and a half that included CV's in the mix. At Midway they most certainly did have a doctrine.

Not to harsh your mellow but I think I'll bow out as well, I don't see this as a viable alternative to historical, on paper it appears to work. On paper I am a dead ringer for Errol Flynn (google him if you're too young).

Cheers

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Read Shattered Sword and The First Team volumes 1 and 2. No one, except possibly the Japanese truly understood how to operate a carrier or especially a fleet of carriers at this stage in WW2. The US war strategy before Pearl Harbor was still "sail the battleships out for a battleship fleet engagement". That alone should tell you that the US didn't truly understand how to operate their carriers. Now, I would say we adapted rather quickly, but we still learned some harsh lessons early on such as, 18 fighters is not nearly enough, carriers should operate extremely close to repel attacks to take advantage of mutual firepower, how to guide fighters using radar to most effectively intercept incoming raids, etc.

Yes the US Navy had been playing with and learning with their carriers since the 1920's, but weapons, tactics, radar and airplane performance and technology moved at a pace from 1939 to 1945 that at least rivals cell phone and computer advancements of the last 10 years. 1939 stuff was obsolete by 1940, 1940 obsolete by 1941 and so on. We barely got rid of our F3F biplane fighters before the war started. The F4F held its own, but needed replacing before the war started. The less said about the Devastator the better.

I have been reading about pacific battles for about 36 years. I learned more correct info from Shattered Sword and The First Team volumes 1 and 2 than most everything else combined. They are the best books available that i am aware of. You will get a very deep understanding of the problems of both sides concerning carrier operations.

All that being said, I am still not messing with carrier operations themselves.

My plan very simply is:
1. bring all available fighters to Midway that were actually available 21 Wildcats delivered to Noumea, 15 Wildcats traded in by Yorktown, 10 Wildcat replacements in Hawaii, and 22 P36's in Hawaii deemed obsolete by the AAF

that totals an extra 46 wildcats and 22 P36's to bolster the Midway defenses

2. deck load those fighters onto Enterprise or Hornet and let the other ship provide escort until somewhere south of Midway. This is exactly what Wasp did when twice delivering Spitfires to Malta and what Enterprise and Hornet did for the Doolittle raid. US carriers delivered P40's, P47's, and Spitfires to areas needing fighters all through out the war. Not sure why delivering 46 navy fighters and 22 P36's is such a huge problem now. The area south of Midway was free from enemy activity, no subs, no carriers and no patrol planes.

3. Midway is an unsinkable radar picket station with a now rather formidable fighter group. They know the date and approximate time of the Japanese attack, close enough in fact that pilots were in there planes with the engines running. Every single fighter and bomber was off the ground by 0600 the morning of the attack with the first attack on enemy planes starting at 0621. That gives the very last guy off the runway 21 minutes to climb to 20,000 and form up. If the P36's, a P36 can climb to 20,000 in 7.8 minutes, were the last group off the runway, the last guy would be at 20,000 by 0608 giving him 13 minutes to form up with his group.

4. The carriers could drop off the fighters from 100 miles out and simply wait and see how the first raid played out. I personally think the Japanese raid would have had a rough time. I think the bombers especially would have been decimated.

The feedback I'm getting is: 53 Wildcats, 22 P36's and 21 Buffaloes bouncing a the Japanese strike was a hopeless case for the US. I'm kind of at a loss.

At least 15 of these planes would be flown by Lexington pilots who just fought the Japanese at Coral Sea and rated the F4F-3 as equal to the Zero in climb, dive and speed, superior in firepower and protection and inferior in turn. They said if you have a height advantage the F4F-3 could handle a Zero. P36's actually have the wing loading to dogfight with a zero on equal terms above 180-200 mph.

I believe I have laid out, using history as a guide, a reasonable play showing that the US could have had 96 (give or take a couple for mechanical reasons) Wildcats, P36's and Buffalos at 20,000 feet, formed up and ready to bounce the 1st Japanese raid.

Do you guys actually think that 96 wish US fighters, with the advantage of altitude and surprise would come out on the losing end against 36 Zeros and 72 carrier bombers?

pinsog said:

I believe I have laid out, using history as a guide, a reasonable play showing that the US could have had 96 (give or take a couple for mechanical reasons) Wildcats, P36's and Buffalos at 20,000 feet, formed up and ready to bounce the 1st Japanese raid.

Do you guys actually think that 96 wish US fighters, with the advantage of altitude and surprise would come out on the losing end against 36 Zeros and 72 carrier bombers?

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It's not that easy to move squadrons of aircraft around. These aircraft all required maintenance, refuelling, and rearming and that requires having the needed numbers of trained groundcrew in place. 2ndly, Midway was a rather small island with already crowded airstrips and, again, it would not be easy, or even possible to accommodate such large numbers of aircraft at short notice. The fact that the US didn't do something so obvious suggests, that it was not easy to do, nor perhaps, even possible.