Battle of Midway, a better plan

For the record, I served nearly 9 years in the RAN 4 years on the Carrier as a PWO, reaching the rank of Lt. Some of that time was on active operations, not a shooting war, but a war of nerves against a foe at least as cunning as the Japanese. We were reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, for the record, and itt was as close to a shooting war that I ever want to get. A friend of mine ended up in the drink during those operations and went onto command a Sea Harrier squadron in the RN. I can tell you there is a phenomenon known as the fog of war that absolutely makes your pet scheme unworkable. its called the fog of war. The unknown variables that will take the best laid plans and turn them into scrap at a moments notice. Your plan is full of assumptions and what the enemy is expected to do, the very mistake the Japanese made in their over intense planning for Operation MI.

Subsequent to my Naval career I was engaged as a tutor for strategic studies units at a local uni. You could say I was a teacher of tactics and how to plan for operations.

so I am confident that I have the training to assess and comment on operational plan. I am confident to say that yours looks good, but for the reasons the vets have pointed out to you, is basically a dud plan.

XBe02Drvr said:

Like I said, I'm outta here. "The First Team" is a good book, but it ain't the Bible.
Cheers,
Wes

Click to expand...

Your the one the called me "McNamara" and yet your the one that refuses to acknowledge half a dozen blatantly wrong statements. Have a nice day.

Dude.

You have multiple veterans trying to explain to you how the military actually works. Either a bunch of people who have probably never met are carefully sculpting a troll on you or you're beating a dead horse. Which is more likely?

To address (in vain) some issues.

It appears the intel from the code breaking was correct. At the time nobody was going to bet the farm on that intel. Intel had been wrong before. They firmly believed their were spies on Oahu. That possibility has to be allowed for and it impacted the plans.

If the carriers (or even one) is covered with deck parked Army planes it's non-operational. That's risky, as pointed out above.

Sending bombers, and a mix of aircraft did more than just put the planes here. It allowed them to see if the planes worked in an operational environment. It's going to be a long war. They might also do some good at the same time.

The mission of the carriers and Lang based fleets wasn't to destroy all the planes. It was to defend Midway and sink ships. That's why they focused on defending Midway and sinking ships. Carriers are a primary target. I know you disagree, please don't say so again. The admirals at the time wanted to sink carriers. They were right as more planes back in Japan don't matter without carriers until we want to get to Japan. At which time we will have way more planes than they do as America is big.

The admirals always knew that if we could stay in the game Long enough we could win. So what they needed to do was play the Long game.

parsifal said:

For the record, I served nearly 9 years in the RAN 4 years on the Carrier as a PWO, reaching the rank of Lt. Some of that time was on active operations, not a shooting war, but a war of nerves against a foe at least as cunning as the Japanese. We were reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, for the record, and itt was as close to a shooting war that I ever want to get. A friend of mine ended up in the drink during those operations and went onto command a Sea Harrier squadron in the RN. I can tell you there is a phenomenon known as the fog of war that absolutely makes your pet scheme unworkable. its called the fog of war. The unknown variables that will take the best laid plans and turn them into scrap at a moments notice. Your plan is full of assumptions and what the enemy is expected to do, the very mistake the Japanese made in their over intense planning for Operation MI.

Subsequent to my Naval career I was engaged as a tutor for strategic studies units at a local uni. You could say I was a teacher of tactics and how to plan for operations.

so I am confident that I have the training to assess and comment on operational plan. I am confident to say that yours looks good, but for the reasons the vets have pointed out to you, is basically a dud plan.

Click to expand...

I respect anyone who has served. I also respect those on here who haven't served. I understand you disagree with me, and thats fine. There is no way to know, we can't rerun history. Without a scale Midway runway and scale airplanes its hard to know if all of the planes I want to land would fit. Who knows how well they would have gotten off the strip, how well they would have climbed, or how well they would have done if they engaged piecemeal or how well they would have done if they engaged in 3 groups, 2 groups or 1 huge gaggle. The Midway bombers found the target and what was left found Midway. We lost a lot of planes and pilots just from them getting lost.

My plan was 2 fold, land based planes thin down the carrier planes. After second japanese raid, the US carriers close in on Midway and launch a strike at the carriers. My plan was that many fewer pilots and planes would be lost because they can't find the ship.

I can't prove it would work. It can't be totally disproven. I'm here to have fun anyway and whether I agree with you or not Parsifal, your knowledgeable and state your case well. I enjoy debating you

Tkdog said:

Dude.

You have multiple veterans trying to explain to you how the military actually works. Either a bunch of people who have probably never met are carefully sculpting a troll on you or you're beating a dead horse. Which is more likely?

To address (in vain) some issues.

It appears the intel from the code breaking was correct. At the time nobody was going to bet the farm on that intel. Intel had been wrong before. They firmly believed their were spies on Oahu. That possibility has to be allowed for and it impacted the plans.

If the carriers (or even one) is covered with deck parked Army planes it's non-operational. That's risky, as pointed out above.

Sending bombers, and a mix of aircraft did more than just put the planes here. It allowed them to see if the planes worked in an operational environment. It's going to be a long war. They might also do some good at the same time.

The mission of the carriers and Lang based fleets wasn't to destroy all the planes. It was to defend Midway and sink ships. That's why they focused on defending Midway and sinking ships. Carriers are a primary target. I know you disagree, please don't say so again. The admirals at the time wanted to sink carriers. They were right as more planes back in Japan don't matter without carriers until we want to get to Japan. At which time we will have way more planes than they do as America is big.

The admirals always knew that if we could stay in the game Long enough we could win. So what they needed to do was play the Long game.

Click to expand...

I understand your reasoning and hate that some guys can get wound up. I also don't claim to know everything. Several of these gentlemen pointed out some good points. Some of these gentleman said things that were either entirely wrong or that I didn't think was a huge problem.(food fuel ammo oxygen had to be provided to the 37 bombers and crew also) Some of the things we disagree on can't be proven either way. I am not offended by anything you said even if I disagree with you.

I also understand the carriers were the prime targets. My thinking was, wear down the japanese air groups with land based fighters who's airstrip can't be sunk. Simple premise, might have been a glorious victory, might have been a complete failure, can't tell now its all just a discussion. Then the US carriers strike after the Japanese air groups have been reduced.

One thing we know now that the admirals back then didn't know, the japanese were terribly short of planes and pilots. If hypothetically all the planes on these 4 carriers were shot down in one day, the carriers would have probably taken over a year to work up new air groups.

I agree on intel. Thats why I only deck loaded one carrier and the other was for escort. The deck parked carrier planes would be fueled and armed in case of attack. They were all fighters, that would be helpful in repelling an attack. If there is a problem with the P36's then over the side they go so the Wildcats can get aloft.

I also understand that many people on here are veterans. I respect that and I respect their knowledge and if you go through my threads, many times I am simply asking about things that i don't know. That being said, just because your a veteran doesn't make them right and me wrong. The vets argue among themselves on here. All the generals and admirals on the losing side were vets to.

I'm just here to chat, learn and have fun. This can't be proven either way. I like the idea, you guys don't. Maybe I would have been the "desert fox' of the pacific with this wonderful plan of mine, maybe i would have been General Custer.

Anyway, thank you for reaching out.

Reread your first paragraph. Just because one can handle the logistics of 37 planes doesn't mean they can do it for many more. It's called the tip of the spear for a reason, there's a lot behind it to make it work.

Amateurs talk tactics, dilettantes talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.

Your right about reinforcing the position is generally a good idea. In the context of defending that position. And not allowing or factoring in other outcomes that might arise from that reinforcement process.

I think there are a few areas of potential concern that are likely to turn the assumptions that underpin your scenario on its head.

The first is what, if anything, might the Japanese do in reaction to this concentration of effort. Diverting 96 a/c away from other TOs to bolster the Midway defences is something that the US would find hard to disquise from the Japanese. Contrary to the popular narrative, the SIGINT war was not always one way….the Japanese could and did, at times gather quite accurate reports on allied dispositions. It would also I think be hard to completely hide the lack of pressure on places like Rabaul if most of the aircraft allocated to the defence of Australia (australia included NG at that time) and the SW Pacific (not designated as a separate command until 18 March) were withheld from either of those TOs. The USAAC and marine forces had deployed 108 a/c in those TOs, some of which had to be temporarily manned by RAAF personnel at that time. The most significant raids which materially affected IJN deployments were the B-25 and B-26 attacks on Rabaul carried out from February through to April. These attacks forced the IJN to reinforce their garrsons in Rabaul and Lae by more than 40 A6Ms. These were the best of the best, easily carrier qualified though they had never been assigned as such.

One of the hallmarks, brought out in shattered sword incidentally, was that the CAGs aboard the 6 fleet carriers were substantially understrength at the time of Operation MI. Akagi for example went into battle with a complement of 63 a/c. she had fielded over 73 at Pearl, and was quite capable of carrying over 80 a/c into battle. There were some hundreds of carrier qualified pilots in japan at the time of MI, but these had to be witheld because the frontiers had to be reinforced because of the pressure being applied by the allies on the empires frontiers. Losses account for some of the gaps in the CAGs, but so too was the urgent need to reinforce their air garrisons to counter the rapidly expanding (and unexpected) capabilities and strength of allied air power, which was recovering far quicker than the Japanese had thought possible. Ive read that there were over 60 zekes diverted to the NEI to deal with the rising threat coming from Darwin, for example. Not all of these could be expected to transfer to carriers, but some could.

So the first possible result of your what if, is that the Japanese might well take to opportunity to exploit and reinforce their own CAGs so that they were at full strength. At full strength, there would be five carriers available, not four, plus with a potential CAG of 360+ a/c. Further, with all the signal traffic likely to be generated around this frenzied reinforcement of Midway, there is no telling whether the Japanese might cotton on that something was afoot. This was certainly the nightmare scenario that haunted the Pac flt planners at the time. One possibility is that they might cancel their Aleutians operation and use the two carriers to reinforce the main assault. Another is that the Advance Force (containing the carriers) and the main body(containing a lot of heavy units) might trade places so that the main body undertook the bombardment of Midway with the Advance Force providing aircover against both air and surface intervention by the USN.

Im still not convinced your plan is viable, and I certainly cannot agree that it is a given that the IJN would operate in a certain predictable way. I am prepared to agree that if reinforcement was possible, with no loss to fighting efficiency and no detriment to other fronts of the TO, it might be a useful thing to do .

as a wargamer, ive fought Midway many times on the sand table. its generally a tough fight for the USN to win, they usually lose at least one more carrier than they did historically whilst the IJN usually loses only 2 or at most 3 flat tops in the exchange. add another 100 aircraft to the IJN inventory and the situation becomes hopeless for the Americans, although ive never explored the possibilities thrown up by your hypothetical.....

Just FYI, I have read Shattered Sword, First Team (both) and about every book you can think of on the Pacific War since about 1968. Again, you lay your argument out well, but the U.S. did what it did for a reason.

Also, I'm not sure I'd say that the 96 fighter bounce of the Japanese is hopeless, but coordinating and actually intercepting en mass is the problem. I think logistically this wasn't done because the U.S. made every preparation possible to get ready for the battle. Do you contend that Nimitz et.al. didn't think of something like this? From my reading I got the impression they sent everything they could to Midway, not including obsolete AAF fighters was probably thought of as a good idea.

Again, I'll leave it at that, your scenario makes sense on paper, but then again, so did the Japanese plan for Midway.

Cheers

Ok...I'm giving this one last shot.

Pinsog states that the radar operators on Midway would just tell the pilots where to go. To do that, they have to have radios that work with ALL the defending fighters. There's ZERO guarantee that USN and USAAF radios were compatible. Hell, there were problems communicating between formations of the SAME service. Doing it across 2-3 services (depending on how you assign the USMC) had never been done in mid-1942 (Guadalcanal was a later...but see below).

At Guadalcanal the F4Fs and P-39/P-400s NEVER operated as a cohesive formation for interception. Yet this is exactly what Pinsog wants 3 different types of fighters to achieve...indeed it MUST be achieved in order to establish the aspired numerical superiority. Just 'cos you have 96 planes in the air does not mean you have local, tactical numerical superiority. If each squadron goes in on its own against the Japanese formation, it's highly likely that they will be dismantled piecemeal by the defending Zeros.

Tactics and formations make a huge difference. Older division and vic tactics demanded closer formation flying and often the designation of a "tail-end-Charlie" to protect the formation's 6 o'clock. That poor bloke had to zig-zag across the back of the formation, using up much more fuel and, inevitably, the formation lead would have to slow down his speed otherwise Charlie would get left behind. The alternative is the "finger four" formation but that spreads aircraft out over a much larger area of sky. You then have problems turning the formation - the inside aircraft has to slow down almost to stalling speed while the outside aircraft has to accelerate considerably to maintain formation. Imagine trying to do this with 96 aircraft, all flying at different speeds...and you MUST keep the formation together if you're to achieve the concentration of force required.

You can't equate the logistics required for bombers with the logistics for fighters. For the former, yes, there's a lot of "stuff" but there's typically a long time between sorties to prepare. Fighters don't have that luxury. You have to turn them quickly which means having sufficient oxygen production to replenish numerous aircraft at the same time. It means being able to get POL to a larger number of airframes which means more fuel trucks or more people hand-lugging jerrycans (as was the case in Guadalcanal).

In an earlier post, Pinsog equated the presence of B-17s and Avengers as of equal importance to his plan for large numbers of fighters. That is NOT an equivalent change from the Japanese perspective. If you're planning a raid against an enemy airfield, you don't care about the bombers. You do, however, care greatly about how many fighters you're going up against. That fundamentally changes the tactical situation and the resultant decisions.

You absolutely want CAPs up and running rather than sitting aircraft on the deck. If you're taking the B-17s and other multi-engine types off the island, you have no local patrol capability which is NOT a good idea - remember the surface vessels shelling Wake? CAPs burn aircraft and crews. Without them, you risk being surprised. You can't, with hindsight, say a commander on Midway could guarantee that the Japanese would come in the morning. That was the best assessment. It proved correct. But any commander would still want to be prepared for as many eventualities as possible, which means striking a balance between conserving resources while provide sufficient advance warning.

Finally, as noted above, in order to achieve the local tactical numerical superiority, you have to get all 96 fighters into the fight at the same time. But you can only have 3 aircraft taking off at a time. Getting all of them into the air will take quite a while...and the aircraft already airborne will be circling the island waiting for the others to form up. That will also take time. The reason VMF-221 operated in the way it did was because they formed up as divisions, and each division went in almost independently. That can happen a lot faster (and had been practiced a lot) than is the case of trying to get 96 aircraft all in the air, all heading in the same direction.

Buffnut453: (I think we all got a little grouchy last night. As I stated to others above, this plan may be a horrible idea, but look at the changes made due to some of your valid points such as getting everyone launched in time to form up and different radio frequencies)

Well thought out post, thank you. I agree with many of your points, some of which I did not know, radio frequencies for one.

As is usual on discussions on the internet, some things get missed, overlooked or misread on both sides that would not happen in person over dinner. I would have absolutely kept all the B17's and Catalinas for exactly the reason you said (it was in my posts but easily missed) but all other aircraft would have been fighters. I also knew P39's and Wildcats didn't fly in the same group (I also said this above, but again, also easily missed when posts are crossing in space) Wildcats went as high as possible and P39's did the best they could or stayed low and picked off stragglers.

Your points on scrambling all fighters into 1 'gaggle' from a small airfield in the time allotted are noted and accepted also.

I would absolutely run a small CAP with a few designated fighters while letting the rest wait for the expected time of battle, fueled and armed of course.

Since all 90ish can't get into 1 gaggle and attack together:
Your thoughts on the CAP of around, say 30 fighters (none of them Buffaloes!!), diving into the Zeros as far out as they could and tying them up in a fight as the rest of the fighters scrambled, hitting the bombers as best they could when they got into action? My thinking is that, without radios, the Zeros would likely fight the CAP and never know the bombers were getting hammered by the rest of the flight. I would prefer the other fighters be formed up and attack in a group, but, it is unlikely, as you have pointed out, that they would have time. That being said, piecemeal attacks on Japanese single engine carrier planes were many times very successful, such as when I believe Alex Vraciu broke up a torpedo attack on Enterprise almost single handed. The dive bombers having a better chance to escape while the Kates (by far the most dangerous in my opinion) would be hard pressed to get away.

I read of the Germans doing that, a small group tied up the escorts while the twins rocketed a large amount of B17's from the sky. The same book pointed out that even if you sacrificed the force attacking the escorts it allowed the bombers to be worked over by unmolested fighters.

Please note: This plan does depend on the Japanese not altering their plan, they attack on the same day, same time, same force. It also depends on the US believing they know the date and approximate time of the first attack. My plan does not, and never did, expect this large force of fighters to sit on Midway for anything over 2 or 3 days, it was a "they are coming June 4th, probably in the morning" so we run in and ambush them. If, for instance, they came in from due west along with or south of the invasion force, my plan would be in trouble. My plan also treated the P36's for certain, as disposable assets that would fight 1, 2 or 3 sorties on day one of the battle and then they are probably spent. It is one reason I wasn't concerned about sending large groups of people to work on them (right wrong or indifferent, that was my thinking. I hope this explains some of the things that seem to be wrong with it, when in my head, maybe or maybe not type out, I didn't account for these things because of the expected shortness of their stay)

Peter Gunn said:

Just FYI, I have read Shattered Sword, First Team (both) and about every book you can think of on the Pacific War since about 1968. Again, you lay your argument out well, but the U.S. did what it did for a reason.

Also, I'm not sure I'd say that the 96 fighter bounce of the Japanese is hopeless, but coordinating and actually intercepting en mass is the problem. I think logistically this wasn't done because the U.S. made every preparation possible to get ready for the battle. Do you contend that Nimitz et.al. didn't think of something like this? From my reading I got the impression they sent everything they could to Midway, not including obsolete AAF fighters was probably thought of as a good idea.

Again, I'll leave it at that, your scenario makes sense on paper, but then again, so did the Japanese plan for Midway.

Cheers

Click to expand...

Thank you. I have conceded that without actually knowing the precise time the Japanese would show up, that getting 95 planes into the air, formed up, different radio frequencies, etc is in fact a pipe dream. After considering many of the things pointed out, I have amended my plan now to say:

A standing CAP of around 30 fighters, PBY calls in, radar picks them up and the rest of the group starts to launch. CAP (all one group) jumps Zeros as far out as possible, rest of flight attacks bombers piecemeal, as best they can from sighting near the island to as far out as they care to pursue. My thinking is, the Zeros would stay and fight the initial CAP fighters until they are ready to go home, without radios, the bombers, quickly drawing out of sight of the Zeros before being attacked, would have no way to call for help.

Just a thought. I also agree with your assessment, the P36's would never leave Pearl ever

The Zeros don't have the job if staying to fight the defending fighters. They are escorts. They will escort the bombers to the best of their ability.

Tkdog said:

The Zeros don't have the job if staying to fight the defending fighters. They are escorts. They will escort the bombers to the best of their ability.

Click to expand...

Correct, that is their job. But in either Shattered Sword or The First Team, Thach and his guys noticed that the Zeros seem to want to spar with the escorts rather than attack the bombers. Also, if jumped by a decently large CAP, they might assume that this was the entire Midway fighter group and think they are doing their job by only fighting them ( a very reasonable assumption on their part) and without radios, the bombers, once out of the Zeros sight, could not radio them for help.

Ive attached an article relating to a similar situation as that being hypothesized about here, the convoy battle for Operation Pedestal


http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/~/media/Files/Navy-PDFs/News-and-Events/Special Events/20120801 Operation Pedestal Aug 42.pdf

In an after action study carried out by the naval staff about 6 months after thr battle, the following conclusions were drawn....

"Operation "Pedestal" provides an example of the effectiveness of the fighter protection so provided, and also of the disastrous results accruing from lack of it and the break up of the convoy formation. The very heavy air attacks from Sardinia by over 100 escorted bombers throughout daylight hours of 12 August, when the convoy was protected by a total of 60 carrier-borne fighters, only succeeded in damaging one merchant ships and two of the escorting ships. The [FAA] fighters attacking at a distance from the convoy were usually able to break up the enemy formations sufficiently for the A/A guns of escort and convoy to be able to deal with those that got through".


50 a/c were available for CAP after the loss of the Eagle. Most of these were Sea Hurricanes, but quite a few were Fulmars and the 6 gun version of the Martlet. seven of the CAP were shot down by the enemy, and a further 6 were written off in landing accidents. Due to the relatively short endurance of the allied fighters, an average of only 13 fighters were available at any time during the day. The CAP was assisted by radar enabling interceptions to be made as far out as 30 miles. most importantly the radar assisted the CAP in coordination and teamwork.


Axis losses were exceedingly heavy, more than 30 aircraft, out of more than 140 bombers and fighters thrown at the convoy that day were lost outright, and a further 30 (approximately) forced to turn back damaged. Some of the more determined aircrews did penetrate the convoy , but none of the attacks were well co-ordinated after having run the gauntlet of the CAP and heavy AA defences.

There would be a number of differences in this hypothetical combat. There is little chance of the being "jumped" though the lack of radar , is a problem. This number of 96 is in no way comparable to the airstrikes made by the USN carriers . At high altitude, a concentrated air group of that size will be visible to the outrider pickets of the advance force for 20miles+. At an approach speed of 200mph , the airborne CAP will have about 6 mins to position themselves. Typically, the Japanese positioned their CAP at around 10000 feet . If the US fighter sweep is higher, it really could not be expected to be much higher than 20000, the IJN CAP will have to climb at a rate of a bout 2000 ft per min. I think they can do that easily.

In addition the fighters on the deck could be scrambled and should be able to reach about 5000 feet before the strike aircraft are in position. IJNs might be available for CAP because we cant be certain as to when this hypothetical strike might occur, plus we cant be certain about the total numbers of fighters that the Japanese might commit. Taking a middle ground, we could assume no draw downs from the NEI or the Sth pacific, but we probably should assume the presence of the two Aleutians carriers boosted by a few in the CAGs because losses due to weather in the approach would be less. I estimate on that the IJN carriers would have available about 106-110 Zekes, Historically half were allocated to the attacks on the atoll, whilst half were allocated to fleet defence. assuming the same proportions, we should have 53- 55 for both missions. The much greater endurance of the Zeke relative to the Sea Hurricane means that about 50% of the available CAP can be kept aloft for CAP. That gives the IJN 25-30 immediately available, and probably another 10-20 that Compare this with the lousy 13 available to the RN for Pedestal, of which just 7 or 8 might be in the correct position. how many did those inferior RN fighters bring down again ......oh yes, it was 30 with another 30 forced back damaged. These RN fighters were outperformed by many of the Axis opponents.....Me 109s, Re2001, Mc202s, Ju88s, versus Fulmars. Zekes against P-36s and clapped out F4Fs? You gotta be sh*tting me

The assumption that the US planners could base more aircraft (fighters) at Midway ignores the cascading effect on resources, fuel, food, airbase area (Midway is tiny) and drinking water only comes from a desalination plant! (that US falsely leaked to Japanese was broken before Midway). The US plan as it stands worked perfectly, they knew when the attack would occur and they sent a carrier strike to hit after IJN planes had struck Midway and were returning to their carriers.

I find it more interesting that although the IJN led the world in multiple carrier offensive ops they had an untested doctrine in defense that each carrier deck was tied up servicing its own CAP. It was only after the Midway disaster that they started dedicating a carrier to CAP. Also "Shattered Sword" says the IJN carriers were spaced 5-8km apart so when it came to AAA they were all on their own! As Parsifal described above the secret was breaking up the attack well before the fleet was reached, and without decent radar the IJN was always playing catchup.

Hi Pinsog,

I didn't read all of this thread yet, but the question you asked me was whether or not it is materially different to work on a P-36 as opposed to a P-40. The basic answer is no.

They are basically the same airframe with the P-36 having a radial that is way easier to work on than an Allison. You'd need different parts, sure, but anyone who worked on an SBD engine could work on a P-36, assuming they had the tools to remove the cowlings. Cowling tools aren't anything special, a Dzus driver is about all the special tools you need, maybe 2 sizes. The real issue is that the R-1830 in the P-36 is a 2-row radial and the SBD engine is a single-row radial. The parts are similar, but you WOULD need R-1830-specific training to be Navy-legal. In a pinch, any R-1820 or R-1830 -trained mechanic could work on the other and sometimes DID, WITH a variant-specific manual alongside. They are basically either single stage or 2-stage. The two are about the same unless you have to pull the stages apart. Then maybe you'd need a specialty wrench or two; maybe not. I have disassembled an R-1820, but have never tried to reassemble one as a runner.

I see the P-36 / P-40 as VERY similar and have seen them side by side. Interestingly enough, we had three former P-36 pilots at the event when we unveiled the brand new, baby P-36 (see below) and, to a man, all said they'd have kept their P-36s, if allowed to do so. They all considered the P-40 to be a step backwards. They felt as though the shorter-coupled P-36 was a better turner by a significant amount and that more than made up for the slight top speed increase in the P-40.

I have flown IN a P-40 but not in a P-36. I have never actually flown as PIC of either, so I don't have a personal opinion. 100% of the people I know who DID actually fly both prefer the P-36, including one modern pilot (that's what I heard, but not in person). I suppose I have to go with their opinion since they have "been there, done that," and I haven't.

I'll read the rest of the thread at a later date. Interesting read, so far.

Cheers, Pinsog!

New P-36:



Pretty bird! And looked great in formation with our Seversky AT-12 Guardsman! The AT-12 is basically a 2-seat P-35.



Can you see the resemblance? Maybe not the same family, but the same concept.

Thank you for your input Greg. Another aviation mechanic on here told me the same thing, that any of those mechanics could do basic work on the P36 if they had a manual, basically most stuff short of a full overhaul and needing a special tool here and there. One small detail, the question was "could Wildcat, Dauntless, B17 etc... mechanics work on P36's?" But you answered it when you said Dauntless mechanics could.

I look forward to your opinion when you get a chance to read the full thread.

Interestingly the "Brewster Buffalo" thread down in (I think) the technical sub-forum has some feedback from in the cockpit at Midway relevant to this thread.

Brewster pilot scrambled to intercept, couldn't make the intercept mistook the Zeros who went after him in return. Basically exactly the chaos discussed here.

I'm off to bed, can you add a link? Love to read it tomorrow

Here it is. It was in "stories" not "technical"

Brewster Buffalo F2A-3, BuNo 01562 aircraft history