Parsifal: as usual you have presented wonderful facts and a well laid out perspective. If you could send me a link where it shows the P36's at Pearl Harbor getting more guns installed before intercept, I haven't seen that before and I would enjoy reading that account.
I didn't post that.
I agree with your assessment of logistics in the Pacific (and actually in europe and north africa also. Our logistics is what allowed us success in all theaters. Most, if not all the time we simply out supplied the guys we beat)
Okay, so why post a scenario variant where logistics is basically ignored?
One thing I believe you may be missing is, my alternate battle doesn't depend on logistics like a long campaign does.
The length of the campaign is relevant only in that the nature of the logisitic challenges will change for a short sharp campaign like this, as opposed to a long drawn out one like say guadacanal. A/c need armourers, controllers, fitters, ammunition, refuellers, vehicles to move them around, hangar spaces, you name it. Take those elements away and you have amassive aircraft handling and servicing issue. What took an hour, say, to refuel, rearm, and scramble a strike or defensive CAP effort historically 9which is roughly what it did take), with the same amount of logiustic support, will take a lot longer. It might easily take 5 or 6 hours to organize your CAP, your runways might be clogged to the point of being unable to function.
I served on a carrier with a crew of 1300, and an air group of 21. The carrier had deck space to accommodate 37 a/c as designed. We still could have crammed 30 something a/c on that carrier, but the logisitic demands of modern aircraft made it inefficient to do so. It was more efficient to operate a lesser number of a/c on a day to day to day basis. Airbases are the same. They have a maximum capacity. As the Japanese found on several occasions, shuttling a/c in and out on a whim like this ruins your logistics both on a lon and short term basis.
You might argue that you could make room by removing your strike and search a/c. very bad idea. Your strike aircraft are your eyes mostly, plus there was no way before the battle of knowing that the land based strikes would not be effective. Unless we are relying on the tea leaves and crystal balls, we need those strike a/c to balance up the numbers for the carriers.
All extra 46 Wildcats and 22 P36's arrive at Midway on lets say June 3 in the afternoon. All new fighters land with full ammo and nearly full fuel tanks (they take off with full fuel and only use enough for a short flight, depending on how far away you want US carriers from Midway.
So what? They have been airborne, and at least half of them will require servicing. Because you have sucked out your pool of aircraft from allover, including the reserves, these guys arrive with no integration, no battle tactics, no experience, tired, and aircraft in need of service. Malta provides the best parallel to draw from. In the situations where spits (or hurricanes) were flown off the carrier, for the purposes of reinforcing the island defences and immediate turn around, the support crews for the squadron(s) were already on the island, more importantly the squadrons were fully trained and fully integrated so they could fight as a team, as it was losses of these hurried reinforcement efforts were always heavy. It takes time to learn the ropes, learn who goes high and who goes low, who banks left and who goes right. Your gaggle of untrained, half trained zonked out drones basically will have no chance
Moreover getting those guys onto the island, refueled and rearmed required extraordinary efforts by the existing garrison. A/C were sent out to guide the newcomers in, facilities were built in advance to house service and protect the new arrivals. Major increases in the air garrison would take months of planning in advance, you have hours.
Or carriers run up very close, fly off fighters and then retire to 50, 75, 100 miles, south of Midway) The 1st Japanese raid was expected on morning of June 4th.
Expected, but not certain, and with so many changes on your plan, compared to the historical situation, you cannot be sure of this.
NO admiral, worth his salt is going to risk his carriers by taking the carriers to within 100 miles of a disputed island. You have got to be kidding. If a transfer of this kind was attempted, you can bet your last dollar, it will be be from the maximum possible distance from the atoll. Moreover, short or long, there will be attritional losses in your relief force. This is a bunch of untrained, un-integrated wallies flying clapped out reserve aircraft without over water navigation skills. Ever been over the ocean, in the middle of nowhere and not know where your target is. Its scary. For good reason. It would not be out of the question to expect attritional losses of 30-50% in this scenario. When the Japanese tried something similar in 1944, it decimated the transferring formations before even a shot was fired. At the Marianas, where the Japanese tried a similar stunt, non combat losses from emergency transfers from the assets further south and to the west, amounted in total to over 305 of the force commitment. You can probably expect a higher attrition rate from your untrained, un-integrated forces attempting the same thing.
So expected was the attack that morning that all of the fighters not already in the air were on the runway, pilots in cockpits, engines running!
It still took a while for them to intercept, and the defending CAP could not fight as a single integrated group. Scramble was ordered shortly after the second confirmation at around 0555 hours. First interceptions were 25 minutes later by just 9 a/c, followed by a further 12 a/c with insufficient altitude to be fully effective. Your reaction times are going to be worse, much worse, no way to know for sure, but could arguably add 15 minutes to the scramble times, maybe more. During the BoB, untrained formations could usually take more than 3 times as long to scramble as fully trained formations. It led to several disaster in that battle. This would be the same.
That is pretty confident that an attack is on the way soon! If I was in charge, I am not concerned about a logistics issue, this combat is going to be a shotgun duel at 10 feet, short and violent. I want enough CAP to engage the Zero escorts and tie them up long enough for the rest of the fighters to get at the single engine Japanese carrier bombers unmolested.
You are dreaming. Logisitics 9albeit of a different nature0 is as important, or probably more important in your short shapr fight as it is in a long drawn out fight. I can see large numbers of fighters lost in the over water transfer, large numbers unserviceable after the flight, insufficient ground crews on hand to service them properly, and insufficient air traffic control to get them up in a sufficient time.
In the air, I see a disaster as well. Totally unintegrated formations, with no battle plan, no opportunity to train as a team, many of the pilots lacking the flying skills to be competitive. It would be a turkey shoot alright, a clay pidgeon shoot…of American fighters.
We all know what happens to unescorted Japanese Carrier bombers at the hands of a Wildcat, they die and they die quickly
Really? In the hands of a trained air group, flying to an agreed plan with adequate fighter control, yes. In situations where this was absent, which was the case facing VMG-221, and even moreso with the gaggle you are proposing the results would be very disappointing. Historically the the 22 defending fighters that were lost ofr written off, with the loss of 13 pilots, managed to bring down maybe, but not certain, just 4 a/c. moreover on two occasions in the historical battles they got the drop on the escorts and achieved a clear firing pass on the defending bomber formations.
No, you kid yourself yet again. It is not a given that the Japanese bombers would be hacked out of the sky. Highly unlikely actually
You say numbers don't help?
I should qualify this by saying that they don't help unless properly supported.
What would happen to 29 Hurricanes trying to intercept 72 Stuka's if 36 ME109's were 5,000 feet above them?
It was often the case in the BoB that formations of 50+ bombers escorted by 20-30 Me 109s, stacked high and above the bombers in loose escort formation would be attacked by 2 or 3 hurricanes. It was important for the hurricanes to be high and carry out a diving pass before scarpering gain height and do it allover again. 29 hurricanes would amount to a "big wing" which was found to be unworkable and inefficient in that battle.
I would guess the same thing that happened at Midway
It would be a very rare event, for a Cap to be 70+ a/c. With your 50 something defenders, you might get 20 in the first wave. They will be late, and low, fighting uncoordinated and at an altitude disadvantage
What would happen if 42 Hurricanes jumped 36 ME109's from above and then 53 Hurricanes attacked 72 Stukas in groups of 2-4?
The stukas would have bombed their target and be home for tea by the time a formation of that size had formed up. It's a ridiculous supposition, never happened, never could happen. I suggest you read a little, and study the effects of mallory's so called "big wings". They were useless and totally ineffective. As your plan would be. .
I would say the ME109's would get tied up and the Stuka's would not do well. (and at least the ME109's had radios so the Stuka's could beg for help)
If it was possible, the numbers would help, but there are so many difficulties in achieving this as to make it possible to rule out as ever happening
Also, Midway scrambled not only the rest of her fighters, I don't know how many were in the air, but also 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, and around 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive bombers, all between the sighting of the Japanese 1st attack and 0600. Either Shattered Sword or The First Team says that every airplane was off Midway by 0600, I can't remember which.
Its true, but the first interceptions by a formed up fighter group were some minutes later. Only 9 of the 27 defenders were in position, and even then the form up of this group was incomplete. The second group could only intercept with difficulty just outside the flak zone, and almost all were poorly positioned for their attacked. The second group claimed to shoot down 4 bombers but more likely managed to shoot down just two before being monstered by the A6Ms.
With another 50+ aircraft to get off the ground, response times will suffer. I think the CAP would be far too late to react if it tried to form a defence gp of more than about 15 to 20 a/c. Later with improved radar this response was increased, but not in 1942. The defenders only received 30 minutes warning of the attack from their radar. They were already alerted to the attack by the airborne PBY patrols some minutes earlier than that