Best airborne anti shipping weapon?

Seems to me the WW2 radio guided bombs were far too vulnerable to radio jamming throughout the war years and that diminishes their effectiveness compared to that of the Kamikaze.

If we are going to limit the discussion only to ships sunk, I believe the Kamikaze wins by a hair, but it is also a late war, and short duration (~ one year) methodology that is being compared to systems used throughout the war.

47 Ships Sunk by Kamikaze Aircraft

Considering the ships damaged (put out of action) the number jumps by nearly an order of magnitude to ~300

Category:Ships damaged by kamikaze attack - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Kamikaze may have been crude by today's standard but they were extremely effective. The RN USN (as did the Soviet and Chicom cavies) recognized the extreme danger and effectiveness of the Kamikaze, and especially its natural evolution into a more effective radio/TV-guided, jam resistant, long range technology. that prospect and its fulfillment has kept admirals up at night for over a half-century into the modern era as proven by the experience of the Stark, the Atlantic Conveyor, Sheffield and many others.

from wikipedia: Anti-ship missile - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In 1967, the Israeli Navy's destroyer Eilat was the first ship to be sunk by a ship-launched missile - a number of Styx missiles launched by Egyptian Komar-class missile boats off the Sinai Peninsula.
In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 the Indian Navy conducted two raids using OSA 1 - class missile boats employing the Styx on the Pakistani Naval base at Karachi. These raids resulted in the destruction or crippling of approximately two thirds of the Pakistani Navy. Major losses included two destroyers, a fleet oiler, an ammunition ship, approximately a dozen merchant ships and numerous smaller craft. Major shore based facilities, including fuel storage tanks and naval installations were also destroyed. The Osas returned to base without loss.
The Battle of Latakia in 1973 (during the Yom Kippur / Ramadan War) was the scene of the world's first combat between anti-ship missile-equipped missile boats. In this battle, the Israeli Navy destroyed Syrian warships without suffering any damage, using electronic countermeasures for defense. After defeating the Syrian navy the Israeli missile boats also sunk a number of Egyptian warships, again without suffering any damage in return, thus achieving total naval supremacy for the rest of the war.
Anti-ship missiles were used in the 1982 Falklands War. The British warship HMS Sheffield, a 4,820 ton Type 42 Destroyer, was struck by a single air-launched Exocet AShM, she later sank as a result of the damage that she sustained. The container ship Atlantic Conveyor was also sunk by an Exocet. HMS Glamorgan was damaged when she was struck by an MM38 missile launched from an improvised trailer-based launcher taken from the Argentine Navy destroyer ARA Comodoro Seguí by Navy technicians,[1] but she was able to take evasive action that restricted the damage.
In 1987, a US Navy guided-missile frigate, the USS Stark, was hit by an Exocet anti-ship missile fired by an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter plane. Stark was damaged, but she was able steam to a friendly port for temporary repairs.
In October 1987, the Sungari, an American-owned tanker steaming under the Liberian flag and a Kuwaiti tanker steaming under the American flag, the Sea Isle City, were hit by Iranian HY-2 missiles.
In 1988 ASMs were fired by both American and Iranian forces in Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf. During this naval battle, several Iranian warships were hit by American ASMs (and by the US Navy's Standard missiles - SAMs which were doing double-duty in the anti-ship role). The US Navy hit the Iranian Navy light frigate IS Sahand with three Harpoon missiles, four AGM-123 Skipper rocket-propelled bombs, a Walleye laser-guided bomb, and several 1,000 lb "iron bombs". Despite the large number of munitions and successful hits, the 1,540 ton IS Sahand did not sink until fire reached her ammunition magazine, causing it to detonate, blowing the frigate to bits.[2] In the same engagement, American warships fired three Standard missiles at an Iranian Navy corvette. This corvette had such a low profile above the water that a Harpoon missile that arrived several minutes later could not lock on to it with its targeting radars.
In 2006, Lebanese Hezbollah fighters fired an AShM at the Israeli corvette INS Hanit, inflicting battle damage, but this warship managed to return to Israel in one piece and under its own power. A second missile in this same salvo struck and sank an Egyptian merchant ship.

Shortround6 said:

For tonnage I would venture to GUESS the torpedo.

One 35,000 ton battleship equals how many smaller ships?

Between Tranto, Pearl Harbor (some ships saved by shallow water, they could only sink so far) Prince of Wales and Repulse, Yamato and Musashi and a few others the torpedo was the primary ship killer. Assisted by bombs in some cases but carrier aircraft had trouble carrying Battleship (or Heavy cruiser) "killing" bombs.

In the early part of the war the Torpedo planes had to carry the big armor piercing bombs because they were too heavy for the dive bombers. AP bombs have to be dropped from a certain minimum height for enough impact velocity to penetrate the armor. AP bombs carry much less explosive than GP bombs. US 1600lb AP bomb carried 209lb of explosive (13%) SAP bombs carried about 30% explosive and GP bombs were about 50-52% so a 500lb GP bomb had more explosive than the 1600lb AP bomb. A latter, but more common 1000lb AP bomb had 15% explosive and could penetrate a 5 in deck if dropped from 10,000ft or 6500ft in a 300kt 60 degree dive.
Japanese AP bombs used at Pearl Harbor were converted 16in shells and had 2.4% explosive.

The Guided missiles showed the way to the future.

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Thanks!
Now, to further refine, which US airborne antishipping weapon sunk the most tonnage?
I suspect the answer may be bombs.

gjs238 said:

Thanks!
Now, to further refine, which US airborne antishipping weapon sunk the most tonnage?
I suspect the answer may be bombs.

Click to expand...

It would be for the Germans as well.
Steve

Since ships vary so much in size and construction no one weapon or class of weapons is "best" for sinking all ships.

Bombs do a very good job of getting "Mission Kills", Ship is sunk or too badly damaged to continue mission or too expensive to repair. Many of the Kamikaze "damaged" ships fall into the last category. With the end of the war in sight or ending before some of those ships could be brought into a ship yard why spend money fixing a ship when you were decommissioning perfectly good ships (undamaged) ones and scrapping ships under construction?

Blowing off chunks of the topsides and causing fires does very well for that. Killing the hull takes a bit more on large, protected ships.

While many ships were damaged/sunk by chance occurrences or almost flukes, proper weapons planning and procurement wants repeatable/reproducible results.
Put that together with the fast pace of aircraft and weapon development over the 6 years of WW II and trying to figure which weapon was best by overall war record may not give the right answer.

In the 1930s carrier planes were doing good to carry a 500lb bomb or at best a 1000lb bomb. You can ruin a battleship's day with 500lb bombs but sinking it is highly unlikely unless the resulting fires get away from the damage control parties. The 500 and 1000lb bombs can't make it through the armored decks and into the magazines and engine rooms/steering spaces. 1500-2000lb could but need bigger planes to carry them and for land based planes (multi-engine bombers) such large bombs mean a much smaller chance of getting a hit (1/2 to 1/4 the number of bombs).
Torpedoes don't often set fires but do let lots of water into the ship. Battleship belt armor is almost useless against a torpedo. Few battleships ran their main armor belt more than 6-8 feet below the water line. It would have made the ship too heavy. Battleships used their width as protection with compartments (including fuel tanks) between the hull side and an inner "torpedo bulkhead" a number of feet inside the ship. The "torpedo bulkhead" was often armor or high tensile steel and intended to stop any fragments form the outer hull or intermediate bulkheads from getting into the protected spaces.
In the ongoing race/battle between attack and defense somebody came up with the bright idea of having the torpedo miss the ship completely and use a magnetic exploder to detonate the warhead under the ship, breaking it's back and/or damaging the engine rooms. Even a normal double bottom is vulnerable to such an attack and would have required even bigger ships to come up with the required protection over the majority of the ships bottom. This idea was so attractive that at least three navies tried it but with less than stellar results

As mentioned before torpedoes have to run around 8-12ft under water or deeper. Trying to run too shallow can lead to porpoising (torpedo comes out of the water and dives back in like a porpoise), which means even a destroyer is a difficult target for a torpedo. Many were sunk by torpedoes but many were missed.

Typical WWII era ocean going merchant was 8 to 10,000 tons.

However the battleship costs about 50 times as much to purchase. That's why using capital warships for commerce interdiction is crazy. You can never sink enough merchants to pay for that very expensive battleship.

davebender said:

Typical WWII era ocean going merchant was 8 to 10,000 tons.

However the battleship costs about 50 times as much to purchase. That's why using capital warships for commerce interdiction is crazy. You can never sink enough merchants to pay for that very expensive battleship.

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The sinkings are only a part of the cost. Battleships running loose on the high seas have a sea denial effect. It dislocates the the entire countries impoort systems. For both Britiain and Japan this had disastrous effects on their imports and war outputs.

What was inneffective was the "guerre De Course' campaign undertaken by the KM. hit and run attacks here and there could not dislocate the british economy enough to make a difference. and because her capital ships were placed at very high risk each time they sortied, it was indeed crazy. For the Americans, in 1944-5, with conttrol of the oceans, the release of the fast carriers (and Battleships) for commerce operations (which they did on several occasions) destroyed the Japanese economy, along with the USNs subs. this was a low risk, but highly effective campaign.

The British anti shipping campaigns against the axis, in the channel and in the Med were also highly effctive use of surface warships, including battleships. In the case of the operations against the Axis in Europe, the emphasis was more tactical, but enjoyed considerable success, contributing materially to the defeat of Rommel in North Africa (by denying him supplies and reinforcements), and denying the germans usage of channel seaborne transport 9which limited supply into occupied France, and stymied development of the Atlantic Wall

Surface commerce operaatoions were not as complete or effective as they had been in the blockade of WWI (and this was in turn not a complete blockade either), but it was useful, and cost effective, but only after control of the sea area had been achieved. For the Germans, in the Atlantic, which is what you are referring to this never happened.

Battleships didn't run loose on the high seas in either world war. They normally remained in a well protected harbor as they were too expensive to risk in combat.

Guadalcanal is a good example of this. IJN cruisers slugging it out with USN cruisers during the fall of 1942. Both sides had a bunch of battleships which could have been at Salvo Island, Cape Esperance etc.

davebender said:

Battleships didn't run loose on the high seas in either world war. They normally remained in a well protected harbor as they were too expensive to risk in combat.

Guadalcanal is a good example of this. IJN cruisers slugging it out with USN cruisers during the fall of 1942. Both sides had a bunch of battleships which could have been at Salvo Island, Cape Esperance etc.

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no not correct. At Guadacanal, and indeed for the opening campaigns generally, supply was the constraint. In other situations, battleships did cut loose, such as in the central basin, by both sides, and of course by the KM in the Atlantic.

As the war progressed the need for aircover, limited the ability of Battleships to operate independantly, but they stil operated in the desigtnated role, of course always escorted by carriers. in the end they became superfluous in the acific, but not so in the Atlantic, or at least, not as much.

Also, you show your essentially continental view of naval operations, when you equate sea denial, with "running around loose allover the ocean". BBs didnt actually have to do that in order to achieve their mission, as the Tirpitz amply demonstrated, it was still having a profound effect on commerce, even though it basically stsayed in port. Wont win a war, but has an effect on a campaign....a profound one as it turns out. For Navies that control the oceans, they can afford to put their BBs to sea, because the risks are generally manageable

Just a few convoys shot up by a battleship or two FORCES the larger navy to either STOP convoys (and trade and supply) or escort EVERY convoy with a powerful enough escort to deter the smaller navy from attacking. The Old "R" class Battleships made many an Atlantic crossing or arctic convoy run. Just keeping a few battleships in Scapa Flow means they cannot be used elsewhere. The German ships tied up a much greater number of British ships, men and fuel just by existing.

Veering a bit off topic,but the Battle of the Atlantic is usually perceived in the UK as primarily a war against the U boats. Up until the third year of the way (1942) most losses in the Atlantic were not caused by submarines at all.



Even when narrowed down to specifically British Merchant Navy losses.



Steve

davebender said:

Battleships didn't run loose on the high seas in either world war. They normally remained in a well protected harbor as they were too expensive to risk in combat.

Guadalcanal is a good example of this. IJN cruisers slugging it out with USN cruisers during the fall of 1942. Both sides had a bunch of battleships which could have been at Salvo Island, Cape Esperance etc.

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Dave AFAIK, both the IJN and USN wanted to get their BBs into the Solomon's fight, two factors kept them out of it for the most part. IJN BBs were on a short lease from Truk due to lack of sufficient fuel. Early on the USN had the same problem. BBs were the ultimate in fuel consumption. Each navy had a choice of continually operating (fighting) its light forces (DD CL CA), transports and CV assets or its BBs. Within a month after the PH attack, the USN BB force had been restored to the prewar level (7 BBs). King wanted to use them to raid the IJN outposts but Nimitz found reasons to keep them tied to the West coast mainly on convoy escort duty. The old ones weren't fast enough to work well with the CV groups.

The few times the BBs were unleashed, they proved very effective in accomplishing their missions. (Shore bombardment, AA platforms or counter-BB ops). The USN also had a problem with deployment of its BBs. One USN admiral (Halsey?) was evidently furious when he found out his BB-centered task group (the new fuel efficient fast BBs) wasn't in position to be present off Guadalcanal when it was under siege by the IJN. Later it was and proved to be a winner on November 14-15, 1942. The other problem with deploying BBs during the Guadalcanal campaign was the restricted waters. Evidently BBs like to have lots of elbow room to maneuver which didn't fit the Solomon's geography.

Good sources are Frank, Hornfischer and (of course) Lundstrom (BSCA)

davebender said:

Battleships didn't run loose on the high seas in either world war. They normally remained in a well protected harbor as they were too expensive to risk in combat.

Guadalcanal is a good example of this. IJN cruisers slugging it out with USN cruisers during the fall of 1942. Both sides had a bunch of battleships which could have been at Salvo Island, Cape Esperance etc.

Click to expand...

I seem to recall that 2 IJN battleships were sunk in the sea battles off Guadalcanal in Nov. Wasn't the USS South Dakota in one of those sea battles?

in the battle of Savo Island USS South Dakota was damaged by IJN Kirishima after an electrical failure, but then USS Washington came up and overwhelmed the Kirishima, reducing her to a flaming wreck in about 15 minutes that was scuttled by her crew

norab said:

in the battle of Savo Island USS South Dakota was damaged by IJN Kirishima after an electrical failure, but then USS Washington came up and overwhelmed the Kirishima, reducing her to a flaming wreck in about 15 minutes that was scuttled by her crew

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Nor, not to be too picky but in an effort to keep alive the memory of the worst battle defeat suffered by the USN in its history, the Battle of Savo Island is typically the title of the action off Savo Island that occurred on August 8-9, 1942. The US and RA navies lost a total of 4 cruisers a (with another damaged) to the IJN for minimal damage done to the enemy.

Battle of Savo Island - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The battle you are citing is typically referred to as the second naval battle of Guadalcanal

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

two nights earlier saw the melee that preceded it when a USN CA, CL DD force took on two IJN fast battleships and rendered one unnavigable so that it fell prey to Henderson Field based torpedo and dive bombers the following day.

Fuel didn't appear to be in short supply during June 1942.
.....1st Battleship Division (Yamato, Mutsu, Nagato) was in the vicinity of Midway.
.....Midway Invasion force included 2 BCs.
.....Kido Butai had 2 BCs for escort.
.....2nd Battleship Division (Fuso, Hyuga, Ise, Yamashiro) was in the Aleutians.

A total of 11 Japanese dreadnoughts steaming around during June 1942, none of which contributed anything to military operations. Put those same 11 dreadnoughts at Guadalcanal and they might do some good while burning no more fuel then was wasted two months earlier. Could be an interesting fight if USN reply by sending all available Pacific Fleet battleships to the Coral Sea.

davebender said:

Fuel didn't appear to be in short supply during June 1942.
.....1st Battleship Division (Yamato, Mutsu, Nagato) was in the vicinity of Midway.
.....Midway Invasion force included 2 BCs.
.....Kido Butai had 2 BCs for escort.
.....2nd Battleship Division (Fuso, Hyuga, Ise, Yamashiro) was in the Aleutians.

A total of 11 Japanese dreadnoughts steaming around during June 1942, none of which contributed anything to military operations. Put those same 11 dreadnoughts at Guadalcanal and they might do some good while burning no more fuel then was wasted two months earlier. Could be an interesting fight if USN reply by sending all available Pacific Fleet battleships to the Coral Sea.

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An unintended/unforeseen consequence of Midway: crippling the IJN battle force mobility during the crucial solomon's campaign?

Another issue the IJN had to overcome was its adherence to the prewar envisioning of the pivotal battle between BBs to decide the war's outcome. After demonstrating to the world the preeminence of the Aircraft carrier in naval warfare they couldn't decouple from their prewar expectations of how the PTO war would unfold. I don't know if that expectation aggravated the problem with logistics (BB fuel that might have been used in the Solomons was preserved for the anticipated battle) or whether the actual amount of fuel wasn't enough to do much of anything with its BBs. Maybe Parsifal or Syscom has some insight into the IJN situation.

In the South Pacific, I believe the USN had at times, the modern fast BBs Washington, the SoDac, the North Carolina, and at least seven prewar BBs tied to the rear areas. The Indiana (sister to the SoDac) arrived in November to replace her damaged sister. So it looks like if BBs were the first line order of battle, it might have been a fairly even match up.

Thee is a fundamental difference between the operations againt Midway and the Aleutioans and the operation in the South pacific. And use of Japanese battleships in anti shipping operations,have more in common with Guadacanal than they do to Midway. Midway was a short, target specific operation that placed a temporary strain on Japanese logistics, but did not overwhelm it. Basically, go in, win the decisive battle, get out. Guadacanal was fundamaentally different....a sustained campaign about control of a region rather than a specific point specific operation. Guadacanal called for aprolonged (and for the japanese unsustainable) strain on the logistc system.

There is, i would concede, another aspect to why the Japanese were unwilling to commit their battlefleet to anti-shipping operations. The Japanese were wedded to Mahanist theories of the "decisive battle", and Midway was consistent with that. so too were the USN. Both wanted to hold back their battlefleets for the "decisive battle". Midway fitted that criteria, commerce raiding did not.

The Japanese did not commit their battleships directly to anti-shipping operations, though the raid into the Indian Ocean came close, and certainly saw the IJN BBs engaged in covering operations that did allow 4 x CAs and Carrier Ryujo opprtunity to go ahead and sink close to 200000 tons of shipping. The commerce operations in the Indian Ocaean revealed the possibilities for the japanese to inhibit Allied recovery, but they failed to capaitalise, because sinking merchant ships for them was not na priority.

Milosh said:

I seem to recall that 2 IJN battleships were sunk in the sea battles off Guadalcanal in Nov. Wasn't the USS South Dakota in one of those sea battles?

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An interesting set of articles by Robert Lundgren on the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal are at The Robert Lundgren Historical Resource

Sorry it's taken so long to get back to this thread, i only get to pop in occasionaly. Certainly guided weapons like the Fritz-X were very powerful and could do a lot of damage but their use seems to me highly specialized, needing well trained crews and specially fitted aircraft.

I like the rocket for it's ubiquity. It seems like it was fitted to just about every aircraft out there (ok I'm exagerating but you know what I mean) and any reasonablly well trained crew could use them. A wing sortie from Banff and Dallachy could have thirty aircraft in it all armed with eight rockets hunting merchant shipping travelling down the Norwegian coast. That's a lot of firepower to bring in one place and had a big impact on German operations in Norway.

Would have been my M.I.L. should she have been around in those days. Just sayin.