Best Bomber Killing Aircraft......

[Erich]

no quit4e correct as the mg 131's were removed even on the R2 variant, all attacks were done on the tail gunner whether mg 131's or 2cm's with the 3cm Mk 108 for the close in up to 50 yards out.....no thanks don't like the idea of a face full of B-24 or B-17 exploding in my face.

even if the 3cm would of been removed from the 262 and it should have been and just replaced with four center 2cm cannon it would of been enough, the foursome combination already proved itself as far back as 1943 on twin engine ZG 110G-2's and the Fw 190A-6

 

[Civettone]

But no added protection, the FW190 had a lot of extra protection. Which might save the pilot. Planes can be rebuilt, with ease (relative). Pilots not.

Plus what fighter would be flying cover?

You have to be careful when making broad statements on the Fw 190 Sturm fighters. Erich can tell you more about that.

But first of all, not all Sturmjäger were uparmoured. Many even had their armour partially or completely removed to gain some speed. Most of the time the MG 131s were removed for the same reason, limiting the armament to 4 cannons (20 and 30 mm).

The heavily armed Bf 109 I suggested (or the official Bf 109G-6/R6) would be slower but only by 10-15 kmh. They would have been vulnerable against P-51s but the Fw 190 even more so!

I would also suggest removing the MG 131s on the Bf 109 and replace them with some extra armour. The Bf 109 already had a decent amount of armour anyway.

In short, I think the Bf 109G could have done what the Fw 190A-8/R2 could do but at a lower price and with an aircraft better at altitude. The Fw 190 was the better gun carrier but this means little when flying at such close distance. A Bf 109G with 3 MK 108s, extra armour and a decent inline engine with the AS supercharger would be excellent while normal Bf 109s would provide top cover.

And after that just wait for the Fw 190D.
Kris

edit: http://falkeeins.blogspot.com/2010/09/difference-between-fw190a-8r2-and-8r8.html

 

[tail end charlie]

The requirement for armour is a funtion of the lack of numbers of the luftwaffe, the more fighters there were the less concentrated defensive fire was. Loading up fighters with armour was just proof that the LW was losing the numbers game.

 

[Civettone]

Maybe you are right. But it may also be that there is a maximum of fighters in formation attacking an enemy formation. You can't simply send in 50 fighters at the same time.
Usually they attacked bomber formations in groups of 4 fighters.


Kris

 

[tail end charlie]

Maybe you are right. But it may also be that there is a maximum of fighters in formation attacking an enemy formation. You can't simply send in 50 fighters at the same time.
Usually they attacked bomber formations in groups of 4 fighters.
Kris

Given enough fighters anything is possible, if the LW had 2000 fighters available things may have been different, it is a long flight to Berlin and back.

 

[Colin1]

...if the LW had 2,000 fighters available things may have been different...

2,000 fighters when?
The Luftwaffe had the entire fighter arm in the West, a total of 3,000 fighters in mid-November 1944, carefully husbanded by Galland himself for a big-punch strike against the RAF and USAAF. These were frittered away just before, during and just after Christmas 1944 in the Ardennes, then decimated in the new year with Bodenplatte; numbers were not the problem for the Luftwaffe, it was the manner in which they were deployed.

We can only speculate on what a 3,000-fighter punch focussed on the RAF and USAAF in the air might have achieved but losses to both services would almost certainly have been unacceptably high and may well have caused the 8th AF to review their daylight bombing campaign.

 

[tail end charlie]

2,000 fighters when?
The Luftwaffe had the entire fighter arm in the West, a total of 3,000 fighters in mid-November 1944, carefully husbanded by Galland himself for a big-punch strike against the RAF and USAAF. These were frittered away just before, during and just after Christmas 1944 in the Ardennes, then decimated in the new year with Bodenplatte; numbers were not the problem for the Luftwaffe, it was the manner in which they were deployed.

I meant 2000 availableto put in the air to oppose a single attack at the start of escorted raids.

 

[Erich]

attacks in summer of 44 were done in staffel strength anywhere from 7 to a full 16 a/c and then divided into 2's possibly 4's as JG 301 did in December 44 and into 1945 in a Sturm like attack but in much smaller numbers.

by the time in the west strength by overwhelming numbers was supposed the LW was broken up for defensive actions in the east by mid-January 1945 taking the heart out of Reich defense, but back on topic.

you need a protective fighter with heavy arms slow enough to engage and give devastating blows, the Fw 190A-8/R8 delivers such a system. the 262 single seater needed a longer ranged cannon and a slower speed and really the common LW pilot was not going to be able to score even one shot with the speed ratio the jet had over the rear of a heavy bomber formation

 

[Civettone]

Strange thing though ... the bomber combat box was 12 or 16. Would make perfect sense to attack them in a similar number. But of course the formation would have to be identical to that of the bombers and that must have been tricky.

Oh, btw Erich, do Sturmgruppen/staffel still work with wingmen? Because in that case, two aircraft would attack the same bomber. But I have never read anything like it.

Kris

 

[tomo pauk]

2,000 fighters when?
The Luftwaffe had the entire fighter arm in the West, a total of 3,000 fighters in mid-November 1944, carefully husbanded by Galland himself for a big-punch strike against the RAF and USAAF. These were frittered away just before, during and just after Christmas 1944 in the Ardennes, then decimated in the new year with Bodenplatte; numbers were not the problem for the Luftwaffe, it was the manner in which they were deployed.

We can only speculate on what a 3,000-fighter punch focussed on the RAF and USAAF in the air might have achieved but losses to both services would almost certainly have been unacceptably high and may well have caused the 8th AF to review their daylight bombing campaign.

3000 fighters in mid-November? Care to elaborate that?

 

[tomo pauk]

Strange thing though ... the bomber combat box was 12 or 16. Would make perfect sense to attack them in a similar number. But of course the formation would have to be identical to that of the bombers and that must have been tricky.

Oh, btw Erich, do Sturmgruppen/staffel still work with wingmen? Because in that case, two aircraft would attack the same bomber. But I have never read anything like it.

Kris

Kris, why would it make more sense to attack 12 bombers with 12 fighters, instead of attacking them with 24 (providing you could muster those 24)?

 

[Civettone]

Yeah it wouldn't.

Only when opposed by enemy fighters do you really need a wingman.

Now that I think about it one can have both. The wingman gets released from his job of protecting the guy in front and gets his own bomber target appointed to him.
Kris

 

[Erich]

Kris and others the Sturmgruppen from July 44 onward to mid January 45 attacked by staffel with the other staffel follwed in suit the high protective gruppe with 109G's would be at least a 1000 feet higher and behind to battle P-51 escorts - if they could.

The heavy Fw's would close in in line abreast and then individually take out a bomber it was hoped, making one firing pass and if any other bombers were left staggering or not touched by 2cm/3m would then be assaulted by the successive staffels in same manner.

what JG 301 did in the first missions in November of 44 would approach by staffel strength and then break down to elements of 4 with the leader of this small formation forming the dagger or small wedge as they cut through the bombers making a much smaller target for the Us bomber gunners - again this was hoped. at this time with many raw recruits no missions under the belt they would stick close to the small formation leader to protect his flank while the small group went in with the leader the only one firing until after 2-3 missions these new pilots could get the feel and attack on their own. Of course one of the biggest problems with the "new" boyz is that they had no experience of defending themselves in a fighter versus fighter scenario the small leaders did not have the time to teach the kids except by personal example hoping the kids would make it through at least 1 mission. the experienced pilots seem to be the cadre of III./Jg 301 as they had come from the very tried and true 109G gruppen from the now defunct JG 302 already flying day ops against the US. As JG 301 did not have a protective stafflen in it's renewed formation of November 44 it depended on 2 staffels of I. and II. gruppe to provide this high cover or light staffeln while the other 2 staffels of each gruppe were called heavy to attack the bombers

 

[ivanotter]

According to Alfred Price's book "The last year of the LW 1944-45",Pg 11,

"At the end of May 1944, the LW had a total strength of about 2,800,000 men and women. The force possessed about 4,500 combat aircraft..."

According to Price the acceptance in May 1944 was:

Bf109 1,065
Fw190 841
Bf110 158 (Night fighter,, possible s.musik)

A total of 2,987 (all other a/c not so interesting)

According to Price, LW got 3,821 a/c in September 1944, 80% being Bf109 and Fw190. Fighter strength in November 1944: 3.300 a/c.

So, it is not too far off.

obviously you will need a lot of pilots to make it effective, though. And fuel.

How it can be recon'd with Cajus Bekker's claim in LW War Diaries of a fighter strength of +/- 300 (24 May 1944), i don't know.

PS: is this thread limited to German a/c vs. US/RAF bombers?

The Bf110 springs to mind (night fighter w/ s.musik) or maybe something in Japan?

Ivan

 

[Glider]

Can I ask what you are trying to say. What point are you trying to make

 

[ivanotter]

Sorry - I just stepped into Colin and Tomo's discussion whether Germany had that many a/c towards the end '44.

I just looked it up in Price's book, really.

Not really a point in itself.

Reg,

 

[cimmee]

Easy...


Me-262, no doubt in my mind.

Lousy engines, poor range, and poor guns... It was fast and pretty....

The Germans did the allies a favor by sinking a bazillion reichmarks into that beast.

3000 fighters in mid-November? Care to elaborate that?

No doubt.

Maybe 3k fighters with 300 experienced pilots and NO gasoline...

According to Alfred Price's book "The last year of the LW 1944-45",Pg 11,

"At the end of May 1944, the LW had a total strength of about 2,800,000 men and women. The force possessed about 4,500 combat aircraft..."

According to Price the acceptance in May 1944 was:

Bf109 1,065
Fw190 841
Bf110 158 (Night fighter,, possible s.musik)

A total of 2,987 (all other a/c not so interesting)

According to Price, LW got 3,821 a/c in September 1944, 80% being Bf109 and Fw190. Fighter strength in November 1944: 3.300 a/c.

So, it is not too far off.

obviously you will need a lot of pilots to make it effective, though. And fuel.

How it can be recon'd with Cajus Bekker's claim in LW War Diaries of a fighter strength of +/- 300 (24 May 1944), i don't know.

PS: is this thread limited to German a/c vs. US/RAF bombers?

The Bf110 springs to mind (night fighter w/ s.musik) or maybe something in Japan?

Ivan

Meaningless.

Where were they deployed? Italy? Russia? France? How much gasoline was available? How many experienced pilots were left?

 

[ivanotter]

Cimmee:

Meaningles or not, I tried to shed some light on the claim of 3,000+ a/c in late '44.

That, according to Price, is correct.

Also correct that the fuel situation made it rather difficult (if not impossible) to employ all the a/c.

I have a table somewhere depicting the deployment, but Western Europe would be the logical place to deploy the majority.

Yours,

 

[cimmee]

Cimmee:

Meaningles or not, I tried to shed some light on the claim of 3,000+ a/c in late '44.

That, according to Price, is correct.

Also correct that the fuel situation made it rather difficult (if not impossible) to employ all the a/c.

I have a table somewhere depicting the deployment, but Western Europe would be the logical place to deploy the majority.

Yours,

The mongoloid Nazis could have pinched off an F-15 with all of the pretty stuff..

Utterly useless as we dominated their skyscape. They had no gasoline. They had no food. They had no transport. They had no heavy bombers...

Nothing worked. Germany was a wasteland (they earned it, and I am NOT sorry).

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The mongoloid Nazis could have pinched off an F-15 with all of the pretty stuff..

Utterly useless as we dominated their skyscape. They had no gasoline. They had no food. They had no transport. They had no heavy bombers...

Nothing worked. Germany was a wasteland (they earned it, and I am NOT sorry).

And you are an idiot, and have been shown the door.