hi Freebird
Indeed the Ram tank series were a missed opportunity, and the design was a very fine one indeed.
Contrary to what most people think, Tanks are not the best weapons sytem to engage other tanks, and you dont use ones tanks to chargee, cavalry style, the enmies position. Rommel had this type of madness completely covered ....he would use his limited tank numbers to lure the British tanks out, and draw them over his AT screen of 88s and 50mm guns.
Although it was the relative weakness of the British Crusader Cruiser tanks that made this such a problem
Usually fire was opened up at around 1,200m to 1,500m range, and that to ensure the maximum number of hits were obtained whilst at the same time not being in danger of return fire. The British were usually quickly halted once this slaughter started, and it was when they were pulling back that the long range kills were achieved, the 88's not ceasing fire until the British tanks were completely out of sight, knocking out many British tanks at ranges in excess of 3 km. The assistance provided by dedicated range finding equipment also helped ensure very accuracy at long ranges.
This is the point that I was making - Of the British armour ONLY the Matilda II had any real chance to withstand AT hits at even long range (750 - 1,500m) but the lack of HE on the 2 pdr guns meant that they had no effective way to return fire. (As you pointed out)
I do not believe the germans possessed a qualitative superiority to British tanks until the latter part of 1942, and by then the Sherman was being introduced. This explains why the british were always willing to accept an engagement with German Tanks, and Germans were far less willing to do so. The damage to the British Tank forces did not come from German Panzers, it was delievered by the ATGs attached to DAK. On those occasions that pure tank versus tank engagements occurred, the british actually did quite well. But if the the germans were able to take the field (which they often did....eventually) they could recover and repair many of the tanks they had lost. If they wre forced to retreat, the shortage of ARVs in the desert meant that they tended to lose a big perccentage of their broken down vehicles
The Sherman was crap (pardon my bluntness)
The point that I was making was that Gazala was the perfect chance to crush Rommel's Africa Corps, but the chance was lost because the British Tanks were too weak to get the job done. Instead they lost the battle, surrendered 35,000+ men in Tobruk, and retreated all the way to Egypt In this battle (unlike at El Alamain, there were significant tank on tank battles, and while making a mobile attack could not use the 88's in the same degree as they could on the defensive.
We know from accounts of the battle that the British 6 pdr AT performed very well, knocking out a good number of Axis tanks. The Grant tank also made a good impression.
However, had they used the Ram Tank they could have won the battle:
The Ram tank was invulnerable except from 88's, and from the Pak 38/40's, and
The Pz Kwk 39 could punch through a Grant or Crusader at 2,000 m or more, but not on the sloped armour of a Ram Tank beyond about 500 m, if even that. (Remember that the KwK 39 was found to be largely ineffective against the KV-1, and the Ram tank was more heavily armoured than that (Ram - 87mm, KV-1 - 70 - 75mm)
On the other hand, the Grant Crusader (51mm 40mm) were vulnerable to ALL German tank guns, 37's, 50's short 75's
If I remember correctly the UK 6 pdr was similar in performance to the US 75mm, and superior to the short 75 of the Grant.
At this point in mid-42 Rommel had a limited numbber of 88's (about a dozen?), and very few of the newer Pak 40's
Does anyone have any info the OB's at Gazala?
Gazala Battle said:
Rommel's plan started to go wrong at Bir Hacheim. The Ariete and Trieste divisions of XX Motorized Corps and elements of 21st Panzer Division were held up for three hours by 7th Armoured Division's 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, dug in some four miles south east of Bir Hacheim and suffered heavy losses from their guns before over-running them.[12] The Bir Hacheim box, defended by the 1st Free French Brigade under Marie-Pierre Koenig, also proved to be a bigger problem than Rommel had anticipated, and the Ariete failed to take the position while suffering heavy losses from the French 75mm guns in the process.[13][14]
Further to the east the 15th Panzer Division had engaged 7th Armoured Division's 4th Armoured Brigade which had been ordered south to support the 3rd Indian and 7th Motorised Brigades, and inflicted heavy casualties but also took significant losses, surprised by the range and power of the 75mm guns on the newly arrived Grant tanks. The 4th Armoured Brigade then withdrew towards El Adem and spent the night bear the Belhamed supply base east of El Adem.
By late morning the Axis armoured units had advanced more than 25 miles (40 km) north but by midday their momentum had been blunted when they came into contact with and were held by 1st Armoured Division in heavy fighting which saw both sides taking losses.
On the far right of the Axis advance the 90th Light Afrika Division had engaged the 7th Motorised Brigade at Retma and forced it to withdraw east towards Bir el Gubi.
As planned, 90th Light division reached the El Adem area by mid-morning and captured a number of supply bases. The Allies were slow to react but by afternoon there was stiff fighting. The following day however, 4th Armoured Brigade were sent to El Adem and the 90th Light were driven back to the south west.
The tank battle continued for three days and with Bir Hakeim holding out, the Panzer Army Afrika found itself trapped in a region known as "the Cauldron", with Bir Hakeim to the south, Tobruk to the north, and the extensive mine belts of the original Allied front line to the west, and assailed by Allied armour from the north and east. Rommel's supply position by the evening of 31 May was getting desperate. Tasked to defend the German rear, the Ariete Armoured Cavalry Division in the meantime fought off repeated attacks by the British armoured brigades on 29 May and during the first week of June.
Panzer Army Afrika retains the initiative in "the Cauldron"
Finding himself trapped between an extensive minefield and stiff British resistance, Rommel was contemplating surrender. However, early on 29 May supply vehicles, supported by the Italian "Trieste" and "Ariete" Divisions, were able under heavy fire to penetrate the minefield north of Bir Hacheim, and move in much needed supplies to the trapped Axis forces, allowing Rommel to regain his composure.
On the night of 1 June Rommel sent the 90th Light and Trieste divisions south to renew the attack on Bir Hacheim from which position raiding groups were continually being sent to harass his supply line. Once again the assault failed and the struggle for Bir Hacheim was to continue for a further 10 days.
On 5 June Eighth Army finally launched its counter attack but the opposition had had a number of days to prepare and in the north XIII Corps made no progress. The attack by 7th Armoured and 5th Indian Infantry Divisions on the eastern flank of the cauldron launched at 2.50am on 5 June initially went well as the infantry secured objectives to plan. However, the main Axis defences were further west than expected and so when 22nd Armoured Brigade passed through they were met by intense fire and their advance checked. At dawn the 32nd Army Tank Brigade had joined the attack, advancing from the north, and had also run into heavy fire and lost 50 of 70 tanks involved.
By early afternoon on 5 June Rommel decided to attack east with the Ariete and 21st Panzer Divisions and northwards towards the Knightsbridge defensive box with elements of 15th Panzer Division. The eastward thrust towards Bir el Hatmat dispersed the tactical HQs of the two British Divisions as well as the HQs of the 9th and 10th Indian Infantry Brigades and other smaller units. Command and control broke down completely.22nd Armoured Brigade, having lost 60 of its 156 tanks, was forced from the battlefield by renewed attacks from 15th Panzer. Of the Allied attack, three Indian infantry battalions, a reconnaissance regiment and four artillery regiments were left in the cauldron. Unsupported by armour they faced an overwhelming task on 6 June and were one by one over-run.
Rommel continued to hold the initiative, building up his strength in the Cauldron and sending out thrusts at the various opposing strong points. Between 6 June and 8 June he launched further concerted attacks on Bir Hacheim but although the defensive perimeter was shrunk the French defenders continued to hold out and exact a heavy toll with their guns with the support of columns from the 7th Motor Brigade and 29th Indian Infantry Brigade which continued to harass the enemy's communications. Reinforced with a further combat group, the Axis attacked again on 9 June, finally breaking deep into the defences on 10 June. At this time the Free French position had become untenable and Ritchie ordered them to evacuate that evening.
The British Armour is heavily defeated
On 11 June Rommel pushed 15th Panzer and 90th Light Afrika towards El Adem and by 12 June had forced 201st Guards Brigade to withdraw from the Knightsbridge Box to the Tobruk perimeter. 29th Indian Infantry Brigade repulsed an attack on the El Adem box on 12 June but 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades on their left were pushed back four miles by 15th Panzer and forced to leave their damaged tanks on the battlefield unretrieved. On 13 June 21st Panzer advanced from the west to join the battle, engaging 22nd Armoured Brigade.