The Russians lost over 130000 aircraft during th war, to (very) roughly 60000 German aircraft. However 2/3 of German losses were on the western front, so in effect, and extremely roughly, we see the Germans losing about 20000 aircraft on the eastern front, to roughly 7 times that number for the russians. During 1941, the Russians lost over 30000 a/c and in 1942 about 20000, whilst German losses in the east in that 41-42 period was around 1500-2000. I dont think the 41-42 los rates ought to be considered when assessing overall performance, because many Russian a/c were caught on the ground and destroyed by land forces. Same thing happened in reverse 43-5 for the germans, but never on such a massive scale.
So, in that period 43-5, I estimate that the Germans lost maybe 18000 aircraft to the Russians 80000. That means, the Russians were losing 4 a/c for every one German. No doubt things got worse as the war drew closer to final victory. During Kursk for example, Bergstrom reports that in fighter combats, the german fighter arm was achieving victory rates of around 9 or 10 to 1. Total losses for all types to all causes 5-18 July were around 200 for the germans to about 920 for the Soviets. But as percentages of the total force structures available to each side, the germans were suffering unsustainable losses, whilst the Russians were not. The VVS emerged from Kursk with valuablke lessons learned, and numerically as strong as it went in, the germans did not. VVS training was a huge part of this disprportionate loss rates.....an average of about 20 hours pilot training is simply not enough, and this was being addressed by the end of the year (my best estimate is that the average Soviet pilot had about 100 hours by the end of 1943 a he entered front line operations. by comparison, german training times were plumetting by that time, during Kursk it was around 200-250 hours, by the end of the year, with the crisis over the Reich, it was down to about 150 hours....the qualitative edge in pilots for the germans was narrowing by that stage).
There is no sustainable argument in my view that can establish the Soviet manpower or technology was superior qualitatively in that period. But that doesnt mean the Soviets were not important or decisive. They hit upon a particulalr strategy and pursued it relentlessly. The Germans, in the end, had no solution to Soviet doggedness, but it cannot be said the germans were overpowered by quality.