Best German fighter for the Eastern Front

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More power in the Dora?

"Before us we see the Focke-Wulf 190 with no radial engine but an inline job,a Jumo 213.....The engine provides a mere 1800-1900 hp,that's not even as much as the older Fockes! And with this we shall enter the fray once more and win the war?"

From Hans Dortenmann's diary.

He did change his mind.

"...even now the machine proves its superiority with every flight. Enormous climbing ability,far better acceleration in a dive,significantly higher cruising speed and definitely improved turning capability compared to a Fw 190 or a 109. Slowly we are getting enthusiastic about the Dora 9."

Steve
 
I would have to say the Fw190, why?

1, wider undercarriage allowing operations on poor eastern fields.
2, vastly better visibility for the pilot.
3, longer range
4, superior firepower.
5, radial engine, more robust.
6, best roll rate of any fighter of ww2

Me109 was past it's sell by date in reality by 43.
 
The Bf 109 was never bested 1 on 1 by the Russians?

I bet there are an older generation of Russian fighter pilots who would disagree. It was bested by the Yak-3, Yak-9, La-5, La-5FN, and La-7. The La-7 was thought by the Russians superior to any non-Russian Allied piston aircraft and shot down Me-262's in addition to propeller aircraft.
 
The Bf 109 was never bested 1 on 1 by the Russians?

I bet there are an older generation of Russian fighter pilots who would disagree. It was bested by the Yak-3, Yak-9, La-5, La-5FN, and La-7. The La-7 was thought by the Russians superior to any non-Russian Allied piston aircraft and shot down Me-262's in addition to propeller aircraft.
You mean the Russians thought they were better than everyone else? Never! (sarcasm)
They Soviets shot down 1 Me262 with the La-7. The P51 shot down many.
La-5/7 vs Fw 190: Eastern Front 1942-45 (Duel): Dmitriy khazanov, Jim Laurier, Gareth Hector: 9781849084734: Amazon.com: Books
This book disagrees that the La-7 was better than the FW190. The Fw190 also wasn't better than the La-7; they each had their abilities, but the La-7 was very tempermental and was frequently broken down and waiting for repair.
The Me109 even later in the war was able to keep up speed-wise and Soviet pilots had a lot of respect for the aircraft even later in the war when German pilot quality dropped like a stone.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin_La-7
The twin ShVAK armament inherited from the La-5 was no longer powerful enough to bring down later, more heavily armored German fighters, especially the Focke-Wulf Fw 190, in a single burst, even when Soviet pilots opened fire at ranges of only 50–100 meters (160–330 ft).[7]

The 156th Fighter Air Corps of the 4th Air Army was the next unit to receive the La-7 in October 1944. At one point during the month, they had fourteen aircraft simultaneously unserviceable with engine failures.[7] By 1 January 1945 there were 398 La-7s in front-line service of which 107 were unserviceable.[9] By 9 May 1945 this had increased to 967 aircraft, of which only 169 were unserviceable.[10] For the invasion of Japanese Manchuria, 313 La-7s were assigned and only 28 of these were unserviceable on 9 August 1945.[11]
 
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The Bf 109 was never bested 1 on 1 by the Russians?

I bet there are an older generation of Russian fighter pilots who would disagree. It was bested by the Yak-3, Yak-9, La-5, La-5FN, and La-7.

1944 to 1945 Bf-109G6, and -109G14 with Db-605AM engines for medium altitudes had a top speed in clean fighter configuration of 413 mp/h at 16,404ft and 352mph at SL (on B4 fuels). They were also lightened up and considered very maneuverable and responsive, unless they served with gunpods, drop tanks or bombs.

Interestingly, the 1943 -109G2 wasn´t much slower either at 410mph. One may add that even the 1942 Bf-109F4 exceeded 400mph top speed.

How fast were La-5, La-7, Yak-9 and Yak-3 at these altitudes? I guess a couple of planes were faster at higher altitudes but medium altitude performance is a different aspect.
 
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Tossing the Yak-9 and La-5 in the same group with Yak-3 and La-7 is what puzzles me.
The only war-time Yak-9 that was really a performer was the Yak-9U (with VK-107), with 2000+ produced (war time total ~ 15000 Yak-9s), and it served in the last 12 months of the war. The Yak-9 fighters with VK-105 engines were having performance at the BoB level, ie. comparable with Spitfire I/II and Bf-109E. The La-5 was in the ballpark with those Western fighters, both Soviet types introduced during the winter of 1942/43.
The engines installed in La-5FN, La-7 and Yak-9U were plagued with problems at 1st, the VK-107 being wholly de-bugged earlier than ASh-82FN.
 
The Russians lost over 130000 aircraft during th war, to (very) roughly 60000 German aircraft. However 2/3 of German losses were on the western front, so in effect, and extremely roughly, we see the Germans losing about 20000 aircraft on the eastern front, to roughly 7 times that number for the russians. During 1941, the Russians lost over 30000 a/c and in 1942 about 20000, whilst German losses in the east in that 41-42 period was around 1500-2000. I dont think the 41-42 los rates ought to be considered when assessing overall performance, because many Russian a/c were caught on the ground and destroyed by land forces. Same thing happened in reverse 43-5 for the germans, but never on such a massive scale.

So, in that period 43-5, I estimate that the Germans lost maybe 18000 aircraft to the Russians 80000. That means, the Russians were losing 4 a/c for every one German. No doubt things got worse as the war drew closer to final victory. During Kursk for example, Bergstrom reports that in fighter combats, the german fighter arm was achieving victory rates of around 9 or 10 to 1. Total losses for all types to all causes 5-18 July were around 200 for the germans to about 920 for the Soviets. But as percentages of the total force structures available to each side, the germans were suffering unsustainable losses, whilst the Russians were not. The VVS emerged from Kursk with valuablke lessons learned, and numerically as strong as it went in, the germans did not. VVS training was a huge part of this disprportionate loss rates.....an average of about 20 hours pilot training is simply not enough, and this was being addressed by the end of the year (my best estimate is that the average Soviet pilot had about 100 hours by the end of 1943 a he entered front line operations. by comparison, german training times were plumetting by that time, during Kursk it was around 200-250 hours, by the end of the year, with the crisis over the Reich, it was down to about 150 hours....the qualitative edge in pilots for the germans was narrowing by that stage).

There is no sustainable argument in my view that can establish the Soviet manpower or technology was superior qualitatively in that period. But that doesnt mean the Soviets were not important or decisive. They hit upon a particulalr strategy and pursued it relentlessly. The Germans, in the end, had no solution to Soviet doggedness, but it cannot be said the germans were overpowered by quality.
 
The Russians lost over 130000 aircraft during th war, to (very) roughly 60000 German aircraft. However 2/3 of German losses were on the western front, so in effect, and extremely roughly, we see the Germans losing about 20000 aircraft on the eastern front, to roughly 7 times that number for the russians. During 1941, the Russians lost over 30000 a/c and in 1942 about 20000, whilst German losses in the east in that 41-42 period was around 1500-2000. I dont think the 41-42 los rates ought to be considered when assessing overall performance, because many Russian a/c were caught on the ground and destroyed by land forces. Same thing happened in reverse 43-5 for the germans, but never on such a massive scale.

So, in that period 43-5, I estimate that the Germans lost maybe 18000 aircraft to the Russians 80000. That means, the Russians were losing 4 a/c for every one German. No doubt things got worse as the war drew closer to final victory. During Kursk for example, Bergstrom reports that in fighter combats, the german fighter arm was achieving victory rates of around 9 or 10 to 1. Total losses for all types to all causes 5-18 July were around 200 for the germans to about 920 for the Soviets. But as percentages of the total force structures available to each side, the germans were suffering unsustainable losses, whilst the Russians were not. The VVS emerged from Kursk with valuablke lessons learned, and numerically as strong as it went in, the germans did not. VVS training was a huge part of this disprportionate loss rates.....an average of about 20 hours pilot training is simply not enough, and this was being addressed by the end of the year (my best estimate is that the average Soviet pilot had about 100 hours by the end of 1943 a he entered front line operations. by comparison, german training times were plumetting by that time, during Kursk it was around 200-250 hours, by the end of the year, with the crisis over the Reich, it was down to about 150 hours....the qualitative edge in pilots for the germans was narrowing by that stage).

There is no sustainable argument in my view that can establish the Soviet manpower or technology was superior qualitatively in that period. But that doesnt mean the Soviets were not important or decisive. They hit upon a particulalr strategy and pursued it relentlessly. The Germans, in the end, had no solution to Soviet doggedness, but it cannot be said the germans were overpowered by quality.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich
Apparently 18,000 German aircraft were destroyed on the ground/at factories during the 1942-45 campaign over Germany. Not sure if your destruction numbers include them or all the aircraft that were captured/destroyed in the ground campaigns of 1943-45 in the East and West. I know that German armor loss figures include those captured at the end of the war, so it stands to reason that the Luftwaffe loss figures might include those overrun on the ground, just as Soviet losses include the 1941-42 losses on the ground.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipment_losses_in_World_War_II
Germany: Estimated total number of destroyed and damaged for the war totaled 116,875 aircraft, of which 70,000 were total losses and the remainder significantly damaged. By type, losses totaled 41,452 fighters, 22,037 bombers, 15,428 trainers, 10,221 twin-engine fighters, 5,548 ground attack, 6,733 reconnaissance, and 6,141 transports
Again not sure if this includes those lost in the bombing of production facilities, bases, etc. or were captured in ground operations.
 
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VVS training was a huge part of this disprportionate loss rates.....an average of about 20 hours pilot training is simply not enough

I live in a flight school where taildraggers are used, and the wind is strong (conditions which might be found in Russia). With 20 hours at the maximum the majority of the students would conduct their solo flight. And with this flight time, the landings of some of them are really not what you could call "good", even with frontal wind. I will mention, however, that understanding of flight theory is usually not strong among the cases I personally know, which might contribute with some degree to their lack of skill.

In actual fact, before the war the Soviet pilots received 50 hours of flight training. Shooting and aerobatic practical training programs were removed to avoid accidents.
 
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I live in a flight school where taildraggers are used, and the wind is strong (conditions which might be found in Russia). With 20 hours at the maximum the majority of the students would conduct their solo flight. And with this flight time, the landings of some of them are really not what you could call "good", even with frontal wind.

In actual fact, before the war the Soviet pilots received 50 hours of flight training. Shooting and aerobatic practical training programs were removed to avoid accidents.

Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The officer corps was decimated in the Great Purge and operational level effectiveness suffered. The 6,000 officers lost and then the subsequent massive expansion schemes, which increased the number of personnel from 1.5 million in 1938 to five million in 1941 flooded the VVS with inexperienced personnel and the infrastructure struggled to cope. It still left the VVS short of 60,000 qualified officers in 1941. Despite the expansion of flight schools from 12 to 83 from 1937 to June 1941, the schools lacked half their flight instructors and half of their alloted fuel supplies. Combined with these events, training was shortened a total of seven times in 1939-1940. The attrition and loss of experienced pilots in Barbarossa encouraged a culture of rapid promotion to positions beyond some pilots' level of competence. It created severe operational difficulties for the VVS.[81][82]

The process of modernisation in the VVS' frontline strength had started to gain pace and strength. The alleged technical primitivism of Soviet aircraft is a myth. The Polikarpov I-16 fighter and Tupolev SB bomber was just as capable as foreign aircraft. In 1941, the Ilyushin Il-2, Yakovlev Yak-1, Lavochkin-Gorbunov-Gudkov LaGG-3, Petlyakov Pe-2 and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 were comparable to the best in the World.[50] Only 37 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-1 and 201 MiG-3s were operational on 22 June, and only four pilots had been trained to fly them.[83] The attempt to familiarise pilots with these types resulted in the loss of 141 pilots killed and 138 aircraft written off in accidents in the first quarter of 1941 alone.[64] On 31 August, the first foreign aircraft arrived. The Curtiss P-40 Warhawk was among those handed over but the Soviets did not have Russian-language manuals. The type was evaluated and made it into operations in September/October 1941.[84]

Apparently accidents were a significant issue, but not that much more than that of the Germans according to Williamson Murray; if anything there was just a lack of instructors and massive expansion going on while Stalin purged the VVS.

Plus there was another purge in 1941-42:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purge_of_the_Red_Army_in_1941
Soviet industry was highly productive, and on the eve of Barbarossa, possessed at least 9,576 frontline aircraft which made it the largest air force in the World. However, its equipment, like that of the Red Army, was largely obsolescent and suffering from prolonged use. The Great Purges had also hit aircraft manufacturers, and the loss of personnel ended the Soviet lead in aircraft design and aeronautics. At least one designer was shot for a charge of sabotage on the crash of an aircraft, and many designers were sent to Gulags.[77] Indeed, the Head of the VVS, Yakov Alksnis was shot and 400 to 500 aero engineers were arrested from the Commissariat of Aviation Industry. Some 70 were shot and 100 dies in forced labour camps. The others were later put into prison workshops, and allowed to continue their work. The aviation industry was disrupted, severely, and while the damage caused was later patched up in 1941, months of idleness and disorganisation contributed to the disasters in 1941.[78]
 
The Polikarpov I-16 fighter and Tupolev SB bomber was just as capable as foreign aircraft

This is a joke, specially in the case of the I-16. If the I-16 was employed by experienced pilots with the proper tactics, it could fare better than usually was historically. Even so, the flexibility for the pilots flying it was limited, and the German could engage and desingage at will. The I-16 vs the 109F match was probably worse than a Zero vs a Hellcat.
 
This is a joke, specially in the case of the I-16. If the I-16 was employed by experienced pilots with the proper tactics, it could fare better than usually was historically. Even so, the flexibility for the pilots flying it was limited, and the German could engage and desingage at will. The I-16 vs the 109F match was probably worse than a Zero vs a Hellcat.
I assume the author means that the type was just as good as the equivalent western models, which the Me109 wasn't, as it came a design generation later.
 
This thread has been very informative. Many things that I do not know about the Russian front.
 
Speed is nothing if your engine won't start..........

Which brings us to yet another important aspect. Bf-109G14 and late G6 with DB-601AM attained slightly -or notably higher top speeds (depending on where You look at) using the normal B4 grade fuels, while the Fw-190A -and most of the high performance -190D were entirely dependent on higher grade C3 fuels. The latter was less aviable in late war and more needed in the defense of the Reich against more capable higher altitude opponents.

If You want to boost mid altitude performance further, go on and use a cleaned up Bf-109G10, or -K4 airframe with Db-601AM or Db-601DM, in combination with C3 fuels.

But with B4 beeing more common, the Bf-109G becomes logistically more feasable on the Eastern front and frees up C3 for the west. Even less refined, J3 diesel fuel could be used for jets but the only jet which makes sense against the East late war in the defensive role is the He-162A in my mind, and those jets appeared unfrequently.
 
Actually about 60% of fuel production in 1944/5 was C3.

Technical Report 145-45 - Table of Contents

The shortage was of both grades of fuel,combined with an inability to move fuel already produced to where it was needed.

The engine/fuel situation was much more complicated as well.

The Fw 190 D used B4 fuel in its Jumo 213.

Dietmar Hermann:

"The condition representative of standard production Fw 190 D-9's during 1945 is as follows: Jumo 213A operating at 1.8 ata with B4 fuel MW 50"

Whenever a fuel triangle is visible it is usually a factory standard "B4 OKt 87" or rarely a simple "B4".

Also later versions of the DB 605 (I don't think you meant 601 :) ) could use B4 fuel.

Cheers

Steve
 
Hey Bob,

Don't believe everything you read.

In the Spanish Civil War, the I-16's didn't meet any Bf 109F's. They fought Bf 109B and C models, and weren't overwhelmed by the Bf 109, but by the numbers of them. Individually, the I-16 was a match for the Bf 109 B / C as an aircraft. Whether or not it was during the fight was determined by the pilots. The I-16 was quite good, but had reached its development potential while the Bf 109 was just getting developed into a combat-ready fighter. With the arrival of the Emil model, the I-16 was outclassed.

The Soviet Union stayed with the I-16 longer than was advisable and, by the time it DID meet with the Bf 109F on the Russian Front, it WAS oboslescent. They continued with it while they developed the Yaks, Lavochkins, and MiGs. And the Soviet Union didn't get shot down in droves in the 1943 - 1945 timeframe ... that's when THEY shot down a LOT of Germans.

That's what my readings have indicated and that's what was said to be by several former WWII Russian pilots as well as at least 3 more modern former Soviet pilots who were out of the cockpit and visiting the USA to purchase modems for their communication network said. One in particular said his instructors, who were former WWII fighter pilots, said that while the Germans frollicked early in the war, the Soviet pilots would hunt them down in packs after mid-1943. The Soviets particularly enjoyed attacking German airfields in bad weather when the Germans were grounded but the Soviets were operating. By summer of 1944, the Germans were still there, but were basically being systematically eliminated as they were found. By early 1945, they were almost gone on the Russian Front and only a small handful were still operational. Near the end, the resistance that existed was almost all ground forces with only the occasional odd German fighter to deal with.

Numbers aside (accurate records for them don't exist in Russia), the Soviet Air Force after mid-1943 was a better force than the Luftwaffe, especially at lower altituides where they mostly operated. The MiG-3 was one of the few higher-altitude fighters in Soviet service. Most of the rest had single-stage superchargers and were good up to about 16,000 - 18,000 feet, after which the Bf 109 and Fw 190 had the edge. So the Soviets declined to go up and fight, instead prefgerring to attack German troops and force the Luftwafee down to fight. It worked and the Luftwaffe was slowly worn down in the last year and a half of the war.

Coincidentally, during this same period, the germans pilots in the west were also becomming less capable and less trained. We know their pilot quality declined in the West ... does anyone really think they sent the better pilots to the Russian Front an saved the new, green guys to defend the Reich? It also declined in the East as the Soviets got better planes and better tactics. Sorry, the Luftwaffe wasn't the best in the world in mid-1944 and was in decline everywhere while still being able to field the occasional good day filled with exploits of the "experts." Years of war will do that to you when the supply of pilots isn't keeping up with attrition.
 
my previous thoughts are still with me the Fw 190Dora as mentioned by it's pilots and the Soviets desired in getting their hands on 1-2 ASAP. and yes Wiking the 262 was used in the ground attack role by KG(J) 6 and another KG as well as JG 7 armed with altered head R4M's for ground attack work. from JG 7 pilots the rockets just vaporized Soviet MT's. one must conclude that some Soviet armor even J-Stalins were brewed in the course of these late war ops but personal accounts are very very few.....with the chaos of the end of the war near.
 

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