Best Tank of WW2 (1 Viewer)

I have not seen the post where it was revealed that this list does not include armament and communication equipment, maybe someone can point me to it. I just find it very odd to have a breakdown list of the main components of a tank, even point out specifically that the weight includes armament, but then put a price under that doesn't include a significant portion of the above mentioned bulletpoints that's all.

The wiki extract also says that the quoted costs dont include armament or comms

As I said wiki is the main source, though ther are plenty of others you can use if you want to do some serious research.


Relevantly, Wiki states....One source has cited the cost of a Panther tank as 117,100 Reichmarks (RM). This compared with 82,500 RM for the StuG III, 96,163 RM for the Panzer III, 103,462 RM for the Panzer IV, and 250,800 RM for the Tiger I. These figures did not include the cost of the armament and radio.[13][14] In terms of Reichmarks per ton, therefore, the Panther tank was one of the most cost-effective of the German AFV's of World War II.[15] However, these cost figures should be understood in the context of the time period in which the various AFVs were first designed, as the Germans increasingly strove for designs and production methods that would allow for higher production rates, and thus steadily reduced the cost of their AFVs. For example, another source has cited the total cost of the early production Tiger I in 1942–1943 to be as high as 800,000 RM.[16]

The link for this extract is Panther tank - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Another link gives further breakdowns on loses and unit costs for selected german items

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/panzer-statistics.htm

Very interesting debate. Brings up questions which I had not pondered before. Michael especially has made some good points, IMO. What might have been the outcome if Germany had settled on a single tank design somewhat like the T34 or M4 that was easily and cheaply produced and was very reliable and had had six or eight times as many of those units as they had Panthers and Tigers?

As far as which car, Ferrari or Taurus, is best. Depends on your definition of best. My bet is that if a factory fresh Ferrari( or M-B, Porsche or BMW) is pitted against a factory fresh Taurus (or Toyota, Nissan or Hyundai) in a coast to coast summer time run across the US at posted speed limits, the Taurus would have better odds at making the trip without a breakdown. I think that situation is a little like the comparison of the T34, M4 versus the Panther, Tiger.

While Germany produced 3 different heavy thanks within 2 years, they totally neglected 'workhose' tanks.
Pz-IV was decent tank, but it was older design than competing M4 T-34, and it was not as suited for mass production as those two were. We should take in account that Germany was main/sole supplier of military hardware for it's allies, and it was not able to supply those with enough tanks, planes etc. So the Romanians, Hungarians, Fins, Italians had to use their flimsy tanks vs. better equipped enemies. Same goes for planes - Buffaloes, CR-42s and He-112 instead of 109s.

I would note that production of arms, whither it is rifles, Submarines, tanks or airplanes, is often governed by the availability of both raw materials and manufacturing capability.
Just because one design costs three times what another design costs doesn't always mean you can build threes times as many of the cheaper design.
Steel production figures can tell a lot about the relative strengths of countries but steel production is not armor production. Armor needs special elements for alloying and it needs special furnaces and heat treatment facilities.
You can't take 2000tons of steel from a destroyer and build eighty 25 ton tanks either. Not unless you have several dozen tones of the elements needed to turn regular steel into armor. And you need hundreds of hours worth of heat treatment. Depending on the construction of the tank the armor may have to be fabricated as to size and shape with holes pre-drilled and then heat treated. Trying to roll out already heat treated steel is going to be a real B***H!
It is also nice to think that you can get three 250hp engines for the price of a single 750hp engine but things seldom worked out that way either.

While the smaller, lighter tank will need smaller, lighter, cheaper cranes and handling machinery in it's factories to really build three times as many you are going need more of them.

when comparing some models of tanks it is always a good idea to try and find out what they were really capable of. For instance the Russians use of the same and engine and transmission in the T-34 and KV series tanks is often held up as a good example of standardization. Was it? Some people claim that KV's rarely reached their quoted top speed because the transmission was so hard to shift the drivers rarely got them into top gear. Cruising in 2nd or 3ed isn't going to do much fro range either.

The Germans did make plenty of mistakes in production and in design but lets examine real performance and choices and not just dividing one cost into another and claiming instant changes in production numbers.

My vote for best tank available in numbers and available for almost a year?
Sherman Firefly.

Your caution is well founded, but the fact that it takes 55000 hours to produce a single Panther, versus 4000 hours for a T-34, says volumes about produceability.

The Germans had all sorts of problems in their manufacturing apparatus, thats true. One of the great advantages for the Russians was the formation of massiver tank building complexes, whereas German industry, despite being many times larger overall, was really a colloection of relatively innefficient smaller factories, the result of poor prewar preparation and planning.

Shortages of resources was another factor limiting German production, but so too were the shortages afflicting the Russians. Overwhelmingly for the Russians was the losses of their most productive territory, amounting to 35% of their factory spaces. Unlike the Germans, who never took steps to manage their production apparatus correctly, the Russians from the start took steps to command their economy, and plan centrally for industry requirements.

So low productivity in the German industrial complex is definately a major factor, as is shortage of materials. However, none of this was taken into account in their procurement machine. Despite knowing these limitations, they still opted for complex, large tank designs difficult to manufacture. If you have a weak tank manufacuring base, then the last thing you need to do is produce a tanks difficult to build. you build to your capacities and capabilities, not to an unrealistic wish list unattainable with the resources available to your country

Is it really a fact or is it just repeated very often?

How are the numbers determined? just like trying to compare prices between two economies using price controls to determine true costs, you jave to have some idea of how man hours are counted. Work on loading docks, unloading materials? Work done in foundry on castings?
Does the German figure include armament and engine?
Does the Russian figure include armament and engine?

Or, like US aircraft numbers, are the engine, armament, radios and a few other items considered government furnished equipment and only the hours needed to install them are counted?

Don't get me wrong, I believe that the big German tanks were expensive and time consuming but the idea that 30 ton tanks could be built TOTALLY in 3000-4000 hours seems a bit much.
For big production you also have to invest in big factories. How is this investment counted in price?
as an example the Ford company was given 14 million by the US gov to start construction of a plant to build R-2800 engines. Some sources say the building cost 39 million to complete without machine tools or equipment. I don't know if this is the original building or if it applies to the building as it was in 1944. The 1944 structure was triple the size of the 1941 building that rolled out the first engine. Man hours dropped from 2,330 hrs per engine to 905 hours.

Is it valid to make a direct correlation between the 55000 hours needed to build a Panther and the 4000 hours needed to build a t-34??? Absolutely not. Ther are too many unknowns to reach that conclusion, but I believe there is at least some indicative truth in there. The fact that the russians, with all their problems and limits could turn out 83000 T-34s whilst the Germans, with a much bigger Industrial base could manage about 11000 equivalent types over a longer time frame makes it clear there was something seriously wrong in the German acquisition system....and that means, by extension, there was something seriously wrong with the actual designs they were trying to build. We dont have enough information to be more specific than that, but we can say that something was wrong....really wrong

parsifal said:

The fact that the russians, with all their problems and limits could turn out 83000 T-34s whilst the Germans, with a much bigger Industrial base could manage about 11000 equivalent types over a longer time frame makes it clear there was something seriously wrong in the German acquisition system...

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There may be something wrong with this fact also.

Do you have a source for 83,000 T-34s (even including Su-85s and Su-100s) being built in WW II?

As for the 11,000 equivalent types----that seems a bit low. if we include just MK III with the long 50mm gun and MK IVs with the longer 75mm we can get to around 17,150 tanks plus 8,500 assault guns with long barrels plus about 1800 jagdpanzers not including the jagdpanzer 38t. adding in about 1300 Hummel and Nashorn chassis and the total, while far below Russian numbers is way above 11,000.

The Germans also built almost 22,000 armoured half tracks compared to the Russians production of how many???

The Germans produced about 4,000 armored cars compared to 8,000 Russian BA-64s but comparing a BA-64 to even a Sd Kfz 222 shows were manufacturing effort was going.

Considering the Russians had built over 20,000 tanks by the start of the war, even if most of them were lighter than the T-34 makes it a bit tougher to claim the Russians were coming from way behind in tank production facilities.
Yes, a number of them had to be moved and yes, a number of them operated in appalling conditions for large parts of the war but they had the machine tools and cranes and production equipment TO MOVE.
The easiest civilian production facility to convert to tank production was a railroad locomotive shop/factory. They were about the only facilities that already had the over head cranes, foundries and machine tools big enough to handle tanks. If your country doesn't have enough locomotives to begin with then using those shops for a quick and easy addition to production isn't really an option and you have to build factories from scratch.

Were the German designs over complicated? Yes, but not to the 7 to 1 extend your numbers suggest.

One could also say that the Russian designs were over simplified leading to both combat losses and breakdowns. That 2 man turret with the commander acting as the gunner meant that you needed more tanks to have the same combat effect. Break downs can be recovered a fair amount of the time but can affect operational readiness. The KV trying to use the same transmission as the T-34 was a problem as much as the Panther trying to use one designed for a lighter tank.

Do you have a source for 83,000 T-34s (even including Su-85s and Su-100s) being built in WW II?

As for the 11,000 equivalent types----that seems a bit low. if we include just MK III with the long 50mm gun and MK IVs with the longer 75mm we can get to around 17,150 tanks plus 8,500 assault guns with long barrels plus about 1800 jagdpanzers not including the jagdpanzer 38t. adding in about 1300 Hummel and Nashorn chassis and the total, while far below Russian numbers is way above 11,000.

I think I do have to concede an error here. After checking it seems the Soviet output of tanks is slightly different to the number I gave, though not necessarily less.

please find attached some figures on tank production for both the axis and the allies, which, whilst differnt to what I thought, does not really diminish the production differential between the two countries.



The Germans also built almost 22,000 armoured half tracks compared to the Russians production of how many???


Have attached Ellis's list on truck production. I consider Halftrack production to be more akin to truck production to be more closely related to truck production than tank production, particulalry given that a good percentage of Soviet trucks were tracked anyway. Some german HTs were lightly armoured, whereas Russian HTs were not, but this hardly puts the germans in the category of AFVs


Here is a good link to try and get an idea of the general characteristics of Soviet vehicles

Engines of the Red Army in WW2


The Germans produced about 4,000 armored cars compared to 8,000 Russian BA-64s but comparing a BA-64 to even a Sd Kfz 222 shows were manufacturing effort was going.

Agreed, but the Russians were not known for their high quality ACs, nevetheless they took the view that ACs were expendable and designed and built accordingly

Considering the Russians had built over 20,000 tanks by the start of the war, even if most of them were lighter than the T-34 makes it a bit tougher to claim the Russians were coming from way behind in tank production facilities.

I never claimed or said that, but their production was behind that of germany in 1939-40, and had to cope with wholesale dislocation and relocation in 1941 and 42.

Yes, a number of them had to be moved and yes, a number of them operated in appalling conditions for large parts of the war but they had the machine tools and cranes and production equipment TO MOVE.

According to Overy, they still lost 35% of their factory capacity to enemy occupation despite the relocation plan. The fact that the Russians planned for an indepth conflict almost from 1921, does what to lessen the argument that the russians were prepred for a war, in the sense of its control of production???



The easiest civilian production facility to convert to tank production was a railroad locomotive shop/factory. They were about the only facilities that already had the over head cranes, foundries and machine tools big enough to handle tanks. If your country doesn't have enough locomotives to begin with then using those shops for a quick and easy addition to production isn't really an option and you have to build factories from scratch.

KIind of, except that the Russian tank factories were usually Tractor factories that were converted to tank production.

Were the German designs over complicated? Yes, but not to the 7 to 1 extend your numbers suggest.

Probably agree with this, though the implication that seems to be embedded in your inferences that they were only slightly more complicated (please accept my apologies if I have misinterpreted you), I totally reject. There were significant differences in the complexities of germnan and Russian tanks. German tanks were markedly more complex, and harder to build.

Not sure how mechanical you are, but have a look at their respective suspension systems, and the compexities of the engines they put into each of their vehicles. Russian suspensions and drive trains were a model of simplicity (and in the case of the drivetrains, in the beginning, embarrassingly unreliable), German suspensions and drive trains were hopelessly overcomplicated....just as an example.

One could also say that the Russian designs were over simplified leading to both combat losses and breakdowns. That 2 man turret with the commander acting as the gunner meant that you needed more tanks to have the same combat effect. Break downs can be recovered a fair amount of the time but can affect operational readiness. The KV trying to use the same transmission as the T-34 was a problem as much as the Panther trying to use one designed for a lighter tank.


I dont agree....one of the great lies was that they suffered such heavy losses. TGhey suffered heavy losses, but it was not the onesided affairs that people think. 1944 is the year to consider I guess...somewhere between 19 and 23000 tanks lost, versus somewhere between 9 and 12000 German losses, in my book this fails to justify the lavish effort and manhours put into the German tanks

Good discussion guys.

Indeed - thanks for the table

parsifal said:

I think I do have to concede an error here. After checking it seems the Soviet output of tanks is slightly different to the number I gave, though not necessarily less.

please find attached some figures on tank production for both the axis and the allies, which, whilst differnt to what I thought, does not really diminish the production differential between the two countries.

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thank you for the figures and charts but they do show that for total tank/SPG production the Russian out produced the Germans by a factor of 2.24 and not the 7.54 suggested by your original figures. Shift to tanks/SPGs with 75mm guns and above the ratio changes to 2.44. Juggle light tanks or SPGs based on light tank chassis in and out of the figures as you will but I doubt if the ratio will change to better than 3 to 1.

parsifal said:

Have attached Ellis's list on truck production. I consider Halftrack production to be more akin to truck production to be more closely related to truck production than tank production, particulalry given that a good percentage of Soviet trucks were tracked anyway. Some german HTs were lightly armoured, whereas Russian HTs were not, but this hardly puts the germans in the category of AFVs

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Ah, but it does affect armor production and work load. As a for instance say the half track has 6.35mm armor (10lbs per sq. ft.) and is 15ft long and 5 ft high. that is 1500lbs of armor per vehicle just for the sides. Add in the front,rear and hood and I think we can comfortable estimate 1 ton of armor per vehicle. Only 500-1000 medium tanks worth but the labor involved is probably dis proportionally high.


Thank you for the link, it is interesting.

parsifal said:

Agreed, but the Russians were not known for their high quality ACs, nevetheless they took the view that ACs were expendable and designed and built accordingly

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An armored jeep, while expendable is also rather limited in capabilities and may require the support of more capable (expensive) vehicles, in order to perform sone missions in which case it's actual cost/benfit ratio goes down a bit.
Why was Soviet tank production down in 1939-40? Lack of manufacturing capability or were they unhappy with the present models and waiting for new models (T-60?-T-34 and KV series) to finish trials and be approved?

parsifal said:

KIind of, except that the Russian tank factories were usually Tractor factories that were converted to tank production.

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That is nice sounding propaganda, peaceful Russians convert agricultural tractor factories to war production and defeat invaders, but it doesn't stand up well to closer examination, anymore than saying the US converted car or truck factories to tank or aircraft production. In the US many such "converted" factories were actually new buildings with new equipment built adjacent to existing car/truck factories to take advantage of transportation infrastructure (rail, ship/barge) and existing workforce/housing. Granted minor parts suppliers could supply both types of factories (nuts, bolts, tubing, instruments, batteries,etc.) but a factory equipped to deal with 6-11 ton tractors with minimal body work is not equipped to deal with 26-45ton vehicles without substantial reworking let alone the armor fabrication.

See: Oldtimer gallery. Trucks. Tractors. S-60 "Stalinec".

And poke around a bit to see what kind of pre war tractors we are talking about.

I agree that the German designs were more complicated and harder to build, they may also have been caught by timing. When the Panther transmission was originally designed the designers may have screwed up in not anticipating that the production tank would be much heavier than they planned on. Did they also screw up in not anticipating that there would be material shortages 2 years in the future leading to gear and bearing troubles or that 2 years in the future much of the labor would be slave labor?
Designing transmission/steering gears for heavy AFVs is not easy. What works in a simple system for a 3-10 vehicle just fine and is OK but not great in a 20-30 ton vehicle can be hopeless in a 45 ton vehicle. Transmission design can also be influenced by engine availability. If you have a large, powerful engine in a relatively light tank you can get away with fewer gears than in a lower powered engine in the same weight tank and still keep mobility. Abrupt changes in track speed while turning can lead to track throwing or breaking traction with the ground surface and bogging down. Regenative steering systems, while more expensive to manufacture do have less wear on the steering clutches/brakes and may need less frequent maintenance.
Just like in cars, even putting in synchronizers on the gears makes the transmission larger, more complicated and more expensive but it may pay for itself in an easier to use transmission, less clutch wear and fewer broken/chipped gear teeth and failed transmissions.

How many gears and how complicated you make the transmission is subject to debate but simplest is not always better.

parsifal said:

I dont agree....one of the great lies was that they suffered such heavy losses. TGhey suffered heavy losses, but it was not the onesided affairs that people think. 1944 is the year to consider I guess...somewhere between 19 and 23000 tanks lost, versus somewhere between 9 and 12000 German losses, in my book this fails to justify the lavish effort and manhours put into the German tanks

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By 1944 the Germans were also suffering more from air attack, retreats always loose more tanks than advances, you can't recover damaged/broken tanks and the Russians are introducing 3 man turrets.
The Germans were never going to build a medium/heavy tank that used a 2 man turret. It gives away too much in command and control of both small formations and even the tank itself. If the commander is the gunner he is not looking out for dangers, looking for the next target, following what the rest of the platoon is doing, spotting for the gunner and other commander type duties.

The Germans would have been well served by using a smaller, simpler tank than than the Panther/Tiger but the T-34 was no paragon after the first few thousand had been built until the T-34/85 showed up.

For a totally fictional German tank, Imagine a slightly stretched MK IV with wider tracks with the front and sides of a Jagdpanzer IV with a bit bigger than normal turret on top mounting 75mm/60 gun with about the performance of the 77mm gun in the British Comet. get an engine with perhaps 20% more power to top things off.
Off course I have the benefit of hind sight to KNOW that this combination would take care of most threats until the end of the war.

parsifal said:

Considering the Russians had built over 20,000 tanks by the start of the war, even if most of them were lighter than the T-34 makes it a bit tougher to claim the Russians were coming from way behind in tank production facilities.

I never claimed or said that, but their production was behind that of germany in 1939-40, and had to cope with wholesale dislocation and relocation in 1941 and 42.

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The tables you attached to this very same post directly contradict this statement or am I not getting something here?

1939: 2950 vs 247
1940: 2794 vs 1643

With light tanks and tankettes added that ratio might actually be more drastic (T-26, BT-5) We might argue about quality (both in the engineering and production sense), but to me it seems e.g. the T-26 was not hopelessly outclassed (was at least good enough to be sometimes used by the Germans when captured), eventhough its concept was outdated when compared to the Pz III and IV. Same can be said about the T-28 or the T-35, although these had also mechanical reliability problems so servere that most of them broke down in the first few weeks of the war (see, it's not just a German problem). And that's why they are often overlooked.

In the early 30s the Soviets were the first to have relatively modern medium and heavy tanks and considering the peacetime they built quite a few of them too. Compare this to the contemporary French (FT-17) and German tanks (Pz. I and II and even those were still on the drawing board). They were also among the first to have radios and aaa guns on their tanks. The SU was a strong player in the field of tank design and production long before the war started and their designs were steadily improving. It didn't happen over night sometime in 1941.

It was rather their general armor doctrine that was outdated and they have to blame themselves for that. The Germans learned quickly from the experiences in the Spanish Civil War. The Soviets had the same experiences and the Khalkhin Gol War, but Stalin rather listened to his pet-marshals like Kulik and not progressive commanders like Zhukov. Thus they had to re-learn the hard way in the Winter War and the first months of Barbarossa.

Mikey g said:

The Sherman was a piece of junk that could not beat any of the top tanks without a clear numerical superiority.

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Myth, as demonstrated by the Battle of Arracourt in September 1944. Another myth is that the Soviet 85mm had superior anti-armor performance to the much-maligned US 76mm; the reverse was true, as illustrated by the Soviets' own tests conducted against captured King Tigers.

The typical Sherman of WWII was outgunned and underarmored vis a vis the heavy German panzers like the Mark V and Mark VI, but that was not due to any inherent fault in the design, which was quite amenable to uparmoring (like the M4A3E2, one of which shrugged off six direct hits by 88mm shells) and upgunning (a 90mm variant was produced as the M36B1).

Shermans served in the front lines into the 1970s, and with upgunning (first with a Panther-derived 75mm and later with a 105mm) Israeli Shermans were able to successfully take on frontally much more formidable opponents than anything the Germans build in WWII.

FWIW von Manteuffel's choice for best tank of WWII was the IS2.

I voted the King Tiger as the best defensive tank of WWII.

Just a bit more information that I found, since these interesting discussions took place.

A lot of debate revolved around the relative produceability of Russian tanks versus German tanks (of which the T-34 was representative of the russian tanks, and the Panther and Mk IV were representative of the german tank park). Other arguments were advanced that whilst the German economy was considerably larger than the Russian economy, German production tended to dissipate into other areas, such as Halftrack production. This is all true, but tanks are not isolated weapons, used without reliance on other weapons systems. A tank, like and aircraft, is supported by a whole range of supporting arms and technologies, so it is impossible to spearate the effects of a single weapon system in relation to overall loss rates. Its like those arguments that try to argue that if only the Me 262 was ready earlier, things would have been different, or that the Mustang was THE weapon that broke the back of the Luftwaffe. There are elements of truth in both statements, and yet the underlying messages in each case are misleading. The Me 262 was a significant weapon system, that had great potential, but it could not turn the air war around by itself. The Mustang was a big factor in the defat of the Luftwaffe, but it cannot be argued that it was THE aircraft that won the battle of germany.

Similarly, you cannot say that the t-34 was responsible for winning the war in the east, or that the panther was responsible for nearly beating it. Both these statements are really quite ridiculous. Point of fact is that in both cases....the t-34 and the panther, these pieces of equipment represented the pointy end of the spear, but really only represented a fraction of the whole. Even if you want to restrict the discussion to the effectiveness of the armoured formations, these respective pieces of hardware still only represent a fraction of the whole package. Armoured warefare was an all arms concept , of which the tanks were a part, but not even the major part of the package.

Other arguments have been put forward about the relative vulnerability of the russians vis a viz the Germans. An often quoted figure is that the Russians lost 23000 tanks in 1944 to about 9000 German tanks. This, on the face of it suggests that Russian tanks were 2.55 times more vulnerable to German tanks. In fact this is a misuse of the statistic. For a start, the Russians were on the offensive....an inherently more dangerous and costly posture....the textbooks usually assume casualties are about 1.5 to 2 times higher for an army on the attack than that same army would be if defending. Secondly over 14000 of those Russian tanks lost, were lost to ATGS and not tanks at all. Most of thes ATGs were of the towed variety, under the control of the Infantry formations. I doubt that german tank losses by source were comparable. Invaribaly, German tanks were being employed to contain breaches made by Russians tank formations, rather than immolating themselves against Russian Infantry formations. Put another way, whereas 56% of russian tank losses wre due to ATGs, I doubt that a similar proportion of German Tanks were lost to Infantry controlled ATGs after 1943. Certainly at Kursk and before, whilst the Germans were on the attack, this was true, but after Kursk, the nature of Panzerwaffe deployments suggests fewer assaults against Russian Infantry

Good point about Russian tank losses - guess StuGs like really shine in defence, while that's 'natural' way of employment for towed ATGs .
IIRC Russians considered StuG-III the most dangerous opponent from all German AFVs; can someone shed some light on that?

Guys how many tanks you produce depends on the facilities available.On the one hand SU had Chelyabinsk and Nizhny Tagil while on the same scale Germany only had Nibelungenwerk in Austria .Also it would be best if people who think that German tanks took 2.000.000 hours and only 5 for the T-34 actually source their material.