Best World war two warships?

Double B, I agree German technology in building ships was pretty good, although perhaps not as good as advertised, but building ships and operating them is another question. Britain, US and Japan had been operating and learning and getting the bugs out of carrier operations ever since WW1 and still did not know all the answers. For instance I recently found out that the IJN carriers did not have the capability of starting the engines and warming them up on a strike force until the AC were on the fight deck. The US could and that played a role at Midway. The German started to build a carrier or two but had never designed a purpose built ship board fighter and they even got their ideas for dive bombing from a USN dive bomber demonstration.

Yes, Renrich. I am aware that the operation of ships, particularly a very complex weapon system such as an aircraft carrier, which has some very demanding operational procedures, is an art which can be learned only by doing.

However, my argument was not that the germans would have got better value for their money by building carriers as ships for naval warfare - my argument was that the germans would have got better value for their money by building carriers as commerce destroyers.

Now, if you'll think about it, the requirements for a commerce destroying mission are far less than that required for a naval warfare mission. Even if you are so inefficient (and a navy just beginning to operate carriers will definitely be!) as to have a very low aircraft takeoff rate, and loooong servicing times, deck clearing times, etc etc etc, you dont need a cloud of carrier bombers to sink slow, clumsy and defenceless or almost defenceless merchantmen. And maintaining a slow air patrol for 2-3 hours five times a day by two planes at a time circline in a 60-80 mile radius from your carrier should not be too difficult either.

Its a reference as old as dirt, but in his encyclopaedic work "Aircraft Carriers -A history of Carrier Aviation and its Influence on World Events" Norman Polmar, Minoru Genda, Eric Brown (RN) Professor Robert Langdon (US Naval Academy), Macdonal Co, 1969, an entire chapter is spent on the European Axis efforts to develop carrier aviation. The salient point they make is...

"An operational carrier in either the German or italian Navy would have been of considerable value to the axis. At the very least, fleet exwercises with a carrier would have exposed naval commanders to the potentials and threats of a seaborne air striking forces.

With proper aircraft and personnel, and some operational experience, an aircraft carrier with an Axis battlefleet or raiding squadron could have provided invaluable recon, defence and possibly offensive capabilities. It is unlikley , on the basis of carrier experience during the war that Germany or Italy could have produced an effective carrier striking force. The requirements and co-ordination of men, machines and doctrine appear to have been beyond their competence."

I think this assessment is pretty much on the money. Co-ordinating multiple carriers is an altogether different proposition to having a single carrier operational

Great authorities cited, Parsifal. I have not read that - at least not directly, though the book is familiar as I have seen many excerpts from it - but I have studied naval warfare, and one of the things that strikes me, is that the potential for carriers as a commerce destroyer and commerce interrupter has not, AFAIK, been studied by any of these otherwise awesomely detailed and wise studies.

One reason is clear...they were not deployed as such. Number of carrier missions, any side, during WW II for commerce destruction:

Zip.

Thus it was that historians and analysts of all sides overlooked this potential.

And yet, if we look at the situation dispassionately, the potential is there! Submarines are supposed to be the commerce destroyers par excellence, and yet when we look at the cost of four wolfpacks of 20 submarines versus one light aircraft carrier and air fleet, by virtue of its tremendous range, 130 to 250 mile search radius, 3x economical cruising speed, 2x sprint speed, time on station, and economy of force (one 1000 lb bomb costs a fraction of a torpedo) I am amazed that the potential of the fast, cheap light carrier as a commerce destroyer was not explored by the Germans.

And, as I have said in my original post, the one-two punch of a carrier capable of both independent operation and U-boat refueling would have caused tremendous problems to the British during WW II.

BB, you make some good points and the report authored by Genda is most interesting. Actually, Freebird, on other threads, has postulated some of the same ideas as you have.

Carriers were used for mercantile warfare. The most well known was Kakutas foray into the indian Ocean. In operations independant of the main fleet under Nagumo, the Japanese carrier Ryujo, with no more than ten strike aircraft available, managed to sink or disable over 80000 tons of shipping

In their conquest of the NEI, the Japanese Mobile Fleet was used to blockade and sink over 250000 tons of shipping in less than a month. Another 400000 tons (roughly) was locked up tight in NEI ports, and was promptly captured, and put to use by the Japanese.

The American fast carriers subsequently achieved greater sinkings than the Ryujo raid, but never with such economy of scale. The Brits also used their carries for mercantile raiding (although not dedicated as such) of the norwegian coast and in the med.

The effects of carrier based aviation in this sea interdiction was actually massive. It was crucial in winning the war in the pacific, and led firectly to Hitler concluding that Norway was going to be invaded

Somewhere deep in the archives of this forum, is a brilliant analysis of the KM "Graf Zeppelin" done by a member who rarely comes by anymore ...."Leonard".

He systematically chopped to pieces any argument there was for the potential effectiveness of the "Graf Zeppelin" should it have been completed and used.

In the end, its probably good for the KM they didnt complete it.

And yet, if we look at the situation dispassionately, the potential is there! Submarines are supposed to be the commerce destroyers par excellence, and yet when we look at the cost of four wolfpacks of 20 submarines versus one light aircraft carrier and air fleet, by virtue of its tremendous range, 130 to 250 mile search radius, 3x economical cruising speed, 2x sprint speed, time on station, and economy of force (one 1000 lb bomb costs a fraction of a torpedo) I am amazed that the potential of the fast, cheap light carrier as a commerce destroyer was not explored by the Germans.

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Aircraft carriers are expensive to make, equip and use in operations. And they cannot be used in foul weather and have quite limited effectiveness at night.

Unless you can get a task force together with a fair sized escorting force, all you're doing is spending a lot of time and money to get minimal results.

R_Leonard made a good account on operational concerns with Graf Zeppelin here:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/what-if-721-5.html
#61

I have tried to make a response to this account starting #26 at this thread:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/lack-german-aircraft-carrier-8375-2.html

Best regards,
Delc

The post by Leonard shows a lot of knowledge about WW2 carrier ops and, as usual, Del makes many good points and I enjoy his knowledge about sea power but I think the post which includes an opinion from Genda is the key. In a nutshell he says that based on experience gained in WW2, it is unlikely the Germans or Italians could have produced an effective carrier force. Sounds pretty definite to me. And I would think he is quite an authority. Also made me think about carrier ops in WW2. The actions in the Pacific by IJN and US forces are strikingly different from theactions that British carriers participated in. By the way, Del, CVEs operated with difficulty but effectively in the Atlantic as convoy escorts and hunter killer groups in WW2. Another point is that it would be interesting to see the performance figures on the 109T. My bet is that they would not be much if any better than the FM2s.

didnt read all of the discussion Del, but i get the drift.....GZ as a design would have had problems, but it would have been possible to iron out the kinks, like happens with every warship ever built, some more than others. Because the Germans had little experience with carriers, the GZ would have had a lot of problems, but it would be possible, like every other ship ever built to overcome.

That is certainly the position taken by Polmar, Genda, Brown and Langdon.
I dont believe that the germans could have operated a carrier TF with multiple carriers working in unison, but they could have operated a carrier singly with a small number of escorts on limited operations (this is what the experts say). Development of the skills needed to operate a multi-hull CTF would have been beyond the germans, as it is a skill that takes years to develop. But a single carrier was entirely within the realms of German capability. I also believe that the GZ was a ship with a lot of problems, but they were all fixable problems, even in the early years wartime environment.

As for the notions that Carriers are the realms of the rich nations and that carriers can only operate in clear weather....well the operations of the numerous small nations that have operated carriers very successfully on relatively limited budgets stands as mute testimaony against that....countries like Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Thailand, Canada, Netherlands, these have all very successfully operated carriers on low budgets, and with minimal outside assistance. Carriers are actually cheaper to build and operate than a force of capital ships, and are much more cost effective, even for small nations....

Moreover the operations of the British carriers above the arctic circle puts the old chestnut of carriers not able to operate in rough seas to rest. The correct answer is that the US and Japan were unable to operate carriers in rough weather. The RN did it on a more or less routine basis. they also operated carriers using massed deck strikes at night as well. The question that cannot be answered is if the Germans could have operated with the same special rough weather/night capability as the Brits. At a guess I would say probably better than the Americans, but less so than the British.

First, my thanks to all the very, very experienced members of the forum who have posted very illuminating comments. And another apology too - as a NooB here, unlike the members who have something like 1,000, 2,000 or even 30,000 posts, I of course am not aware of most of what has been posted before. I am at present reading the excellent thread referred to, and will post more after I have digested it.

A point, however, about carrier cost. There is a 'middle way' between the cheapo-cheapo 'carriers' built on merchant hull conversions, which are (just) barely capable of carrier duties - and the 24 karat built-to-naval-standards fleet carriers of WW II. It was the brits who discovered that 'middle way' with their "Collosus" class auxiliary fleet carriers.

That class was built to mercantile standards but used destroyer powerplants that happened to be more or less surplus. It was built from scratch in two years, versus the four or five years it took for British shipyards to build "Illustrious" class carriers, and I suspect ton for ton at about half the price.

I have given a figure of one carrier with air group and armament equivalent to 20 submarines. I suspect with the Colossus class, the equivalent would be nearer 14-15 subs.

At that ratio, the carrier looks increasingly cost effective...IMHO...

but without actual monetary figures, all this is of course just guesswork. Who has the cost figures for the 'Collosus' class versus 10-20 British submarines of the equivalent tonnage? The air group of course would be a separate expenditure.

The Invincible Class "Thru deck cruisers" in 1980 dollars cost 500 million, with the CAG attached cost another $500 m. The Collins class boats, (the Oberon Class replacements) were originally contracted at $1.5 Billion for ten boats. That price has been considerably exceeeded in tha ctual delivery, and the government wont cough up what it has cost the taxpayers in the final run. Mind you, they are probably the most effective conventional subs on the planet today, with a submerged speed in excess of 25 knots, sub launched cruise missiles, and wire guided torpedoes that also have both active and passive homing systems, and a range exceeding 50000 yards

But to give a perspective....one modern carrier with air group is equivalent to six boats in terms of cost

Best World war two warships?
1.) Battleship: Iowa class/Yamato class
2.) Battlecruiser: Admiral Graf Spee
3.) Heavy cruiser/Armored cruiser: Scharnhorst
4.) Light cruiser: Atlanta class
5.) Destroyer: USS Johnston class
6.) Submarine: Germany's type VII-B
7.) Patrol Boat or MBT: US PT boats
8.) Aircraft Carrier: Essex class

To continue...

The use of u-boat packs was not. as some might think, a concentration of u-boats in the ocean waiting for convoys.

No. All u-boats were spread out in a scouting line, and the pack was formed from the nearest available u-boats only after the convoy had been sighted and trailed by one lucky u=boat.

This meant that the formation of the pack, and the synchronization of the attack, suffered. Only in 1943 did the KM have the numbers to have a real pack attack on convoys - the 'pack' in 1940 and 41 usually was about four boats!

But with the introduction of diesel engined commerce destroyer carriers into the picture, the tactics can now be changed....

That is certainly the position taken by Polmar, Genda, Brown and Langdon.
I dont believe that the germans could have operated a carrier TF with multiple carriers working in unison, but they could have operated a carrier singly with a small number of escorts on limited operations (this is what the experts say).

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That´s my opinion, too. Possibly without escorts (due to the lack of proper escort vessels with a long enough range to operate at high cruise speed) as a lone raider. A true carrier Task Force is to much strain on operational and logistical conditions imposed to Germany in ww2 and therefore unlikely.
There is one good argument for that they expected modifications on their carrier designs. Carrier 2 (Träger B) was delayed and hope was expressed that the construction should get a positive impact from experiences of Graf Zeppelin. It was builded up including to the level of the side belt main armour deck. When fitting out of carrier 1 (GZ) was halted in 1940, construction of carrier two
was abandoned.
One of the strange things is that the Luftwaffe already commenced flying trials on specially congested landing strips and catapult trials with Bf-109 from the mothership BUSSARD. The Luftwaffe asked for construcion of a floating ponton deck in 1939/40 to continue the trials on more realistic conditions but the Navy rejected that with reference to construction yard workloads. It appeasr to me that a carrier was not really wanted pressed for.

By the way, Del, CVEs operated with difficulty but effectively in the Atlantic as convoy escorts and hunter killer groups in WW2. Another point is that it would be interesting to see the performance figures on the 109T. My bet is that they would not be much if any better than the FM2s.

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Perhaps one should ask HoHun or Kurfürst for performance figures of the Bf-109T. the figures I have seen indicate a performance on par with the Bf-109E3 (575 km/h at full pressure height with 1 x DB-601N and 1.3 ata). The -T submodel did had fully folding wings, a structurally enforced tail and gear and an arrestor hook. The greatest difference ist the new wing. It was increased in span by adding a special inner wing filet to give more area and higher aspect ratio and effectively reduced the stall speed despite increased weight to 115 - 120 Km/h compared to 130 - 135 Km/h for the late Bf-109E. Therefore and despite identic top speed figures, You might expect to see some significant performance differences on the Bf-109T compared to the Bf-109E with DB-601A (just a guess):
(A) larger wing area, reduced landing stall speed, resulting in better turn climb performance
(B) worser roll performance
(C) lower dive speed limit
(D) better approach angle controll by wing mounted airflow breaks
(E) heavier but due to (A) better (=lighter) wingload, possibly less acceleration, too.

Still, that carrier fighter does not compare unfavourably in performance with 1941 period opposition. But GZ does only has an airwing of four (!) fighters (plus reserve)...

Very well. Let us imagine that in 1933, when Hitler came to power and threw off the terms of the Versailles treaty, he made the decision (and only he could have made it) to build commerce destroyer aircraft carriers, over the heated protests of both the battleship admirals of the KM and Hermann Goering.

And let us suppose that he decided to go down the 'Collossus" route instead of the "Graf Zeppelin" route. Carriers with AA armament only, no armour, no fancy advanced turn-on-a-dime cycloidal propellers, just slim merchant or second class passenger liner hulls with the diesel powerplant of the Graf Spees. Buildable in two years. Let's say three, to be conservative.

Laid down in, say, 1934. Finished in 1937.

Two years to shake out the carriers in their expected hunting ground...THE ATLANTIC.

How many could they have built? If they kept the Bismark and Tirpitz but cancelled the Scharnorst and Gniesenau, they could have built at least four. I think six, but let's say four.

So in 1939 you have four 26-28 knot carriers, capable of travelling up to 19,000 miles at 10 knots, and using diesel power.

AND with two years at least of Atlantic experience.

How should they have been used?

Ah, welcome, Delcyros! I see my post has crossed yours. Would you like to comment before i post further?

My thought: They should have been used with the u-boats.

In tandem, with the strengths of one combined with the strengths of the other.

In 1939, the KM could have put three packs of six u-boats each in the Atlantic.

Let our four German Collossi go out in two packs of two. Trail their flags in front of the British hunter groups.

Let the British sight them - but let the Germans see the british first, due to their constant air patrolling. Let the germans radio their own location to the packs.

And as the British chase...let the Germans run away...straight towards a u-boat pack...

Note: fear of this tactic was BTW the reason why Jellicoe broke off the action at the Battle of Jutland - he was afraid that the retreating German fleet was luring him into the torpedo tubes of waiting german submarines.