Best World war two warships?

[delcyros]

This proposal was thought of as a design exercise to exploit the lower (extreme) limits of carrier designs. It is not a good proposal, even though it matches some of Your ideas well. As Dave pointed out, gun battles and avgas stores don´t match well.
Two main criticisms may be raised:
(A) the block coefficient is to low for the ship, resulting in to high a speed and significant space limitations for the submerged part of the hull
(B) I believe that the flightdeck is to small, altough it would be possible to operate dedicated low stall speed A/C such as the Ar-195 and Fi-167

The basic impetus for the design comes from Harold, who redesigned kind of a seaplane carrier on the base of a K-class CL-cruiser hull by removing the foremost turret and installing a Hangar, two catapults and plane recovery instruments. Quite an interesting proposal as it allows rapid introduction of air power on the mid atlantic without requiring carrier doctrines.

The task to give Germany airpower in the Atlantic is difficult. Sometimes I believe that the most practical way wouldn´t be a carrier but an auxilary cruiser, a rebuild merchant optimised for launching seaplanes such as the Ar-95.

 

[Burmese Bandit]

Delcyros,

In spite of your own disclaimer of your design being "close, but no cigar" I personally think it is good both from the design and the tactical point of view, because

(1) It is even cheaper, I think, than my "50% Scharnhorst" design, which means that one should be able to build at least six light carriers if one was willing to forego building these two battlecruisers. If we throw in two light cruisers foregone - the germans did build at least two light cruisers, which effectively did zip during the whole war - we get EIGHT light carriers, half ready before 1939, half in 1940. Plenty of time to work the bugs out in Atlantic shakedown cruises.

(2) In 1939 we would still have the Panzerschiffes as well. Two Panzerschiffes with two carriers apiece, with rendezvous and refuel instructions for deep sea wolfpacks, could be sent out. Four packs of four submaries could have been put into place in 1939. Concentrate them, don't spread them out to search. Let the airplanes go out to search. When convoys are found, radio their location, then let the wolfpacks close in and massacre them. Stand off with your own planes and bomb them - don't get close to the convoys. Air patrol continuously. If a British hunter killer group is found, avoid them. If they pursue, run to the nearest wolfpack and lead the British into a torpedo trap.

By the way, Delcyros, what about using the biplane Hs 123 for a naval attack plane? On the Eastern front it gained a legendary reputation for battle damage tolerance, bombing accuracy, and the STOL capacity. Its only weakness was its light bombload. Perhaps an upengined version with a navigator/rear gunner would be just the ticket for the German Carrier Navy!

 

[Burmese Bandit]

In another post on the Nav Weaps.com board a poster mentions the possibility of using seaplanes with the Jumo opposed piston opposed cylinder diesel engine...

I think that's an excellent idea. Have the two or three Panzershiffes, give them an escort of two carriers each, build six fast tankers with Jumo diesel engined seaplans, and hey presto...a strike/refuel/reconnaissance force!

 

[Burmese Bandit]

Here is something I wrote on another forum:

My reasoning is this - it is 1939 and because the KM has cancelled the Scharnhorst and Gniesenau, we have six diesel carriers with three panzerschiffe accompanied by three tankers on the high seas. They have left port escorted by the destroyers available before the outbreak of war. 1000 nm out, the heavy ships refuel from the tankers - watched by the British, who are following from a not-so-discreet distance - and then the destroyers and tankers turn back towards port. The nine ships continue, followed by the British - until nightfall, when they break up into three hunting packs, one panzerschiffe and two carriers each, and do a night sprint at high speed in three different directions.

Dawn finds them lost from sight. (I think this is quite plausible)

Two days later, war is declared. The British intensify the hunt, but the three packs are still lost...for they are heading deep, deep into the south atlantic, into the area of weakest British Presence.

Meanwhile, pre-positioned U-boats move into action near Gibraltar and the North Atlantic, distracting a portion of the British Fleet, which has to consider the possibility of combined action near the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic. (Rumours to that effect of course having been let slip beforehand)

Near the South Atlantic the raiders spring their surprise. Acting in concert, about 60 nm apart, they systematically divebomb any merchantman showing a British flag within 80-120 miles radius of their carriers. Radio silence is preserved by the use of aircraft couriers, allowing the three raiding forces to operate with stealth.

The British rush heavy cruiser, carrier and battlecruisers to the South Atlantic. However only two Fleet carriers are available. Thus of six British hunting forces, only two have carrier search and strike capability.

Meanwhile, the three raiding forces have recieved orders from Berlin to return. (I believe this, too, is plausible as the British fleet assembly and departure would be too large to be completely hidden, and in addition there is radio traffic analysis...) orders also go out to all u boats to combine into one large pack in mid atlantic.

Now, the three raiding forces combine in a prearranged rendezvous, and with 144 aircraft and three panzerschiffe mounting 18 28cm guns, sweep up concentrated to escape even as the hunting groups come down spread out to hunt. The advantage of the raider in escape is now apparent: he can afford to concentrate, whereas the hunter has to spread out to search. The raider's orders are: avoid combat with superior, equal, and near-equal opponents: overwhelm weaker opponents with dive bombing and gunfire: maintain air patrols at all times in daylight and good weather so that tactical surprise cannot be achieved: try to maintain patrols as conditions permit in night and bad weather: steer to your home ports on a course that goes through the U-boat pack mid atlantic.

And the results? Well, on the side of the raiders I like these odds in 1939.

 

[Soren]

Delcyros,

Since I know you're pretty much an expert in the area of WW2 Naval material I have a question:

What was the difference between the Bismarck's fire control system and that of the Iowa class ?

Now I know the Germans fielded by far the best optical equipment, but that is only useful for visual contact and cant be used to accurately assess where each salvo hits. So gun laying radar was used. But what was the difference between the system used on the Bismarck class and that on the Iowa class ?

 

[delcyros]

What was the difference between the Bismarck's fire control system and that of the Iowa class ?

Now I know the Germans fielded by far the best optical equipment, but that is only useful for visual contact and cant be used to accurately assess where each salvo hits. So gun laying radar was used. But what was the difference between the system used on the Bismarck class and that on the Iowa class ?

To answer this question one has to check the primary source material GUNNERY DOCTRINE and INSTRUCTIONS, BATTLESHIPS U.S. PACIFIC FLEET. Unfortunately, they don´t explain the rational behind the spotting procedures but I remember that Bill Jurens and Brad Fisher wrote a good analysis of this in an older warships international issue, worth reading.
The US Navy deployed four types of fire control radar in 1941: CXAS-1/FA/Mark 1, FB/Mark 2, FC/Mark 3, and FD/Mark 4.
The USS IOWA´s (as well as all US BB´s with Mark 8 FCS) FC/Mark 8 radar had a significantly better range and bearing discrimination than their 1941 predecessors. In fact and compared to US cruisers, The battleships main battery had better radar about 4 times the range discrimination of +/- 15yds + 0.1% of range.
In addition to the much improved range discrimination, the advent of Mk 8 FCR continuous radar ranges, allowed an experienced rangekeeper operator to track a target to with a margin of error of 2 degrees and 2kts. This must be considered as a critical advantage. Early radar sets such as BISMARCKS DeTeG had discrimination problems as well as limited performance and (not Bimsarck´s problem but typical for period sets) slow rate of data transmission- typically early radar operators passed ranges to plot/TS via voice circuits. This had two negative effects; one is that there is an obvious lag of several to tens of seconds in the reception of said ranges while the second is that there is a larger lag in waiting for the plotting of ranges and the extraction of the observed range rate.
This allowed IOWA to spot not only a target but also the individual fall of shots, easening any correction in firecontroll solutions. Bismarck´s FC system relied on stereoscopic rangefinder (as did the US) for observing the individual fall of shot, it´s radar could find ranges to targets but couldn´t spot the fall of shots.

 

[parsifal]

Here is something I wrote on another forum:

My reasoning is this - it is 1939 and because the KM has cancelled the Scharnhorst and Gniesenau, we have six diesel carriers with three panzerschiffe accompanied by three tankers on the high seas. They have left port escorted by the destroyers available before the outbreak of war. 1000 nm out, the heavy ships refuel from the tankers - watched by the British, who are following from a not-so-discreet distance - and then the destroyers and tankers turn back towards port. The nine ships continue, followed by the British - until nightfall, when they break up into three hunting packs, one panzerschiffe and two carriers each, and do a night sprint at high speed in three different directions.

Near the South Atlantic the raiders spring their surprise. Acting in concert, about 60 nm apart, they systematically divebomb any merchantman showing a British flag within 80-120 miles radius of their carriers. Radio silence is preserved by the use of aircraft couriers, allowing the three raiding forces to operate with stealth.


Now, the three raiding forces combine in a prearranged rendezvous, and with 144 aircraft and three panzerschiffe mounting 18 28cm guns, sweep up concentrated to escape even as the hunting groups come down spread out to hunt. The advantage of the raider in escape is now apparent: he can afford to concentrate, whereas the hunter has to spread out to search. The raider's orders are: avoid combat with superior, equal, and near-equal opponents: overwhelm weaker opponents with dive bombing and gunfire: maintain air patrols at all times in daylight and good weather so that tactical surprise cannot be achieved: try to maintain patrols as conditions permit in night and bad weather: steer to your home ports on a course that goes through the U-boat pack mid atlantic.

And the results? Well, on the side of the raiders I like these odds in 1939.

BB

This scenario pre-supposes a lot, not least of which being that there would be a fundamental change in KM thinking and theory. The KM would transform itself from being one of the least air minded navies to being one of the most, and manage to overcome all the problems associated with a new type, namely a disel powered carrier. I assume, for example that these fictional carriers are relying on the older style catapults, which as Del points out were slow in recovery and not considered satisfactory. So even though the Germans could fild superior types, the deck handling and turn around capabilities of these carriers is going to be terrible.
But assuming that all these inconvenient truths could be solved, the really big flaw in this scenario is that the British are going to sit back and just do nothing. The British in fact are going to react, and not in a limited or inneffective way. With experience of raiding dating back several hundred years, and a primary mission of trade protection, and a German navy assumed to have lept forward several generations in its thinking, one has to also assume a similar gestation in British thinking. Its all fanciful, for both sides, and a bit silly, but I felt it necessary to demonstrate why such fantasies are dangerous to understanding the problem.

Just using the extrapolation method, the British are going to realize pre-war that the germans are building a carrier force for raiding. The first thing they are going to realize is that they need carriers as well, lots of them. So they are not going to build battleships when the Germans are building carriers, and they are going to progress their carrier designs to the 2nd or 3rd generation like the germans. That means that they will have available to them the super carriers of the Audacious class, and the Light Fleet Colossus and Majestic classes. They will also pour a lot more into aircraft development, with a number of possible outcomes, Most optimistically they will have a dedicated carrier fighter the most likely candidate in my book might be the F5/34 prototype, which appears to me to be something very similar to a zero. With proper deck handling, long range, good performance, this spells trouble for your German effort. Allied to that would be the development of high performance strike aircraft, something equivalent to the Firefly and Barracuda.

Now with approximately 3.5 times the funds for new construction, new designs and new aircraft, and a proven ability to anticipate the effects of surface raiders, your six German carriers are not going to be met by six hokey British carriers, they are going to be met by siomething like 15-20. Being conservative, I roughly estimate that the British would retain their 6 existing carriers, and add to that 12 or so Colossus class, and 1 or 2 Audacious classes.

In addition to that with the German carriers being diesel, the British are going to develop thair at sea refuelling capabilities. So when your carriers attemtp to sneak into the south atlantic theirr positions are going to be immedialtely known, and tracked. Within two days of war being declared, I would predict their demise at the hands of the British carrier fleet.

The problem with all these fantasy scenarios is that they fail to consider any quid pro quos. If the germans change their build policies, why on earth would the British just sit their and let it happen. They never displayed such disregard for any threat previously, and with vastly greater resources at their disposal, no amount of german "cleverness" is ever going to solve that. The British are going to anticipate their every move, and simply out build them in the appropriate category of ship, as they did historically....

 

[spitfire44]

Battleship - Texas
Battlecruiser - Alaska
Carrier - Enterprise
Heavy Cruiser - Baltimore
Light Cruiser (under 9,000 tons standard) - Fiji
Destroyer - Allen N Summers
MTB - Fairmile D
Submarine - T Class

 

[syscom3]

Battleship = Texas class?

Carrier = Enterprise?


hehehhehehehe. Sure ......

 

[ratdog]

depends on who is commanding them syscom

 

[syscom3]

depends on who is commanding them syscom

I think even an ensign commanding an Iowa class BB or Essex class CV would win.

 

[ratdog]

ok this is kinda off topic but look up "big guns rc warship" on google and on youtube there are some interesting videos

 

[fly boy]

Battleship - Texas
Battlecruiser - Alaska
Carrier - Enterprise
Heavy Cruiser - Baltimore
Light Cruiser (under 9,000 tons standard) - Fiji
Destroyer - Allen N Summers
MTB - Fairmile D
Submarine - T Class

uhhhh spitfire when you use class of ship it works better then giveing the names because anyone of the yorktown class carriers cloud have made the war.

 

[Soren]

To answer this question one has to check the primary source material GUNNERY DOCTRINE and INSTRUCTIONS, BATTLESHIPS U.S. PACIFIC FLEET. Unfortunately, they don´t explain the rational behind the spotting procedures but I remember that Bill Jurens and Brad Fisher wrote a good analysis of this in an older warships international issue, worth reading.
The US Navy deployed four types of fire control radar in 1941: CXAS-1/FA/Mark 1, FB/Mark 2, FC/Mark 3, and FD/Mark 4.
The USS IOWA´s (as well as all US BB´s with Mark 8 FCS) FC/Mark 8 radar had a significantly better range and bearing discrimination than their 1941 predecessors. In fact and compared to US cruisers, The battleships main battery had better radar about 4 times the range discrimination of +/- 15yds + 0.1% of range.
In addition to the much improved range discrimination, the advent of Mk 8 FCR continuous radar ranges, allowed an experienced rangekeeper operator to track a target to with a margin of error of 2 degrees and 2kts. This must be considered as a critical advantage. Early radar sets such as BISMARCKS DeTeG had discrimination problems as well as limited performance and (not Bimsarck´s problem but typical for period sets) slow rate of data transmission- typically early radar operators passed ranges to plot/TS via voice circuits. This had two negative effects; one is that there is an obvious lag of several to tens of seconds in the reception of said ranges while the second is that there is a larger lag in waiting for the plotting of ranges and the extraction of the observed range rate.
This allowed IOWA to spot not only a target but also the individual fall of shots, easening any correction in firecontroll solutions. Bismarck´s FC system relied on stereoscopic rangefinder (as did the US) for observing the individual fall of shot, it´s radar could find ranges to targets but couldn´t spot the fall of shots.

Thanks Delcyros

 

[renrich]

Spitfire, did you know that Texas had reciprocating engines that were so out of date that with prolonged use, she probably would have been towed into battle. My guess is that when assigned to her the crew and officers probably thought they had been banished to Purgatory. She would have been "state of the art" in 1903.

 

[parsifal]

Even Enterprise is a strange choice, as they were completely eclipsed by the Essex class.

 

[syscom3]

Renrich, the USS Texas did perform gunfire support duty for the Normandy invasion, and did it with distinction. But aside from that, she was obsolete by the middle 1930's, and the fact the USN didn't invest a lot into her in the modernization refits of 1942 and 1943 indicate her days were numbered.

 

[Burmese Bandit]

Parsifal:

The RN counter the KM's carrier building spree? Such a response may well have been done...

...in 1938, after Czechoslovakia...

..when it was too late. For these reasons ...

Remember the peace pledge vote of the 1930s? Remember the cry "scholarships not battleships" ditto? Remember the motion carried by a majority of the Oxford Debating Society that its members would "never again fight again for King and Country"???

The fact is that ALL the parties, both the Tories and Labour and the Liberals, were rabidly pacifist in the 1930s was because of the insanely naive pacifist mood of the 1930s, aided and abetted by the usual suspects, the liberal intellectuals, the artists, and the media pundits. In 1936 Stanley Baldwin nakedly admitted that the British Government had known all along about German Rearmament but hushed it up because he did not want to lose the election! Here is a verbatim quote from his speech..

"...put before the whole House my own views with an appalling frankness. From 1933, I and my friends were all very worried about what was happening in Europe. You will remember at that time the Disarmament Conference was sitting in Geneva. You will remember at that time there was probably a stronger pacifist feeling running through the country than at any time since the War. I am speaking of 1933 and 1934. You will remember the election at Fulham in the autumn of 1933...That was the feeling of the country in 1933. My position as a leader of a great party was not altogether a comfortable one. I asked myself what chance was there...within the next year or two of that feeling being so changed that the country would give a mandate for rearmament? Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment! I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain.."

Churchill commented "...I have never heard such a squalid confession from a public man as Baldwin offered us yesterday"

And to add to all this, the Royal Navy was riddled through and through with Battleship Admirals.

So...with all these as givens...a decision by Britain to match the German CV building spree before 1938???

I don't think so, no sirrreeee!

 

[renrich]

I was pretty familiar with Texas and actually went aboard her at San Jacinto once. She originally burned coal but was converted to oil between wars. She also served in the Neutrality Patrol, I think, in early 1941 in the Atlantic and, I believe, was tracked once by a German sub which could not get into a positon to fire. She also served, along with her sister, New York, at Iwo and Okinawa. We got our money's worth with those old girls.

 

[syscom3]

I was pretty familiar with Texas and actually went aboard her at San Jacinto once. ......

Me too.

I like how they preserved the deck damage from that unexploded German 8" AP shell from Cherborg.