Best World war two warships?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The Scharnhorst was a fine ship - but she did not have a killer punch! This is shown by the fact that she engaged RN Cruisers and did not do serious damage to them (or even hit them?) whilst they did hit and damage her. see -
Battle of North Cape - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The now unescorted Scharnhorst encountered Burnett's cruisers shortly after 09:00 hours. At a distance of nearly 13,000 yards (12 km), the British cruisers opened fire and Scharnhorst responded with her own salvoes. While no hits were scored on the cruisers, the German battleship was struck twice, one shell destroying the radar controls, leaving Scharnhorst virtually blind in a mounting snowstorm. Without radar, gunners aboard the battlecruiser were forced to aim at the enemy's muzzle flashes. This was made more difficult because two of the British cruisers were using a new flashless propellant, leaving Norfolk the relatively easier target. Bey, now outgunned and believing he had engaged a battleship, turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers."

"At 16:48, Belfast fired starshell to illuminate Scharnhorst. The battlecruiser, with her turrets trained fore and aft, was clearly visible from Duke of York. Duke of York opened fire at a range of 11,920 yards (10.90 km) and scored a hit on the first salvo.[1] Scharnhorst's foremost turret ("Anton") was disabled after a while, and another salvo destroyed the ship's aeroplane hangar. Bey turned north, but was engaged by the cruisers Norfolk and Belfast, and turned east at a high speed of 31 knots.

Bey was able to put some more distance between Scharnhorst and the British ships to increase his prospects of success. He had also scored two hits on the Duke of York. However, his ship's fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse at 18:20 hours when a shell fired by Duke of York, at extreme range, pierced her armour belt and destroyed the no. 1 boiler room. Scharnhorst's speed dropped to only 22 knots, though immediate repair work allowed it to regain to 26 knots. She was now vulnerable to the attacks of the destroyers. Five minutes later, Bey sent his final radio message to the German naval command: "We will fight on until the last shell is fired." [2]"

I think this along with other accounts of 11 inch shells not incapacitating Cruisers indicates that they would have to be very close and very lucky to have anything like a chance against a Battle Cruiser or Battle Ship!
 
Hi my first post here,

Having amassed a bit of knowledge about WWII radar and WWII warships perhaps I can be of some help here?

The Scharnhorst didn't do much in the way of shooting back in the first battle at about 0900 because it had been caught by surprise and was just trying to get clear. It was caught by surprise because its radars had not been switched on. Previously it had detected the British radars with its radar detectors. This was why the Scharnhorst had turned around and altered its course to the southwest. The fact that the British passed by at only 12,000 yards unnoticed, proves that its active radar had not been switched on. During this engagement its forward radar set was destroyed by a direct hit.

In the second engagement at about 12:30 the Scharnhorst had the advantage of an artic twilight compensating to a degree its lost forward radar. This time the Scharnhorst was not hit, but scored hits on the British cruiser Norfolk. Norfolk's X turret was knocked out and an engine room damaged, as well as several radars on Norfolk knocked out. The SH would have used HE or semi armour peircing ammo vs a cruiser, because AP ammo may pass completely through without exploding.

The third engagement came to pass when the DoY detected the SH with Type 273Q search radar at about 16:17 hours from a range of about 42km. The Scharnhorst could not locate the DoY without active radar that could scan the forward sectors, although it had previously picked up the DoY's radar signals with its radar detection gear. SH was once again caught by surprise after Fraser had allowed SH to close to 11km battle range. Fraser ordered SH illuminated with star shell and DoY opened fire. Over the next approx. 90 minutes the SH slowly opened the range out to 19.5km. During this 90 minutes the DoY managed about 4 direct hits with its main battery. As the range increased, the DoY was forced to rely more and more on its 50cm Type 284M gunlaying radar. However it became increasingly more difficult to spot the fall of shot for line as the range increased. At one point the DoY gunners broke over the radio requesting any other British ship to help spot the fall of shot. Finally with the range at about 19.5km it was forced to cease fire because it could not spot the fall of shot. The SH ceased fire soon afterward.

The SH forward turret was hit early on and the forward magazine was flooded as a precaution. This meant that B turret was also unusable for a considerable period of time. The SH could only reply with the 3 guns from the aft turret until B turret came back on line. After B turret was useable again the SH adopted the tactic of suddenly turning to the south and firing a six gun broadside and then turning back onto it's escape path to the east at intervals. The SH only fired a fraction of the salvoes that DoY did overall.

The SH was equipped with special night optics, separate from the regular optics, and it fired star shell to illuminate its targets early during the engagement, along with radar ranging from the aft radar set. The SH seems to have followed the standard German shooting drill. This was to fire a first salvo disregarding exact range, just to warm up the guns and check the bearing track. Cold guns were not expected to range accurately. Then to fire two quick salvoes just short andjust long to confirm the firing solution for range. The Scharnhorst's 3rd salvo reportedly was a very close near miss right off DoY's bow. As the range increased beyond the effective range of the night optics, the SH was forced to rely on its aft radar set and it ceased to fire star shell. This was when the SH shooting became uncomfortably accurate. From approx. 17km battle range to 19.5km battle range, the SH consistently straddled the DoY. This was very impressive radar directed shooting considering the conditions. Indeed a case could be made that it was better than DoY's radar directed shooting.

I personally doubt that SH was slowed by a hit penetrating a boiler room, because of the chronology. Nearly 15 minutes had passed after the DoY was forced to cease fire and before Adm Fraser called off the pursuit. It was further several minutes after Adm Fraser called off the pursuit before the British radar operators began to call off decreasing ranges, and they knew that SH had been delivered into their hands. Some of the German engine room personal later stated that the loss of speed was because of a broken steam line to one of the turbines. This is plausible considering that the Scharnhorst had its machinery pushed beyond proper limits for many hours at that point.
 

Understanding the comparative capabilities between the Iowa's WWII firecontrol radars and the late war German equipment may be better attained by first understanding the problems the Americans had with their earlier 40cm Mk3 firecontrol radars introduced in 1942.

The Mk3 was hampered by poor resolution for both range and also for bearing. Accuracy and resolution are not quite the same things. The accuracy for range and bearing of the Mk3 were actually very good. Resolution is however, the ability to resolve from among two or more closely grouped targets. The resolution for range is in most cases the function of the pulse duration. Radar pulses travel at a speed of 300 meters per microsecond (one/millionth second). Therefore a pulse of 1ms covers 300 meters distance. Since the leading edge of the pulse will have already rebounded off the target before the trailing edge of the pulse arrives, the range resolution will be ½ the pulse distance. A 1ms pulse gives a range resolution of 150 meters. A 2ms pulse gives a range resolution of 300 meters and so forth. The German GEMA radars were not strictly bound by these limitations because they utilized a different principle for processing range data. The range resolution of the Mk3 was 400 yards. It therefore had problems resolving shell splashes from the target itself and could not be used to correct the MPI (mean point of impact) of straddling salvoes or even if the salvo was a straddle or not.

The bearing resolution was also poor. This was because when lobe switching, which is necessary to attain a bearing fix accurate to fractions of a degree as required for gun laying, the Mk3's beam width became as wide as 15* . The bearing resolution is equal to the beam width. The beam width can be calculated by dividing the wave length by the effective size of the antenna. Therefore good bearing resolution comes from using shorter wavelengths, or larger antennas, or both.

When the Mk8 firecontrol radar began replacing the Mk3 during 1943 the Americans looked at Mk8 as something of a miracle device. Such advances often leads to the assumption that you have a capability nobody else has though. It operated on 10cm wave length and had a beam width of 2*. Its pulse duration was also decreased to about 0.4ms so its resolution for range was drastically improved from the Mk3's 400 yards, to about 70 yards. Another important improvement over Mk3 was the ability to lobe switch by manipulating the phase of the individual antenna elements or phased array techniques. The data was presented on a B-scope which was much like looking through rifle scope with the cross hairs on the target and splashes off line showing as such.

However, a type of presentation of bearing data similar to the B-scope and phased array techniques had already been in use on the German naval radars for years. The German sets were always quite capable of spotting the fall of shot. The German Seetakt radars were multirole radar sets, in that they were used for both surface, and air warning (The famous Freya air warning radars were actually a long wavelength version of Seetakt), as well as being very well suited for gunlaying. As mentioned above, they utilized a different principle for processing range data and could achieve excellent range resolution regardless of pulse duration, hence the ability to spot the fall of shot relative to the target for range. The bearing resolution was about 5-6* for the early sets. By 1943 they were developed to the point that the common problem of the reliability of vacuum tube electronics aboard warships was manageable, and they were well integrated into the advanced firecontrol systems of German warships. Their accuracy was also very good. The Germans didn't have a pressing need to replace these radars with more modern equipment like the Americans had with Mk3. They did however want to improve the performance over existing levels. In 1943 they introduced improved models with huge 3x6 meter antennas. These large antennas provided a beam width of about 3 degrees, and significant improvement in range to target attainment. These models also had improved signal processing circuitry which improved the range accuracy to 25 meters regardless of the range.
 

In these tests they were testing to see how well the shells performed against sloped armor. The plates were 70* errect, so it would be like shooting at a belt sloped 20* These tests should not be confused with the so called proofing angle. The German proofing tests were entiely different. They tested at 30* from the normal, then 45* from the normal, then 60* from the normal. The German shells performed very well during oblique attack (the fuses were another matter). In the sloped belt tests the Bismarck classe's 38cm could defeat a 20* sloped belt 12.2" thick all the way out to 25km (27,340 yards).

I don't recall the SH 's 28cm performance but it really won't be too far behind. This is because penetration of cemented armour by large caliber shells is mainly a matter of velocity rather than caliber or weight. The American 16" doesn't have much better belt penetration because of its relative low velocity. It hardly matters anyway because of the belt plus slope design of the German ships can't be dfeated at virtually any range.

The German guns belt penetration will probably result in a German victory at battle ranges inside of 27,000 yards, and that's not taking into consideration the very poor quality of American Class-A armor. This armor typically had only about 75% the ballistic resistance it should have against large caliber shells.
 
Hi Wavelength,

welcome and thank you for you very excellent posts.


I agree. I think a 14 inch shell from DOY hit through the upper belt (possible up from 18500m) and exploded on the main deck with a huge shock impact and the always fragile Boiler Room1 was out of action. If DOY had a striking hit through the main deck, i don't think it's possible for SH to go back to 26kn 15-20min later.
Also a striking hit was never confirmed from the survivors of SH and Boiler Room1 was out of action or with problems at every mission of SH and SH was plotted 3-5 kn faster as DOY by a wind strenght of 9, so the machinery was very much owerpowered.


But SH had a major problem with it's thin 45mm upper Belt, up from 18500-19000m, because every huge (up from 11-12inch) shell can strike through the upper belt and go directly to the main deck, which is also thin with 80mm.
SH had the best immune zone under 18000m from all Battleships ever build (accept her turrets) but up from 18000m it's fragile and SH isn't a balanced design because the battle range at WWII was 15000m-25000m.

Also the the german naval weapons were all designed for belt penetration (huge muzzle velocity; light shell) rather than deck penetration, so to fight against an other battleship SH must go to an infight (under 18000m) to play it's good parts (belt penetration power and belt plus slope design).

For the radar equipment on SH for my opinion it was not a radar fire control equipment. By radar you can find ranges and integrate them in the gunnery solution but you couldn't opperate the SA of SH only by it's radar equipment.
For my understanding the MK 8 and the british fire radar equipment could opperate their SA only by radar and for the battle of Nordcap it was the key to win because there was any daylight and the british ships were equiped with flashless powder.
 
Last edited:

The German designers also found the SH upper belt, if it can be called such, a major flaw. They always considered the Bismarck's upper belt of 145mm KC a major improvement.

It was not realistic to attempt to provide complete protection to turrets and barbets at battle ranges below about 20km. In most cases the turrets were designed to provide protection from 20km-30km battle range. It's no surprise that the Bismarck's B turret could be knocked out by a 16" shell from Rodney at ranges of slightly less than 20km, or SH's A- turret being knocked out at 11km by a 14" shell.

The Germans did not use light shells per caliber to enhance MV, although it did, but to concentrate the shells center of gravity in the head and to retain a center of gravity near the shell head should the hard penetrating cap become removed. This greatly enhanced the shells ability to penetrate intact during oblique attack. They therefore used relatively short body shells with medium sized burster cavities. This concept can be illustrated by British tests of their battleship AP shells postwar. The short body Nelson class 16" shells always penetrated intact striking at 30*. But the longer per caliber 14" and 15" shells usually did not. If the shells center gravity is too far away from the head it would likely become broken up during oblique penetration. Removing the cap shifts the center gravity away from the head of the projectile in heavier per caliber shells that have relatively long shell bodies. This was good reason to use a deck protection system that always de-caps. This is also why in the case of heavy shells against the German de-capping deck systems it gets very complex, and is not any kind of a slam dunk for the heavy shells to defeat the German deck system intact at realistic battleranges.

I agree that the SH 28cm gun was just too weak to take on WWII battleships in most cases. The Tirpitz's 38cm gun was far more capable. The ballistics of the 38cm gun is most interesting. It has a flat trajectory and great terminal velocity at ranges where it will likely strike an enemy's belt. But because of its relative lightness and the lesser amount of momentum it carries down range compared to a heavier shell, it begins to obtain steeper final trajectories at the battle ranges that it more likely to strike decks. Compared to the heavier French 38cm with an angle fall of 25*, and 115mm deck penetration at 30km, the German 38cm has a 31* angle of fall and 128mm deck penetration at 30km. The Iowa's 140mm effective deck protection could be defeated by the German 38cm by about 31km battle range. I don't know if the SH 28cm gun can defeat the Iowa's deck protection at any realistic battle range?

The German radars could be used to direct fire blind after about 1941-mid 1942. In a 1944 Naval Conference there is some concern about the increasing dependence on radar alone directed fire. Radar direction is so much easier to use and master. The concern was, that the proficiency with more traditional methods may become inadequate should the radar become disabled or non functional-as was the case with the Scharnhorst's forward radar at North Cape.
 
Last edited:
Hello Wavelenght
Quote:" The SH forward turret was hit early on and the forward magazine was flooded as a precaution"

Are you sure that it was only a precaution. According to Garzke and Dulin. "At 1655, a 356mm shell struck the Scharnhorst's starboard side abreast of turret Anton. The turret jammed, with the training and elevating gears out of action. The magazines caught fire from incandescent splinters, which also penerated the fireproof bulkhead into magazines for turret Bruno…"

Also boatswain Gödde tells in Nauroth's Scharnhorst book on thick smoke after that hit and that he later heard that fire and strong smokegeneration prevented rescue crews to enter into the turret.

On British heavy shells, at least those 15" shells which hit Dunkerque at Mers-el-Kébir worked OK, even that which hit the upper edge of 225mm inclined side armour or starboard edge of 115mm deck armour, depending on source, from appr. 17'500y penetrated and went deep into ship before exploding. I have heard the banana effect on British heavy shells when hitting an inclined armour plate, but cannot recall which stage of shell development was in question. On the other hand IIRC the banana effect was the key to the effectiveness of long penetration rods against well sloped frontal armour of tanks in 70s.

Juha
 
G&D seem to find more detail oft times than the record can contain. For example, the idea of the final DoY hail mary shot before ceasing fire, having passed over the main belt and up against the boiler hump penetrating the panzer deck cannot be known. It's plausible, and I'm not saying it didn't happen that way, but nobody knows if it did happen that way. Of course concerning SH here, there is not any documentation about exactly what happened aboard the ship as far as hits go. There were only a handful of survivors, all of them ratings, with none of them having first hand knowledge of the exact details.

The Hood's 15" shells should have easly penetrated the Dunkerque's thin belt intact at that range. Its only about 28* from the normal, with its cap intact, and the velocity will be plenty sufficient. Where the longer body British shells had problems in their trials was at greater obliquities, such as typical in deck hits of 65* or more from the normal. Often distortion of the main body or base slap rendered the shell intert or broken. Interestingly the American shells they tested with smaller burster cavities actually did worse at staying intact in these cases, although the less massive American 14" shells had considerably better deck penetration than the British 14". In 40* tests of British 14" and 15" shells selected at random, they all failed. Specially selected shells from the Royal Ordnance Factory passed in some cases. During 30* tests they overlooked several failures of 14" and 15", but allowed this. The short body 16" passed in all cases.
 
Hi Wavelength

The German designers also found the SH upper belt, if it can be called such, a major flaw. They always considered the Bismarck's upper belt of 145mm KC a major improvement.
Click to expand...

Yes! But I think to build a BB with slope design, straight main belt and a good deck protection, it would be necessary to go 1 deck low with the upper deck and build without a upper belt, to take the free steel to put it in a thicker upper deck. That would be a compromise to the protected ship room but your upper deck is earlier in the overall protection in a gun fight. And for my opinion it would be very difficult to strike through a 70mm upper deck + a 80-95mm main deck.


I agree because every turret from any BB at WWII would be out of action after a 14 inch hit from 11km.
But the german turrets weren't as good protected as many counterparts.


Very interesting statement with the shell body.
We had a huge discussion in a german maritim forum about the interaction between shell weight, bore lenght, muzzle velocity and accurately.
For example the french 15 inch wants all, huge muzzle velocity + heavy shell but only 45 bore lenghts.
The effect was a gun that that wasn't accurate it was very poor in this discipline.
The german 11inch gun for my opinion was a great gun for 11inch with a medium shell and a very huge muzzle velocity, but a long bore lenght 54,5 and very accurate.
The german 15 inch gun was a bit conservative design because the first 15 inch gun from the Bayern Class had massive problems with the accurately in it's first design. A muzzle velocity of 900m/s, a shell weight of 750 kg and a bore length of 45. So the muzzle velocity was reduced to 800m/s and than the gun was accurate.
So I think the designer were very conservative with the 15 inch SK 34 because with a bore lenght of 52 their would be of chance of more muzzle velocity then 820m/s by a shell weight of 800kg. But accurately had priority.

I don't know if the SH 28cm gun can defeat the Iowa's deck protection at any realistic battle range?
Click to expand...

No, the 11inch 54,5 was a very poor deck penetrator because of the huge muzzle velocity (angle of fall).
 
That's an interesting idea Don. It avoids what the Germans considered to be a real sin, of many other contemporary designs, of positioning the main armored deck where its tonnage could not do any good in terms of backing up the main belt ballistics wise or by containing plate debris. If the Dunkerque had had such an arrangement, the Hood's belt penetrating15" would have been kept out of the vitals.

The French had a similar layout to this idea, but they concentrated the main deck armor above and put a thin 40mm splinter deck with slopes, but with the slopes at rather non-optimal angle, below. This thickness of steel below and behind the belt really does very little good. In that case: 150mm + 40mm = 155mm effective. That is an inefficient use of armor tonnage.

The German ballistics engineers would have objected strongly to reducing the distance between the ober deck and the panzer deck by ½, however. The distance between the two armored decks was of crucial importance to the proper functioning of a spaced armor setup.

The amount of inter-space is important because there must be sufficient space for such things as completely removing the cap and yaw induction, to become more manifest. For example, a blunt head shape, such as used by American APC, results in a slower rate of precession. The distance between the two armored decks as built is exactly the right distance for the maximal amount of yaw to become manifest. This can increase the necessary velocity required to penetrate the panzer deck by as much 30%. This would essentially increases the effective thickness of the panzer deck by 30% in such a case.

It would take fusing out of the equation too. For example, if a large caliber shell or bomb strikes the upper deck it would penetrate, but its fuse would also become activated. The upper armored deck would also slow it down some. If the fuse delay was 0.035 seconds and its residual velocity was 300 m/s it would explode after traveling 10.5 meters. Given an angle across the inter-space of 25*, the distance is ~12.5 meters on the original design (if I remember correctly), and the shell would explode before it could reach the panzer deck. This principle is most important when it comes to protecting the ship's vitals from aircraft delivered bombs. Bombs can strike the decks at nearly the normal, but their typical terminal velocity is much less than those typical of artillery shells. A Luftwaffe study of the system, determined that the upper deck would reduce the velocity of large caliber armored piercing bombs 5-10%. The greatest distance possible needed to be maintained, to keep this principle fully in play. A thicker upper deck would reduce the velocity more, but this introduces other trade offs.

The Germans observed that if the thickness of their Wh armor penetrated was 50% the diameter of the shell, then the post penetration trajectory was shifted about 4* toward the normal. This would mean that it would strike the next deck in the series at more advantageous angle, reducing the velocity required to penetrate the next deck. The German knew that there was an optimal thickness ratio and ballistic resistance ratio between the two decks. The thickness they used resulted in a thickness that was about 13% the diameter of large caliber shells, and the resultant trajectory shift toward the normal was relatively insignificant. They wanted to concentrate as much armor as possible into the main plate from the sum total, but leave just enough armor thickness in the upper deck to be effective. By using a thickness for the upper deck that was still thick enough to cause de-capping, velocity reduction, and yaw, they could build a spaced armor system that could equal or exceed the effective thickness of a single plate of the same total thickness.

Finally, there are structural engineering considerations. Generally, the upper deck or the weather deck is the primary strength deck in the overall structural system. This is why the British used a laminate of D-steel (high tensile structural steel) for this deck. The German approach of using 50-80mm of armor grade steel (tensile strength of 80kg/mm2) for the upper deck, allowed the same tonnage expenditure to address both structural and ballistic considerations. It was also more weight efficient. They could use a low weight expenditure of only 6mm thick for the non-ballistic deck in between.
 
Hello Wavelenght
On the other hand their description of what happened to A-turret and magazine is in line of the Gödde's story, whose battle-position was, if we can believe his interview in The Scharnhorst double-DVD, alongside and inside the conning tower.

On Hood's 15" shells hitting on Dunkerque, the one which hit on the 150mm roof of the13" Turret II, even if hit angle was shallow, gouged deep into the armour plating before exploding, most of the shell ricocheted but pieces of armour or of shell struck the loading platform and started a cordite fire which killed the entire gun crew of the starboard half turret. The hole in the roof armour was something like 1,5m x 20-30cm.

Juha
 
If I was searching for the "best" ships, I wouldn't be looking on the bottom of the oceans!
 
Thats funny, but there is a serious side to the statement. With all these advantages, and accuracy in their gunnery systems, particularly in the alleged improvements after 1943, were there any tangible improvements in the gunnery for the germans? In the same vein were there any improvements for the allies? Who showed the greatest level of improvement? If the germans had all this wunderbar equipment, and they did not show any great improvement in accuracy, or even a decrease in accuracy, why did this happen?
 
I'm not following what your trying to say here parsifal. Can you provide any examples to make your point(s) clearer??
 

Hello Juha,

Penetration of SH's A turret probably would have started fires and heavy smoke from several possible sources, particulary ready use ammunition in the turret. A conflagaration into the forward magazines would probably result in B-turret being out of operation from that point on. But it came back on line.

The German ammo storage was not as dangerous as British bagged cordite. The German charges was much more stable, cooler burning, and in metal cartridges, themselves within armoured lockers, within the magazine. So any magazine fires are much more managable though.

The Hood hit against the turret roof on Dunkerque is not really remarkable. The roof was of face hardened material, not homogenous material and sloped downward about 9*. Plugging in the true striking angle and velocity for FH armorthe result is a shell that almost penetrates but breaks up. Exactly what happened.
 
Wavelength said:
I'm not following what your trying to say here parsifal. Can you provide any examples to make your point(s) clearer??
Click to expand...

Wasnt trying to say anything really, was posing a question. Did the standard of gunnery in the German navy improve as its technology was improved, or did it fall away as the war progressed. Similarly, did the Allies improve or deteriorate in terms of accuracy as the war progressed. Comparing the two, who progressed, or deteriorated the most over time. And what were the factors that influenced that progress or deterioration over time, what in your opinion caused those changes?
 
Last edited:
The basic centralized firecontrol equipment such as the gyros, computers, remote power control…ect.. for most everybody during WWII were fully developed prior to the war itself. The German central firecontrol system (C/38) as used by their cruisers and battleships was very similar in design and capabilities to that used by the USN, such as in the new construction fast battleships. There could be no comparative fall off or improvement based on basic systemic technical capabilities, but there may be based on human skill in operating the firecontrol systems.

What needs to be clearly understood, and forgive me please if this is overly elementary, is that in naval gunnery one shoots to straddle the target. Once one is straddling the target, one is actually shooting as accurately as one can. Hitting the target during a straddle becomes a matter of probability and ballistics. There is a saying among naval gunners: "Good shooting gets you straddles, but only God gives you hits." This can be illustrated by the experience of the American battleships Washington and South Dakota at Guadalcanal. Radar can help you determine the exact range bearing of the target, possibly helping one to straddle sooner and more often, but other than perhaps allowing minor corrections to the mean point of impact, it does not improve the probability of hits from a straddle.

The American battleships unloaded at least 14 radar directed broadsides against a Japanese light cruiser and two destroyers at ranges between 11,000 and 18,000 yards. They scored no hits. Later the Washington scored several hits on the Japanese battle cruiser Kirishima at a range of 8,400 yards. This also illustrates the problem of comparing accuracy of different events. The range, and the target size, as well its orientation, has much to do with hit probabilities from straddles. Luck is always a factor of course.

Comparing Allied to German accuracy improvements, or fall offs, late war to early war, becomes a bit difficult, because the German Surface Navy was mostly confined to harbor by Hitler's no risks policy after the sinking of the Bismarck. There are only really two major battles after Bismarck to examine, so late war comparisons can be difficult to make.

About 45 days after the American battleships went into action near Savo Island the Germans and the British were involved in a surface battle in the Barents Sea. Although the outcome was bad for the Germans, because of Hitler's reaction to it, their actual shooting performance demonstrated a significant improvement in accuracy, rather than a fall off, despite the German crews being rusty. This had to be because of upgrades in their firecontrol radar capabilities allowing them to straddle more quickly and more often.

British Adm. Tovey wrote in his post action report that the extremely cold weather rendered optical equipment useless, forcing a reliance on RDF for firecontrol and ranging. These climatic and weather conditions effected both sides. The visibility was at most 7 miles, and there was fog, snow storms, and the artic darkness to contend with too. The British were laying smoke screens as well. Despite the conditions, the German cruiser Hipper scored a first salvo straddle and hit against the destroyer Achates from 14,000 meters, followed by 4 -8-inch hits out of 36 rounds expended against the destroyer Onslow. Later on, the Hipper re-engaged the Achates at a range exceeding 18,000 meters and scored a first salvo straddle and multiple hits once again. The Achates would sink. This was unprecedented and astonishing, long range (for a cruiser), shooting against relatively small destroyers.

After Barents Sea, the Germans put increased emphasis on radar directed shooting. The Scharnhorst had the latest model radar installed at its foretop position in Oct 1943. Its new captain put the SH through a series of radar directed shooting exercises and accuracy tests during Nov 1943- within the confines of the Alta Fiord complex. However, this radar set was the one destroyed in the first skirmish.

Despite loosing its best radar, the Scharnhorst consistently straddled the Duke of York at ranges from 17,000 meters to 19,500 meters. This would have been impossible without effective radar control from the remaining set. Remember if you're straddling, you're already shooting as accurately as you can. The Duke of York scored only about 4 hits over a period of about 90 minutes at ranges from 11,000 meters to 19,500 meters and many more rounds expended. This doesn't indicate a comparative accuracy disparity.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

World War II "practical" assault rifles/automatic carbines
Replies
12
Views
771
BarnOwlLover
What If: World War II SHTF automatic carbines/rifles
2
Replies
27
Views
1K
BarnOwlLover
85 years ago today, Sept 1 1939, the second world war began.
Replies
1
Views
532
MIflyer
M
Favorite "obscure" theater or World War II to research?
Replies
9
Views
1K
EwenS
E
Season’s Greetings from Air War Publications.
Replies
0
Views
331
Snautzer01