Best WWII Air-Force

[drgondog]

DRGONDOG:

I dont have it handy, as it is buried in a thread somewhere (I think it was the "most effective bomber" thread).

I'll re-read it to see if I can find it

Flyboy and Deradler can vouche for it, as I was proven wrong in my assesment that daylight bombing made for better accuracy.

There is a segment of the USSBS on the oil plant attacks that clearly stated that bombs of 4000 Lbs or more were needed to destroy the industrial machinery in the plants. The 500 and 1000 pounders could bring down the roof and maybe the walls, but not inflict permanent damage.

I do remember the reference to 2,000 pounders being more effective on foundaries, and bombs of 4,000 or more on submarine pens - but the 500/1,000 pounders were more than adequate for all the refinery equipment, rail centers, a/c factories, bridges (NOT concrete abutments)

The RAF method of bombing a target over a extended period of time was found to be far more usefull than the AAF daylight attacks due to all the repair crews (at the targets) having to stay in their bunkers for hours on end.

Interesting only in proportion to starting the reconstruction perhaps hours earlier?

I believe the accuracy of the RAF crews was better than the AAF due to them bombing at lower altitudes, and not relying on a single bombardier in a whole squadron to determine the bomb release points.

Again, are we talking about city area bombing or daylight attacks?

The lead crew concepts formulated and implemented by Curtis LeMay for 8th AF achieved major improvements to CEP from bombing and far fewer navigation errors.

Of course when one lead crew screwed up the mission results were not as good.

Low(er) altitude bombing with Oboe or other radio based techniques at night over blacked out cities or targets were not as effective as precision daylight bombing on days in which the targets could be seen.

RAF daylight precision bombing was good to excellent -

So which approach are we discussing?

Regards,

Bill

 

[Hop]

Low(er) altitude bombing with Oboe or other radio based techniques at night over blacked out cities or targets were not as effective as precision daylight bombing on days in which the targets could be seen.

So which approach are we discussing?

I think we're discussing bombing overall.

There's little doubt that in perfect conditions the USAAF could bomb very accurately. The problem is Europe rarely had perfect conditions, and German smoke screens made things worse.

The USSBS report Syscom referred to gave a sample of attacks on 3 large oil refineries, Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Zeitz. The plants covered a total of 3.5 square miles between them.

30,000 tons of bombs, 146,000 bombs in total.

Air Force Percentage of Hits Within the Plants
8th AF visual aiming 26.8%
8th AF, part visual aiming and part instrument 12.4%
8th AF, full instrument 5.4%
RAF, night Pathfinder technique 15.8%
Weighted average 12.6%

What you can see from that is that the USAAF was accurate when using visual aiming, poor when using radar aids, atrocious when using purely radar aids. The RAF was worse than USAAF visual methods, better than USAAF radar methods.

The overall average was below the RAF's average, which means the USAAF put fewer bombs on target than the RAF.We can't say how many fewer without knowing the amount of bombs each force dropped.

However, 10% seems to be in the right ballpark.

If you look at just the USAAF figures, if they got 26.8% when using purely visual means, 12.4% using part visual and part radar, and 5.4% using radar, and the final figure was 10%, then you can see that they didn't drop many bombs visually.

There is a segment of the USSBS on the oil plant attacks that clearly stated that bombs of 4000 Lbs or more were needed to destroy the industrial machinery in the plants. The 500 and 1000 pounders could bring down the roof and maybe the walls, but not inflict permanent damage.

From the USAAF summary on oil attacks:

Small Bombs Stopped Production, but Did It the Hard Way

The small bombs generally used against German oü-chemical targets were capable of creating breaks in vital utilities systems, there temporarily shutting off plant production, but only very rarely were small bombs able to, destroy vital equipment. (During the oil offensive average size of all the 508,512 high-explosive bombs dropped on oil producing targets by the USAAF was 388 lb, and of the 263,942 dropped by the RAF, 660 lb. The average for both air forces was 480 lb.) Winning a war with small bombs requires a tremendous airforce, but this is possibly the only choice open if visual sighting is not possible or if vital aiming points are not chosen.

Only Large Bombs Destroy Vital Process Equipment

Few large bombs were used against German oil-chemical plants, and most of these were dropped by the RAF. It is the unanimous conviction of all Oil Division observers that, under bombing conditions which permit sighting on a specific aiming point and with reasonable bombing accuracy, heavy bombs (2,000 to 4,000 lb., instantaneously fuzed) are several times as effective per ton as the lightweight bombs (500 lb. or less) used principally against German oil targets

The RAF method of bombing a target over a extended period of time was found to be far more usefull than the AAF daylight attacks due to all the repair crews (at the targets) having to stay in their bunkers for hours on end.

Again from the USSBS:

Larger Raids Would Have Been More Effective

The short duration of most USAAF raids enabled German defense personnel to leave shelter in time to deal with incendiaries and incipient fires before conflagrations were started. Because of the longer duration and lack of uniformity of RAF raids - each bombardier sighted his own bombs independently, whereas the customary practice in the Eighth Air Force was for pilots to release their bombs on a signal from the lead plane - RAF attacks were. By almost unanimous agreement among the Germans interrogated, more terrifying and more damaging. Had it been found possible, with the limitations imposed by operational considerations, to vary the length and pattern of USAAF raids, greater results would have been achieved for the same expenditure in bombs.

 

[drgondog]

DRGONDOG:

I dont have it handy, as it is buried in a thread somewhere (I think it was the "most effective bomber" thread).

I'll re-read it to see if I can find it

Flyboy and Deradler can vouche for it, as I was proven wrong in my assesment that daylight bombing made for better accuracy.

There is a segment of the USSBS on the oil plant attacks that clearly stated that bombs of 4000 Lbs or more were needed to destroy the industrial machinery in the plants. The 500 and 1000 pounders could bring down the roof and maybe the walls, but not inflict permanent damage.

I do remember the reference to 2,000 pounders being more effective on foundaries, and bombs of 4,000 or more on submarine pens - but the 500/1,000 pounders were more than adequate for all the refinery equipment, rail centers, a/c factories, bridges (NOT concrete abutments)

The RAF method of bombing a target over a extended period of time was found to be far more usefull than the AAF daylight attacks due to all the repair crews (at the targets) having to stay in their bunkers for hours on end.

Interesting only in proportion to starting the reconstruction perhaps hours earlier?

I believe the accuracy of the RAF crews was better than the AAF due to them bombing at lower altitudes, and not relying on a single bombardier in a whole squadron to determine the bomb release points.

Again, are we talking about city area bombing or daylight attacks?

The lead crew concepts formulated and implemented by Curtis LeMay for 8th AF achieved major improvements to CEP from bombing and far fewer navigation errors.

Of course when one lead crew screwed up the mission results were not as good.

Low(er) altitude bombing with Oboe or other radio based techniques at night over blacked out cities or targets were not as effective as precision daylight bombing on days in which the targets could be seen.

RAF daylight precision bombing was good to excellent -

So which approach are we discussing?

Regards,

Bill


Syscom - just found these excerpts from the Survey - still nothing on night attacks achieveing higher precsion

"In the latter half of 1944, aided by new navigational techniques, the RAF returned with part of its force to an attack on industrial targets. These attacks were notably successful but it is with the attacks on urban areas that the RAF is most prominently identified.

The city attacks of the RAF prior to the autumn of 1944, did not substantially affect the course of German war production. German war production as a whole continued to increase. This in itself is not conclusive, but the Survey has made detailed analysis of the course of production and trade in 10 German cities that were attacked during this "

]

 

[drgondog]

I think we're discussing bombing overall.

There's little doubt that in perfect conditions the USAAF could bomb very accurately. The problem is Europe rarely had perfect conditions, and German smoke screens made things worse.

The USSBS report Syscom referred to gave a sample of attacks on 3 large oil refineries, Leuna, Ludwigshafen-Oppau, Zeitz. The plants covered a total of 3.5 square miles between them.

30,000 tons of bombs, 146,000 bombs in total.

Air Force Percentage of Hits Within the Plants
8th AF visual aiming 26.8%
8th AF, part visual aiming and part instrument 12.4%
8th AF, full instrument 5.4%
RAF, night Pathfinder technique 15.8%
Weighted average 12.6%

What you can see from that is that the USAAF was accurate when using visual aiming, poor when using radar aids, atrocious when using purely radar aids. The RAF was worse than USAAF visual methods, better than USAAF radar methods.

Basic agreement with your conclusions

The overall average was below the RAF's average, which means the USAAF put fewer bombs on target than the RAF.We can't say how many fewer without knowing the amount of bombs each force dropped.

OOPs! Are we now comparing the precision of a raid on Cologne by RAF in which a bomb dropped within city limit is counted with same context as that of a 1000' CEP from aiming point for a USAAF 'blind bombing' attack? Or just the example above. And given that USAAF made 11 times the attacks just on Leuna alone than RAF it will be difficult to say RAF put more bombs on target?

What was the mode (i.e were both RAF raids on Luena Pathfinder attacks while the 22 were mixed for USAAF)and standard for accuracy for the figures you just quoted for the Oil targets (combined)

Hop - I believe that conclusion is probably seriously flawed as the number of raids by RAF on Oils and Chemicals was far lower - see below as an example and I fully realize Luena is not by itself enough of a statistical sampleto derive conclusions from

Hop - on page 42 of the "Excerpts from USSBS", the report points out three specific statistics for Leuna alone as an Illustration:

1. The USAAF made 22 attacks, the RAF 2
2. The total tonnage dropped was 18,328 Tons
3. The importance of the Target was so high that 8th AF committed to steady, frequent and large attacks independent of weather, and many attacks were made in miserable conditions for precision bombing.

So, we have to be a little circumspect in drawing general conclusions about accuracy and even 'relative' bombing effectiveness, when talking about Oil Targets.

Even moreso if we wish to compare RAF efforts and commitment to these attacks versus USAAF. Luena was so important that 8th AF was not attacking Leuna with ordinary and customary planning doctrine (i.e Good weather for visual bombing).

QUOTE]

Hop - ordinarily I wouldn't dive into the statistics debates but I am reminded that many times the comments in the survey are reproduced, sometimes without complete context.

The survey was very explicit about RAF efforts not materially impacting German war production until late 1944 when they devoted more missions and tonnage to German industry.

The USAAF (ETO) finished the war with more tonnage dropped on Germany than the RAF and was the key factor in destroying German industry.

I was suprised that with nearly 80,000 causalties each that the RAF and USAAF-ETO was separated by only 16.. 79,265 (USAAF) to 79,281 (RF)

 

[syscom3]

One thing is for certain in the ETO, and that was clear sky's for effective daylight bombing were far and few between.

The 8th AF war diary (By Roger freeman) indicates that most of the attacks were not visual, and many times the primaries were obscured and the secondaries were attacked.

As for bomb hit percentages..... I'm still looking for that document that showed the RAF had a better CEP overall than the AAF. It does exist, and I'm not bloviating or making things up.

 

[drgondog]

One thing is for certain in the ETO, and that was clear sky's for effective daylight bombing were far and few between.

The 8th AF war diary (By Roger freeman) indicates that most of the attacks were not visual, and many times the primaries were obscured and the secondaries were attacked.

This is particularly true of Late Fall and Winter. However the Secondaries were often attacked with visual runs when the Primary wasn't available.

As for bomb hit percentages..... I'm still looking for that document that showed the RAF had a better CEP overall than the AAF. It does exist, and I'm not bloviating or making things up.

I don't think you're "making it up". I just doubt the credibility of the source you found that makes a statement like that, given most of the RAF missions were area bombing. The very definition for CEP for say the first Cologne 1000 bomber mission or Berlin begs the question "what do they mean by 'CEP' ?"

 

[d_bader]

I would certainly say that it is between the RAF and Luftwaffe.

The RAF had a limited amount of money and more importantly time, to develop good aircraft for both attacking and defensive roles. Unlike America, Britain fought from 1939, yet America did not become her ally. The spitfire was an ancient desing by the end of the war, but it worked because it was a solide design that could be altered. No American aircraft alsted that long.

America had a huge economy to fuel it's airforce, yet struggled to produce decent carrier aircraft until the Hellcat and Corsair.

The luftwaffe developed some extarordinary aircraft, especially near the end of the war with little funding and resources. The planes matched anyone elses for ages and only lost air supremacy to lack of numbers, again due to a huge american economy........

 

[Hop]

OOPs! Are we now comparing the precision of a raid on Cologne by RAF in which a bomb dropped within city limit is counted with same context as that of a 1000' CEP from aiming point for a USAAF 'blind bombing' attack? Or just the example above.

No, just the example above, where accuracy is defined as a bomb landing within the plant boundary, for both air forces.

What was the mode (i.e were both RAF raids on Luena Pathfinder attacks

The report says "RAF, night Pathfinder technique", so I'd say yes, all these figures to the RAF using pathfinder attacks (which were standard practice, anyway)

Hop - I believe that conclusion is probably seriously flawed as the number of raids by RAF on Oils and Chemicals was far lower

The number of raids was certainly far lower, as the RAF tended to send more bombers with a bigger bombload.

Tonnages dropped by AF on oil targets:

RAF - 97,914 long tons
USAAF ETO - 76,283 long tons
USAAF MTO - 65,050 long tons

Whilst the RAF total is lower, it's still 41% of the total, which is ample to get a statistically significant average.

So, we have to be a little circumspect in drawing general conclusions about accuracy and even 'relative' bombing effectiveness, when talking about Oil Targets.

Well, this example was chosen by the USSBS team themselves to be part of the general summary on the oil section. If they thought it was representative, given all the information they had (far more than we do), then I think it's safe to trust their judgement.

Even moreso if we wish to compare RAF efforts and commitment to these attacks versus USAAF. Luena was so important that 8th AF was not attacking Leuna with ordinary and customary planning doctrine (i.e Good weather for visual bombing).

That's true for most targets. USAAF doctrine before they got in to the war was visual aiming, and precision bombing. Reality was lots of radar bombing, sometimes of the primary target, sometimes of the secondary. I was just skimming through bomb reports from the 303rd bomb group, one that struck me was them bombing a Ford factory through 10/10 cloud. They reported that no observations of effect could be made.

How accurate do you think they were when they couldn't even see the target?

As Syscom said, a very large percentage of USAAF bombing was carried out using electronic aiming. From memeory, something over half of all bombs were dropped this way. (less than half of raids, because they didn't get bombing radar until later, but most bombs were dropped after D Day)

The survey was very explicit about RAF efforts not materially impacting German war production until late The Ball-Bearing AttackThe Ball-Bearing Attack when they devoted more missions and tonnage to German industry.

Well, the survey did have its biases as well, for example they say very little (if anything) about US area bombing of German cities, in line with USAAF policy to deny they had carried out area bombing.

But if you read the USSBS report, you will see that USAAF attacks didn't bear fruit until the autumn of 1944, either.

The USSBS summary breaks down the attack by industry. Here are the conclusions for each industry:

The Ball-Bearing Attack

From examination of the records and personalities in the ball-bearing industry, the user industries and the testimony of war production officials, there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production.

The Attack on German Aircraft Plants

The culminating attacks on the German aircraft industry began in the last week of February 1944. With the protection of long-range fighter escort, 3,636 tons of bombs were dropped on German aircraft plants (again, airframe rather than engine plants) during that week. In that and succeeding weeks every known aircraft plant in Germany was hit.

<snip>

Production was not knocked out for long. On the contrary, during the whole year of 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939, or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack. Although it is difficult to determine exact production for any single month, acceptances were higher in March, the month after the heaviest attack, than they were in January, the month before. They continued to rise.

<snip>

Nevertheless the attack on the aircraft plants, like the attack on the ball-bearing plants, showed that to knock out a single industry with the weapons available in 1943 and early 1944 was a formidable enterprise demanding continuous attacks to effect complete results. Recovery was improvised almost as quickly as the plants were knocked out.

The Attack on Oil

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

They go on in similar fashion. None of the targets attacked by the USAAF prior to summer 1944 had a large effect, either. In late spring 1944 the USAAF started their oil campaign whilst the RAF was bombing in support of the invasion. Both were rather successful. From late summer both air forces turned to attacking Germany, and again both were rather successful.

The truth of the bombing campaign, for both the RAF and USAAF, is that prior to summer 1944 it was far too small to be effective. For both forces, autumn 1944 was the half way point. They dropped half their bombs in the years prior to the autumn, half in the months afterwards. (I believe halfway for the RAF was in September, October for the USAAF)

The USAAF (ETO) finished the war with more tonnage dropped on Germany

The USAAF in the ETO dropped 539,998 long tons on Germany. That's all aircraft types, including tactical.

Bomber Command dropped 657,664 long tons on Germany. That excludes tactical air forces.

In fact, even if you throw in the USAAF Med forces, and include attacks on Austria, the total is still some way short of Bomber Command's.

I was suprised that with nearly 80,000 causalties each that the RAF and USAAF-ETO was separated by only 16.. 79,265 (USAAF) to 79,281 (RF)

I believe the US figures were taken at the time, and include "missing" airmen who were captured, whereas the RAF figures were compiled after the war, and do not include PoWs, but just those killed and "permanently" missing.

Still, the figures are remarkably close, even if they do refer to different definitions of casualties.

 

[drgondog]

Hop Quote:
The Attack on Oil

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

They go on in similar fashion. None of the targets attacked by the USAAF prior to summer 1944 had a large effect, either. In late spring 1944 the USAAF started their oil campaign whilst the RAF was bombing in support of the invasion. Both were rather successful. From late summer both air forces turned to attacking Germany, and again both were rather successful.

The truth of the bombing campaign, for both the RAF and USAAF, is that prior to summer 1944 it was far too small to be effective.


Hop - by your own statistics above the Oil campaign was hugely successful in the Spring and Summer of 1944... but certainly devastating from Speer's perspective in the Sprin alone.

Speer's own words on page 350 "Inside the Third reich" were

"On June 21,Nine tenths of the production of airplane fuel was knocked out."

"On July 22, we were down to one hundred and twenty tons daily production - virtually done for.

In between 6/21 and 7/5 USAAF operations were driven back to Tactical by Eisenhower but Spaatz managed to reach out in early July to start the campaign again and continue. The RAF also started in July and put 4300+ sorties and 18,000 tons into Oil/Chemical operations

The raids had taken the production from 10% on June 21 to 2% on July 22.

The unexpected bonus from these May 12 through July attacks was that the synthetic rubber and Nitrogen supplies were also virtually eliminated.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/aafsd/aafsd_pdf/t141.pdf

The above link will reference the official USAAF records for WWII - Europe with the following breakdown:

Total Tons Dropped 1,554,463 - All Europe - USAAF
ETO 971,762
MTO 582,701

Of those Germany- 604,787 tons

Where were your figures derived showing USAAF at such a low total for ETO?

As always it is tough dueling with you

Regards,

Bill

 

[pbfoot]

Geez Hop could you do me a favour considering 20% of Bomber Command was RCAF and am quite sure others like the RAAF and RNZAF and the Poles etc resent it and call it Bomber Command rather then RAF

 

[Hop]

Hop - by your own statistics above the Oil campaign was hugely successful in the Spring and Summer of 1944... but certainly devastating from Speer's perspective in the Sprin alone.

Yes, the effect of the attacks was felt from the summer onwards.

Speer's own words on page 350 "Inside the Third reich" were

"On June 21,Nine tenths of the production of airplane fuel was knocked out."

"On July 22, we were down to one hundred and twenty tons daily production - virtually done for.

Production certainly fell away rapidly, although that overstates it a bit. The USSBS gives oil production in Germany as something over 340,000 tons for the month, including 52,000 tons of aviation fuel.

Where were your figures derived showing USAAF at such a low total for ETO?

Same source.

You said bombs dropped on Germany, the total for the USAAF in the ETO was 604,787 short tons.

The US uses a ton of 2,000 lbs, called the short ton. The UK uses a 2,240 lb ton, called the long ton. To compare US and UK tonnages, you have to convert either the UK figures in to short tons, or the US figures in to long tons. I converted the US figures to long tons.

So from the ETO the USAAF dropped 604,787 short tons, which is 1,209,574,000 lbs

Bomber Command dropped 657,664 long tons on Germany, which is 1,473,167,360 lbs (736,583 short tons)

If you want figures for the whole of ETO, then the USAAF dropped 971,762 short tons, which is 867,644 long tons.

Bomber Command, again excluding tactical air forces, dropped 955,044 long tons in the ETO.

Bomber Command also dropped 47,307 sea mines in the ETO, which are not included in the above totals. Mines weighed between 1 and 2,000 lbs, so probably another 25,000 tons of mines.

 

[drgondog]

I would certainly say that it is between the RAF and Luftwaffe.

The RAF had a limited amount of money and more importantly time, to develop good aircraft for both attacking and defensive roles. Unlike America, Britain fought from 1939, yet America did not become her ally.

You have certainly confused me - did the US align with Germay?

The spitfire was an ancient desing by the end of the war, but it worked because it was a solide design that could be altered. No American aircraft alsted that long.

I suspect that the C-47 (1935-today), (B-17 (1935-1946), the P-38 (1939-1949), the F4U (1940-1955), the A-26 (1942-1973), the P-51(1940-mid 80s in service), the P-47 (1941-1955), B-29 (1942-1984) are a few American aircraft that did not last long? and would not qualify for longevity by your standards?(

America had a huge economy to fuel it's airforce, yet struggled to produce decent carrier aircraft until the Hellcat and Corsair.

You would describe the F4F as dogmeat in 1941-1942? And how many decent carrier aircraft did RAF, Luftwaffe, Soviets produce - including torpedo bombers, dive bombers, night fighters, and even the ubiquitous F7F and F8F comparable quality?

The luftwaffe developed some extarordinary aircraft, especially near the end of the war with little funding and resources. The planes matched anyone elses for ages and only lost air supremacy to lack of numbers, again due to a huge american economy........

I Guess dollars made the difference, not skill or blood-and certainly not quality.

So, at the end of the war, September 2, 1945, which air force do you want to take with you in 1946?

 

[d_bader]

Although the Luftwaffe were in ruin due to lack of resources and the effect of allied planes, their technology and amazing ideas, well ahead of their time were awesome.

For sheer numbers etc America.
Radically cool designs like Luft 46, Luftwaffe

 

[The Basket]

The Spitfire had been constantly redesigned and as good as any other prop fighter. It shared nothing with the prototype which first flew in 36.

The Spitfire could dive faster than any other aircraft. Even jets.

The Royal Navy had some very good prop aircraft...easily equal to anything that the USN had. Sea Fury, Hornet, Seafire, Firefly. Maybe not the Skyraider but we bought those.

The thing is that the RAF was the only air force that was strong from the first day to the last. The best American fighter in 1939 was the Curtiss P-36! Outclassed by the Hurricane nevermind the Spit. And at Pearl Harbour time it was the P-40 and the Wildcat. Hopeless against the Fw 190. The Wildcat would have been dogmeat against the latest German fighters.

The USAAC was all powerful at the end but was poor in 1939.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Hopeless against the Fw 190. The Wildcat would have been dogmeat against the latest German fighters.

Is that why during Operation Torch the Wildcat took on and was successful against French and German fighters? And there was one account in the North Sea where Wildcats held their own quite well against Bf 109s.

And you're wrong about the P-36 - one of the most under-rated aircraft of WW2 - during the Battle of France it performed quite well.

I could agree about the state of the AAF in 1939 but then again at that period the US was just preparing for war.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

As for bomb hit percentages..... I'm still looking for that document that showed the RAF had a better CEP overall than the AAF. It does exist, and I'm not bloviating or making things up.

Ive seen the same thing somewhere as well. I think we were discussing it in the Bomber thread. Not sure though where it is at the moment. Will see if I can find it later.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I would certainly say that it is between the RAF and Luftwaffe.

The RAF had a limited amount of money and more importantly time, to develop good aircraft for both attacking and defensive roles. Unlike America, Britain fought from 1939, yet America did not become her ally. The spitfire was an ancient desing by the end of the war, but it worked because it was a solide design that could be altered. No American aircraft alsted that long.

America had a huge economy to fuel it's airforce, yet struggled to produce decent carrier aircraft until the Hellcat and Corsair.

The luftwaffe developed some extarordinary aircraft, especially near the end of the war with little funding and resources. The planes matched anyone elses for ages and only lost air supremacy to lack of numbers, again due to a huge american economy........

Sorry but I have to disagree with you. It is not about what aircraft you can produce. It is about the overall capability of your airforce.

As for you saying the US struggled to make good aircraft, I also disagree. Here I will name good US aircraft for you:

P-51
P-47
P-38
B-17
B-24
B-29
A-26
Corsair
Hellcat
Wildcat

See where I am getting at....

1939 to 1943 it was the Luftwaffe and 1944 until now it is the USAAF/USAF.

 

[The Basket]

The P-36 had a top speed of about 280mph!

How does that compare to a 350mph Emil!

Yes the P-36 was agile but it had a job intercepting bombers.

Never liked the Wildcat or Martlet as it is called here. Available yes...but slow heavy and outclassed. But a good pilot will do the best with what he's got.

 

[syscom3]

....No American aircraft alsted that long.

B17 and P38

America had a huge economy to fuel it's airforce, yet struggled to produce decent carrier aircraft until the Hellcat and Corsair.

Wildcat and Dauntless

The luftwaffe developed some extarordinary aircraft, especially near the end of the war with little funding and resources. The planes matched anyone elses for ages and only lost air supremacy to lack of numbers, again due to a huge american economy........

The AAF had lots of excellent designs, flown by good pilots backed by an immense industrial machine.

Thats what beat the LW

 

[renrich]

Just a note, there seems to be a bias on this forum toward the models of ac that fought in the ETO. Understandable since many members live in Europe. However, I think it is well to remember that many formidable ac fought in the Pacific. For instance, as far as long range fighters are concerned, the A6M went operational on the last day of July, 1940, and was in action in China in August-September of 1940. I know, the Zeke had no armor and no self sealing tanks at this time. Neither at this time, during the BOB, did the British or German fighters have the complete set of self sealing tanks. When you compare the performance of the 109, Spit, Hurricane and Zeke in 1940, an argument could be made that the Zeke overall was the best fighter in the world. What would have happened during the BOB if the LW bombers had been escorted by A6Ms with more than twice the range of the 109s. Moving on, Hellcats and especially the Corsairs were at least the equal of the fighters in the ETO. Someone stated earlier that the Spit could outdive any ac. According to Bob Johnson, in mock dogfights with Spits, he could always outdive and outroll Spitfires.