Best WWII Air-Force

[The Basket]

The Zero was a clever design but would a European air force take it on with those weaknesses? I bet not.

Gloster did fly a Zero lookalike with similar performance and it rejected quickly.

Although the Zero was a better naval fighter than the Spitfire. In terms of range, reliabilty and carrier operation.

And both the Bf 109 and Spitfire in its later marks could go over 400mph which no Zero could.

How the Zero could have entered Luftwaffe service for 1940 is a bit impossible. Might as well say F-86 Sabre!

I'll keep me Spitfire.

 

[ToughOmbre]

The Zero was a clever design but would a European air force take it on with those weaknesses? I bet not.

Gloster did fly a Zero lookalike with similar performance and it rejected quickly.

Although the Zero was a better naval fighter than the Spitfire. In terms of range, reliabilty and carrier operation.

And both the Bf 109 and Spitfire in its later marks could go over 400mph which no Zero could.

How the Zero could have entered Luftwaffe service for 1940 is a bit impossible. Might as well say F-86 Sabre!

I'll keep me Spitfire.

I would keep the Spit as well. And the Wildcat (yes even a tough as iron, Thach weaving Wildcat!), Hellcat, Corsair, Lightning, Mustang, Jug, 109, 190. The Zero was OVER-RATED (IMHO). Yes, it was very, very dangerous in the hands of an experienced and skilled pilot, but things obviously changed as the war progressed and the Zero became more myth than reality. (Can you tell I'm not a big Zero fan?)

 

[SoD Stitch]

I must clarify this question I'm looking for how the USAAC P51s etc covered the B17's and 24's .

Oh, I'm sorry, I misunderstood the question . . .

As Graeme said, the fighters had to weave back and forth about 5,000ft above the bombers in order to avoid overtaking them and leaving them behind. I remember seeing a really good picture with contrailing B-17's in the forground, and in the background you can see a couple of flights of -47's or P-51's weaving above the bombers; I think this is it:

The contrails higher up that are flying back and forth at an angle to the bombers are the escort fighters.

 

[Kurfürst]

During the BoB the RAF were also ordered to focus on the enemy bombers. And yet fighter losses for the RAF were only slightly higher than fighter losses for the Luftwaffe, and overall losses were almost 2 to 1 in the RAF's favour in the BoB.

If you look at the performances during the USAAF daylight offensive and the BoB, then the Luftwaffe doesn't compare well. Their losses were very high, the losses they inflicted on the enemy relatively low, in both cases.

Bogus statements; the RAF was quite badly mauled in the BoB actually, and any wishful '2 nazis for every true Brit' figures only arrived by heavy manipulation of the loss statistics. Usually it's done by including all German losses occuring during the Battle of Britain period, including bombers, transports, fighters and recce aircraft, wheter they occured to enemy action, ever present accidents on operational missions or even losses on non-operational training flights. Naturally of course German losses are counted wheter the plane was actually shot down (100% loss), or returned to base with it's crew but was subsequently written off and salvaged due being unecomical to be repaired.

In short, the Brits when presenting statistic for BoB loses include everything that was lo

On the other hand, for the British losses it only counts fighters, often only Huricanes and Spitfires without including Blenheims, Defiants and others types. Bomber Comand's losses, several hundred bombers during the perido in fact, are rarely mentioned (but German bombers are..)... non-combat British losses are ignored, as are everything that was not directly and completely destoryed in combat.

Reality is somewhat different; the LW is usually quoted as having lost at around 1789 aircraft during the battle on operation, but only 1385 of that was actually attritbuted to enemy action. That 1385 already includes aircraft that weren't actually shot down but returned to base and were subsequently written off to heavy damage. Of that, 502 single engined fighters and 224 twin engined fighters were lost to enemy action, either being shot down or written off upon returnig to base, a total of 726. The total number that become permanent loss was 663 singl engine and 252 twn engine fighter, a total of 915 109s and 110s, which were lost to all possbile causes : shot down, written off to damage sustained in combat, outside combat on operations and even not on operational missions. 71/54, for a total of 125, had sustained repairable damage on operations, 250 if we include non-operational flights.

In contrast the British statistics admit 1149 fighters being written off during the battle, further 707 being damaged and had to be returned to the manufacturer or contractor for repairs, the vast majority being single engined fighters in combat.

The 2 : 1 kill rate for RAF is nothing but a pipe dream, in short, despite the fact the RAF had so many aces up in it's sleeve : superiority in numbers, early warning, the advantage of fighting over friendly territory, constantly worsening wheater, yet through the battle it continued to sustain greater losses than the attacking Luftwaffe. The pink glass picture painted by our local British nationalist also excludes the fact that British fighters achieved all that while enjoying a significant superiority in fighter numbers compared to the Luftwaffe's fighters during the Battle.

 

[Kurfürst]

Yes, the effect of the attacks was felt from the summer onwards.



Production certainly fell away rapidly, although that overstates it a bit. The USSBS gives oil production in Germany as something over 340,000 tons for the month, including 52,000 tons of aviation fuel.



Same source.

You said bombs dropped on Germany, the total for the USAAF in the ETO was 604,787 short tons.

The US uses a ton of 2,000 lbs, called the short ton. The UK uses a 2,240 lb ton, called the long ton. To compare US and UK tonnages, you have to convert either the UK figures in to short tons, or the US figures in to long tons. I converted the US figures to long tons.

So from the ETO the USAAF dropped 604,787 short tons, which is 1,209,574,000 lbs

Bomber Command dropped 657,664 long tons on Germany, which is 1,473,167,360 lbs (736,583 short tons)

If you want figures for the whole of ETO, then the USAAF dropped 971,762 short tons, which is 867,644 long tons.

Bomber Command, again excluding tactical air forces, dropped 955,044 long tons in the ETO.

Bomber Command also dropped 47,307 sea mines in the ETO, which are not included in the above totals. Mines weighed between 1 and 2,000 lbs, so probably another 25,000 tons of mines.

Curiously, Albert Speer also have some very unflattering remarks about the insanity of British area attacks on residental areas, in fact it's strikes me that Albert Speer was rather relieved that the British wasted their limited resources on such mindless terror attacks that had little effect instead of systematically analyzing the German industry's weak spots and going after those.

It's a pity that Hop is so selective with Albert Speer's book..

 

[The Basket]

Hey! I'm a British nationalist!

Albert Speer had a very selective memory of what he remembers. Boy, he could be very,very forgetful.

Losses mean nothing if they can be replaced quickly.

The Luftwaffe botched the battle of britain. Lost a generation of top air crew and future leaders and aircraft which were not there for Barbarossa.

The RAF achieved its war aim and the Luftwaffe didn't.

 

[drgondog]

Bogus statements; the RAF was quite badly mauled in the BoB actually, and any wishful '2 nazis for every true Brit' figures only arrived by heavy manipulation of the loss statistics. Usually it's done by including all German losses occuring during the Battle of Britain period, including bombers, transports, fighters and recce aircraft, wheter they occured to enemy action, ever present accidents on operational missions or even losses on non-operational training flights. Naturally of course German losses are counted wheter the plane was actually shot down (100% loss), or returned to base with it's crew but was subsequently written off and salvaged due being unecomical to be repaired.

In short, the Brits when presenting statistic for BoB loses include everything that was lo

On the other hand, for the British losses it only counts fighters, often only Huricanes and Spitfires without including Blenheims, Defiants and others types. Bomber Comand's losses, several hundred bombers during the perido in fact, are rarely mentioned (but German bombers are..)... non-combat British losses are ignored, as are everything that was not directly and completely destoryed in combat.

Reality is somewhat different; the LW is usually quoted as having lost at around 1789 aircraft during the battle on operation, but only 1385 of that was actually attritbuted to enemy action. That 1385 already includes aircraft that weren't actually shot down but returned to base and were subsequently written off to heavy damage. Of that, 502 single engined fighters and 224 twin engined fighters were lost to enemy action, either being shot down or written off upon returnig to base, a total of 726. The total number that become permanent loss was 663 singl engine and 252 twn engine fighter, a total of 915 109s and 110s, which were lost to all possbile causes : shot down, written off to damage sustained in combat, outside combat on operations and even not on operational missions. 71/54, for a total of 125, had sustained repairable damage on operations, 250 if we include non-operational flights.

In contrast the British statistics admit 1149 fighters being written off during the battle, further 707 being damaged and had to be returned to the manufacturer or contractor for repairs, the vast majority being single engined fighters in combat.

The 2 : 1 kill rate for RAF is nothing but a pipe dream, in short, despite the fact the RAF had so many aces up in it's sleeve : superiority in numbers, early warning, the advantage of fighting over friendly territory, constantly worsening wheater, yet through the battle it continued to sustain greater losses than the attacking Luftwaffe. The pink glass picture painted by our local British nationalist also excludes the fact that British fighters achieved all that while enjoying a significant superiority in fighter numbers compared to the Luftwaffe's fighters during the Battle.

At the end of the day Kurfurst the RAF prevailed with a smaller force. (The RAF did not always have superior numbers, fighter vs fighter, at the point of attack - even with radar... and the numbers for either side when ione had superiority were not large enough to make it a huge issue.

The more telling point was that Goering shackled his fighters to the bombers making every battle virtually reactive - whereas the USAAF after January 11, let their fighters hunt rather than try to only 'deflect'

The Germans called off the invasion due to lack of air superiority.

I don't have a real problem with either your statistics or allocation of losses, but the USAAAF lost more than the daily mission Summaries showed due to write offs/accidents (as I suspect the LW also) yet they prevailed because of industrial strength and will.

The LW`failed on the 'will' side.

History shows that the LW may yet have prevailed because of the losses they inflicted proportionately, but they failed on the 'will' and the 'strategy' part of the Battle.

 

[Glider]

Bogus statements; the RAF was quite badly mauled in the BoB actually, and any wishful '2 nazis for every true Brit' figures only arrived by heavy manipulation of the loss statistics. Usually it's done by including all German losses occuring during the Battle of Britain period, including bombers, transports, fighters and recce aircraft, wheter they occured to enemy action, ever present accidents on operational missions or even losses on non-operational training flights. Naturally of course German losses are counted wheter the plane was actually shot down (100% loss), or returned to base with it's crew but was subsequently written off and salvaged due being unecomical to be repaired.

In short, the Brits when presenting statistic for BoB loses include everything that was lo

On the other hand, for the British losses it only counts fighters, often only Huricanes and Spitfires without including Blenheims, Defiants and others types. Bomber Comand's losses, several hundred bombers during the perido in fact, are rarely mentioned (but German bombers are..)... non-combat British losses are ignored, as are everything that was not directly and completely destoryed in combat.

Reality is somewhat different; the LW is usually quoted as having lost at around 1789 aircraft during the battle on operation, but only 1385 of that was actually attritbuted to enemy action. That 1385 already includes aircraft that weren't actually shot down but returned to base and were subsequently written off to heavy damage. Of that, 502 single engined fighters and 224 twin engined fighters were lost to enemy action, either being shot down or written off upon returnig to base, a total of 726. The total number that become permanent loss was 663 singl engine and 252 twn engine fighter, a total of 915 109s and 110s, which were lost to all possbile causes : shot down, written off to damage sustained in combat, outside combat on operations and even not on operational missions. 71/54, for a total of 125, had sustained repairable damage on operations, 250 if we include non-operational flights.

In contrast the British statistics admit 1149 fighters being written off during the battle, further 707 being damaged and had to be returned to the manufacturer or contractor for repairs, the vast majority being single engined fighters in combat.

The 2 : 1 kill rate for RAF is nothing but a pipe dream, in short, despite the fact the RAF had so many aces up in it's sleeve : superiority in numbers, early warning, the advantage of fighting over friendly territory, constantly worsening wheater, yet through the battle it continued to sustain greater losses than the attacking Luftwaffe. The pink glass picture painted by our local British nationalist also excludes the fact that British fighters achieved all that while enjoying a significant superiority in fighter numbers compared to the Luftwaffe's fighters during the Battle.

I admit that my sources have different figures for the German losses. I suspect the problem could be the definition of the Battle of Britain. If it helps

For the period May - September 1940 the figures I have are:-
All Types
Lost due to enemy operations 2,313 (fighters 901, Bombers 1,010)
Lost on Operations not due to enemy operations 487 (fighters 170, Bombers 214)
Destroyed not on Operations 264 (fighters 79, Bombers 128)
Total lost 3064

For the period July - September
All Types
Lost due to enemy action 1,184 (fighters 612, bombers 483)
Lost on Operations not due to enemy operations 271 (fighters 88, bombers 137)
Destroyed not on operations 181 (fighters 53, Bombers 89)
Total lost 1636

PS I must disagree with your statement that the RAF were quite badly mauled. If they had been, they would have lost.

 

[Kurfürst]

At the end of the day Kurfurst the RAF prevailed with a smaller force.

Well the RAF was incapable of stopping German bomber attacks at all, even temporarily. The attacks continued from the Adlertag in August 1940 till May 1941 until the LW bombers were re-deployed to the East.

In contrast, despite the industrial might of the US, the LW had some significant successes despite the small numbers of fighers presen in the Reichsverteidigung until 1944, they won at Schweinfurt, at Ploiesti, above Berlin against the RAF night bombers, and at Poltava; each signified a serious setback, even if temporary to the raging Allied air offensive.

It's even more impressive in the face of the forces deployed to achieve that. The usual nonsense Hop is spouting up about the poor outnumbered RAF and the massive number of Luftwaffe interceptors meeting incoming fortresses, the reality was quite different. On May 31 1943, the LW had as 'many' as 296 fighters with the RV in Germany facing USAAF attacks, 328 in France with Luftflotte 3 to counter the entire RAF and it's short ranged fighters and daylight raids.

The notion that the RAF had a smaller force in BoB is a rather old myth, trying to spice up the story about 'the Few'.

On August 10th, when the whole thing really started, the RAF Fighter Command had 1106 fighters around in squadrons, of which 749 were servicable. At the week ending on 9th of August, they also had 80 Defiants, 160 Hurricanes and 132 Spitfires in storage units, ready to be issued immidietely. And that's only the ones that were immidietely ready, for example at the same time 23 Hurricanes ready within 4 days, and 150 under preparation for issue, 33 awaiting repairs.

In contrast, the Luftwaffe as a whole had 934 single engine fighters (805 servicable), and 289 Zestörern present (224 servicable). That's not the force that actually fought the BoB however, as a number LW units were back in Germany and other places, providing a home defense force.

It mirrors also in the sortie rates of fighters.On the week ending with September 8, the RAF flew 5513 fighter sorties, the LW flew 2555; on the week ending with September 15, the RAF was flying 3152 Fighter sorties, the LW flew 875. And so on.

(The RAF did not always have superior numbers, fighter vs fighter, at the point of attack - even with radar... and the numbers for either side when ione had superiority were not large enough to make it a huge issue.[QUOTE/]

Indeed and of course, but first of all that is in contrast with your previous statement where you say note that 'the RAF prevailed with a smaller force', and in any case, it doesn't shed too much good light on the RAF's organisation of defense, after all, if they had more fighters (being on defense and all), and they flew more fighter sorties, yet if you say they couldn't outnumber the LW always (which is certainly true) , it would only point to that the RAF's forces were deployed quite inefficiently or managed tactically.

The more telling point was that Goering shackled his fighters to the bombers making every battle virtually reactive - whereas the USAAF after January 11, let their fighters hunt rather than try to only 'deflect'

Fighters (meaning here all fighters)were not 'shackled' to bombers, some provided close escort, other provided top cover, and others performed fighter sweeps in front of the bombers, on Freie Jagd or Free Hunt missions. These tactics overall proved very effective. Of course it was the guys flying close escorts were the most vocal ones, but they weren't the only ones around.

In fact the USAAF escort fighter tactics were extremely similiar to those used by the Luftwaffe over Britain in September. Of course with time the USAAF's independently marauding escort fighters become far more noticable, since the USAAF after a while had such a superiority in numbers, that more and more can be allocated to free hunts without compromising close escort of the bombers.

The Germans called off the invasion due to lack of air superiority.

Actually no, though this is the founding stone of the Battle of Britain myth, that there was a real danger of a seaborne invasion. There never was, the Germans were quite aware that they simply did not have the means to transport troops accross the channel, virtually from march after the French campaign, while trying to dodge the Royal Navy's much superior force. It was a gamble that nobody was willing the take. I am not sure if you're familiar with Kershaw's recent books, he gives some excellent examples. von Rundstedt, nominally C-in-C of the 'invasion force', for example, considered the whole Seelöwe 'a joke', and didn't even bother to inspect his 'invasion troops'. The invasion preparations were appearantly nothing more than means of putting politcal pressure on Britain to come to terms with Germany. You can't really call of an invasion you don't seriously consider to execute in the first place.

And air superiority they definietely had over Britain, after all, they bombed everything in Britain at will. The RAF could not stop their bombers. There was of course resistance from the RAF, and losses as a result, which is why they did not have at any time air supremacy, total, unrivalled control of the air.

I don't have a real problem with either your statistics or allocation of losses, but the USAAAF lost more than the daily mission Summaries showed due to write offs/accidents (as I suspect the LW also) yet they prevailed because of industrial strength and will.

The LW`failed on the 'will' side.

History shows that the LW may yet have prevailed because of the losses they inflicted proportionately, but they failed on the 'will' and the 'strategy' part of the Battle.

Bill, I am not sure if I am following you correctly on the 'will' part. I suppose you mean they didn't commit their industrial potential fully to the task..? Or do you mean something different.

 

[The Basket]

The Luftwaffe lost.

Do you think the cities of Germany were utterly destroyed because the Luftwaffe let them?

The RAF couldn't stop every bombing raid and the Luftwaffe switched to night attacks for the same reason RAF did....heavy losses.

Why were the Stukas withdrawn if the Luftwaffe had control of the skies?
Bf 110 was a loser too.

Do not agree.

 

[Glider]

Kurfurst
CAn I ask where you are getting
a) your figures from
b) the idea that the BOB didn't start until 10 August?

The norm is that it started in July but action really started in May.

On 29th June the Germans had 1,107 Me109's, 357 Me110's, 1,380 twin engined bombers and 428 dive bombers.

On the 10th August the RAF had the following servicable fighters. I think you will agree that only the 627 Spits and Hurricanes had any chance against the German attack and remember that these were also spread over the whole of the UK. There is no doubt that the German had a large significant numerical advantage plus better quality.

Blenheim - 60
Spitfire - 245
Hurricane - 382
Defiant - 22
Gladiator - 2
Total - 711

 

[Graeme]

Well the RAF was incapable of stopping German bomber attacks at all, even temporarily. The RAF could not stop their bombers.

 

[Kurfürst]

Kurfurst
CAn I ask where you are getting
a) your figures from

Wood and Dempster, the LW Quartermaister's own figures on German losses, in brief, it's the actual stuff from archieves, reproduced in many books (but I used wood and dempster since they have it all in one place).

I suggest you get that book, it has extremely detailed figures for British strenght and losses.

b) the idea that the BOB didn't start until 10 August?

The norm is that it started in July but action really started in May.

Who's norm? The Germans did not start the offensive until Adlertag (August 13). In whole july, for example, a mere 34 Bf 109s were lost to enemy action, which is quite sound example how quiet things were in July. Initial skirmishes over the Channel, basically, before the offensive commenced.

As for May, obviously there were combats between the LW, the FAF and RAF in May already, but that's pretty much the Battle of France period, besides aerial combat never really stopped, so any drawing of a line where the 'battle' started is arbitrary at best.

Point is, the really large scale air battles started off with Adlertag on the 13 August, and I dare say it's the attacker's choice when he actually starts the battle, and eventually calls it off.

In this case, the Germans started their aerial offensive in August 1940 and called it off in May 1941, when the bombers were re-deployed against the USSR.

On 29th June the Germans had 1,107 Me109's, 357 Me110's, 1,380 twin engined bombers and 428 dive bombers.

On the 10th August the RAF had the following servicable fighters.

So you're basically comparing the entire Lutfwaffe, bombers, fighters etc., servicable or not, including units that are stationed in Germany and did not even participate in the combat over England (JG 77, for example, yet it's 109s would be counted in your totals), to the

On the other side of the scale, you have only fighters, and only the servicable ones. What happened to Coastal command, Bomber Command, Fleet Air Arm, or the RAF fighters stationed in - India (since you insist counting German fighters in Germany, too..)?

What purpose does it serve, apart from trying to prove the RAF was outnumbered by comparing apples and oranges?

I think you will agree that only the 627 Spits and Hurricanes had any chance against the German attack and remember that these were also spread over the whole of the UK.

Yes, but on the same reasoning token you shouldn't count 110s, Do 17s or Stukas.. what's the point in this? If you count the forces available to both sides, for the same purpose (a fighter does the same on both sides, even if it's not so good at it, it's still a fighter tasked to shoot down planes), you have how they related to each other as far as numerical superiority went.

Then you can go on how much those numbers actually reflect their true potential, ie. qualitative superiority or parity.

The BoB's important figures were single engined fighters. Now you have the figures you posted, 627 servicable single engined fighters on 10th August in the RAF. The LW had 805 servicable 109s on the same day, but about a hundred from JG 77 were back in Germany and did not participate at all (or perhaps more, I am not sure how many other fighter units were back in Germany). That leaves you about 700 German SE fighters vs. 620 British SE fighters, it's pretty much the same numerical strenght when you consider that numbers varied day to day, and that the LW had both offensive and defense tasks at hand (it couldn't just send all fighters over England without leaving some behind in France for obvious reasons).

There is no doubt that the German had a large significant numerical advantage plus better quality.

I have to disagree aut numerical superiority. Doubts or not, the simple fact is that the British had started the Battle with a rough parity in numbers as far as fighters went, and they continued to have similiar or even a bit more fighters and pilots around, that was made possible by that they sent raw, trainee pilot s from crash courses into combat to replace losses.

Simple as that, they were never outnumbered on the whole.

 

[Kurfürst]

Interesting cartoon, though Wood and Dempster have some fitting figures about British fighter production for October.

During October, the monthly output of fighter aircraft fell significantly below the planned figures. Beaufighter production was 19 less than planned, Hurricane production fell 50 planes below that was planned, and Spitfire production fell 82 below that was originally planned. In addition, Whirlwind and Defiant production was 11 below the planned figures.

Overall in October, British fighter production fell 301 fighters short of the planned figures, compared to -287 in September and -56 in August.

 

[Glider]

Kurfurst
All I am trying to do is get to a position where I could understand your figures and compare like with like.
I will certainly try and get the book you mantioned, can I ask what the ISBN no is to help with ordering.
Can I ask you then, what were the German forces available for the BOB excluding the ones in Germany etc?

Much appreciated

 

[Hunter368]

Kurfurst
All I am trying to do is get to a position where I could understand your figures and compare like with like.
I will certainly try and get the book you mantioned, can I ask what the ISBN no is to help with ordering.
Can I ask you then, what were the German forces available for the BOB excluding the ones in Germany etc?

Much appreciated

I am not sure why Hop, Glider, Kurfurst, etc you are all trying to compare BoB to BoG.......its really impossible to do accurately.

It seems like you are all trying to show one side did a better job then the other.....but why? Is it important?

One side claims how great the RAF is, the other side claims how great the LW is.



RAF and the LW made mistakes in BoB, both could of done better. All sides made mistakes in BoG, all sides could of done better. Not sure why people find such a need to prove their country or bias opinion is right and others are wrong.

Why not look at each battle separately and put aside all bias opinions, stopping comparing RAF to LW to USAF. Talk about what each side did right and what they could of done better and what would of happened "if" they had done this. Etc....

My $0.02

 

[drgondog]

In contrast, despite the industrial might of the US, the LW had some significant successes despite the small numbers of fighers presen in the Reichsverteidigung until 1944, they won at Schweinfurt, at Ploiesti, above Berlin against the RAF night bombers, and at Poltava; each signified a serious setback, even if temporary to the raging Allied air offensive.

Actually, the LW had continued local successes in 1944 through at least May12 if you want to use a rule of thumb of 10% attrition on the striking bomber forces. In each case in early to mid 1944, the LW was able to exploit early warning, educated guesses of probable targets, selection of the one(s) they wanted to defend and skillfully place local concentrations of s/e and t/e fighters to strike less well defended bomber stream.

In the analogy you posed about RAF Fighters outnumbering GAF escorts, the defenders should always strive at local air superiority to be effective

It's even more impressive in the face of the forces deployed to achieve that. The usual nonsense Hop is spouting up about the poor outnumbered RAF and the massive number of Luftwaffe interceptors meeting incoming fortresses, the reality was quite different. On May 31 1943, the LW had as 'many' as 296 fighters with the RV in Germany facing USAAF attacks, 328 in France with Luftflotte 3 to counter the entire RAF and it's short ranged fighters and daylight raids.

And very effective they were, actually keeping air superiority over France, Belgium and Holland and punishing USAAF over Germany... don't know when the increase really took place but I. Jagkorps had increased s/e fighter strength to 460 (337) and t/e to 196 (139) - total (effective) by 12-31-43

The notion that the RAF had a smaller force in BoB is a rather old myth, trying to spice up the story about 'the Few'.

On August 10th, when the whole thing really started, the RAF Fighter Command had 1106 fighters around in squadrons, of which 749 were servicable. At the week ending on 9th of August, they also had 80 Defiants, 160 Hurricanes and 132 Spitfires in storage units, ready to be issued immidietely. And that's only the ones that were immidietely ready, for example at the same time 23 Hurricanes ready within 4 days, and 150 under preparation for issue, 33 awaiting repairs.

The issue wasn't with the available aircraft - the RAF had an acute pilot shortage reducing the 'Effectives' - much like May 1944, when German a/c production was delivering a lot of aircraft - but not enough trained pilots to get butts in the air to be effective. The RAF and RCAF were just in process of working with US to start training programs in US

In contrast, the Luftwaffe as a whole had 934 single engine fighters (805 servicable), and 289 Zestörern present (224 servicable). That's not the force that actually fought the BoB however, as a number LW units were back in Germany and other places, providing a home defense force.

As I recall there were more than a few examples of force fighter superiority by LW s/e fighters, although the RAF achieved local force superiority due to early radar warning - again like the LW in 1944

It mirrors also in the sortie rates of fighters.On the week ending with September 8, the RAF flew 5513 fighter sorties, the LW flew 2555; on the week ending with September 15, the RAF was flying 3152 Fighter sorties, the LW flew 875. And so on.

One sortie by LW pilot, multiple by RAF with fewer Spitfire and Hurricane pilots than Me109 pilts in the early days?

(The RAF did not always have superior numbers, fighter vs fighter, at the point of attack - even with radar... and the numbers for either side when ione had superiority were not large enough to make it a huge issue.[QUOTE/]

Indeed and of course, but first of all that is in contrast with your previous statement where you say note that 'the RAF prevailed with a smaller force', and in any case, it doesn't shed too much good light on the RAF's organisation of defense, after all, if they had more fighters (being on defense and all), and they flew more fighter sorties, yet if you say they couldn't outnumber the LW always (which is certainly true) , it would only point to that the RAF's forces were deployed quite inefficiently or managed tactically.

I hold to my statement that the RAF Fighter Force was less than the Attacking GAF fighter forces available and effective with respect to both number of aircraft and pilots to fly them, and b.) that the defending outnumbered forces, if ably led, can apply greater forces in a local area - this analogy held very true for RAF over England and luftwaffe over Germany in first half of 1944 - with serious blows to 8th AF



Fighters (meaning here all fighters)were not 'shackled' to bombers, some provided close escort, other provided top cover, and others performed fighter sweeps in front of the bombers, on Freie Jagd or Free Hunt missions. These tactics overall proved very effective. Of course it was the guys flying close escorts were the most vocal ones, but they weren't the only ones around.

This statement seems to be at variance to Galland's statements as a general rule - and a key differentiator between LW and USAAF Fighter Doctrine starting in 1944. I've had this conversation with him and he is unbending on his comments. Yes there were Freie Jagds and they were effective - but he emphasized that was not a.) encouraged and then b.) permitted when the escorted bombers were overwhelmed increasingly

In fact the USAAF escort fighter tactics were extremely similiar to those used by the Luftwaffe over Britain in September. Of course with time the USAAF's independently marauding escort fighters become far more noticable, since the USAAF after a while had such a superiority in numbers, that more and more can be allocated to free hunts without compromising close escort of the bombers.

Agreed, although Free Lance Sweeps with Mustangs deep into Germany started in March 1944when the USAAF only had three such groups plus the 354th FG from 9th AF. The practice became doctrine in April when the Mustang Force expanded to four. Close escort was compromised simply because four Mustang and 3 Lightning groups could not cover 35-40 Bomb Groups over a 40-100 mile trail

Actually no, though this is the founding stone of the Battle of Britain myth, that there was a real danger of a seaborne invasion. There never was, the Germans were quite aware that they simply did not have the means to transport troops accross the channel, virtually from march after the French campaign, while trying to dodge the Royal Navy's much superior force. It was a gamble that nobody was willing the take. I am not sure if you're familiar with Kershaw's recent books, he gives some excellent examples. von Rundstedt, nominally C-in-C of the 'invasion force', for example, considered the whole Seelöwe 'a joke', and didn't even bother to inspect his 'invasion troops'. The invasion preparations were appearantly nothing more than means of putting politcal pressure on Britain to come to terms with Germany. You can't really call of an invasion you don't seriously consider to execute in the first place.

No, I haven't read Kershaw's books or the examples of German thinking you are referring to. It is certainly plausible. Having said that, suppose the RAF was defeated and LW had full access to all corners of UK. The fleet is vulnerable, British industry is vulnerable and surface shipping to UK is threatened by land based LW- You suppose that the notion of a.) land invasion would not become a real possibility? or that Britain would be more likely to sue for peace when faced with starvation and loss of fleet?

The importance of the outcome is not diminished by German intentions to not invade at that time

And air superiority they definietely had over Britain, after all, they bombed everything in Britain at will. The RAF could not stop their bombers. There was of course resistance from the RAF, and losses as a result, which is why they did not have at any time air supremacy, total, unrivalled control of the air.

Kurfurst - the 8th AF 'bombed at will' in mid 1943 to October 14, 1943 but was not going to continue bombing at will if every future mission had 15-25% attrition. That would have been a political disaster. For Germany to continue 'bombing at will' with the kind of losses inflicted on them, Operation Barbarossa would not have much airpower left to take out USSR air forces.


Bill, I am not sure if I am following you correctly on the 'will' part. I suppose you mean they didn't commit their industrial potential fully to the task..? Or do you mean something different.

Yes. Germany was still operating largely on a peacetime economy, thinking they could win against everyone they chose to fight. And I also meant 'will' in the context of fully committing to defeating Britain before even contemplating taking on USSR.

Even though we were crushed at Pearl Harbor, we never gave a second thought to focusing on Germany's defeat, because we knew what the real danger was... and we took those terrible losses in establishing strategic daylight bombing docrine before the US prevailed in daylight everywhere over the Reich in mid 1944.

The comment was not to denigrate the incredible will the German people and soldiers demonstrated - only the political will to prevail over an important foe when Germany had the power to do so. I don't believe the RAF could have prevailed if Germany had not stupidly diverted their focus from killing the RAF, and with the defeat of RAF, the fleet followed, then...?

All the above is big time opinion based on my own 20/20 hindsight

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Kurfurst I am just trying to figure something out. What does it matter if the aircraft were actually shot down or made it back to base but were written off due to heavy damage?

A loss of an aircraft is a loss of an aircraft.

In the end the British prevailed and won the BoB. History does not lie.

 

[drgondog]

I am not sure why Hop, Glider, Kurfurst, etc you are all trying to compare BoB to BoG.......its really impossible to do accurately.

It seems like you are all trying to show one side did a better job then the other.....but why? Is it important?

One side claims how great the RAF is, the other side claims how great the LW is.



RAF and the LW made mistakes in BoB, both could of done better. All sides made mistakes in BoG, all sides could of done better. Not sure why people find such a need to prove their country or bias opinion is right and others are wrong.

Why not look at each battle separately and put aside all bias opinions, stopping comparing RAF to LW to USAF. Talk about what each side did right and what they could of done better and what would of happened "if" they had done this. Etc....

My $0.02

Hunter, pocket the 2 cents and dive in the way you want to lead the discussion - opinionated people like to express opinions and I suspect that is primarily what the forum is about..

You might recall that this poll and thread is about "best AF" so it's hard to avoid debating the attributes and deficiencies.

information exchanges, questions posed, debates engaged, opinions expressed - some heated others cordial.

These comments are not critical of your POV or what you want to see (or not see)..

Regards,

Bill

 

[Hunter368]

Hunter, pocket the 2 cents and dive in the way you want to lead the discussion - opinionated people like to express opinions and I suspect that is primarily what the forum is about..

You might recall that this poll and thread is about "best AF" so it's hard to avoid debating the attributes and deficiencies.

information exchanges, questions posed, debates engaged, opinions expressed - some heated others cordial.

These comments are not critical of your POV or what you want to see (or not see)..

Regards,

Bill

True I guess, it just get tiring seeing the same people with the same bias opinions towards their own country always being the best. Maybe it's easier for a person like myself to be less bias when my country was not a major player in WW2. I look more for the truth and less towards national pride.