Best WWII Air-Force

[Hop]

It's a pity that Hop is so selective with Albert Speer's book.

Selective? I'm so "selective" with Speer's book I didn't actually post anything from it, afaik.

The Luftwaffe botched the battle of britain. Lost a generation of top air crew and future leaders and aircraft which were not there for Barbarossa.

Yes. Williamson Murray, who worked as a historian for the USAF, said in his book on the wartime Luftwaffe, Strategy for Defeat:

One can argue with justification that the Germans lost World War 11 in the late summer of 1940

Caldwell in JG 26 says something similar:

The seeds of the total defeat of Germany's fighter force in 1944 were thus sown over the fields of Kent in 1940.

Caldwell gives some rough figures for the pilot losses, that show just what happened to the German fighter force in the BoB.

JG 26 had 103 pilots on the 29th June, 88 on the 29th September. They lost 56 pilots during the BoB, either killed, prisoners or missing. (not counting wounded pilots who couldn't fly again)

JG 54 had only 42 pilots at the end of June, 106 at the end of September, and lost 43 pilots.

JG 27 had 91 pilots at the end of June, 102 at the end of September, and lost 60 pilots.

For those 3 units, initial strength was 236 pilots, and between them they lost 159 pilots during the BoB. I believe losses overall were a lower proportion than that, and similar to the RAF's losses as a proportion of initial strength.

There is a difference, though, in that a large proportion of the RAF pilot casualties were of the inexperienced pilots who left training during the battle, whereas the German casualties tended to be of the experienced pre war pilots, as the newcomers were usually withheld from battle.

As Caldwell says:

But the significance for Germany lay not in the number of casualties, but in their quality. Most of the German pilots lost in 1940 were professional soldiers and airmen, with extensive pre-war training. Men of the calibre of Bürschgens, Ebbighausen, Ebeling, Henrici, and Müller-Dühe were quite literally irreplaceable.

On May 31 1943, the LW had as 'many' as 296 fighters with the RV in Germany facing USAAF attacks, 328 in France with Luftflotte 3 to counter the entire RAF and it's short ranged fighters and daylight raids.

May 1943? In May 1943 the entire USAAF in Europe flew less than 4,000 sorties.

The period in question is late 1943 and early 1944. Hooton gives German day fighter strength on the 20th December 1943 as 572 in Germany, 312 in France. In December the USAAF flew 5,741 fighter sorties, to match those number the German based fighters would have had to fly only once every 3 days.

The notion that the RAF had a smaller force in BoB is a rather old myth, trying to spice up the story about 'the Few'.

On August 10th, when the whole thing really started,

In July the Germans lost 66 fighters on operations against Britain, 109 bombers, over 40 other types. They lost another 56 aircraft in the first 9 days of August. Rather careless to lose 271 aircraft before the battle even starts, isn't it?

The truth is the battle started in early July. Strengths at the end of June were 1,107 Me 109s and 1,126 pilots for them, along with approx 300 110s, and a great many bombers, against 819 British fighters of all types, including Gladiators, Blenheims and Defiants.

On August 10th, when the whole thing really started, the RAF Fighter Command had 1106 fighters around in squadrons, of which 749 were servicable. At the week ending on 9th of August, they also had 80 Defiants, 160 Hurricanes and 132 Spitfires in storage units, ready to be issued immidietely. And that's only the ones that were immidietely ready, for example at the same time 23 Hurricanes ready within 4 days, and 150 under preparation for issue, 33 awaiting repairs.

In contrast, the Luftwaffe as a whole had 934 single engine fighters (805 servicable), and 289 Zestörern present (224 servicable).

As to August the 10th itself, Fighter Command had the following serviceable aircraft:

Blenheim - 60
Spitfire - 245
Hurricane - 382
Defiant - 22
Gladiator - 2
Total - 711

Of those, only 627 Spitfires and Hurricanes were front rank fighters, note Kurfurst makes no mention of secondary German types like the Heinkels, Ju 88 fighters etc.

So against 627 RAF fighters, the Luftwaffe had 1029 serviceable fighters, and a lot of bombers.

The RAF of course had aircraft in reserve, but then Kurfurst has repeatedly claimed the Luftwaffe did as well, and whilst I don't believe they had as many reserves, even the Germans must have had aircraft undergoing preparation for issue, etc.

It mirrors also in the sortie rates of fighters.On the week ending with September 8, the RAF flew 5513 fighter sorties, the LW flew 2555;

Kurfurst is using unsourced Luftwaffe sortie figures from Wood and Dempster, they are very close to the British estimates of the time. (British estimates released at the end of each day were 16,154 sorties 2nd Sept - 29th Sept, Wood and Dempster give 16277 fighter and bomber sorties, and 1,455 "GR")

ER Hooton gives German sortie figures taken from the actual Luftwaffe records, because they are much higher Kurfurst ignores them. According to Hooton, the Luftwaffe flew 4,050 fighter sorties that week. (Hooton's figures are approximate because the Luftwaffe records are on a monthly basis, Hooton has extrapolated weekly totals from them)

on the week ending with September 15, the RAF was flying 3152 Fighter sorties, the LW flew 875. And so on.

And Hooton gives the Luftwaffe 1,875 fighter sorties for that week.

Actually no, though this is the founding stone of the Battle of Britain myth, that there was a real danger of a seaborne invasion. There never was, the Germans were quite aware that they simply did not have the means to transport troops accross the channel, virtually from march after the French campaign, while trying to dodge the Royal Navy's much superior force. It was a gamble that nobody was willing the take.

Certainly they weren't willing to take it at the time, because of the failure of the Luftwaffe. But the plan was for the Luftwaffe to win air superiority in 4 days, then spend a month or so bombing in preparation of the invasion. As time went on, and it became clear that the Luftwaffe couldn't win air superiority, they cooled on the whole invasion plan.

And air superiority they definietely had over Britain, after all, they bombed everything in Britain at will.

No. They sent over large numbers of fighters with small numbers of bombers, switched more and more bombers to night operations, withdrew Stukas because of their heavy losses, and finally gave up altogether.

By your definition the RAF had air superiority over Europe from 1941 onwards.

 

[Hop]

So you're basically comparing the entire Lutfwaffe, bombers, fighters etc., servicable or not, including units that are stationed in Germany and did not even participate in the combat over England (JG 77, for example, yet it's 109s would be counted in your totals),

JG 77 didn't take part in the BoB? Can you explain why they claimed 57 Spitfires and Hurricanes in August, September and October 1940? The most common location for these claims was around Tunbridge Wells, which is in Kent.

As to comparing forces, the Germans stationed very few of their fighters outside the battle area. The RAF, on the other hand, maintained strong forces in the north and west of Britain, well away from the fighting.

The BoB's important figures were single engined fighters. Now you have the figures you posted, 627 servicable single engined fighters on 10th August in the RAF. The LW had 805 servicable 109s on the same day, but about a hundred from JG 77 were back in Germany and did not participate at all (or perhaps more, I am not sure how many other fighter units were back in Germany).

OK, lets play that game, and ignore the 110 altogether, even though it wasn't that much worse than the Hurricane.

Wood and Dempster have the RAF order of battle for 8th August. 13 Group in northern England and Scotland had 11 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes. They did not take part in the battle, apart from intercepting the only German attempt against the NE on the 15th August.

12 Group had 12 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes. Of these, 3 were at Church Fenton and Leconfield, 160 miles north of London, and out of the battle. 2 were at Kirton in Lindsey, 140 miles north of London, and out of the battle. 2 were at Digby, 100 miles north of London, out of the battle. 2 were at Wittering, 75 miles north of London, out of the battle.

Only 3 were based at fields close to London, and taking part (occasionally) in the battle.

10 Group had 7 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires. 1 was at Pembrey, 170 west of London, and out of the battle.

11 Group had 19 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes.

That means out of a grand total of 49 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons, only 28 were based close to the SE where the fighting was. If you divide 627 serviceable fighters by 49, you get 12.8 per squadron. Multiplied by the 28 squadrons in the SE, that's 358 serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes, against, according to Wood and Dempster, 805 serviceable 109s "Deployed against Britain" on the 10th August.

I have to disagree aut numerical superiority. Doubts or not, the simple fact is that the British had started the Battle with a rough parity in numbers as far as fighters went,

Only if you:

A) Redefine the start of the battle to a point further in, where the Germans have already sustained heavy losses.

and

B) Count only German fighters in France whilst counting British fighters in Scotland, Wales and the N of England.

If you do like for like, aircraft actually taking part in the battle, the Germans still had a large superiority in single engined fighters even on the redefined start date.

 

[plan_D]

All this comparison of fighter numbers...

I hope we're all aware that bombers win the war, not fighters. The important aircraft for the Luftwaffe was the bomber - for a proper look at the Battle of Britain you should be looking at how many bombers the RAF shot down for a loss of RAF fighters. Shooting down the German escorts was a bonus.

And if you want to be really technical, try and find out how many German bombers were shot down before they dropped their bombs on target to see how well the RAF really did when intercepting.

I do have to admit the debate is good reading.

And the USAAF was the best air force of World War II, it was strategic and tactical in every theatre of U.S operation. The only one that came close was the RAF but it only performed strategically in Europe.

 

[Hunter368]

All this comparison of fighter numbers...

I hope we're all aware that bombers win the war, not fighters. The important aircraft for the Luftwaffe was the bomber - for a proper look at the Battle of Britain you should be looking at how many bombers the RAF shot down for a loss of RAF fighters. Shooting down the German escorts was a bonus.

And if you want to be really technical, try and find out how many German bombers were shot down before they dropped their bombs on target to see how well the RAF really did when intercepting.

I do have to admit the debate is good reading.

And the USAAF was the best air force of World War II, it was strategic and tactical in every theatre of U.S operation. The only one that came close was the RAF but it only performed strategically in Europe.

I agree with your post for the most part.

100% agree USAF was hands down the best air force in WW2......to be honest LW and RAF were close in mind for a distant second and third. RAF and LW were close in my mind, both had different strenghts and weaknesses.....but were close to each other overall.

USAF was by far the best air force overall in WW2.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

All this comparison of fighter numbers...

I hope we're all aware that bombers win the war, not fighters.

BINGO! As the line from the movie - "Fighter Pilots make movies, Bomber Pilots make History."

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Gotta agree with that. Thats why I allways think it is funny when people automatically choose a fighter as the best aircraft of WW2.

 

[drgondog]

All this comparison of fighter numbers...

I hope we're all aware that bombers win the war, not fighters. The important aircraft for the Luftwaffe was the bomber - for a proper look at the Battle of Britain you should be looking at how many bombers the RAF shot down for a loss of RAF fighters. Shooting down the German escorts was a bonus.

And if you want to be really technical, try and find out how many German bombers were shot down before they dropped their bombs on target to see how well the RAF really did when intercepting.

I do have to admit the debate is good reading.

And the USAAF was the best air force of World War II, it was strategic and tactical in every theatre of U.S operation. The only one that came close was the RAF but it only performed strategically in Europe.

Plan_D - I agree your major points. I suspect that discussing the role of fighter aircraft is about the contribution toward enabling bombers to do their jobs - with losses acceptable from both a military and political POV.

If you conclude that Daylight Strategic Bombing was an important component toward shortening the war then Fighters were extremely important in achieving the goal.

The LW (like the RAF in BoB) had wrested control of the air over Germany after October 14, 1943. The P-38 was proving a disappointment due to multitude of low temp issues at high altitude, the P-47 and Spitfire had inadequate range and there were no Continental bases to eliminate rang issues. Without the Mustang, Germany inflicts unacceptable losses over Germany - and US may not have been able to re-start until thos problems of range and cold weather were solved - probably June 1944 before P-47s started getting more legs and P-38L solved it's problems..

In the meantime, wresting control over Germany is a major question.

It was the combination of a successful long range fighter, the resurgence of deep strikes over Germany by 8th, then 15th AF, plus the orders to 'seek and destroy the LW on air and ground' - that led to the battles that ultimately enabled successful attacks and destruction of Oil and Chemical Industry - and the RAF also played an important role in that.

The Mustang was the 'tool' that sought out and destroyed the LW over its own airfields - places where the Spits and Typhoons and Thunderbolts could not go.

Interestingly enough - escort fighters were important over Japan - but the major destuction was caused by low level night attacks with unescorted B-29s... different game even from RAF in ETO

Regards,

Bill

To summarize the point I think you are making - except for some scattered attempts to use P-38s (and Mosquitos) to bomb strategic targets, the heavy lifting and destruction (and most losses) was the bomber force.

 

[Hunter368]

Bill,

Do you then agree with the voting totals in the thread?

RAF 33

LW 51

USAF 76

Would you rank thus #1 USAF, #2 LW and #3 RAF?

 

[syscom3]

Drgondog, dont denigrate the P38 so fast........................

After the P38 started escorting the 8th AF bombers, bomber losses went down drastically.

Was it an air superiority fighter? No. Did it keep the LW away from the bombers? YES!!!!

 

[Hunter368]

Drgondog, dont denigrate the P38 so fast........................

After the P38 started escorting the 8th AF bombers, bomber losses went down drastically.

Was it an air superiority fighter? No. Did it keep the LW away from the bombers? YES!!!!

I don't think he was insulting the P-38......just saying it had problems. Not to mention I think if you had sent "any" fighter with the bombers it would of helped a fair bit reduce bomber losses, it just happened to be the P-38 was the fighter. Not saying the P-38 was a bad fighter, but it did have problems. B/c of several reasons the USAF eventually went with the P-51.

 

[SoD Stitch]

I don't think he was insulting the P-38......just saying it had problems. Not to mention I think if you had sent "any" fighter with the bombers it would of helped a fair bit reduce bomber losses, it just happened to be the P-38 was the fighter. Not saying the P-38 was a bad fighter, but it did have problems. B/c of several reasons the USAF eventually went with the P-51.

The P-38 could've been "the" fighter in the ETO, but the Mustang was introduced just about the time they had finally ironed out the majority of the problems with the P-38 (the "L" model); by that time, it was just easier to go with the single-engine fighter than to try and keep soldiering on with the P-38, especially when the limited production of P-38's were more badly needed in the PTO.

As near as I can tell, one of the main things that held the P-38 back from more widespread service was it's higher production cost vs. other single-engine fighters (i.e.: the P-47 -51); if I remember correctly, a P-38 cost approximately 50% more to produce than a contemporary single-engine fighter due to it's higher finish quality (the P-38 was practically hand-assembled) and more materials required.

 

[drgondog]

Drgondog, dont denigrate the P38 so fast........................

After the P38 started escorting the 8th AF bombers, bomber losses went down drastically.

Was it an air superiority fighter? No. Did it keep the LW away from the bombers? YES!!!!

Syscom - I'm not denigrating the 38. It was less efective in the January through May 1944 for three reasons.

The first and most important reason is that the J model didn't have dive brakes and when they did engage with German fighters they could easily out dive because of immediate entry into compressibility - coupled with sustained high altitude engine/supercharger problems causing a lot of aborts and in some cases losses. When the P-38L came in in June all this changed and the 38 became formidable at high altitude against the 109 and 190.

The last reason is that the 38 was so distinctive, the LW was never really caught by suprise and could engage or flee pretty much at will. I'm sure you have read a lot of the 20th, 55th and 364th Mission summaries - most of which stated no 'enemy fighters sighted'..

AFAIK the 8th AF P-38's claimed less than 225 German fighters from 10/43-5/44 in those three groups - far lower than the Mustang totals for Jan-May1944

It's hard to make a case that the introduction of the P-38 dramatically reduced 8th BC command losses as the 8th pretty much slowed or stopped deep penetrations after the disasters in October '43 until Big Week in February 1944.

On the other hand, to your point, the bombers they escorted were less likely to be attacked because it was easy to note they were being escorted and easier to try to find out an unescorted task force particulary in the early days of P-38 ops when they were only groups capable of Target escort... one or two groups to cover 35 Bomb Groups was just spread way too thin to do much good.

Who knows what the history of 8th AF FC would look like if P-38L's had been operational in August 1943?

 

[Hunter368]

The P-38 could've been "the" fighter in the ETO, but the Mustang was introduced just about the time they had finally ironed out the majority of the problems with the P-38 (the "L" model); by that time, it was just easier to go with the single-engine fighter than to try and keep soldiering on with the P-38, especially when the limited production of P-38's were more badly needed in the PTO.

As near as I can tell, one of the main things that held the P-38 back from more widespread service was it's higher production cost vs. other single-engine fighters (i.e.: the P-47 -51); if I remember correctly, a P-38 cost approximately 50% more to produce than a contemporary single-engine fighter due to it's higher finish quality (the P-38 was practically hand-assembled) and more materials required.

100% agree we have debated this before, the P-38 was a good fighter but it had problems.

Cold cockpit, cost and hard to handle (could be dangerous even) for a rookie pilot, harder to maintain. PTO was a better fit for it, two engines was a good idea flying over long spans of water, added a level of comfort.

P-51 was cheaper, easy to maintain, great plane overall, few faults, easy to fly.

It would of made my choice between them easy to make. P-51 every time when talking about an air force full of average pilots. In the hands of an ace pilot the P-38 could be very lethal indeed.

 

[drgondog]

Bill,

Do you then agree with the voting totals in the thread?

RAF 33

LW 51

USAF 76

Would you rank thus #1 USAF, #2 LW and #3 RAF?

Hunter, I think I commented to Chris and Soren early in the thread what my perspective was... but this is what I believe.

From start of war through 1942 I felt LW was best.

In 1943 I felt RAF and US were a 'toss up' with RAF having an edge. This was transition time before full weight of quality aircraft and trained pilots in USAAF started to weld very strong combat units in both Europe and Pacific.

From Big Week forward, when USAAF again committed and sustained long range daylight operations all over Germany, and B-29 Operations over Japan started, I just see no comparison in ability to project overwhelming force everywhere.

And unlike others I also count a VERY strong Naval/USMC sea based airpower as an added part of the equation.. but would state that USAAF could stand alone in the judgment.

The only aspect of air combat that the USAAF did not excell in was strategic operations at night in a heavily defended target spectrum. No airforce executed like RAF/RCAF in that role.

 

[Hunter368]

Hunter, I think I commented to Chris and Soren early in the thread what my perspective was... but this is what I believe.

From start of war through 1942 I felt LW was best.

In 1943 I felt RAF and US were a 'toss up' with RAF having an edge. This was transition time before full weight of quality aircraft and trained pilots in USAAF started to weld very strong combat units in both Europe and Pacific.

From Big Week forward, when USAAF again committed and sustained long range daylight operations all over Germany, and B-29 Operations over Japan started, I just see no comparison in ability to project overwhelming force everywhere.

And unlike others I also count a VERY strong Naval/USMC sea based airpower as an added part of the equation.. but would state that USAAF could stand alone in the judgment.

The only aspect of air combat that the USAAF did not excell in was strategic operations at night in a heavily defended target spectrum. No airforce executed like RAF/RCAF in that role.

Yes I have to 150% agree with every single word you said in that post. I see it exactly the same way to the letter. You reading my mind?

 

[drgondog]

The P-38 could've been "the" fighter in the ETO, but the Mustang was introduced just about the time they had finally ironed out the majority of the problems with the P-38 (the "L" model); by that time, it was just easier to go with the single-engine fighter than to try and keep soldiering on with the P-38, especially when the limited production of P-38's were more badly needed in the PTO.

As near as I can tell, one of the main things that held the P-38 back from more widespread service was it's higher production cost vs. other single-engine fighters (i.e.: the P-47 -51); if I remember correctly, a P-38 cost approximately 50% more to produce than a contemporary single-engine fighter due to it's higher finish quality (the P-38 was practically hand-assembled) and more materials required.

SoD - I quite agree your main point as I agree Syscom comments... but the P-38L was only introduced in June, 1944 timeframe and by that time Doolittle had committed to 100% conversion to 51s (except for 56th FG).. whereas the 51s flew first missions in Dec 1943, going fully operational in Jan1944 and four operational in early March.

The 51s did the most damage by far in the Jan to D-Day timeframe.

The P-38 was 50% more expensive than the P-47 but 100% more than the 51 (a nit but a possible factor) - more materials, two engines, complex dual systems.

I am not denigrating the P-38 - it was one heckuva multi role fighter that flew ALL of the possible roles, unlike the Mustang which never flew as a night fighter or high altitude level bomber or even bomber interceptor..it was the only fighter we put out that was nearly as versatile as the Mosquito.

Regards,

Bill

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Hunter, I think I commented to Chris and Soren early in the thread what my perspective was... but this is what I believe.

From start of war through 1942 I felt LW was best.

In 1943 I felt RAF and US were a 'toss up' with RAF having an edge. This was transition time before full weight of quality aircraft and trained pilots in USAAF started to weld very strong combat units in both Europe and Pacific.

From Big Week forward, when USAAF again committed and sustained long range daylight operations all over Germany, and B-29 Operations over Japan started, I just see no comparison in ability to project overwhelming force everywhere.

For the most I completely agree. The only thing I see differently is I would call 1943 a complete toss up between the RAF/LW/USAAF.

 

[Hunter368]

For the most I completely agree. The only thing I see differently is I would call 1943 a complete toss up between the RAF/LW/USAAF.

True in 43 it was very very close.

USAF was new to ETO and just building. Lacked night fighting ability.

RAF was building but was more concerned with night raids, which was good but not decisive in BoG. RAF could not carry out day raids successfully.

LW was good but used its bomber strength in a battle field support role, not a strategic role. Its bomber force was never a very good strategic force in the first place but better then none.

1939-1942 LW was best.

1943 close tie between all three forces. Here a person could make a argument for any of the three and not by far off.

1944-1945 USAF hands down the best by far, no one is even close.

 

[drgondog]

For the most I completely agree. The only thing I see differently is I would call 1943 a complete toss up between the RAF/LW/USAAF.

Chris - good point, ditto Hunter. I viewed the LW trailing in 1943 originally based on losing nearly all offensive initiatives due to Allies (including VVS) getting control of their own air space - but in fact all three were in transition in 1943.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I see it as pretty much as Hunter put it for 1943.