OOPs! Are we now comparing the precision of a raid on Cologne by RAF in which a bomb dropped within city limit is counted with same context as that of a 1000' CEP from aiming point for a USAAF 'blind bombing' attack? Or just the example above.
No, just the example above, where accuracy is defined as a bomb landing within the plant boundary, for both air forces.
What was the mode (i.e were both RAF raids on Luena Pathfinder attacks
The report says "RAF, night Pathfinder technique", so I'd say yes, all these figures to the RAF using pathfinder attacks (which were standard practice, anyway)
Hop - I believe that conclusion is probably seriously flawed as the number of raids by RAF on Oils and Chemicals was far lower
The number of raids was certainly far lower, as the RAF tended to send more bombers with a bigger bombload.
Tonnages dropped by AF on oil targets:
RAF - 97,914 long tons
USAAF ETO - 76,283 long tons
USAAF MTO - 65,050 long tons
Whilst the RAF total is lower, it's still 41% of the total, which is ample to get a statistically significant average.
So, we have to be a little circumspect in drawing general conclusions about accuracy and even 'relative' bombing effectiveness, when talking about Oil Targets.
Well, this example was chosen by the USSBS team themselves to be part of the general summary on the oil section. If they thought it was representative, given all the information they had (far more than we do), then I think it's safe to trust their judgement.
Even moreso if we wish to compare RAF efforts and commitment to these attacks versus USAAF. Luena was so important that 8th AF was not attacking Leuna with ordinary and customary planning doctrine (i.e Good weather for visual bombing).
That's true for most targets. USAAF doctrine before they got in to the war was visual aiming, and precision bombing. Reality was lots of radar bombing, sometimes of the primary target, sometimes of the secondary. I was just skimming through bomb reports from the 303rd bomb group, one that struck me was them bombing a Ford factory through 10/10 cloud. They reported that no observations of effect could be made.
How accurate do you think they were when they couldn't even see the target?
As Syscom said, a very large percentage of USAAF bombing was carried out using electronic aiming. From memeory, something over half of all bombs were dropped this way. (less than half of raids, because they didn't get bombing radar until later, but most bombs were dropped after D Day)
The survey was very explicit about RAF efforts not materially impacting German war production until late The Ball-Bearing AttackThe Ball-Bearing Attack when they devoted more missions and tonnage to German industry.
Well, the survey did have its biases as well, for example they say very little (if anything) about US area bombing of German cities, in line with USAAF policy to deny they had carried out area bombing.
But if you read the USSBS report, you will see that USAAF attacks didn't bear fruit until the autumn of 1944, either.
The USSBS summary breaks down the attack by industry. Here are the conclusions for each industry:
The Ball-Bearing Attack
From examination of the records and personalities in the ball-bearing industry, the user industries and the testimony of war production officials, there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production.
The Attack on German Aircraft Plants
The culminating attacks on the German aircraft industry began in the last week of February 1944. With the protection of long-range fighter escort, 3,636 tons of bombs were dropped on German aircraft plants (again, airframe rather than engine plants) during that week. In that and succeeding weeks every known aircraft plant in Germany was hit.
<snip>
Production was not knocked out for long. On the contrary, during the whole year of 1944 the German air force is reported to have accepted a total of 39,807 aircraft of all types -- compared with 8,295 in 1939, or 15,596 in 1942 before the plants suffered any attack. Although it is difficult to determine exact production for any single month, acceptances were higher in March, the month after the heaviest attack, than they were in January, the month before. They continued to rise.
<snip>
Nevertheless the attack on the aircraft plants, like the attack on the ball-bearing plants, showed that to knock out a single industry with the weapons available in 1943 and early 1944 was a formidable enterprise demanding continuous attacks to effect complete results. Recovery was improvised almost as quickly as the plants were knocked out.
The Attack on Oil
Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.
They go on in similar fashion. None of the targets attacked by the USAAF prior to summer 1944 had a large effect, either. In late spring 1944 the USAAF started their oil campaign whilst the RAF was bombing in support of the invasion. Both were rather successful. From late summer both air forces turned to attacking Germany, and again both were rather successful.
The truth of the bombing campaign, for both the RAF and USAAF, is that prior to summer 1944 it was far too small to be effective. For both forces, autumn 1944 was the half way point. They dropped half their bombs in the years prior to the autumn, half in the months afterwards. (I believe halfway for the RAF was in September, October for the USAAF)
The USAAF (ETO) finished the war with more tonnage dropped on Germany
The USAAF in the ETO dropped 539,998 long tons on Germany. That's all aircraft types, including tactical.
Bomber Command dropped 657,664 long tons on Germany. That excludes tactical air forces.
In fact, even if you throw in the USAAF Med forces, and include attacks on Austria, the total is still some way short of Bomber Command's.
I was suprised that with nearly 80,000 causalties each that the RAF and USAAF-ETO was separated by only 16.. 79,265 (USAAF) to 79,281 (RF)
I believe the US figures were taken at the time, and include "missing" airmen who were captured, whereas the RAF figures were compiled after the war, and do not include PoWs, but just those killed and "permanently" missing.
Still, the figures are remarkably close, even if they do refer to different definitions of casualties.