Better German Aircraft in 1943 Inflict Crucial Losses of Allied Air Power in Britain? (1 Viewer)

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The whole premise of a "decoy of bombers so the horde of escorts can attack the interceptors" is… odd. The interceptors are at home. They can engage, or not. If they don't engage you have to chase them for your "trap" to work- which you don't have the fuel to do. Maybe you can catch some maybe you don't. If they do engage you maybe you shoot some down. They shoot some of you down. If they are damaged they limp back to base. If any of yours are damaged they likely don't make it back to base. If you try this more than once (slow learner maybe?) they let you chase some of them then when you're at critical fuel the rest of them pounce you from altitude. They don't even need to hit you, just stay at military power for extra minutes and you risk losing the whole fighter force.

Either way you have spent a lot of valuable fuel to go fly over Scotland to maybe shoot at some fighters but not drop any bombs. You've lost planes and pilots to non-combat losses inherent to flying 40's era planes across the ocean. You've accomplished nothing. So then you what? Do it again?

Some spoof raids to throw off the defense can be fine to throw in the mix of a strategic bombing campaign I suppose. But it is not a battle winning strategy.

I think your "friend" needs to take an accounting class. If the cost of the mission is higher than the losses it causes the enemy then there isn't a reason to launch it. In the scenario you're proposing there are far too many costs to ever justify attempting to gain the modest rewards that might be possible.
 
It's funny you should state that info, which is good and details a very smart means of producing damage to the UK simply because they were so difficult to defend against.

The thing about the 1942/1943 raids is that they didn't really do that much damage. At least not to the RAF or to the UK's war efforts. The Germans recognised this, as the raids were literally called 'nuisance' and 'harassing' attacks.

In 1942, about 70% of Jabo attacks were against a target that was considered of some identifiable military value by the British. In early 1943, attacks against military targets slowed and those against civilian targets increased substantially.

Bear in mind too, that military value is a very broad definition. It included everything from natural gas storage tanks (a very popular Jabo target), industrial works, electricity substations and railway junctions/stations, to stuff only tangentially related like fishing boats, hospitals, hotels and even bus depots.
 
The Germans recognised this, as the raids were literally called 'nuisance' and 'harassing' attacks.

The problem was the value that the Germans placed on them and the targets they sought to attack. Had the Germans been more mindful in targetting airfields and factories, as they did during the BoB, the damage inflicted could have been greater. Particularly on bomber airfields in Suffolk and Lincolnshire. The British were fortunate the Germans did not have so much foresight to really appreciate what could have been achieved.
 
The problem was the value that the Germans placed on them and the targets they sought to attack. Had the Germans been more mindful in targetting airfields and factories, as they did during the BoB, the damage inflicted could have been greater. Particularly on bomber airfields in Suffolk and Lincolnshire. The British were fortunate the Germans did not have so much foresight to really appreciate what could have been achieved.

A bit out of the time frame, but one tactic that could have had a significant impact on the Allied bombing campaign was for the Luftwaffe to have launched a sustained Intruder operation against Bomber Command.

The situation was not yet critical in early December 1943, however, and the Luftwaffe remained convinced that Bomber Command could be beaten. The single, most glaring weakness in Germany's air-defence organization, I Jagdkorps noted, was the utter lack of offensive action over the United Kingdom, because bombers, taking off, fully loaded, or trying to land with nearly empty tanks or battle damage, were in no position to take evasive action and were not protected by Window. Generalleutnant Schmid therefore proposed that intruder operations on a large scale should begin against Bomber Command using Ju 88s and He 219s equipped with the latest electronic equipment, but Steinflug (as this operation was called) was turned down by Hitler because, it was said, he preferred bombers to be shot down over Germany, where they could be seen by civilians.

--- The Crucible of War 1939–1945 (Volume III) by Brereton Greenhous, Stpehen J. Harris, William C. Johnson, and William G.P. Rawling – p.748

That such operations could have had an impact is illustrated by the Luftwaffe intruder effort launched in March 1945:

[T]wo nights earlier, the Luftwaffe had finally mounted Operation Gisela, sending 142 Ju 88s over England to pick off aircraft of Nos 4 and 5 Groups as they returned from Kamden and the Dortmund-Ems canal. The night-fighters had attacked forty-three bombers, shooting down twenty-two and damaging eight more. Many crews had been taken completely by surprise and, with their landing lights on, were easy pickings.

--- The Crucible of War 1939–1945 (Volume III) by Brereton Greenhous, Stpehen J. Harris, William C. Johnson, and William G.P. Rawling – p.859
 
The problem was the value that the Germans placed on them and the targets they sought to attack. Had the Germans been more mindful in targetting airfields and factories, as they did during the BoB, the damage inflicted could have been greater. Particularly on bomber airfields in Suffolk and Lincolnshire. The British were fortunate the Germans did not have so much foresight to really appreciate what could have been achieved.

The problem for the Germans attacking airfields and military targets was that it multiplied the danger significantly, and didn't actually offer that much return.

Such facilities were much better protected with light/medium AAA than the coastal towns they generally attacked. It was generally a 'one pass, haul ass' sort of situation.
Such facilities were usually further inland, making interception/chase easier for the RAF
Doing real damage to such facilities required larger groups than the typical 2-4 aircraft that were usually used. In 1943, when they did attempt to attack such targets with larger forces, losses climbed prohibitively. Some of the bigger missions - involving 100+ aircraft - had loss rates approaching 10%.
 
2) Starting Mediterranean action in October 1942, my friend and I unanimously calculate that French Northwest Africa would fall within two weeks (making "Torch" impossible) and the British defended Middle East within months, thus the Axis receiving control over the Abadan oilfields and the pipelines leading to Mediterranean harbors.
There is so much wrong with the scenario, the Luftwaffe is going to attack ships at sea, not in ports, harder to hit moving targets and requiring better intelligence to know when the ships come within range. The defenders will know exactly when and where. Cairo to Adaban is around 1,000 miles but the Germans will get there in weeks, capture the pipeline intact and/or the refineries or at least lightly damaged. And then will have the tanker capacity to take the fuel across the Mediterranean, ship it across Europe then on more tankers Norway.

The great circle route New York to London cuts through the south of Ireland, it is slightly quicker to come via the southern Irish Sea. The defeat of the U-boats has happened, so fewer reports on allied ship movements, escort carriers means more chances of intercepting reconnaissance aircraft. Then there is what happens to the historical allied airpower that was in the Mediterranean, as of 31 October 1943, 1,090 in the strategic force units, 1,326 in the tactical air units, 976 in the Coastal Air Force, 684 in the Troop Carrier Command, 79 in the Reconnaissance Wing, 109 in Malta, throw in reserves and it is 7,341 aircraft plus 692 gliders, then add the forces elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East. Meantime the Luftwaffe is given superior numbers attacking from Norway, despite the need to make North Africa invasion proof and presumably France as well, plus the need to defend southern Iraq at least. Not only that, the Heer is also able to put large numbers of troops there but still somehow keep the eastern border safe from Stalin deciding to attack.

Also since the Eastern Front does not exist the very large amount of war material historically sent there is available to the western allies, in fighter terms mostly P-39, P-40 and Hurricanes, the allied training system as well as the allied strength in the Middle East and Asia would have benefited from around another 1,300 US fighters shipped to end 1942 and 2,500 Hurricanes shipped to end June 1943. The merchant ships on the Arctic run and their above average number of escorts are available for elsewhere. As of 10 October 1942 out of 10,382,000 deadweight tons of US shipping, 441,000 tons was allocated to the Arctic route to the USSR and 551,000 to the Persian Gulf (mostly for USSR but some for Britain). The army equipment now not being sent to the USSR and the associated shipping could nor example enable an earlier and/or bigger operation Torch.

Offensive air warfare is expensive, it means an upgrade to the training system, including more fuel, a year or so before the offensive begins. A long range offensive is even more expensive, for example, taking 1 September 1944 as the date when the continental airfields were open to the 8th Air Force. In the period to 31 August 1944 some 2.7% of B-17s listed as lost to fighters made it back to allied territory, versus 6.4% of those listed as lost to flak. For the period 1 September 1944 to the end of the war the figures become 5.8% and 16.6%. There would also be B-17s that would have been lost without friendly continental airfields, but landed and were ultimately repaired.

1,200 litres of fuel, 264 imperial gallons is around 1,870 pounds of 100 octane and heavier for lower octane values (80 octane around 1,970 pounds) then add the weights of the external tanks, quite an external load for the Fw190A. The Fw190A internal capacity was 525 litres. Maximum range clean given as around 520 miles. Reserves plus combat allowance will cost in round terms 200 miles of range, so 320 miles is the maximum effective escort range. Dundee to Stavanger is 366 miles. Belfast to Stavanger 534 miles. Belfast to Amsterdam 485 miles, Belfast to Calais 413 miles. In this scenario the RAF is the one operating on internal lines, it can move aircraft as required more easily than the Luftwaffe, the allies have good reconnaissance and Ultra to keep track of the Luftwaffe.

Where in Norway are the bases going to be, not a lot of flat land there, including bases for the defensive fighters against allied counter strikes and how often are the bases going to have weather good enough for flights? What navigation aids are there for all those single seater aircraft flying mostly over water. Belfast is down to around 7 and a quarter hours sunrise to sunset in mid Winter. That limits the winter strike window.

According to the maps in RAF Squadrons by C.G. Jefford at one time or another the RAF had 34 operational bases in Scotland north of Dundee, all effectively on the east coast and another 100 south of these and north of the line Blackpool to Hull, operational bases = airfields and seaplane stations used by squadrons. Add the ones in Northern Ireland, around Liverpool and in Wales.

AIR 22/44 has Fighter Command plus the Army Co-Operation units on 31 May 1943 as 104 squadrons and 1 flight, wiht 97 squadrons and 1 flight operational, 1,735 authorised strength, 1,902 operational pilots, 1,432 serviceable aircraft, 1,306 aircraft with crews, note this includes the 7 Auster squadrons. There were 17 Hurricane, 166 Mustang, 673 Spitfire, 177 Typhoon, 18 Whirlwind operational in operational squadrons (And 50 Auster).

1 September 1943, 57 Hurricane, 179 Mustang, 826 Spitfire, 193 Typhoon, 14 Whirlwind operational in operational squadrons .

USAAF strength as of 28 May 1943, 33 Spitfire V, 230 P-47, as of 3 September, 33 Spitfire V, 376 P-47.

The original USAAF deployment plan had the US fighters doing defensive operations, but it was quickly decided the lack of raids and the complications of different command structures etc. meant using Fighter Command alone for the defensive force was best.

There were around 60 He177 in Luftwaffe operational units as of 17 May 1943, the USSBS says 278 built to end April and 442 to end September 1943. The He177 was not ready for major deployment in 1943.

British 1943 fighter production 4,276 Spitfire (including 201 PR types) 1,136 Typhoon, given the standard Luftwaffe bombers the 2,252 Hurricane IIC would be useful, however a number of Typhoon airframes were reduced to spares in 1943 due to a lack of Sabre engines.

Air 20/327 is Army Co-Operation Command Order of Battle 1939 to 1943. Also AIR 20/1962 for October 1941 to May 1943.

As of the end of 1941 most Army Co-Operation squadrons had some Lysanders, establishment for the 16 squadrons was 202, with 130 serviceable aircraft, of which 64 were Lysander. As of June 1942 Lysander were still present in most squadrons, with the 3 month plan to eliminate them and most of the Tomahawks in favour of Mustangs which was largely accomplished, so by 2 October 1942, 54 Tomahawk, 236 Mustang, 19 Lysander
 
Hi all,

thank you for so many answers! But sorry to say, for me they are too many (including some really interesting ones), that I need some time for answering. I ask you for patience. Hopefully I can draft and then post some statements over the weekend.

Best regards,
RT
 
The Germans had several different recon cameras, as did the British.
However one of the standard German cameras was a huge sucker.

It used a 12 in x 12 in negative (or the metric equivalent.) and went around 160lbs or more when installed in an airplane.
The standard British camera used a negative about 1/4 the size. Using an appropriate lens the British camera could make an image where the details were the same size as the German camera (same detail) but each negative only covered area about 1/4 the size.

Many photo recon planes used multiple cameras. two cameras were often mounted so they over lapped images. The cameras didn't take the "paired" photos at exactly the same time but staggered them so the photo interpreters could look at two or more images of the same "detail" from slightly different perspectives, without the photo plane having to fly repeated parallel courses. (which was sometimes done).

Bf 109s did use the big camera but it was far from ideal.
View attachment 657774
that is the just the film magazine.
View attachment 657775
That is a compete camera but without the mount.
I don't know if the backseater could change film magazines in flight or not.
Some of the Do 17/Do 215 and other bombers used for recon used two or three of the big cameras in the bomb bay.

You could modify a Fw 187 to be a photo recon plane but like many of the other proposed modified FW 187, something needs to be taken out or performance suffers.
Like the vaunted maneuverability of the Fw 187. Yeah, with Jumo 210s it could out maneuver a 109. Now, without changing the wing, lets add hundreds of kg of engines, more coolant. bigger propellers and so on and then see what the wing loading would be? All the Fw 187 fans want the extra speed, they don't want to admit that some other qualities might be reduced.
All your questions have veen answered in the past and besides you can always read hermans book.
All fw187 proposed versions, especially the single seaters, had excellent wing and power loadinds. And the wing, although a 30 s design, had demonstrated good handlind.
The ailerons ,as the book reports, could have been improved by the development work on fw190s ailerons
 
All your questions have veen answered in the past and besides you can always read hermans book.
All fw187 proposed versions, especially the single seaters, had excellent wing and power loadinds. And the wing, although a 30 s design, had demonstrated good handlind.
The ailerons ,as the book reports, could have been improved by the development work on fw190s ailerons
I have the book.
It does not answer a lot of questions.

Many planes gained weight as they went through development. Doesn't mean they started handling bad, just means that the later versions didn't handle quite as good as the early ones.
Look at the book, find the weight for the single seat version. Then find the weight for the two seat version.
More guns and ammo, more fuel, bigger radio. Go ahead and take out 100-150 kg if you want. The V4 was still heavier than the V1 or V2 and still had the Jumo 210 engines.
 
Hi all!

buffnut453 buffnut453 :

"Finally, exactly what critical targets will be hit in Scotland?"
The goal is to reach the North Channel and cause carnage to crucial-for-British-warfare shipping there.

"Aside from anything else, the only way the Luftwaffe could generate any sizeable force would be by removing units from the Eastern Front....and that's simply impractical."
You did not read the prerequisitions. There is peace or armistice in the East after Hitler was toppled.
Only an German emergency force is left in the East.


Thumpalumpacus Thumpalumpacus :

"I think "his friend" has already read every reply in this thread."
I believe he does't even know about this place. I tell him "there is an international forum..."

"1) Transporting those troops and then supplying them through a Mediterranean Sea heavily contested by the Royal Navy"
Allied naval and aerial force was not able to stop Axis troops taking Tunisia. They also never stopped Rommel from operating. He was able to do a 2.600 km retreat from El Alamein to Tunisia without an Allied force sincerely hampering him and his troops.

2) Producing the fuel used to mount the drive to Abadan, which is about 1500 miles by road from Cairo"
Germany can use a greater portion of the Rumanian production for this, if there is no fuel consumption in the East. Even Stalin could be asked to give some (I wrote this already).

"3) Getting the oil or refined products back will require tankers to either cross the same Med
They controlled both ends of the Med, and Suez was going to be a tough a nut to crack, as their troops in NA would be falling back on their supply lines and they could call upon units in Palestine and the Levant for reinforcement."
I said the British were lucky because their positions in Egypt and Iraq were never sincerely contested. Had this been, anybody would have seen how difficult it is using the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf as supply lines.

"Then, too, you must convince Hitler to not invade Russia. Given that this was a basic premise of his Lebensraum aim, that seems like a pretty big hurdle."
No, Sir. You also did not read the prerequisitions. Hitler is toppled in September 1942 and there is peace or armistice in the East.


J Jabberwocky :

"If there's no major danger in the Southeast, it's pretty easy to pivot North."
Yes, this is what I think too. But how to convince my friend about this? One effort two sections below.


BiffF15 BiffF15 :

"It will save you A LOT of time arguing a false argument."
I am discussing with my friend since 13 years already. Go figure!


E EwenS , TKdog, Geoffrey Sinclair:

I translated your writings to German and shall forward them to my friend. He still will not believe RAF and USAAF to keep 20.000 fighters in Scotland. But you show there are a lot of opportunities to establish a sufficient fighter force there, if necessary.
*Special thanks for best answers, top is Geoffrey Sinclair's!*


nuuumannn nuuumannn : Well, my friend and I used the same book, the German version of course. For I do not believe Griehl and Dressel produced books of different content in German and English language, I must do a meticulous comparison to show why we come to a very different assessment as you do. This may need to start a new topic about this.


@All:
Another prerequisition: By a lucky incidence, Germany withdraws her U-Boat force in May 1943, so the terrible losses of that time would not happen. In autumn, a renewed German submarine force, using improved types, would join the Luftwaffe in attacks on Allied Atlantic shipping.

Many thanks once more, and best regards,
RT
 
Hi all!

buffnut453 buffnut453 :

"Finally, exactly what critical targets will be hit in Scotland?"
The goal is to reach the North Channel and cause carnage to crucial-for-British-warfare shipping there.

"Aside from anything else, the only way the Luftwaffe could generate any sizeable force would be by removing units from the Eastern Front....and that's simply impractical."
You did not read the prerequisitions. There is peace or armistice in the East after Hitler was toppled.
Only an German emergency force is left in the East.


Thumpalumpacus Thumpalumpacus :

"I think "his friend" has already read every reply in this thread."
I believe he does't even know about this place. I tell him "there is an international forum..."

"1) Transporting those troops and then supplying them through a Mediterranean Sea heavily contested by the Royal Navy"
Allied naval and aerial force was not able to stop Axis troops taking Tunisia. They also never stopped Rommel from operating. He was able to do a 2.600 km retreat from El Alamein to Tunisia without an Allied force sincerely hampering him and his troops.

2) Producing the fuel used to mount the drive to Abadan, which is about 1500 miles by road from Cairo"
Germany can use a greater portion of the Rumanian production for this, if there is no fuel consumption in the East. Even Stalin could be asked to give some (I wrote this already).

"3) Getting the oil or refined products back will require tankers to either cross the same Med
They controlled both ends of the Med, and Suez was going to be a tough a nut to crack, as their troops in NA would be falling back on their supply lines and they could call upon units in Palestine and the Levant for reinforcement."
I said the British were lucky because their positions in Egypt and Iraq were never sincerely contested. Had this been, anybody would have seen how difficult it is using the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf as supply lines.

"Then, too, you must convince Hitler to not invade Russia. Given that this was a basic premise of his Lebensraum aim, that seems like a pretty big hurdle."
No, Sir. You also did not read the prerequisitions. Hitler is toppled in September 1942 and there is peace or armistice in the East.


J Jabberwocky :

"If there's no major danger in the Southeast, it's pretty easy to pivot North."
Yes, this is what I think too. But how to convince my friend about this? One effort two sections below.


BiffF15 BiffF15 :

"It will save you A LOT of time arguing a false argument."
I am discussing with my friend since 13 years already. Go figure!


E EwenS , TKdog, Geoffrey Sinclair:

I translated your writings to German and shall forward them to my friend. He still will not believe RAF and USAAF to keep 20.000 fighters in Scotland. But you show there are a lot of opportunities to establish a sufficient fighter force there, if necessary.
*Special thanks for best answers, top is Geoffrey Sinclair's!*


nuuumannn nuuumannn : Well, my friend and I used the same book, the German version of course. For I do not believe Griehl and Dressel produced books of different content in German and English language, I must do a meticulous comparison to show why we come to a very different assessment as you do. This may need to start a new topic about this.


@All:
Another prerequisition: By a lucky incidence, Germany withdraws her U-Boat force in May 1943, so the terrible losses of that time would not happen. In autumn, a renewed German submarine force, using improved types, would join the Luftwaffe in attacks on Allied Atlantic shipping.

Many thanks once more, and best regards,
RT

The losses -- largely borne by the Italian merchant fleet -- were quite high (The Axis powers' heavy losses at sea during World War II, Sinking Feelings: the Cause of Allied Victory in the Mediterranean during the Second World War | FifteenEightyFour | Cambridge University Press), on the order of 15 to 20 percent. Indeed, the Axis had to start shipping vehicles and even fuel by air (Me323s) because shipping losses were so great.
 
Another prerequisition: By a lucky incidence, Germany withdraws her U-Boat force in May 1943, so the terrible losses of that time would not happen. In autumn, a renewed German submarine force, using improved types, would join the Luftwaffe in attacks on Allied Atlantic shipping.

Stacking the deck in favor the Germans even more?
lucky incidence coincides with the longest days (most daylight) or another way of looking it at, most difficult time for submarines to operate.
Germans got exactly 2 improved U boats into service in 1945, not 1943.
A big part of the U-boat sinkings in 1943 were the result of better weapons and tactics. What is going to make the American-British weapons disappear?

And here is something to look at in shipping or operations in the Med and the Red sea. In 1942-43 the Germans and Italians could not replace losses of merchant ships.
The German-Italian heyday in the Med were in 1941-42.

If Hitler is toppled in Sept 1942 there is little time to transfer men and equipment to save North Africa for the Axis. El Alamein starts in Oct 1942 and that was after weeks of build up.

Troops/equipment on the Russian front on Sept/Oct 1942 will not be be available in North Africa in Nov of 1942 to stop Torch. Yes the Germans reinforced NA at the time but without enough ships the amount of troops and equipment is limited by the number of ships.

Where is the Axis transport (ships) to support a drive from Cairo?

How many days travel from Italy to Tunisia vs how many days travel from even Greece to Cairo.
How may more ships are needed to move the same cargo?
 
Thumpalumpacus Thumpalumpacus :

"I think "his friend" has already read every reply in this thread."
I believe he does't even know about this place. I tell him "there is an international forum..."

Okay.

"1) Transporting those troops and then supplying them through a Mediterranean Sea heavily contested by the Royal Navy"
Allied naval and aerial force was not able to stop Axis troops taking Tunisia. They also never stopped Rommel from operating. He was able to do a 2.600 km retreat from El Alamein to Tunisia without an Allied force sincerely hampering him and his troops.

Just so we're straight, you're envisioning 6-9 divisions, right? 2 Armies?

And yet the Germans couldn't support a much smaller force as close as Tunisia than one of the size required to drive all the way to Abadan, which in the end meant they were booted from the shores of North Africa. One of the reasons why the Allies couldn't stop the Germans reaching Tunis was that their logistics relied upon on small-gauge railway, meaning their movement was hampered. DAK ran into precisely this problem in advancing on Cairo. How are you going to supply this much larger army over one railroad? In June 1942 they got roughly 4500 tons of supplies including fuel and ammo to the front on the Benghazi-Barce rail line. 150 tons per day is not going to see very many divisions in the field staying at strength, meaning you're going to need to use trucks, which will drink more fuel the further they must get from the port or railhead. The figures I've seen for Heersdivisionen varies between 200 and 350 tons/per day (infantry vs panzer). You can see the problem you're up against trying to move an entire Army Group into Mesopotamia.

As for Rommel, he was 1) falling back on his supply lines and 2) was being pursued by Montgomery, who wasn't known for his command of pursuit battles. So that's kinda apples and oranges.

2) Producing the fuel used to mount the drive to Abadan, which is about 1500 miles by road from Cairo"
Germany can use a greater portion of the Rumanian production for this, if there is no fuel consumption in the East. Even Stalin could be asked to give some (I wrote this already).

It's getting that oil to North Africa that's going to be an issue. One panzer division uses how many litres of fuel per day? 60,000 minimum, right? You're going to have to get 15,000 gallons per day for each PzDiv. By the time of your friend's alternate history, the Royal Navy has already hunted down the majority of the tankers the Germans were using to support the Battle of the Atlantic. Even if the Germans decided to replace them, they're still going to have the problem of getting them to Abadan, because they'll have to get out of the North Sea safely, and then transit close to either Aden or Cape Town.

"3) Getting the oil or refined products back will require tankers to either cross the same Med
They controlled both ends of the Med, and Suez was going to be a tough a nut to crack, as their troops in NA would be falling back on their supply lines and they could call upon units in Palestine and the Levant for reinforcement."
I said the British were lucky because their positions in Egypt and Iraq were never sincerely contested. Had this been, anybody would have seen how difficult it is using the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf as supply lines.

The British had to fight pretty vigorously to retain their foothold in Iraq. They were very unpopular and eventually they had to overthrow Rashid Ali as he was courting the NaZis.

"Then, too, you must convince Hitler to not invade Russia. Given that this was a basic premise of his Lebensraum aim, that seems like a pretty big hurdle."
No, Sir. You also did not read the prerequisitions. Hitler is toppled in September 1942 and there is peace or armistice in the East.

I stand corrected, thanks.

I think your friend's alternate history is highly unrealistic.
 
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Another prerequisition: By a lucky incidence, Germany withdraws her U-Boat force in May 1943, so the terrible losses of that time would not happen. In autumn, a renewed German submarine force, using improved types, would join the Luftwaffe in attacks on Allied Atlantic shipping.
So the scenario is when the Germans look like they are about to win on the Eastern Front in September 1942, just before the grind at Stalingrad happens, while the German advance is mainly being held up by supply issues, the Germans change government, withdraw to the pre invasion borders, and begin deployment of the army within weeks to North Africa and beyond, assured by the treaty signed by Stalin he would not take advantage of the major improvement in the Red Army's position and major decrease in the German Army's, at least not during 1943, instead he will supply the German war machine with important items, like oil. So when 8th Army attacks on 23 October 1942 it is defeated with the help of the German troops arriving from the USSR. The largest number of personnel sent to North Africa in a single month was 20,968 in March 1941, so the treaty with the USSR is required before the German summer offensive to have any chance of essentially doubling the size of the Africa Korps by October. But at the same time the Germans are moving tens of thousands of troops with their equipment into French North Africa to be in place before 8 November 1942, when Operation Torch historically began. Now add the major increase in Luftwaffe strength, at least fighters, and associated supplies to counter the RAF and arriving USAAF. Rommel noted how badly his offensive ability was degraded by allied airpower.

Then in March/April 1943 just as it does look like the wolf pack tactic can in fact cause unacceptable losses to well escorted convoys the U-boats are withdrawn from the fight to await better submarines. The around 100 losses May to August will not happen, but the 50 or so losses January to April will, the 100 crews not lost will have new electro boats to use. The Germans will ignore the hydrogen peroxide ideas and simply go with major increases in conventional batteries sometime in 1941 so the electro boats can be in service in 1943. Of course that means fewer conventional U-boats during 1942 as the new, larger designs take their place on the building slips and the problems with supplying a major increase in the number of batteries required. The type VIIC at 761 tons, the type XXI at 1,621 tons, not sure of the increase in batteries but the type VII underwater range was 80 miles at 4 knots, the type XXI 285 miles at 6 knots, so start with around 4 times the batteries.

According to General Halder, the Army in the East, to 31 August 1942 had suffered 326,791 killed, 72,363 missing and 1,189,918 wounded. Hence why the Luftwaffe, apart from the effects of its own losses, had largely given up interdiction and counter air for battlefield support of the depleted army. In 1941 the Germans attacked all along the front. In 1942 on the admittedly longer front the Germans required 4 axis allied armies and kept half the front quiet. Few German formations in the east in September 1942 were at full strength and equipment.

Soviet casualties and combat losses in the twentieth century / general editor G.F. Krivosheev ; authors, G.F. Krivosheev ... [et al.] ; foreword by John Erickson ; [translated by Christine Barnard]. PoWs taken by the USSR, in 1941 10,602, January to June 1942 6,683, July to December 1942 172,143. There were few Germans, mostly aircrew, held as prisoners in September 1942.

Mussolini in his man of destiny moment declared war with about a third of the Italian merchant marine outside the Mediterranean, the bigger on average ships, the ones that would have become those available for military operations, given much of the remaining fleet was needed to keep the economy working.

Note the nominally neutral French ships were doing useful work, the two volume set The Economic Blockade by W N Medlicott notes In 1941 imports from Africa were 3,811,732 metric tons, in January to August 1942 3,194,766 tons. About 40 to 50% of these were food and a third fertilisers so you cannot just take the French ships without consequences.

The RN thinks by end September 1942 the Italian alone losses in the Mediterranean came to 1,096,314 GRT, the Germans another 218,959 GRT.

Following data from The Italian Navy in WWII by M A Bragadin English version. Italian merchant marine summary for WWII to 8 September 1943. Ships of 500 or more Gross Registered Tons. 10 June 1940 Total fleet 786 ships 3,318,129 tons, cut off from the Mediterranean or in enemy ports 212 ships 1,216,637 tons leaving 574 ships 2,101,492 tons in the Mediterranean however a further 26 ships 352,051 tons were decommissioned to be turned into hospital ships or were transatlantic liners too vulnerable to serve. Leaving 548 Italian ships 1,749,441 tons, plus 56 German ships, 203,512 tons. Total axis shipping 604 ships 1,952,953 tons as of 10 June 1940, ships of 500 or more GRT.

The following ships were added by 8 September 1943. Italian ships built or recovered 84 ships 416,742 tons, Foreign ships captured/purchased 126 ships 428,954 tons (mostly French after operation Torch), German flagged ships added 124 ships 378,784 tons, (Italian merchant ships built is put at 60 ships 305,733 tons). So the total merchant ships used (10 June 1940 plus additions) comes to 938 ships 3,177,433 tons. Losses 565 ships 2,018,616 tons.

Italian flagged ships lost ships/tonnage 10 June 1940 to 8 September 1943

year 500 or more GRT // less than 500 GRT
1940 45/161,423 // 29/4,775
1941 156/617,986 // 122/20,511
1942 138/480,652 // 122/18,075
1943 226/758,555 // 486/44,544
totals 565/2,018,616 // 759/87,905

Total axis losses including German ships

1940 74/166,198
1941 278/638,497
1942 260/498,727
1943 712/803,099
total 1,324/2,106,521

Even if the ships are available there needs to be ports in Africa able to unload them, Van Crevald in Supplying War gives an (under)estimate of Libyan port capacity as 55,000 tons per month Tripoli, 20,000 Benghazi, 10,000 Tobruk, but capacity was flexible depending on things like the size of the work force, crane capacity, daylight hours, whether night work was safe and the type of cargo, the wartime peak saw 150,389 tons of cargo arrive in April 1942, 102,358 dry, 48,031 tons fuel. The great need and lack was coasters to move items forward instead of using trucks, but moving cargo from one ship to another counts against port capacity. Next problem, Van Crevald indicates Rommel, with his two understrength Panzer divisions needed 6,000 tons of truck lift to make an effort to hold Libya. Add 50% to support two full strength panzer divisions, double it for the second corps and double it again to make it to Suez. Total truck lift around 36,000 tons, each Army group going into the Soviet Union had a transport unit with 20,000 tons lift each, total 60,000 tons.

Add the voyage from Europe was so short it was not worth doing extensive packing of items like vehicles and you cannot do things like stack trucks or even tanks on top of each other. So the actual tonnage lifted per voyage was something like half the rated tonnage of the ships involved, though part of that is also a precaution against loss.

As Libya was an Italian colony, with people doing things like growing food, about 13% of the cargo that arrived in North Africa was for the civilians. The pre war immigration program meant that there were some 90,000 Italian and 6,000 other European civilians in Libya in 1940, out of a population of 890,000. So the 1941 axis army in North Libya increased the population by around 13%.

Ever considered in the period July 1940 to say end 1942 why there was only a few weeks of full combat in the western desert? Why the Luftwaffe in particular in North Africa was small? The answer is plenty of troops, not so plentiful supplies. To change that on the axis side requires the German military to overcome its most serious systematic fault, supply issues.
 
Hi all!

The following is only about nuuumannn's posting #115 here, so please be patient for my answers to other contributors to come.

I have to say, no personal offence against nuuumannn intended, his writing is a prime example of "selective selection", thus only supporting his personal perception. If a problem is lengthy AND complicated, there can be short answers which only contain the essential parts of the solution, and as well long answers to deal with the matter as a whole and try to illuminate every interesting detail. I shall give you the short answers below and ask you what you like me to give about the long answers.

Serviceability of the Heinkel He 177, quotings from Griehl/Dressel, German version:

By end of 1942, He 177 using DB 606 engines was service-ready (p. 24-26, 53). The engine's operating time reached 130 hours (p. 59).

By end of 1943, He 177 using DB 610 engines was service-ready (p. 148/149). Troubles with this engine mainly had resulted from troubles with the single DB 605 engine.


My offers to you for detailed approach to the He 177/DB-double-engine problem situation:

1) Regrouping nuuumannn's posting #115 to show which timeline is in this. This to demonstrate that a) a big number of his statements deal with the situation before 1943, rsp. deal with organizational diffculties rather with these resulting from the aircraft, rsp. deal with such only short before the He 177 is taken out of production resulting from a fundamental change in German airwar strategy.

2) An evaluation of Griehl/Dressel by page (only German version available) which shows the general development of the He 177 situation.

3) An essay about what were the troubles of the He 177 and how to solve them, if the Germans had tried to systematically work on them.


#2) is written by myself with remarks by my friend, #3) is written by my friend. Before I publish these I have to ask him for permission. In the moment, he is not at home, but I expect him to be back next week.

Best regards,
RT
 
Serviceability of the Heinkel He 177, quotings from Griehl/Dressel, German version:

By end of 1942, He 177 using DB 606 engines was service-ready (p. 24-26, 53). The engine's operating time reached 130 hours (p. 59).

So "service ready" that average aircraft availability for KG50 for all of 1942 was under 50%. During the Stalingrad airlift, seven of 10 KG50 aircraft lost were to engine fires.

By end of 1943, He 177 using DB 610 engines was service-ready (p. 148/149). Troubles with this engine mainly had resulted from troubles with the single DB 605 engine.

He 177 serviceability at the start of Operation Steinbock in January 1944 was actually good - a touch over 90%. Yet by mid February, He 177 aircraft availability had dropped to under 50% of paper strength, and it continued to drop in March. Serviceability through Operation Steinbock was the worst of any type except the FW 200.
 
3) An essay about what were the troubles of the He 177 and how to solve them, if the Germans had tried to systematically work on them.


Best regards,
RT

The Germans were pretty busy cranking out defensive fighters and didn't have the time or resources to solve the problem in time.

Maybe they shouldn't have laid on a dive-bomber role with all the airframe issues that raises? Maybe that could allow splitting the engines so that it didn't catch on fire randomly.

I don't think they had the resources to build and produce a reliable heavy bomber under wartime pressures in useful numbers, while also fighting the Soviets in the East, and the Brits in North Africa, and the Brits and Americans directly over the Reich.

I guess the real lesson is don't take on three huge industrial powers at the same time. Doubt your friend has an answer for that. "Pick your battles wisely" was a lesson the little corporal never really grasped.
 

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